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Abstract 
This thesis questions the prospects for the World Trade Organisation, 
Agreement on Government Procurement. This is the most important 
international agreement seeking to promote cross-border trade in hitherto closed 
national procurement markets. For the above threshold goods, services and 
construction services contracts which it covers, the Agreement's principal 
objective is to require the non-discriminatory treatment of foreign suppliers. 
It is because of this general insistence on non-discriminatory treatment that the 
Agreement's membership is limited to 27 of the 134 World Trade Organisation 
Members. The first theme of this thesis is therefore devoted to explaining this 
problem of limited membership, and to proposing possible solutions. 
While the Agreement's limited membership means that it is not yet capable of 
liberalising international procurement markets among the general WTO 
membership, the thesis also considers the Agreement's prospects among the 
major trading partners which have acceded to date. Our second theme therefore 
explores two of the problematic areas presenting very different difficulties and 
challenges, which will impact on the Agreement's success among its present and 
prospective Members. These distinct areas are, firstly, the use of information 
technology in public contract awards, and, secondly, the need for an effective 
system of remedies and enforcement. 
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Introduction 
The Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA)! is the main international 
instrument seeking to regulate government purchasing. The Agreement was 
concluded under the auspices of the last round of negotiations under the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and formed an integral part of the Final 
Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations ('the Final Act'). The main achievement of these negotiations was 
to establish a much-strengthened organisational framework, with a binding 
system of dispute settlement, in the form of The World Trade Organisation 
(WTO)? Also crucial to the Final Act was the opening for acceptance of an 
ambitious new package of multilateral and plurilateral side agreements.3 These 
were designed to eliminate various types of tariff and non-tariff barriers (NTBs), 
and (for the most part) collectively fOlm part of the Single Undertaking, 
comprising the multilateral agreements which are binding on all 134 current 
WTO Members. By the entry into force of the WTO Agreement on the 1 January 
1995, the GATT had therefore been transformed from a single trade agreement 
into a legally cognisable international organisation. 
1 Agreement on Government Procurement, Annex 4(b) of the WTO Agreement, reprinted in "Uruguay 
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Legal Instruments Embodying the Results of the Uruguay 
Round", Vol. 31, GATT Secretariat, Geneva, 1994, and in (1994) OJ L3361273. The GPA, along with 
a loose leaf system of appendices, can also be viewed at http://www.wto.org. 
2 The WTO was established in 1994 by the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation, published in 
(1994) OJ L336/3. 
3Annex lA of the WTO Agreement contains the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and 12 
multilateral side Agreements on Trade in Goods. These include the Agreement on Technical Barriers 
to Trade; the Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the GATT (the Antidumping Code); 
the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties; and the Agreement on Safeguards. Annex IB 
contains the General Agreement on Trade in Services, and Annex 1 C contains the Agreement on Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. 
Upon the conclusion of the WTO Agreement, a new GP A was also signed in 
Geneva. This replaced the earlier version of the Agreement which had been in 
existence since the Tokyo Round of 1979. While the new Agreement greatly 
4 .. 
increases both entity and sector coverage, and incorporates an mnovatlve 
enforcement mechanism,5 it does not form part of the Single Undertaking. Like 
its predecessor, it is an optional agreement binding only on those WTO members 
who choose to sign it. It is one of only two remaining "plurilateral" agreements 
contained in Annex 4 of the WTO Agreement.6 The GPA however is qualitatively 
different from the other Annex 4 Agreements, which, when they were in force, 
dealt with specific products and commodities. In contrast, the procurement which 
the GP A seeks to regulate spans an enormous range of public purchasers, and 
supplies and services. 
Government procurement is a crucial economic activity in all states,7 and closed 
procurement markets amount to highly significant non-tariff barriers to trade. 
4 The new GPA increases the areas which are subject to open competition to include services, public 
works, procurement by regional and local governments and public utilities. 
5 Article XX requires members to provide for national challenge procedures for aggrieved suppliers. 
6 Up until the end of 1997, the GPA was one of four plurilateral Agreements. These were the 
Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft, the International Dairy Agreement, and the International Bovine 
Meat Agreement. However, the parties to the Meat and Diary products agreements requested the WTO 
Ministerial Conference to delete the two agreements from Annex 4, on the basis that the remit of the 
agreements had been largely subsumed by the establishment of the Committees on Agriculture and on 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. 
7 In 1994, public procurement accounted for an average of 14 per cent of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) in the states of the European Union. This data was compiled by EuroStrategy Consultants in the 
course of producing a report on the economic impact of procurement policy for the European 
Commission. The results of the project are summarised in a Communication from the Commission to 
the European Parliament and the Council, "The Impact and Effectiveness of the Single Market" 
COM(96)520 fmal (see pp.16-17 on public procurement). See also H. Gordon, S. Rimmer and S. 
Arrowsmith, "The Economic impact of the European Union Regime on Public Procurement and 
Lessons in for the WTO" in S. Arrowsmith and A. Davies eds. Public Procurement: Global Revolution, 
27 ( ~ l u w e r r Law International; 1998). 
For South Africa in 1995/6 the procurement of central, provincial and local government amounted to 
13 per cent of GDP, and 30 per cent of all government expenditure. Green Paper on Public Sector 
Procurement Reform in South Africa, GN No.691 GG17928 of 14 April 1997, p.13. The figure is even 
higher for some developing countries. For example, data from the International Monetary Fund shows 
2 
Procurement markets have tended to remain closed because governments have 
traditionally favoured their national firms in obtaining their requirements, rather 
than sourcing from the supplier able to offer the best value for money, in terms of 
highest quality or lowest price. This desire to favour national suppliers, whether 
through explicit rules, or through the natural tendency of purchasers, causes a 
sub-optimal allocation of resources, and both national and global inefficiencies. 
Given the massive amount of expenditure involved, the potential for large savings 
to the public purse to be realised from open and efficient purchasing is clear.s On 
the other hand, the potential for wasted expenditure through inefficient 
purchasing is equally large. 
Procurement cannot therefore be regarded as a marginal activity. Rather, it is the 
political sensitivity of subjecting government contracts to international 
competition, and removing the freedom which governments have in the 
placement of contracts, which explains the GPA's exclusion from the Single 
Undertaking. This political sensitivity is clearly demonstrated by the fact that 
most WTO members have taken full advantage of the optional status of the 
current and previous GP A. The Agreement now in force has only 27 members 
(as of January 2000), and most of these are developed countries. 
higher figures for many countries in the Middle East and Africa than for members of the Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (see F. Trionfetti, "The Government 
Procurement Agreement and International Trade: Theory and Empirical Evidence" (1997; paper written 
for the World Trade Organisation). 
8 The EU's Green Paper on procurement, noted that procurement spending on goods and services 
among the Member States amounted to some ECU 720 billion per annum. It was also observed that, 
"The extent of European public procurement means that buying goods and services by effective 
purchasing systems can make significant savings for governments and thus for taxpayers." See the 
European Commission's Green Paper on "Public Procurement in the European Union: Exploring the 
Way Forward" COM(96) 583 Final, p.3.). 
3 
1. The purpose of this thesis 
This thesis investigates the extent to which the GP A is likely to achieve its 
principal objective of opening up the procurement markets which fall under its 
disciplines to international competition. The thesis has two related themes in 
addressing the GPA's prospects as the main international procurement 
instrument. The first theme, dealt with in Chapters Two to Four, focuses on the 
most pressing problem which procurement regulation on the WTO level faces; 
namely the question of why the Agreement has failed to attract a more significant 
and balanced membership. The GP A will not even be capable of making a 
significant contribution to the opening up of procurement markets, among the 
WTO Members in general, unless its membership is significantly increased. The 
second theme, occupying Chapters Five and Six, questions whether the GP A will 
be a success among its existing members. The author focuses on two distinct 
subject areas raising diverse problems and challenges which are likely to emerge 
as barriers to the Agreement's success. The nature of these challenges and 
problems, and the possible responses to them, are of interest both to the present 
GP A members, and to the non-members, presently either considering the merits 
of membership, or anticipating the possible introduction of multilateral WTO 
procurement disciplines on a compulsory basis.9 
a) The First Theme: The Problem of Limited Membership 
At present, the very limited membership of the GP A is a major concern and must 
be regarded as its most significant weakness. The Agreement's Preamble begins 
9 
There are two multilateral fora under which discussions towards the introduction of multilateral 
disciplines are currently underway. These are the Working Party under General Agreement on Trade in 
4 
by, "recognising the need for an effective multilateral framework ... [ for] 
achieving greater liberalisation and expansion of world trade and improving the 
international framework for the conduct of world trade." It will be difficult for 
the GP A to make a significant contribution towards these objectives unless more 
states accede to the Agreement. Many existing members have entered into either 
regional agreements or have bilateral procurement agreements with other states.
lO 
Often, these agreements existed before the entry into force of the GP A on January 
1 st, 1996. For these GP A Members, it is arguable that the Agreement has had 
only a limited impact beyond further formalising obligations already entered into, 
and requiring states to open some of their procurement market to an extended list 
of states. 
The GP A has had virtually no impact on the development of procurement 
disciplines in states lacking a tradition of regulating procurement activities, where 
awareness of the benefits of liberalisation may be low. The low priority given to 
procurement regulation is a significant reason for non-membership among many 
developing countries, who may not regard the resource expenditure involved in 
setting up national procurement rules (and implementing the GPA) as likely to 
produce any tangible and immediate benefits. Some developing states, however, 
have prioritised procurement regulation and have launched detailed reform 
packages. Nevertheless, they shy away from GP A membership. Here, the 
reasons for non-membership have much to do with the perceived limitations 
S e r v i ~ e s s (GATS), and the Working Group on Transparency. A description of the progress of these 
bodies to date is provided in Chapter 1. 
10 For an overview of regional and bilateral procurement agreements, see S. Arrowsmith, J. Linarelli 
and D. Wallace, Jr., Regulating Public Procurement: National and International Perspectives, 
forthcoming; Kluwer International. 
5 
placed by the GP A on the ability to strategically place contracts to promote 
socio/economic objectives. It may be politically difficult for many governments 
to implement an Agreement likely to curtail the use of mechanisms which afford 
advantages to domestic firms at some stage during the contract award process. 
The interests of domestic industry in maintaining protectionist measures in their 
favour are far more concentrated and vocal, than the diffuse interests of tax-
payers in achieving price savings through efficient purchasing. More cynically, 
GP A membership may be a problem for some states because rules governing the 
conduct of award procedures are likely to make corruption (such as bestowing 
contracts for political or personal gain) more difficult. 
Some developed members have also declined to accede to the GP A. Here, the 
use of procurement for national development objectives is again likely to be at the 
forefront of the reasons for non-membership. There may also be different 
considerations however. The fact that GP A members are permitted to negotiate 
derogations from the Agreement for some of their procurement means that non-
members may be dissatisfied with the level of procurement opened up, and the 
consequent limitations on export opportunities. Ironically therefore, the very 
flexibility of the GP A, which in some respects can be seen as advantageous to 
membership, can also be regarded as an impediment to membership for some 
states. 
A significant portion of this thesis, comprising Chapters Two to Four, is therefore 
taken up by explaining the problem of limited membership from the perspective 
of both developed and developing countries. Chapter Two presents an analysis of 
6 
the various factors which continue to contribute towards the GPA's limited 
membership. Chapters Three and Four then deal with the most important and 
intractable barrier to increased membership, being the perceived limitations 
which the Agreement imposes on the use of procurement for secondary 
objectives. Chapter Three deals with the GPA's treatment of secondary 
objectives of a socio/economic nature. The secondary uses which governments 
have traditionally made of their procurement power are described, and the extent 
of their compatibility with the GPA is analysed. The GPA's insistence on non-
discriminatory procurement is identified as a major reason for limited 
membership, and as an explanation for the complicated coverage which 
necessitates that each state must effectively negotiate with every other state to 
determine the Agreement's application as between them. On balance, it is 
considered that rules which require non-discriminatory procurement should be 
relaxed with the objectives of expanding membership, and of moving towards 
uniform coverage for all states. It is acknowledged, however, that such changes 
to the GP A are unlikely and that a possible new instrument to introduce 
procurement disciplines, based on transparency alone, should now be regarded as 
the main WTO initiative for the multilateralisation of procurement disciplines. 
Chapter Four, deals separately with the use of procurement to strengthen trade 
and competition law policies. This separate treatment reflects the distinct issues 
which are raised here. It was felt to be important to include a Chapter on 
procurement power in relation to competition and trade policies for several 
reasons. Foremost, the author became aware of China's desire to use 
procurement to reinforce their antidumping strategies at an early stage in the 
7 
preparation of this thesis. I I It is also notable that the issues analysed have 
received little academic consideration. 
The possible adoption of multilateral competition law disciplines has been placed 
on the WTO negotiating agenda.12 This move has rejuvenated the academic 
debate where there has been considerable disagreement over whether multilateral 
disciplines are desirable or even workable. The debate has a particular 
significance in the procurement context, especially as it has been predicted that 
the very process of liberalising procurement markets may increase the incidence 
of trade distortions originating in the private sector. \3 The GP A confers rights and 
obligations on governments and contracting authorities to implement and follow 
non-discriminatory and transparent procurement laws and procedures. It has 
therefore been pointed out that the GPA's enforcement rules can only be invoked 
for breach of the procurement rules by procuring entities, and not because of anti-
competitive behaviour. 14 
Given the present absence of multilateral competition law disciplines, Chapter 
Four considers what can be done under the GPA to tackle trade distortions 
originating in the private sector. In particular, it is considered whether 
procurement power can be used to strengthen or reinforce competition and trade 
11 This desire was expressed by Chinese delegates at the conference, "Public Procurement Global 
Revolution", held at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth in September 1997. 
12 The Final Declaration of the December 1996 Ministerial Conference in Singapore includes an 
agreement to establish a Working Group to study issues raised by the Members relating to "the 
~ t e r ~ c t i o n n between trade and competition policy, including anti-competitive practices, in order to 
Identify any areas that may merit further consideration in the WTO framework." The Final Declaration 
~ : n n be found on the WTO homepage at http://www.wto.org/wto/archives/wtodec.htm. 
See, for example, D Konstadakopu10s, "The linked Oligopoly Concept in the Single European 
Market: Recent Evidence From Public Procurement", (1995) 5 Public Procurement Law Review 213. 
8 
laws which deal with problems such as collusion and dumping respectively. 
Clearly, any use of procurement in this respect must be done compatibly with the 
GP A itself. This may not be problematic where the problem tackled is collusive 
tendering which defeats the whole rationale for competitive tendering. However, 
even here, questions are raised by the fact that there is no provision in the 
Agreement dealing directly with collusion. 
Greater difficulties are encountered where the problem is that domestic or foreign 
firms submit low tenders which are part of a dumping strategy. Arguably, it 
would be consistent with the GP A for procuring entities to accept such low 
tenders where the firm is fully capable of performance at the low price tendered. 
Indeed such savings in public expenditure may be regarded by some states as one 
of the principal benefits which the implementation of non-discriminatory and 
transparent laws and procedures can contribute towards. However, acceptance of 
such tenders could be seen to conflict with national antidumping measures. If the 
GP A imposes limitations on the use of procurement power to reinforce trade 
policies embedded in antidumping legislation, then similar obstacles to expanded 
membership arise to those considered in of Chapter Three. In other words, the 
strengthening of trade and competition policies (along with social, economic and 
environmental policies) are among the secondary uses which can be made of 
procurement power, and the present lack of acceptance of these limitations is a 
large part of the explanation for the GPA's limited membership. 
14 
see A. Blank and G. Marceau, "The History of the Government Procurement Negotiations Since 
1945", (1996)4 Public Procurement Law Review 77. 
9 
The question addressed is therefore whether the inclination of contracting 
authorities to award the contract to the lowest tender from a capable supplier, can 
be reconciled with the desire to use procurement power to strengthen 
antidumping laws. This not only depends on the content of the GPA's rules, but 
also on the broader WTO obligations in the Antidumping Code. Chapter Four 
also considers the possible responses to the unauthorised subsidisation of firms 
seeking to participate in GP A covered procurement. The permissible responses 
under the GP A are again found to be influenced by broader obligations contained 
in the Subsidies Code. 
b) The Second Theme Obstacles to the Operation and Success of the 
Agreement 
The second theme of this thesis focuses on a selection of issues having a strong 
bearing on the GP A's likely level of success among its members. The challenges 
which the WTO faces in the subject areas identified below, can be considered as 
presenting barriers to the Agreement's success, while the nature of the WTO's 
responses to these challenges will be strongly indicative of the extent to which 
international competition in procurement markets is achieved. At the present 
time, information on the actual impact of the GP A on increasing cross-border 
participation in procurement among its members, and the extent to which 
discriminatory laws and practices have in fact been reduced, has yet to become 
available. It is important to note, however, that the analysis presented in this 
thesis has been undertaken against a background of available evidence at the 
'European Union (EU) level. In 1995 the Commission called upon the 
EuroStrategy Consultants to undertake a study on the economic impact of the EU 
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rules from 1987 to 1994.15 This was part of a wider study addressing the 
European Single Market Programme. While this evidence indicated a 
considerable potential within the EU for cross-border competition in 
procurement, the general conclusions indicated that procurement rules have been 
largely ineffective to achieve their market opening objectives. 
The Study highlighted a low level of publication of notices finding that only 
around 14 per cent of all covered authorities routinely advertised their 
procurement requirements. Also in evidence was a lack of awareness among 
potential suppliers of the opportunities available in the Official Journal. While it 
was found that firms of all sizes had been successful in winning some additional 
business, the main beneficiaries had been the larger established -firms. The extent 
of price convergence, which one would have expected to result from cross-border 
competition between EU suppliers, was found to have occurred only in a very 
limited number of sectors. For 'commodity' purchases (low-tech, standard 
purchases) the main barrier to price convergence was found to be the supply chain 
structure with any price savings being realised by intermediaries who then pass 
supplies onto contracting authorities at inflated national price levels. For high 
cost strategic purchases, the lack of any real price convergence was found to be 
more indicative of differing technical standards. 
15 E ~ o p e a n n Commission, "Study on the Impact and Effectiveness of the Internal Market", chapter on 
public procurement. The results of the project are summarised in a Communication from the 
C o ~ s s i o n n to the European Parliament and the Council, The Impact and Effectiveness of the Single 
Market COM(96)520 fmal (see pp.16-17 on public procurement). See also H. Gordon, S. Rimmer and 
S. Arrowsmith, "The Economic Impact of the European Union Regime on Public Procurement and 
Lessons in for the WTO" in S. Arrowsmith and A. Davies eds. Public Procurement: Global Revolution, 
27 (Kluwer Law International; 1998). 
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The above findings have significant implications for the GPA's chances of 
success. The Agreement is largely based on the same approach as the EU 
Directives and more than half of its membership is composed of the EU Members 
States. The EU also enjoys a higher degree of market integration than the GP A 
Members. If these Member States have generally been unable to open their 
markets to internal competition within the EU, it is unlikely that any greater a 
level of success will be achieved in opening procurement markets to international 
competition. 
In the absence of any specific evidence on the GPA's impact to date, the second 
part of this thesis concentrates on two of the other areas likely to present obstacles 
and challenges to the task of opening procurement markets to international 
competition. The issues which are considered relate to the following areas and 
comprise Chapters Five and Six: 
• The use of Information and Communication Technology III GP A covered 
procurement 
• Enforcement and remedies 
i) The use of Information and Communication Technologies in procurement 
procedures covered by the GP A 
The use of Information and Communication Technologies (lCTs) is increasingly 
becoming a vital tool in facilitating international trade. It is thus in connection 
with the growth of electronic commerce that the maxims of the globalisation 
process such as 'the borderless economy', and 'the global village' are most 
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frequently used. The ease with which information can now be communicated and 
exchanged allows for greater awareness of opportunities, and an increased 
potential for bringing what were once second and third world economies into 
direct competition with the richer industrialised societies. Electronic 
procurement provides the potential for conducting the entire procurement 
transactions electronically, even to the extent of final delivery of the end product 
to the customer in the form of digitised information flows. In the supplies 
context, much of the purchasing process can be carried out electronically, with 
the obvious difference that goods are later delivered in a tangible form. However, 
while the use of ICTs can minimise the barrier to trade presented by the 
geographical dispersion of firms, it could also lead to the marginalisation of firms 
in those states which do not have ready access to the new -technologies. A 
significant barrier to trade caused by difficulties in accessing new technologies 
could thereby be created. 
Chapter Five provides a full account of the potential contribution which ICTs can 
make to the GPA's objectives. It is emphasised however that ICTs cannot be 
regarded as a complete solution, even for those procurement problems where new 
technologies find a clear application. The Chapter therefore considers the 
challenges which face the WTO in promoting the development of national 
procurement databases in such a manner as to strengthen the Agreement's non-
discrimination and transparency obligations. An account of the adaptations to 
the Agreement's text, which will be necessary in order to accommodate electronic 
commerce, is provided. Chapter Five concludes with a view of the long-term 
developments in procurement practices and regulation, which may occur as 
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experience, and confidence in the operation of electronic procurement systems 
develops. 
ii) Enforcememt and Remedies under the GP A 
The EuroStrategy Consultants study identified the inadequacy of national 
remedies systems as one of the principal explanations for the disappointing level 
of success of the EU regulatory regime. Similarly, the GPA's rules would be 
unlikely to be effective without suitable mechanisms for their enforcement. The 
GP A presently provides for enforcement mechanisms at two different levels. The 
first is the system of inter-governmental dispute settlement under the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding (DSU), which applies to all the WTO Agreements 
including the GP A. Of more importance from the perspective of providing for 
timely and effective remedies for aggrieved suppliers are the national challenge 
procedures required to be established by GP A Members under Article XX. 
The thesis considers the important functions of the DSU in the procurement 
context, although finds that it is unlikely to provide useful remedies for aggrieved 
suppliers, and that this should not be regarded as its principal purpose. Article 
XX, however, is intended to directly address the need for accessible remedies at 
national level. It is the most innovative and controversial provision of the GP A, 
requiring members to provide challenge procedures for aggrieved tenderers 
before national fora against any aspect of the conduct of the procurement process. 
However, it is arguable that Article XX does not go far enough and may not 
provide meaningful and timely remedies for aggrieved tenderers. 
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As well as exploring the uses and limitations of the DSD and the national 
challenge procedures, it is questioned whether additional enforcement 
mechanisms may be necessary to promote compliance with the Agreement. It can 
be noted that the ED Green Paper on procurement reform seeks comments on the 
idea of setting up independent enforcement authorities in the Members States. 16 It 
is envisaged that such authorities could have various functions such as providing 
advice to procuring entities on their procedural obligations, as well as receiving 
and lodging formal complaints relating to breaches of the Agreement. The ED 
has also placed the possibility of setting up independent agencies, on the GPA's 
built-in negotiating agenda under Article XXN:7, as one of the means by which 
the Agreement may be improved. 17 Chapter 5 considers the roles which 
independent agencIes could play in strengthening compliance with the 
Agreement, and the progress of negotiations towards their possible 
implementation. 
16 Eur' C .. " . . 
opean ornrmsslOn, Green Paper, Pubhc Procurement m the European Union: Exploring the 
'tfay Forward", 27 November 1996, COM (96) 538 fmal, paragraphs 3.42 - 3.45. 
See the Working document on GP A Review of the Advisory Committee on the Opening-up of Public 
Procurement CCO/98.21-EN, pp. 2-3. 
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Chapter 1 
The GPA's nelwtiating history, objectives and structure and content 
Introduction 
This Chapter provides the background infonnation necessary for the 
understanding of the motivations for procurement regulation at the international 
level, and the arguments presented in this thesis. Section 1 provides an overview 
of the negotiations leading up to the present GP A, from the early and abortive 
work towards an International Trade Organisation, through to the resumption of 
negotiations within the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, the transferral of the work programme to the GATT Tokyo Round, 
to the conclusion of the present Agreement in parallel with the conclusion of the 
Uruguay Round negotiations. Section 2 clarifies what the GPA's principal 
objective should be understood as being, and outlines the other objectives which 
the GP A can make a strong contribution towards. Section 3 details the 
Agreement's structure, scope and coverage. The author indicates where 
particular provisions are given detailed consideration in the thesis. Section 4 
provides an overview of the work on government procurement within the WTO 
other than under the GP A. 
1. The history of negotiations leading up to the current GP Al 
Negotiations for the opening up of national procurement markets to international 
competition date from the mid 1940s. The starting point for these negotiations 
continues to seem striking, despite the significant improvements which have been 
made to international disciplines dealing with procurement, in particular, with 
regard to entity and sector coverage. In 1946, the US published a "Suggested 
Charter for an International Trade Organisation", under which the GATT 
negotiations were conducted, and which first set out the now familiar Most-
Favoured-Nation (MFN) and National Treatment (NT) obligations? The 
formulations contained in Articles 8 and 9 of the suggested charter, clearly 
contemplated that the MFN and NT obligations should apply to trade barriers 
whether goods were traded between private undertakings, or where governmental 
purchases were involved. Negotiations towards an International Trade 
Organisation lasted one year. 
During the first Session of the Preparatory Committee in London in November 
1946, it quickly became clear that the application of MFN and NT obligations to 
government procurement would be unlikely to be politically acceptable, because 
of widespread desire to preserve discriminatory government purchasing, giving 
preference to national suppliers. By the end of the second meeting of the 
Preparatory Committee in April 1947, the intention of the delegations that 
imports for government procurement should be outside the scope of these 
obligations was clear. This intention was at least partly reflected in the text of the 
Havana Charter, which arose from the third meeting of the Preparatory 
Committee in November 1947, and whose text is almost identical to the that of 
IS . 
ectlOn 1 of this Chapter has been summarised from a detailed analysis of the negotiating history, 
~ d e r t a k e n n by A. Blank and G. Marceau, "The History of the Government Procurement Negotiations 
~ m c e e 1945", (1996) 4 Public Procurement Law Review 77. 
In general terms, Most-Favoured-Nation treatment requires that any advantage granted by a 
contracting party to the products of another contracting party, must also be granted to the like products 
of all ~ t h e r r contracting parties. In this way, discrimination between the same goods from different 
exportmg countries is prohibited. National treatment requires that imported products be treated no less 
favourable than like domestic products, so as to prohibit discrimination between domestically produced 
goods and the same imported goods. For an analysis of these principles ir1 the present GATT context 
see, J.R. Jackson, W.J. Davey and A.O. Sykes, Jr., Legal Problems of International Economic 
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today's GATT. Article I of both instruments, dealing with MFN, contain no 
reference to government procurement, so that uncertainties remain as to whether, 
and to what extent it applies to government procurement.3 Conversely Article III 
leaves no room for doubt by incorporating an express exclusion for procurement 
in paragraph Sea). It is also notable that Article XVII which imposes both 
notification and substantive obligations on state trading enterprises,4 provides in 
paragraph 2 that its obligations do not apply, "to imports or products for 
immediate or ultimate consumption in governmental use and not otherwise for 
resale or use in the production of goods for sale." It goes on to provide that, in the 
context of government procurement, "each contracting party shall accord to the 
trade of the other contracting parties fair and equitable treatment." The inclusion 
of this latter sentence was intended to address concerns, expressed initially at the 
London Conference, that the exclusion of procurement from the ITO draft 
charter, would leave a large gap in the document in a subject area of huge 
economic importance. 
It was not until the early 1960s that government procurement re-emerged on the 
international negotiating agenda in response to general concerns over high levels 
of protectionism and national preferences. The Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) provided the forum for negotiations, and 
impressive achievements were made here from 1963 to 1975, especially in the 
R e l a ~ o n s s (West Publishing, 1995) pp. 436-460 (Most-Favoured-Nation Clause) and pp. 501-550 ~ a t ~ o n a l l Treatment Clause). 
This question was most recently investigated by A. Reich, "The New GATT Agreement on G o v e ~ e n t t Procurement. The Pitfalls of PI uri lateral ism and Strict Reciprocity" [1997] 31(2) Journal ~ f W o r l d d Trade 125. 
nFor an overview of the regulation of state trading e n t e ~ r i s e s s under the GATT, see J.H. Jackson, W.J. 
aveyand A.O. Sykes, Jr., Legal Problems of InternatIOnal Economic Relations (West Publishing 
1995) pp. 1140-1145. ' 
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context of the reconciliation and "cross-fertilisation"S of the regulatory 
approaches emerging from the then European Economic Community, and the 
United States. 
This period of negotiation is distinguished from the ITO negotiations, by the 
recognition that the mere acceptance and application of MFN and NT principles 
to government purchasing, would be unlikely to engender significant liberalising 
effects in themselves. The development of procurement specific rules, designed 
to reflect the need for non-discriminatory treatment, but also setting out 
procedural obligations for contract awards was therefore a key objective. It was 
in this negotiating period that the foundations for the structure and content of the 
present GPA, and its predecessors, were laid.6 These foundations were 
represented by the OECD Draft Instrument on Government Purchasing Policies, 
Procedures and Practices7 transmitted to the GATT at the end of 1976, when the 
OECD's work reached an impasse. Despite the consensus which had been 
reached on the necessary content of many of the procedural rules, further 
progress was prevented by crucial areas of disagreement. These related to the 
extent of entity coverage beyond central government bodies, the appropriate 
financial thresholds which would trigger the procedural obligations, and the 
5 Thi 
6 F s term was used by A. Blank and G. Marceau, supra note 1. 
Or examp.le, the delegations agreed upon alternative tendering procedures which correspond to the 
Open, selectIve and limited procedures found in the GP A. While states retained the choice over which 
procedure. to use, it was also agreed that limited tendering (where contracting authorities contact and ~ a ~ ~negotiate with suppliers individually) should be confmed to certain defined situations, due to the 
r e ~ e n t a l l effects on competition brought about by this procedure. It was also agreed that publicity d ~ q u l f e m e n t s s would be crucial to safeguarding the non-discriminatory operation of the rules, although r ~ s a f r e e m e n t t over the necessary extent of pUblicity requirements, after contract award, remained to be 
n so ~ e d : : by the Tokyo negotiations. On the subject of contract award criteria, it was during the OECD f i e g O t i a t l O ~ ~ that the concept of multiple award criteria, including, but going beyond price alone was o ~ : : recogmsed, subject to the now familiar safeguard that all criteria should be published from the 
7 et. 
See OECD Doc. TC(76) 27. 
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procedures for the settlement of disputes. Disagreements here led to the 
suspension of negotiations at the end of 1975, and with the establishment of the 
Tokyo Sub-Committee on Government Procurement in 1976, it was decided to 
transfer the DECD's work to the GATT. 
Within a little over a year later the GATT Secretariat had circulated a "Draft 
Integrated Text for Negotiations on Government Procurement", which was 
largely based on the principles of the DECD Draft Instrument. Negotiations 
during the Tokyo Round centred on the entity and sector coverage of the Code, 
aspects . the transparency requirements (in particular relating to post award 
obligations), the procedures for dispute settlement, and the treatment of 
developing countries. The last two subject areas were of particular significance 
given that it was only in the broader GATT forum that these issues could possibly 
have been addressed. Developing countries have no formal standing within the 
DECD forum, which also has not traditionally provided for any dispute 
settlement mechanism. Blank and Marceau8 comment that 
"There would not be an international agreement on government procurement if 
the negotiations had not been transferred from Paris to Geneva.... Such an 
agreement could not have taken place without providing rights to accession for 
developing countries (although their participation turned out to be very low.) 
Moreover such an agreement needed a dispute settlement mechanism to ensure its 
implementation and its evolution and such mechanisms are foreign to the DECD 
forum." 
~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
. Blank and G. Marceau, supra note 1 at p.lOl. 
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Negotiations on substantive issues were completed by April 1979. Provisions 
were incorporated for Special and Differential Treatment for Developing 
Countries, and disputes were subject to the inter-governmental panel procedure 
under negotiation in the other Tokyo Codes. The Agreement which was limited 
to central government supply contracts, entered into force on 1 January 1981. 
The original signatories were Austria, Canada, the then six members of the 
European Community, Finland, Japan, Norway, Singapore, Switzerland and the 
US. Greece and Spain joined in 1982 and Hong Kong (for whom the UK had 
originally signed) began participating in its own right from mid 1986 onwards 
when it became a Contracting party to the GATT. While several developing 
countries were active both in the negotiations leading up to the Tokyo Round 
Agreement, and in the activities of the Committee on Government Procurement, 
only Hong Kong, Israel and Singapore had actually acceded by 1995. 
Developing country participation in the GP A remains disappointing to this day. 
Article IX:6(b) provided a built in agenda for the enhancement of the Agreement 
in terms of broadening its entity coverage, expansion to include service contracts, 
and textual improvements. Work under the built in agenda began in November 
1983, and ended with the conclusion of the Protocol of Amendment some three 
years later. Much of the negotiations here were conducted in the meetings of the 
Informal Working Group (IWG) established in 1985. While the three objectives 
above were intended to be of equal importance, it quickly became apparent that 
textual improvements would become the most prominent for several reasons. 
Most importantly, the actual mandate of the IWG was concerned primarily with 
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textual improvements. It was not until 1987 that the IWG actually adopted its 
work programme in the areas of broadening entity coverage, and inclusion of 
service contracts. Unsurprisingly therefore, the concrete achievements of the 
1986 Protocol of Amendments were limited to textual improvements, dealing 
with various aspects of the Agreement from adjustments to the threshold and to 
the procedural deadlines, to the strengthening of the non discrimination 
requirements and the controls over offset requirements. Beyond these concrete 
achievements, the Parties agreed to continue their work on broadening entity 
coverage, and work towards the inclusion of services. 
The crucial stage of establishing the framework for the broadening of coverage 
was reached by the IWG in 1988, when government entities to be covered by the 
Agreement were grouped into three categories. Group A referred to central 
government entities, Group B to regional and local government entities, and 
Group C to other entities whose procurement policies are substantially controlled 
by, dependent on, or influenced by central, regional or local government. These 
Groups correspond to Annexes 1, 2 and 3 of the existing GP A which set out the 
potential entity coverage of the Agreement between its Parties. 
The period after the establishment of the negotiating structure was again marked 
more by the strengthening of the Agreement's procedural obligations (especially 
in regard to dispute settlement, national challenge procedures and offsets) than by 
agreement on entity coverage. Progress here was being held back by delays in 
t h ~ ~ conclusion of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, which had become 
closely linked with the prospects for any progress in the formally separate 
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procurement negotiations. Disagreements between the US and the EC over 
appropriate market opening opportunities, especially in the utilities sector, also 
strongly contributed toward the impasse. The conflict here was at least partly 
resolved by a bilateral agreement in April 1993 providing, in particular, for 
mutual access to works and supply contracts in the electricity sector.9 The 
relaxation of the tension between these two major trading parties, and the 
expectation that the Uruguay Round would be completed by December 1993, 
reinvigorated the procurement negotiations. Several meetings of the IWG from 
mid 1993 saw further negotiations on coverage offers and the finalisation of 
textual issues. It was at this late stage that a new provisions was inserted in 
Article XXIV to acknowledge the potential future uses of information technology 
in the procurement process. 
The new GPA was concluded on December 13, 1993 in parallel with the 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round negotiations two days later. It was signed of 
April 15, 1994 in Marrakesh, along side the signing of the Final Act embodying 
the results of the Uruguay Round. 1o Bilateral negotiations on coverage were to 
continue however between the Agreement's conclusion and its entry into force on 
January 1, 1996. The Parties were therefore permitted to provide, in their 
Annexes, for sector and country specific derogations to the non-discrimination 
obligations of Article III. These derogations were accompanied by a declaration 
that they would be withdrawn only at such times as the respective signatory has 
accepted that the other Party has given comparable access to its suppliers. While 
9---------------------
[1993] OJ. L125/1. See further A. Halford, "An overview ofE.C.-U.S. Relations in the Area of 
Public Procurement". (1995) 1 Public Procurement Law Review 35; P. Trepte, "The E.C.-United States 
Trade Dispute: Negotiation ofa Partial Solution" (1993) 4 Public Procurement Law Review CS82. 
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some of these 'reciprocity derogations' remain to this day, most were withdrawn 
before the GPA's entry into force. 
2. The GPA's objectives 
The principal objective of the GPA, as expressed in its preamble, is to remove 
discriminatory laws and practices in the area of government procurement, which 
afford protection to domestic products or services or domestic suppliers. I I The 
non-discrimination principle also extends to removing unequal treatment as 
between different foreign products and services and suppliers. The removal of 
discriminatory procurement as a non-tariff barrier to trade is seen as a crucial part 
of the WTO's work in promoting the liberalisation and expansion of world trade. 
Apart from the gradual removal of discriminatory laws and practices, there are 
also other objectives which the GP A can go a long way towards promoting. 
While the Agreement makes no reference to the objectives of probity and 
integrity among procurement officials within decision making processes, it is 
clear that its implementation can make a significant contribution to these goals. 
Conducting entire procurement cycles via transparent procedures which are 
publicised and predictable, can make corrupt practices, such as bestowing 
contracts for personal or political advantage, at least more difficult to undertake. 
The GP A therefore provides for specific rules which apply in situations which 
would otherwise present considerable opportunity for undetected corrupt 
practices. For example, Article XV requires entities to prepare a report for every 
10 P" 1 IDa Act E m b o ~ ~ g g the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 
Agreement Estabhshing the World Trade Organisation, published in (1994) OJ L336/3. 
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occasion a contract is awarded under the limited procedure whereby tenders are 
sought from individual suppliers without an advertisement of the contract. The 
primary motivation for defining when limited tendering may be used, and 
imposing reporting requirements is to ensure that foreign suppliers are not 
excluded from participating without justification. However, the objectives of 
non-discrimination and maintaining probity and integrity are closely linked, to 
the extent that the same rules will often be relevant in both areas. 
It is also clear that implementation of the GP A can make a significant 
contribution towards reducing public expenditure, even though the achievement 
of value for money should not be regarded as one of the Agreement's primary 
objectives. In common with most regional and international procurement 
agreements, it will be seen that the GP A emphasises the key principles of 
competition, publicity, the use of commercial criteria for awarding contracts, and 
transparency. These are also the principles which are frequently found to 
underpin domestic procurement laws. However, while one of the principal 
motivations for domestic rules is the achievement of value for money, it has been 
pointed out that the GP A is only incidentally concerned with rules which can 
result in price savings, to the extent that they are necessary to safeguard the non-
discriminatory treatment of foreign suppliers. 12 Thus while both international and 
domestic rules contain provisions on the requisite financial and technical standing 
of selected suppliers, only the latter require standing to be tested, and establish 
the precise means by which this is to be done. In contrast, Article VIII of the 
11Th ' 
12 e term supplier is used in this thesis to include service providers. 
See S. Arrowsmith, "National and International perspectives on the Regulation of Public 
Procurem t· H C flO ?'" S Arr' , en. armonyor on ICt. m, owsnuth and A, DaVIes eds, Public Procurement: 
Global Revolution, 3 (Kluwer International; 1998) pp. 15-23, 
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GPA is clearly limited to ensuring that any process for determining the standing 
of suppliers which is carried out, does not produce any discriminatory effects. 
3. The GPA's structure and coverage 
The GPA's structure is presently divided into its main body (provided in Annex 1 
to this thesis) composed of 24 Articles, and four Appendices. Under Appendix I, 
each Party maintains five Annexes and a set of general notes. These Annexes set 
out the scope of the Agreement (as is explained in sections (a) and (c) below). 
Appendix II lists the publications used by the Parties for the publication of 
notices of intended procurements. Appendix III lists the publications used for the 
annual publication of information on permanent lists of qualified suppliers. 
Appendix IV lists the publications used for the publication of laws, regulations, 
judicial decisions, administrative rulings of general application and any 
procedure regarding government procurement covered by the Agreement. 
The GPA's remit is to ensure that procuring entities conduct their procurement 
according to the procedural rules. While foreign suppliers and service providers 
can rely upon the GPA for non-discriminatory access to covered contracts, this is 
subject to any customs duties and charges on importation and measures affecting 
trade in services under the GATT or GATS. Article 111:3 of the GP A therefore 
makes it clear that the non-discrimination obligations which underpin the 
Agreement are applicable only to the, "laws, regulations, procedures and 
practices regarding government procurement covered by this Agreement". 
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Subject to this caveat, there are a number of considerations which are relevant to 
the question of whether a contract is covered by the GP A, and whether a supplier 
can therefore expect and enforce a right to participate on a non-discriminatory 
basis. These considerations relate to: 
- The type of entity involved. 
-The value of the contract, in terms of being above minimum thresholds. 
- The subject matter of the contract. 
- The content of any applicable exceptions to the non-discrimination principle. 
It is notable that Article IX: 11 requires that notices of invitations to participate in 
an intended procurement make it clear, either in the notice itself, or in the 
pUblication in which it appears, whether the procurement in question is covered 
by the Agreement. 
a) The type of entity involved 
The procurement must be carried out by entities which are specifically listed in 
the Annexes of each signatory, which are contained in Appendix 1. Annex 1 lists 
central/federal government entities. Annex 2 lists sub-central government 
entities and Annex 3 lists other entities which procure in accordance with the 
Agreement, such as those operating in the Utilities sectors. 
b) The value of the contract 
T ~ e e GP A only applies to contracts which are above a certain financial value and 
which are therefore likely to be of international interest. Each Annex for each 
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Party specifies the relevant thresholds for goods, servIces and construction 
servIces. For Annex 1 (central government) all Parties maintain the same 
threshold of SDR13 130,000. Beyond this common threshold, the thresholds vary 
within modest limits as between the Parties. For example most Parties maintain a 
threshold of SDR 200,000 for Annex 2 (sub-central) services although Canada 
and the US maintain a higher threshold of SDR 355,000. Most Parties maintain a 
SDR 5,000,000 threshold for construction services across all the Annexes, while 
Japan's threshold here is dramatically higher at 15,000,000 in both Annexes 2 
and 3. 
c) The subject matter of the contract 
The procurement must either be for goods, or for the services and construction 
services which are specifically listed in Annexes 4 and 5 respectively. While the 
above threshold goods procurement of all covered entities must therefore be 
subject to international competition, a 'positive list' approach is used for services 
and construction services, which are only covered if specifically listed. It should 
also be emphasised that the above principles apply only to civil procurement. 
The Parties are permitted to exclude defence procurement from the scope of the 
Agreement's application. This is made clear by Article XXIII: 1 which provides 
that, 
"Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent any Party from taking 
any action or not disclosing any information which it considers necessary for the 
pr?tection of its essential security interests relating to the procurement of arms, 
13 • 
SpecIal Drawing Rights: the International Monetary Fund's international reserve unit of account. In 
1997, US$ 1.13 amounted to 1 SDR. SDR 130,000 amounts to around US$ 182,000. 
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ammunition or war materials, or to procurement indispensable for national 
security of for national defence purposes." 
In practice, defence procurement has been excluded from coverage to differing 
extents among the Parties, although all have excluded war-like materials from 
coverage. Some Parties such as Israel simply do not list defence departments and 
agencies in their Annexes so that defence procurement is completely excluded 
even for non war-like materials. Other Parties such as Canada and the US list 
these departments and agencies and then set out either the procurement which is 
covered or that which is not or both. 
d) Exceptions to the non-discrimination principle 
Having verified the value of the contract, its subject matter and the type of entity 
involved, the coverage of the contract could also be affected by exceptions to the 
non-discrimination principle contained in the General Notes at the end of most 
Parties' Annexes. For example, while the GPA covers above threshold 
procurement of services expressly listed in each Party's Annex 4, this position 
does not apply when a covered Canadian entity has a services requirement. 
Canada's General Notes provide that, "Until such time as there is a mutually 
agreed list of services to be covered by all parties, a service listed in Annex 4 is 
covered with respect to a particular party only to the extent that such party has 
provided reciprocal access to that service." Further details of the derogations 
maintained by the parties are provided in Chapter 3. 
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4. The GP A's content 
It is arguably not possible to describe the GPA's content in a logical and coherent 
manner by adhering to the provisions in the order and structure of their present 
presentation. The description of the rules presented here is based on the 
improved structure for the Agreement, suggested by the European Commission's 
Advisory Committee on Public Procurement, as part of the review process 
pursuant to Article XXIV:7(b) and (c). These provisions provide a built in 
agenda for periodic negotiations towards improvement of the Agreement. The 
first set of negotiations were due to commence not later than the end of 1999. 
However, the WTO's Committee on Government procurement in its 1996 Report 
to the Ministerial Council14 decided to undertake an early review, starting in 
1997. Informal consultations to date have focused on three areas being the 
simplification and improvement of the Agreement, the elimination of 
discriminatory measures and practices, and expansion of coverage. IS 
As indicated above, the European Commission, through its Advisory Committee 
on Public Procurement, has been particularly proactive in the review process. In 
a September 1998 Report, I 6 the Committee considered that structural 
improvements should be an essential part of the simplification and improvement 
process, with the view of making the Agreement more logical and easy to follow 
by suppliers and entities. To this end, the Report contained a suggested new 
structure, seeking to group provisions according to their purpose, and re-arrange 
14 
Report of the Committee on Government Procurement, 9 December 1996 which can be viewed on 
?ste WTO's home page at www.wto.org. 
Paragraph 22 of the 1999 Report of the Committee on Government Procurement, states that "good 
progress has been made on improving the text of the Agreement, that the momentum of the work needs 
to be maintained and that all three elements need to be covered." The full report can be viewed on the 
WTO home page at www.wto.org. 
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procedural'rules so that they correspond to the chronology of steps taken during 
the procurement process. 
At present, the main body of the GP A appears in 24 Articles which are not 
grouped under any headings. The suggested amended text envisages that the 
Agreement should be divided into 5 sets of provisions as follows: 
• Scope and coverage. 
• Basic principles. 
• Procedural provisions. 
• Bid review . 
• Institutional provisions. 
a) Scope and coverage 
According to the suggested new structure, Part A of the GP A should comprise the 
existing Articles I and II. The opening provisions will therefore establish that the 
covered procurement may involve any combination of goods or services obtained 
via purchase, lease, rental or hire purchase. No attempt is made to set out the 
Agreement's entity and sector coverage. As explained above, this depends upon 
the content of the national Annexes in Appendix 1. 
Article II then sets out the rules relating to the valuation of contracts. As the 
GP A only applies to above threshold procurement, the division of requirements 
to avoid its application is prohibited. Article II also requires the aggregation of 
16 Advisory Committee on Public Procurement, Working Document, GP A Review, CCO/98/21-EN, 
17.09.98. 
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"similar recurring contracts" over set periods, which form part of an "individual 
requirement." There is considerable uncertainty over the practical application of 
the aggregation rules; a matter which is considered in Chapter 3. 
b) Basic principles 
It has been suggested that Article XIX: 1 which deals with the publication of 
procurement laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings 
should incorporated into Part B. Article III, which sets out national treatment and 
non-discrimination obligations, would also fall under Part B. These fundamental 
obligations, which underpin the entire Agreement require that, with respect to 
covered procurement, GP A products, services and suppliers be treated no less 
favourably than domestic products, services and suppliers, and no less favourably 
than the products, services and suppliers of any other Party. Article III also 
requires the equal treatment of locally established suppliers regardless of their 
degree of "foreign affiliation or ownership" and the "country of production of the 
good or service being supplied." The latter obligation of non-discrimination does 
not apply however, where the country of production is not a GP A Party in the 
sense established by Article IV. 
Article IV on Rules of Origin falls under Part B. At present Article IV: I merely 
requires that the Parties should not apply any rules of origin in the procurement 
context which are different to those applied, "in the normal course of trade and at 
the time of the transaction in question ... " At present entities are therefore 
permitted to discriminate against locally established suppliers on the basis of the 
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country of production of the goods or service being supplied, to the extent that 
this is pennitted in the nonnal course of trade. 
Article IV:2 refers to the work programme for the hannonisation of rules of 
origin for goods under the Agreement on Rules of Origin l7 in Annex 1A of the 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation, and requires that the 
Parties take the results into account in amending paragraph 1. 
It is finally envisaged that Article XVI on offsets should be moved to Part B. For 
developed countries, an absolute prohibition on the use of offsets is imposed. 
Developing countries are, however pennitted to negotiate for the use of offsets, 
for the qualification of suppliers, at the time of their accession. The offset 
prohibition is further considered in Chapter 3. 
c) Procurement procedures 
i) Tenderin2 procedures 
It is envisaged that Part C will begin with a description of the three tendering 
procedures currently found in Article VII, being the open, selective and limited 
procedures. Under the open procedure, all interested suppliers may submit a 
tender. However, there is nothing to prevent entities from operating a 
qualification system and then pennitting only qualified suppliers to submit 
17 The Agreement on Rules of Origin calls for the harmonisation of non-preferential origin rules (those 
which generally apply in the absence of any special treatment under bilateral or multilateral trade 
agreements) through a work programme to be undertaken by the WTO Committee on Rules of Origin 
and the Customs Cooperation Council. Article 2 provides for a number of general rules which are 
applicable until such time as the harmonisation work is completed. For example, the rules applicable 
to imports and exports are not to be more stringent than those applicable for determining domestic 
origin. Upon completion of the harmonisation programme, Article 3 requires that origin rules be 
applied equally for all purposes (for antidumping and countervailing purposes; safeguard purposes, 
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tenders. Selective tendering involves the submission of tenders only by those 
suppliers invited to do so by the entity. Under the present Article X, entities are 
required to invite tenders from, "the maximum number of suppliers consistent 
with the efficient operation of the procurement system". Limited tendering 
involves entities contacting suppliers individually under the exhaustive 
conditions set out in the present Article XV. These circumstances include the 
absence of responsive tenders, extreme urgency and additional deliveries by the 
original supplier to avoid interchangeability problems. Under the proposed new 
structure, Article XV will form part of Part C. 
It has sometimes been stated that the GP A provides for a fourth tendering 
procedure, described as competitive negotiation. This is because Article XIV 
makes provision for entities to conduct negotiations with suppliers. However, it 
is better to regard this as a possible additional step in any of the three procedures 
described above, rather than an independent tendering procedure. Entities may 
conduct negotiations either where an intention to do so has been indicated in the 
tender notice, or where no one tender appears to be most advantageous under the 
published evaluation criteria. It is provided that negotiations should be used 
primarily to identify the strengths and weaknesses in tenders. Safeguards are also 
provided for, to ensure that negotiations are not used to discriminate between 
suppliers. 
ii) Qualification conditions 
origin marking purposes and any discriminatory quotas or tariffs, as well as for government 
procurement) . 
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Provisions relating to qualification requirements which suppliers may have to 
meet, are currently dealt with in Article VIII which falls under Part C of the 
suggested new structure. Article VIII(b) provides that "any conditions for 
participating in tendering procedures shall be limited to those which are essential 
to ensure the firm's capability to fulfil the contract in question." This raises 
questions of whether qualification conditions can be used to eliminate firms 
which cannot meet 'secondary objectives' (such as the engagement of long-term 
unemployed or targeted minorities). The issues here are fully explored in 
Chapter 3. Otherwise, the provisions of Article VIII are largely directed towards 
ensuring that qualification procedures are not used to discriminate among foreign 
suppliers or between domestic and foreign suppliers. 
iii) Provision of information to suppliers 
The suggested new structure proposes that provisions dealing with information to 
bidders should be grouped together. The existing Article IX deals with the 
information which must be included in the invitation to participate. The 
requirements do not apply where limited tendering is exceptionally used. Entities 
in all Annexes may use a notice of proposed procurement as an invitation to 
participate. In contrast, entities in Annex 2 (sub-central entities) and Annex 3 
(other entities which procure in accordance with the GP A) may use a notice of 
planned procurement or a notice regarding a qualification system as the invitation 
to participate. 
The difference is that the notice of proposed procurement involves the provision 
of more information to suppliers, at an earlier stage, than the notice of planned 
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procurement. The latter therefore provides more flexibility to Annex 2 and 3 
entities who need only provide information on the contract's subject matter, 
contact details, and a statement that interested suppliers should express their 
interest in the procurement to the entity within the applicable deadline. 
Responding suppliers must then be provided with the more detailed information 
required under the notice of proposed procurement (such as the applicable tender 
procedure, delivery and completion dates and any economic and technical 
requirements) in order for them to decide whether to confirm their interest. 
Where Annex 2 and 3 entities use a notice regarding a qualification system as 
invitation to participate, they must give suppliers the chance to assess their 
interest in participating by providing them with as much of the information 
required by the notice of proposed procurement as is available. 
Article XII deals with another aspect of information provision to bidders; namely 
that which must be provided in tender documentation. This must contain all the 
information necessary to permit bidders to submit responsive tenders including 
the information which must be included in the notice of proposed procurement 
under Article IX. The additional information which must be provided is listed. 
In particular, entities must include, "the criteria for awarding the contract, 
including any factors other than price that are to be considered in the evaluation 
of tenders ... " 
iv) Technical specification 
Part C of the proposed new structure also incorporates the provisions on technical 
specifications. Article VI presently requires that descriptions of products and 
36 
services as well as the processes and methods for their production should not 
create "unnecessary obstacles to international trade." Specifications should focus 
on performance rather than design or descriptive characteristics and should be 
based on national standards or regulations only when international standards are 
not available. 
v) Time limits and deadlines 
Article XI deals with time limits for tendering and delivery, which must be 
adequate to allow domestic suppliers as well as suppliers of other parties to 
prepare and submit tenders. The minimum time periods for the receipt of tenders, 
and for submitting an application to be invited to tender (where selective 
tendering is used) are set out, as are the circumstances in which these time limits 
may be reduced. These time limits are detailed in Chapter Five. 
vi) Submission, receipt and opening of tenders and award of contracts. 
Article XIII sets out the rules on submission, receipt and opening of tenders and 
award of contracts. The suggested new structure splits the rules on awarding 
contracts into a separate provision, and indicates that Article XIII could also be 
further divided. The submission rules currently envisage that tenders shall 
normally be submitted in writing although tenders by telex, telegram or facsimile 
are also expressly permitted. It is likely that electronic means of submission will 
soon be permitted to take account of the use of Information and Communication 
Technologies. The rapid developments here are considered in Chapter Five. 
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The award rules require the entity to award the contract to the supplier whose 
tender is either the lowest, or the most advantageous according to the published 
evaluation criteria. Abnormally low tenders may be rejected, and entities may 
decide not to award a contract at all if the public interest demands this. The 
author considers the scope of these provisions in the context of anti-competitive 
behaviour in Chapter Four. 
vii) Publication of information on awarded contracts 
Finally it is envisaged that part C will incorporate Article XVIII: 1 which deals 
with the publication of information on awarded contracts. Under this provision 
there is some information which must be provided in the national pUblications 
listed in Appendix 2, within 72 days of the award of each contract. This 
information includes the nature and quantity of products or services in the 
contract award, and the name and address of the winning tenderer. Entities may 
however decide that any of the listed information should be withheld where 
certain concerns are present. These include prejudice to the legitimate 
commercial interest of particular enterprises or to fair competition between 
suppliers. 
Under paragraph 2, the listed information need only be provided to individual 
suppliers upon request from any GPA supplier. On request, information 
regarding the rejection of a supplier's application to qualify, and why it was not 
selected must be provided. The provision also requires details of why a tender 
was not successful, and details of the relative advantages of the selected tender, to 
be made available to individual suppliers requesting the information. In respect 
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of this latter obligation, the infonnation may also be withheld under the same 
conditions as specified in paragraph 4. 
viii) Bid review 
The proposed new structure places Article XX under a separate section (C.1). 
Article XX provides for an innovative fonn of dispute settlement in the fonn of 
national challenge procedures. These are intended to provide for timely and 
effective redress for individual suppliers believing that entities have handled a 
procurement inconsistently with the GPA's requirements. Each party must 
therefore provide for a legal or administrative procedure before national courts or 
an independent and impartial review body. The designated body must have the 
authority to order correction of the breach or compensate for the loss or damage 
suffered. It must also be able to order rapid interim measures, including the 
suspension of the procurement process, to correct breaches, and to preserve 
commercial opportunities. A critical analysis of Article XX and of proposals to 
strengthen the review of procurement decisions is provided in Chapter Six. 
d) Institutional provisions 
Part D of the suggested new structure groups together those provisions 
concerning the obligations which the member governments owe to each other in 
the GPA's application. 
i) Information exchange between member governments 
The present Article XXI:2-4 deals with the infonnation which may need to be 
exchanged between governments to enable them to detennine that the Agreement 
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has been properly applied. The provisions therefore complement Article XVIII: 1 
which deals with post-award information, which must be published, or made 
available to individual suppliers on request. In contrast Article XIX:2 enables the 
government of an unsuccessful tenderer to seek such additional information on 
the contract award as may be necessary to ensure that the procurement was made 
fairly and impartially. It will be recalled that under Article XV, governments can 
refuse to disclose requested information to individual suppliers for various 
reasons including the prejudice of fair competition. However, where the 
information is exchanged between governments under Article XIX:2, the 
information (concerning the characteristics and relative advantages of the 
winning tender and contract price) cannot be withheld. Neverthless, the 
government providing the information is entitled to demand that the information 
should not be further disclosed to other persons, such as national suppliers, where 
this would cause prejudice to competition in future tenders. In such a case, the 
authorisation of the government providing the information is required before its 
further disclosure. Article XIX:4 also requires that such authorisation be 
obtained where confidential information has been provided to a member 
government. 
ii) Exceptions to the Agreement 
Part D also comprises the exceptions to the Agreement provided in Article XXIII 
at present. In addition to the defence procurement exception described above, 
this provision permits measures, "necessary to protect public morals, order or 
safety, human, animal or plant life or health or intellectual property; or relating to 
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the products or services of handicapped persons, of philanthropic institutions or 
of prison labour." 
iii) Special and differential treatment for developing countries 
Article V on Special and differential treatment for developing countries falls 
under Part D. The provisions here recognise the development, financial and trade 
needs of developing countries, and least developed countries, by requiring 
account to be taken of development objectives in coverage negotiations. Article 
V also contains provisions on technical assistance, establishing information 
centres giving information on procurement practices in developed countries. It 
also has a built-in review mechanism. Further consideration to Article V is given 
in Chapter 3. 
iv) Statistical reporting 
The rules on statistical reporting currently forming the latter half of Article XIX 
are included in Part D. Under Article XIX:5, each Party must collect and provide 
to the other Parties, through the Committee on Government Procurement, 
statistics on its procurement on an annual basis. Reporting requirements are more 
onerous for Annex 1 entities than for Annex 2 and 3 entities. For example, under 
paragraph (a), Annex 1 entities must report statistics on the estimated value of 
contracts awarded, both above and below the threshold value, on a global basis 
and broken down by entities. The same obligation applies to Annex 2 and 3 
entities but only in relation to above threshold procurement. 
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In its September 1998 Report, the European Commission's Advisory Committee 
on Public Procurement identified statistical reporting as an area where 
simplification and streamlining needs to be considered to address concerns over 
the burdensome and costly nature of present requirements. IS The Committee 
questioned whether more flexible procedures affording greater discretion to the 
Parties could be instituted without unduly detracting from the level of 
transparency potentially engendered by the present rules. In particular, it was 
noted that the possibilities for simplification and streamlining are closely linked 
with advances in the use of information technology. An innovative proposal was 
that Parties should be permitted to apply for waivers from reporting requirements, 
if the obligation to published Contract Award Notices (CANs) (currently 
provided for in Article XVIII) were reinforced. The principal condition for the 
suggested waiver is that interested parties should be able to access data on 
awarded contracts through one single electronic point of access. They should 
then have access to at least the following: price information; type of contract and 
categories of goods and services involved (to be identified via a common 
nomenclature such as the Common Procurement Vocabulary); award procedure; 
date of contract award; and date of pUblication of tender notice. 
The need for statistical reporting would then be obviated by the readily accessible 
CANs which would ensure the transparency of contract awards and enable 
suppliers and governments to monitor compliance with the procedural 
obligations. 
18 Advisory Committee on Public Procurement, Working Document, GPA Review, CCO/98121-EN, 
17.09.98. 
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v) Inter governmental consultations and dispute settlement 
The final significant provision of the suggested Part D is Article XXII which 
deals with inter governmental consultation and dispute settlement. Under this 
provision, the Parties have adopted the WTO Understanding on Dispute 
Settlement as their dispute settlement system, with a few adaptations to take 
account of the nature of procurement disputes and the GPA's plurilateral 
character. Thus paragraph 6 seeks to accelerate the Panel procedure and bring 
forward the date of the final report. Since the GP A is not part of the Single 
Undertaking, paragraph 7 disallows cross-retaliation. The Parties cannot 
therefore suspend concessions under the GP A as a result of dispute under the 
other WTO Agreements, because of any dispute under the GP A. Inter 
governmental dispute settlement under the GP A is analysed in Chapter Six. 
4. Work on government procurement in other WTO fora 
There are three on-going activities in the WTO in the area of government 
procurement. The first is the review of the existing GP A pursuant to in built 
agenda of Article XXIV:7(b). Secondly negotiations are in progress under 
Article XIII:2 of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), within a 
Working Party on GATS Rules. Thirdly, a Working Party on Transparency in 
Government Procurement was established by a decision at the WTO Ministerial 
Conference held in December 1996, "to conduct a study on transparency in 
government procurement practices, taking into account national policies, and, 
based on this study, to develop elements for inclusion in an appropriate 
agreement." The work within the GATS Working Party and Transparency 
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Working Group, is distinguished from the GP A review process in that the 
negotiations are multilateral in character. Any resulting procurement disciplines 
will therefore bind all WTO Members unlike the plurilateral GP A which applies 
only to those states choosing to accede to it. There follows an overview of the 
progress of the multilateral negotiations. 
a) Working Party on GATS rules 
In common with the GATT, procurement activities are excluded from the GATS. 
Article XIII:1 of GATS states that Article II (most-favoured nation treatment), 
Article XVI (market access) and Article XVII (national treatment) shall not apply 
to laws, regulations or r e q u i r e m e ~ t s s governing the procurement by government 
agencies of services purchased for governmental purposes and not with a view to 
commercial resale or with a view to use in the supply of services for commercial 
sale. However, Article XIII:2 goes on to require the commencement of 
multilateral negotiations on government procurement in services within two years 
from the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement. The Working Party on 
GATS Rules was established in March 1995 by the Council for Trade in 
Services. 19 
The most significant achievement to date has been the implementation of an 
information gathering exercise in the form of a questionnaire circulated to all 
WTO Members, requiring them to provide details of their procurement practices, 
and the extent of regulation.2o The questionnaires deal with how procurement is 
19 The Reports of the Working Party on GATS rules can be viewed on the WTO home page at 
www.wto.org and can be downloaded via the Document Dissemination Facility. 
20 The questionnaire itself as well as the responses to it can be downloaded from the WTO documents 
on-line facility. 
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defined; the level of centralisation of procurement activities; the laws and 
regulations in force; tendering procedures; the extent of registration, residence or 
other requirements for potential suppliers; the treatment of foreign services and 
service providers and procedures for receiving and hearing complaints. Some 22 
responses have been received to date which will provide the foundation for 
discussions on multilateral disciplines. 
The Reports suggest that much of the discussion to date has focused on the 
definition of government procurement, with the view of moving on to consider 
non-discriminatory treatment at a later date. The definitional issue has been sub-
divided into three questions: 
• What entities are involved in procurement activities? 
• What is being procured in terms of goods, services and construction services? 
• What types of transactions are covered? 
In respect of the third question, attention has focused on the issue of how 
concessions should be treated, with delegations expressing the need to define 
concessions21 before moving on to consider the relevance of GATS disciplines. 
It has also been recognised that the Working Groups on Transparency in 
Government procurement is also considering questions of definition and scope of 
procurement, so that there is a continuing need for consultations on how best to 
co-ordinate the work with other for a dealing with government procurement. 
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b) Workine Group on Transparency in government procurement 
The work here has again been centred upon infonnation gathering on 
transparency related provlSlons III existing instruments on government 
procurement procedures and practices. Discussions have been conducted under 
the structure of some 11 headings under which the Parties have provided details 
of their existing experiences.22 The possible content of any agreement emerging 
from the activities of the Working Group is considered in Chapter 3. 
21 A services concession would involve a contracting authority engaging a service provider to provide a 
service to the public lying within its area of responsibility, and under which the consideration provided fl the contracting authority consists of, or includes the right the exploit the provision of the services. 
These headings can be downloaded from WTO home page at 
http://www.wto.org/wto/govtlworking.htm. 
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Chapter 2 
The Problem of Limited Membership of the GP A 1 
1. The Present Membership Situation 
The original "GATT" procurement agreement which came into force in 1981 
having been negotiated at the time of the Tokyo Round, applied only to those 
GATT members which chose to sign it. Likewise, the revised and expanded 
Agreement negotiated during the Uruguay Round and currently in force, still fails 
to deal with procurement on a multilateral basis. Rather, it is one of the "Annex 
N" or plurilateral Agreements, in that its disciplines apply only to those WTO 
members that have signed it. Membership of the Agreement is very limited, and 
little interest has been attracted from developing countries. Of the 134 WTO 
members only 27 are GP A signatories. These are Aruba, Canada, Hong Kong, 
Israel, Japan, Korea, Norway, Singapore, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, the United 
States and the European Community and its 15 Member States.2 Korea and Israel 
are the only current parties which have acceded to the Agreement as developing 
countries. 
Panama, Chinese Taipei and Iceland are currently engaged in negotiations for 
accession. The accession procedure is provided in document GP All Annex 2. It 
involves the submission of an offer to the existing Parties containing lists of 
entities and services which would be covered by the Agreement. There are also 
several newly acceded WTO Members with commitments to accede to the GP A. 
These are Bulgaria, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia and Mongolia. 14 WTO members 
I See S. Arrowsmith, "Prospects for the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement: Obstacles and 
Opportunities", (1997) 1 Malaysian Journal of Law and Society 15. 
are observers. These are Argentina, Australia, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, 
Estonia, Iceland, Kyrgyz Republic (requesting observer status) Poland, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Mongolia, Panama, Slovenia and Turkey. Four non-WTO members, 
Chinese Taipei, Croatia, Georgia and Lithuania, and three inter governmental 
organisations, the IMF, the ITC and the OECD, also have observer status. This 
means that they are entitled to sit in at the meetings of the GPA's Committee on 
Government Procuremene, follow its proceedings and receive official 
documents. Observers may be interested to follow developments within the 
Committee to benefit their trading links with other WTO members, while, for 
other states, Committee discussions provide an educational input for their own 
regional procurement initiatives. While membership of the WTO is not formally 
subject to GPA accession, its significance to the WTO's overall package of trade 
liberalisation measures should not be underplayed. Existing GP A signatories 
have indicated that prospective WTO members will be expected, at least, to 
undertake commitments to join the GP A before their WTO membership is 
approved.4 Thus it is hoped that future WTO members from among the 
economies in transition, such as Russia and China will conduct their bilateral 
negotiations with existing GP A members in parallel with their WTO accession 
negotiations. 
2 Austria, Belgiwn, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
3 This body represents all GPA Parties and is responsible for, "affording Parties the opportunity to 
consult on any matters relating to the operation of [the GP A] or the furtherance of its objectives." GP A 
Article XX(I). 
4 See V. Kulacoglu, "An Overview of Developments within the WTO Singapore Ministerial 
Conference", paper delivered to the conference Public Procurement Global Revolution, University of 
Wales Aberystwyth, September 11-12, 1997. 
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2. The need for expanded membership 
The increased membership of the GP A will be crucial if the Agreement is to have 
a pronounced impact on achieving its objectives. These objectives can be 
described under two broad headings being, the need to introduce a consistent 
framework of procurement rules among the WTO members, and the need to 
eliminate discriminatory procurement laws and practices. 
a) The need to introduce procurement rules 
One of the GPA's key objectives, as expressed in the Preamble is the need to 
provide, "transparency of laws, regulations, procedures and practices regarding 
government procurement." This clearly envisages that the GPA is intended to 
have a positive effect on the introduction or consolidation of procurement laws 
and practices. Notwithstanding the separate issue of opening national markets to 
international competition, there is an initial need to ensure that procurement 
procedures are conducted according to published, predictable and commercial 
criteria. Regulation at the national level can lead to various crucial benefits.s 
Prominent among these benefits is obtaining "value for money" or "economy" in 
procurement. This involves the acquisition of goods or services that are 
appropriate to the need identified, on the best possible terms. These terms need 
not be confined to price alone, so that various other factors such as total life-cycle 
costs, can be specified as relevant. 
5 See S. Arrowsmith, "National and International Perspectives on the Regulation of Public Procurement 
: Hannony or Conflict?" in Arrowsmith and Davies eds. Public Procurement: Global Revolution, 3 
(Kluwer International; 1998) at pp.7-8. 
49 
A further prominent concern of national policy makers is usually to safeguard the 
"probity" or "integrity" of the decision making process. Successful regulation 
can therefore lessen the opportunity for corrupt practices, such as placing 
contracts for personal or political gain. Regulation may also be directed at private 
restraints of trade such as collusion among bidders. Of equal importance is to 
safeguard the appearance of independence in the decision making process. Thus 
purchasers should not have any personal interest in the placement of contracts, 
regardless of whether they would ever in fact act on those personal interests. This 
independence can be seen as essential to safeguarding the participation and 
confidence of suppliers, in procedures which they may already regard as overly 
bureaucratic and burdensome. Quite apart from promoting supplier participation 
and value for money in general, the maintenance of probity in procurement can be 
regarded as important for other reasons. Thus Westring and Jadoun observe that 
corruption in procurement can undermine confidence in governments as a whole, 
and provide funding for criminal activities.6 
These are some of the advantages that procurement regulation can engender, ever 
if national markets remain closed. In some instances the GP A has had a crucial 
impact on actually introducing open procurement procedures. For example, until 
Japan implemented the original GATT procurement Code in 1981, it had little 
experience with open competitive bidding, to the extent that around 90 per cent of 
contracts were single tendered to local suppliers, without the pUblication of 
6 G. Westring and G. Jadoun, Public Procurement -Manual for Central and Eastern Europe 
(International Training Centre for the ILO, 1986). 
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contract n ~ t i c e s . .7 In other cases, the GP A has had a crucial impact on increasing 
the scope of application of existing national laws. In Israel the Public Tenders 
Law governs the award of central government contracts.8 This came into force in 
1992, and, for the first time, requires that contracts let by the central 
administration be subject to a system competitive tendering. Under the Law, 
however, the general position is that there is no requirement to publish a contract 
award notice in no less than 28 types of procurement contract.9 Nevertheless, 
where the GP A applies to the contract in question, it overrules Israeli legislation. 
The exemptions can only then be operated in so far as they are compatible with 
the GP A, or where specific derogations have been negotiated for their retention. 
In other instances, it has not been the fact of GP A membership that has led 
signatories to introduce or consolidate their procurement laws. Thus, the EU 
Treaty's articles on the free movement of goods and services have, in principle, 
applied to discriminatory procurement among the Members States for over 25 
years.1O The Treaty provisions have been supported by secondary legislation 
taking the form of Directives since the 1970s, albeit that the momentum towards 
ensuring effective observance of the rules dates from the late 1980s. The new 
7 See J.H. Grier, "An Overview of the Japanese Government Procurement System", 1998(6) Public 
Procurement Law Review 131. 
8 See G. Shalev, "Public Procurement Contracts in Israel", 1997(5) Public Procurement Law Review 
185. 
9 
The motivation for these exemptions has been the existence of some interest prevailing over the 
economic and public interests in favour of competitive tendering. Examples include contracts for the 
marketing of agricultural produce, and contracts for the acquisition of unique medicaments. The 
exemptions are contained in the Public Tender Regulations 1993, which implement the details of the 
main Law. 
10 For an account of the evolution of the EU's policy on procurement, see J.M. Fernandez Martin, The 
EC Public Procurement Rules: A Critical Analysis (1996; Clarendon Press Oxford) chapter 1; S. 
Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement, (1996; Sweet & Maxwell), chapter 4. For 
an account of the current legislative and policy context, see S. Arrowsmith, "The Community's Legal 
Framework on Public Procurement: "The Way Forward" At Last?" (1999) 36 Common Market Law 
ReView 13. 
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programme involved strengthening the existing award procedures, setting up an 
effective enforcement system and expanding the coverage of the rules to cover 
services contracts, as well as the previously excluded utility sectors, of water, 
transport, energy and telecommunications. I I Implementation of the GP A has 
involved the extension of market access under the existing rules to GP A 
suppliers. It has also been necessary to undertake minor amendments to the EC 
Directives, to avoid the situation of GP A suppliers having access to EC 
procurement markets on more favourable terms than EC suppliers themselves. 12 
Thus the rights which Member States enjoy under the current Directives, are no 
less favourable than those which third countries enjoy against Community states 
under the GP A The Directives also ensure that compliance with their procedures 
automatically ensures compliance with the GP A13 
The beneficial impact which the GP A has undoubtedly had on promoting the 
regulation of procurement according to consistent criteria, has, however, been 
limited to its small body of existing members. Many WTO members lack any 
formal regulation of procurement activities relying instead on administrative 
guidelines and strong channels of accountability for purchasing decisions. For 
II The current directives are Directive 93/36/EEC on public supply contracts, [1993] 0.1. L199/1; 
Directive 93/371EEC on public works contracts, [1993] 0.1. L199/54 and Directive 92/501EEC on 
services contracts, [1992] 0.1. L209/1. Procurement in the utilities sectors of water, energy, transport 
and telecommunications are governed by Directive 93/38/EEC, [1993] 0.1. L199/84, and remedies by 
Directive 89/665IEEC, [1989] OJ. L395/83 (public sector) and Directive 92/13IEEC, [1992] OJ. 
L 76/14 (utilities) 12 • 
For example, the thresholds for access to central government services contracts were lower under the 
GP A than under the public sector Services Directive. In some respects, the award procedures under 
the Directives were more flexible than those under the GP A. For example, prior to the amendment of 
the Directives, the rules on reducing time periods for the receipt of tenders following the issue of 
Periodic Indicative Notices (which give advance notice of future purchases) were different under the 
GP A. Time limits could formerly be reduced to a greater extent under the EC Directives compared to 
the GPA: 
13 It is the Member States themselves, however, who are responsible for the correct implementing the 
GPA. 
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example, in New Zealand, there are no laws, regulations or central controls 
dealing specifically with government procurement. Reliance is placed on the 
strict accountability of Chief Executives to their Ministries, and scrutiny of their 
performance by the Parliament and the Audit Office. Purchasing guidelines stress 
that procurement decisions should ensure efficient, cost-effective and ethical use 
of public resources. 14 Many WTO members with developing country status lack 
both formal laws and administrative guidelines on procurement procedures. The 
GP A has therefore had a positive but limited impact on procurement regulation 
among the WTO members. Of course, the Agreement's objectives are more 
ambitious, and go far beyond the mere introduction and consolidation of 
procurement rules. Crucial to the purpose of these rules is the liberalisation of 
procurement markets, through the removal of practices involving discriminatory 
treatment among, and against domestic and foreign suppliers. 
b) The need to eliminate discriminatory treatment 
The GP A has had an impressive positive effect on reducing discriminatory 
procurement laws among its existing members. One would also hope that it has 
had a corresponding effect on discriminatory practices, although evidence on this 
issue is not yet available. While many existing members had already prioritised 
procurement regulation before joining the GP A, this had not involved any broad 
scale commitments to opening their markets to international competition. Thus it 
is possible to envisage regulation at national or regional levels, which prioritises 
value for money considerations, and safeguards the transparency of procurement 
14 For an overview of procurement regulation in New Zealand see the Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation home page at www.apec.org. 
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procedures, but which also makes no attempt to systematically ensure that 
markets are open to foreign suppliers. 15 The achievements of the GPA in opening 
up previously closed, or protected procurement markets, has been considerable. 
Negotiations leading to the present GPA resulted in a substantial widening of the 
scope of the rules. The extension of the Agreement to procurement by sub-
central government bodies, as well as entities in the utilities sector achieved 
much, as did the extension of coverage to services and construction services. It 
should be noted however, that while the GP A covers these sectors and entities in 
principle, the actual coverage of the Agreement as between any two states 
remains dependent on the results of bilateral negotiations. The value of the GP A 
in this regard is that it provides a negotiating forum for the gradual extension of 
its coverage, on the basis of reciprocal concessions. However, there is little that 
can be achieved through negotiations without the political commitment to 
reducing the incidence of discrimination, and increasing cross-border trade in 
procurement. The manner in which the GPA's coverage has been extended as 
between the EU and the US clearly exemplifies this. 16 
At the time of negotiations leading to the adoption of the revised GP A concluded 
in parallel with the Uruguay Round in December 1993, little was achieved in 
terms of expanding coverage between these Signatories, at sub-central 
IS On the interplay between the objectives of national and international procurement rules, see S. 
Arrowsmith, ''National and International Perspectives on the regulation of Public procurement: 
Harmony or Conflict?" in Arrowsmith and Davies eds. Public Procurement: Global Revolution, 3 
(Kluwer'International; 1998). 
16 See A. Halford, "An Overview ofEC - United States Trade Relations in the Area of Public 
Procurement" 1995(1) Public Procurement Law Review 35. 
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g o v e r n m e ~ t t and utilities sector level. However, the April 199317 and April 
199418 EU - US bilateral agreements on government procurement substantially 
widened the scope of regulated procurement between the two parties and 
achieved an acceptable reciprocal balance in bidding opportunities on both sides 
of the Atlantic. Three factors have been identified19 as instrumental to the 
broadening of the US offer at the sub-central government, and utility level, and 
the reduction of discrimination in favour of domestic suppliers required by the 
Buy American Act.2o Firstly, under the 1993 bilateral agreement, the EC was 
able to secure an undertaking that the US Administration would seek the 
voluntary commitment of sub-federal entities to be included in the lists of 
covered entities. Secondly, under Article 4 of the 1993 agreement, provision was 
made for a jointly sponsored study to quantify the procurement opportunities that 
would arise from the GP A coverage of the entities and sectors offered or 
requested by either of the trading partners. By the 1994 agreement, the report had 
been published,21 and it clearly demonstrated that the EC is by far the greatest 
provider of bidding opportunities at the sub-central level, making it politically 
untenable for the US to defend its limited offer. Thirdly, the conclusion of the 
broadened agreement in 1994, was due in part to a US domestic policy initiative 
to cut costs in federal procurement as part of a process of "reinventing 
government".22 
17 Council Decision 93/3231EEC [1993] O.J. L125/1 of May 1993. 
18 COmmission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Council Decision Concerning the 
conclusion of an Agreement in the form of an exchange of letters between the European Community 
~ ~ d d the United States on government procurement, COM 994 251 Final, June 16, 1994. 
See A. Halford, supra note 16, at pp. 44-55. 
~ : : Buy American Act 193347 Stat. 1520 (1933) (current version at 41 U.S.C. S. S.S. 10a-l0d (1976)). 
The report was carried out by Deloitte and Touche, Reported in "EU-US negotiations on public 
procurement" Commission press release April 21, 1994. 
22 ' Facts on File, September 9, 1993, pp. 665-66 At. 
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The fact of GP A membership is thus only a first necessary step towards the 
elimination of discriminatory procurement as a non-tariff barrier to trade. 
Membership itself can achieve only a limited amount without the political will to 
reach agreement on the gradual extension of the GPA's coverage. The author 
now describes the possible barriers that have prevented most WTO members 
from taking the first necessary step, of acceding to the GP A. 
3. Practical considerations 
There are a number of practical considerations which may prevent WTO 
members from prioritising GP A accession. One factor is the cost and complexity 
of accession negotiations. It will be recalled that accession involves more than 
merely agreeing to open the procurement which is, in principle covered by the 
Agreement, to international competition. In practice, the scope of the GPA's 
coverage as between any two members is determined through bilateral 
negotiations. The task of conducting accession negotiations will become 
increasingly complex as the number of signatories swells, due to the need for 
each new member to reach agreement with each and every existing member. It 
has also been noted that the insistence of many parties on obtaining reciprocity on 
a sectoral or entity basis also hinders accession negotiations.23 Negotiations are 
likely to be protracted if members are only prepared to open their procurement 
markets in particular sectors, if other members can likewise commit to opening 
the same sectors to the same extent. As noted, the US and Ee continued 
23 See B.M. Hoekrnan and P.C. Mavroidus, "The WTO Agreement on Government Procurement: 
Expanding Disciplines, Declining Membership" (1994) 5 Public Procurement Law Review 63. 
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negotiations on coverage, beyond the period leading up to the adoption of the 
current GP A in parallel with the Uruguay Round. The 1994 bilateral agreement 
eventually concluded between them (which has for the most part been 
incorporated into the GPA's Annexes) was based on coverage on a "dollar for 
dollar" approach rather than strict entity and sector reciprocity. Even this 
approach has its difficulties, however, as there is obvious scope for disagreement 
as to the actual dollar value of the offers on coverage which are made. As noted 
above, one of the factors leading to the conclusion of the EU - US bilateral 
agreement was the publication of the study which quantified the values of the 
offers made. 
A further potential barrier to increased membership is the short-term resources 
which need to be devoted to implementing the GP A, by providing for contract 
award procedures and training purchasers to use them. The challenges of 
implementation are greater for states lacking a domestic legal tradition of 
regulating procurement activities. It was noted above that the beneficial impact 
which the GP A has had on promoting the introduction of procurement rules, has 
been limited to its small body of existing members. This is not to suggest, 
however, that WTO members which have yet to accede to the GP A have 
generally failed to prioritise the regulation of procurement, or have not recognised 
the economic importance of efficient procurement practices. Under various trade 
liberalisation agendas at bilateral and regional levels, states are increasingly 
. agreeing to enter into commitments on cross-border trade in procurement. Such 
is the momentum of current developments, that it can realistically be said that we 
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are now experiencing a global revolution24 in the area of procurement regulation. 
For the GPA, which is firmly the principal vehicle for procurement liberalisation 
at the global level, there are clearly positive consequences here for the prospects 
of increased membership. Developments at regional and bilateral levels increase 
the profile of procurement as an economic activity which is crucial to national 
economies. Such developments can also be seen, in many respects, as a 
facilitating step towards GP A accession, since it will frequently be easier for 
states to implement the GP A through the adaptation of existing laws or 
regulations, than through the adoption of rules for the first time. 25 
4. The desire of states to retain their secondary uses of procurement 
The author considers that the perceived limitations, which the GP A imposes on 
the use of procurement for secondary purposes, constitutes the most significant, 
and intractable barrier to increased membership. Governments have traditionally 
used procurement as an instrument for the promotion of innumerable secondary 
objectives, sometimes motivated only by the desire to isolate domestic suppliers 
from foreign competition, but often connected with more legitimate objectives of 
a social, economic/industrial or environmental character. There are various 
explanations for the use of procurement for purposes other that the purchase of 
24 The descriptions "global revolution" or "revolution" were first used by D. Wallace, Jr., "The 
Changing World of National Procurement Systems: Global Reformation" (1985) 4 Public Procurement 
Law Review 57. See also Arrowsmith and Davies eds. Public Procurement: Global Revolution (1998; 
Kluwer International). 
2S For an overview of the various trade organisations and regional groupings which currently have on-
going initiatives in the area of international procurement, and for an analysis of whether these initiatives 
should be seen as beneficial from the perspective ofmultilateralliberalisation, see S. Arrowsmith, J. 
Linarelli and D. Wallace, Jr., Regulating Public Procurement: National and International 
Perspectives, forthcoming; Kluwer International. 
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goods and services on a value for money basis. The more prominent explanations 
are explained below. 
Some policies are overtly protectionist, and motivated solely by the desire to 
systematically displace foreign with domestic industry in government contracts to 
increase domestic employment and profits in the industries concerned. The US 
Buy American Act26 of 1993, as amended, represents one of the most 
comprehensive policies of this kind. The legislation covers a number of 
discriminatory measures taking several forms, including preferences and set 
asides for domestic industries, as well as local content requirements. 
Other policies may be motivated by the desire to correct market imperfections. 
For example, in some countries, especially developing countries, capital markets 
are inadequate and finance may not be available for the development of industries 
which would be able to develop a comparative advantage, and flourish in perfect 
market conditions. Guaranteed government contracts then provide a means of 
redressing the market imperfections which hamper the natural development of the 
protected firms. In practice, many countries adopt policies to foster the 
development of small businesses, which are based to a large extent on the idea of 
correcting market imperfections. Such policies also frequently incorporate a 
social dimension such as the desire to promote businesses owned by 
disadvantaged groups. 
26 . B u ~ ~ ~ e n c a n n Act 1933 47 Stat. 1520 (1933) (codified at 41 USC S.s. lOa-lOd (1976)). For a 
descnption of the Buy American Act, see M.J. Golub & S.L. Fenske, "U.S. Government Procurement: 
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Part of the motivation for discriminatory procurement may also be to reduce 
procurement costs in imperfect markets. Economists have identified that the 
application of price preferences in favour of relatively inefficient domestic firms, 
may reduce the prices bid by competing, and more efficient, foreign firms?7 
Whether a preference can have such a positive effect depends on the structure of 
the industry involved and the relative costs of domestic and foreign firms. Using 
price preferences may lower procurement costs, if domestic firms are at a 
competitive disadvantage, and only a limited number of firms bid for the contract. 
Where there are a large number of firms competing in the same market, and they 
are invited to bid for government contracts, this generally ensures that the market 
price is paid. Where domestic firms are at a competitive disadvantage, they will 
submit relatively high bids. The more competitive foreign firms are capable of 
submitting much lower bids, but choose to undercut domestic firms only by 
enough of a margin to win the contract. Where price preferences in favour of 
domestic firms are adopted, the hypothesis is that foreign firms are forced to 
lower their bids in response to the increased competition from domestic firms. 
Finally, as noted above, preferential procurement policies may also be used as a 
bargaining tool to retain some leverage in trade negotiations, rather than 
unilaterally opening national markets without securing reciprocal access. 
Procurement has become an increasingly significant non-tariff barrier to trade as , 
states lose their ability to protect domestic industry via the quotas, duties or 
Opportunities and Obstacles for Foreign Contractors" (1987) 20 The George Washington Journal of 
International Law and Economics 573. 
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subsidies outlawed by the GATT, and other WTO Agreements, on a multilateral 
basis. It is therefore perhaps not surprising that most WTO Members have 
chosen to retain their freedom to discriminate against foreign suppliers in one of 
the few areas where this option is still available to them. The inclination towards 
protecting domestic suppliers may be stronger among developing countries than 
their developed counterparts. It has been suggested that discriminatory 
procurement policies are only effective in protecting domestic producers (by 
displacing competitive imports with non-competitive domestic products or 
services) under certain conditions and that these conditions are far more likely to 
be present in developing countries than in industrialised countries.28 A crucial 
condition here is that government demand for goods, which are frequently 
procured must exceed domestic supply in order for a discriminatory procurement 
policy to be effective. This is more likely to be the case in developing countries, 
which tend to be characterised by a shortage in domestic production of goods that 
governments procure heavily. 
It can also be noted that developing countries are frequently characterised by 
relatively large public procurement markets so that, in signing the GP A, they 
generally liberalise a larger market than an industrialised country would. The 
author is aware that representatives from some developing countries view the 
GP A as a "battering ram" to prise open large procurement markets with 
27 see R.P. McAfee and J. McMillan, "Government Procurement and International Trade" (1989) 26 
Journal of International Economics 291. 
28 See F. Trionfetti, The Government Procurement Agreement and International Trade: Theory and 
Empirical Evidence, paper written for the World Trade Organisation (1997)(unpublished). 
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i n s u f f i c i e ~ t t by way of reciprocal market access opportunities.29 While these 
concerns are genuinely held, it is repeated that the GPA's coverage is determined 
via a process of bilateral negotiations. Concerns over the size and value of the 
respective markets which are offered can be resolved at this time, through a 
'dollar for dollar' approach if necessary. It can be tentatively suggested that the 
argument belies a lack of confidence among developing countries of their ability 
to secure a mutually acceptable result in accession negotiations. 
As noted above, regional agreements are having a considerable impact on 
reducing the ability of governments to routinely place contracts domestically, and 
this undoubtedly limits the effectiveness of procurement as an instrument of 
secondary policy. Nevertheless, states may have retained a considerable scope for 
pursuing secondary objectives under regional arrangements. The strategic uses of 
procurement may also be crucial to reform programmes instituted at national 
level. 30 The situation may therefore be that states are concerned that that their 
secondary uses of procurement will be further limited by GP A accession, or that 
their reform programmes will be threatened. 
The objective of trade protectionism will involve the routine exclusion of foreign 
firms from participation in contract awards. As will be seen, however, the use of 
procurement for more legitimate secondary objectives, such as to redress regional 
disparities, also frequently involves discriminating against foreign suppliers. It is 
29 Such views were communicated to the author at the Conference, Public Procurement: Global 
Revolution, at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth Sept. 1997. 
30 For example, it will be seen in the following Chapter that the strategic uses of procurement to the 
procurement reforms currently being instituted in South Africa pursuant to the Green Paper on Public 
Sector Procurement (GN No. 691, GG17928 of April 14, 1997). 
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the large potential of procurement for contributing towards socio/economic goals 
which makes it extremely difficult to persuade states to give up (or limit) their 
strategic uses of procurement, in favour of the long term benefits to the national 
and global economy, which open trade can generate. Public procurement is one 
of the functions of governments, through which they can pursue the policy goals 
which they have represented to the electorate, who, in turn, have given them the 
mandate to govern. It is therefore understandable that governments are reluctant 
to enter into international obligations which may mean that their strategic uses of 
procurement are lost where some discriminatory effects are likely. While there 
are numerous issues in this area, they are all referable to the overall question of 
whether the GP A strikes the appropriate balance between the objectives of trade 
liberalisation, and the desire of states to retain at least some of their freedom in 
the placement of contracts. Such is the importance and topicality of the issues 
here that the following Chapter is devoted to providing a detailed perspective on 
the GPA's approach to limiting, and accommodating the secondary uses of 
procurement. 
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I 
Chapter 3 
The GP A's limitations on the instrumental uses of procurement as an 
explanation for its limited membership 
The use of procurement for the use of socio/economic policies 
Introduction 
It has been widely suggested that a key part of the explanation for the GPA's 
present limited membership is that non-members desire to retain their ability to 
discriminate against foreign products or suppliers when awarding contracts. 1 
There may be several reasons for this, ranging from a desire to isolate domestic 
industry from competitive pressures to the tendency of governments to use 
procurement to achieve other secondary objectives of a social and economic 
character. This broad use of procurement power, is in conflict with a view which 
sees the principal ideal which should inform procurement decisions as the 
reduction of public expenditure through the purchase of goods and services on a 
value for money basis. In this connection, two conflicting ideologies on the role 
of public procurement have been identified. 2 
The first approach can be described as the 'economic rationale,.3 This is 
concerned primarily with opening-up procurement markets and increasing cross-
See, for example, B.M. Hoekman and P.C. Mavroidis, "The WTO's Agreement on Government 
Procurement: Expanding Disciplines, Declining Membership" (1994) 5 Public Procurement Law 
ReView 63 2 • 
See J.M. Fernandez Martin, The EC Public Procurement Rules, A Critical Analysis (Clarendon Press, 
?xford; 1996) atpp. 41-49. 
Ibid. at p.4l. 
border procurement opportunities. Under a strictly economic approach, the aim 
of social welfare is closely equated with the reduction of wasted expenditure in 
procurement through a transparent regime of competitive tendering. The 
discretion of public authorities is narrowly circumscribed to favouring the 
contractor who is able to offer either the best price, or the most advantageous 
tender according to strict commercial criteria, relevant only to the firm's ability to 
perform the contract. The economic rationale seeks to sever procurement from 
the various other instruments at the disposal of governments to achieve their 
economic and social objectives. Under this view secondary objectives should be 
dealt with by using alternative instruments. Procurement may be seen as a 
second best and inefficient option. 
Economic savings can indeed result in several ways from sourcing procurement 
requirements from the most competitive firm internationally, rather from a 
favoured domestic supplier. Prices charged by domestic firms are likely to drop, 
as they compete with foreign firms, on government contracts as well as on 
contracts with private clients. The liberalisation process is therefore seen as 
crucial to the achievement of value for money and the avoidance of wasted 
expenditure. The fair and equitable use of taxpayers' money is ensured. Re-
structuring and adjustment also promote macro-economic growth, as firms are 
forced to become more efficient and innovative. In the mid-1980, it was 
estimated that the effect of competition on domestic firms, and restructuring 
effects alone, would generate savings worth an enormous 12 per cent of total 
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European Union GDP.4 While estimates of this kind are unavailable in the WTO 
setting at present, it is clear that comparable savings on the global level could be 
generated by an effective, observed, and enforced regulatory system. 
It is also clear however, that there are significant barriers to the success of the EU 
regime in actually achieving these economic benefits. These barriers have a 
strong relevance to the GPA's success and future development.5 Both these 
regimes have the same basic objective of opening up procurement markets to free 
competition through a body of rules which are broadly similar in content. In 
1995, the EU commissioned a substantial study to assess the economic impact 
which the EU procurement rules have had between 1987 and 1994.6 The study 
was characterised by striking conclusions contributing to the overall impression 
that the EU rules have not had a significant impact in promoting cross-border 
trade in procurement markets. It was found that less than 14 per cent of entities 
covered by the rules had published any contract award notices at all. At an early 
and fundamental point in the procedure, suppliers had therefore generally been 
deprived of the opportunity of becoming aware of procurement opportunities. 7 
The study also highlighted the apparently limited impact of the rules on 
4 "The Cost of Non-Europe", in Public Sector Procurement, Research on the Cost of Non-Europe, 
Basic Findings, Vol. 5A, by W.S. Atkins Management Consultants (Commission of the European 
Communities, 1998), p.54. 
5 See H. Gordon, S. Rimmer and S. Arrowsmith, "The Impact of the European Union Rules on Public 
Procurement and Implications for the GP A" in S. Arrowsmith and A. Davies eds. Public Procurement: 
Global Revolution 27 (Kluwer International; 1998). 
6 Published on the European Commission's internet pages under The Single Market Review Series 
Subseries III - Dismantling of Barriers : Public Procurement, July 1996. ' 
<h1tp:lleuropa.eu.intlcommldgI5/studies/stud26.htm> 
7 The author would suggest here tha:t the p u b l i c a t i ~ n n of procurement notices is merely a first step 
towards bringing about the econormc benefits envisaged by the EU and WTO procurement rules. 
There is no obligation on the supply side to respond to advertised procurement opportunities. Indeed 
in the GP A context, it is arguably umealistic to expect suppliers to have access to all the government' 
gazettes and equivalent publications which would enable them to become aware of all opportunities. 
This is a concern even at present when the GP A has failed to attract a significant membership. The 
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competition. It was assumed that the liberalisation process would lead to price 
convergence among the Member States, in frequently procured supplies. No 
price convergence was in fact observed in most product sectors, suggesting that 
the EU rules have been largely ineffective in increasing the competitiveness of 
the covered markets. While the potential economic benefits of open procurement 
have been strongly emphasised, it is therefore now clear that any system of rules 
should only be regarded as a necessary first step towards the achievement of 
these benefits. 
In contrast to the 'economic rationale', the instrumental approach recognises the 
value of public procurement for promoting innumerable objectives beyond 
market liberalisation and value for money. Thus Fernandez Martin notes that, 
"[t]he responsibilities of public authorities for ensuring harmonious and peaceful 
economic and social development, together with the volume of government 
procurement, justify this use of public procurement as a socio-economic policy 
instrument."g On this view, public authorities assume political responsibility to 
the electorate, which reflect prevailing values in society. These responsibilities 
materialise in all their activities, and public interest considerations are inherent in 
decisions relating to procurement methods, and the placement of contracts. 
One of the challenges for any system of rules seeking to regulate government 
purchasing, is to attempt to reconcile these different ideologies. It is clear from 
the GPA's preamble that the Agreement is concerned to achieve the appropriate 
balance between the need for market liberalisation, and the desire of states to 
potential difficulties will become greatly pronounced if and when the Agreement attracts an increased 
membership. The problems here are fully analysed in the Chapter 5. 
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retain the instrumental uses of procurement. The Preamble identifies the need for 
the expansion of world trade, the non-discriminatory treatment of foreign 
suppliers, and the need for transparent procedures. It also recognises that these 
objectives should be attained consistently with the development needs of 
developing and least-developed countries. The question considered by this 
Chapter, is whether the GP A is likely to achieve the appropriate balance. 
In the context of the EC rules, Fernandez Martin reaches the firm conclusion that 
the interpretation of the rules by the European Court of Justice, and the 
Commission's insistence on an economic approach, leans too far in favour of the 
economic rationale. Thus the author points towards the political responsibilities 
of contracting entities in addressing disparities in regional development, and the 
unavoidable relevance of public interest considerations in procurement 
decisions.9 The inadequacy of alternative means of safeguarding regional and 
social cohesion is also cited as a reason against restricting the instrumental uses 
of procurement. 10 These conclusions have been reached in the context of a 
political and legal system intended to create an internal market, leading to 
Economic and Monetary Union, and the common treatment of third parties by the 
Member States. The WTO's objectives are, of course, not nearly as ambitious as 
this. The two regimes share common objectives such as raising standards of 
living, promoting full employment, and expanding the production and exchange 
of goods. However, the WTO's remit is restricted to removing the tariff and non-
8 I.M. Fernandez Martin, supra note 2, at p. 45. 
9 Ibid, at pp. 89-92. 
IOIbid, at pp. 86-88. The author argues that until such time as common rules are adopted on how to 
deal with regional disparities, a flexible approach should be taken under Articles 92 to 94 Ee (now 
Articles 87-89) to permit preferential procurement policies to be assessed in the light of the State Aids 
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tariff barriers to trade among its Members on the basis of reciprocal and mutually 
advantageous arrangements. Its remit does not extend to the creation of a 
customs union, still less the creation of an internal market. More generally, it 
may be noted that the differences in economic development between some WTO 
states, is far greater than those existing between, and within the EU's Member 
States. It can therefore be suggested that it would be surprising if one could find 
the same emphasis on the 'economic rationale' to procurement under the GPA, as 
one can now detect in the EU context. 
It is against this background that the author analyses the approach which the GP A 
takes to balancing the conflicting ideologies identified here. This is a difficult 
undertaking, not least because of the lack of WTO Panel decisions which would 
provide some indication of the policy underlying the Agreement's text. The 
author's arguments are guided by the obvious need for an increased SUbscription 
to the GP A, but also by the recognition that increased membership cannot be 
achieved at any cost, and that there must be convincing reasons for departing 
from the traditional GATT principles of competition, and non-discrimination. 
It is also emphasised that the issues presented here are of real and immediate 
concern. Of the three dispute settlement cases initiated under the present GP A, 
two have been directly concerned with the use of procurement power for 
secondary purposes. In October 1998, at the request of the European 
Communities and Japan, a panel was established to examine a Massachusetts 
provisions. This would allow for the Commission to undertake a full examination of the measure in 
light of all the relevant considerations. 
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law, II prohibiting its contracting entities from having any business dealings with 
finns from, or having business interests, in Bunna due to the latter's human rights 
abuses. 12 Regrettably (from the point of view of gaining authoritative guidance 
on the meaning of the GP A provisions which were allegedly infringed) the Panel 
suspended its work in relation to this complaint in February 1999. This was in 
response to a US court ruling which granted an injunction restraining 
enforcement of the Massachusetts law, when it was challenged as 
unconstitutional by the US National Foreign Trade Council (NFTC) in November 
1998.13 
In the same month as the Massachusetts complaint was withdrawn, the US made 
a request for consultations concerning the procurement practices of the Korean 
Airport Construction Authority. Part of the complaint involves requirements that 
participating suppliers have manufacturing facilities in Korea, and that foreign 
finns undertake to partner with local Korean finns. Both the European 
Communities and Japan have since joined the consultations, and a request for the 
establishment of a panel was made in May 1999. 14 The nature of these disputes 
II Massachusetts "Act regulating State contracts with companies doing business in or with Burma" of 
June 25, 1996, Chapter 130, S.s.!, 1996 Mass. Acts 210, codified at Mass.Gen. Laws, Chapter 7, 
S.s.22G-22M. 
12 See A. Oram, "WTO Complaint against a Massachusetts Procurement Measure", 1998(6) Public 
Procurement Law Review, CS 171. 
13 The Panel's work was suspended in response to the decision of the District Court of the First Circuit 
which found that the Massachusetts Burma Law unconstitutionally infringed on the foreign affairs 
powers of the foreign government. (National Foreign Trade Council, 26 F. Supp 2d at 290; National 
Foreign Trade Council v Baker, No. 98-10757 (D. Mass, Nov. 17, 1998 (order granting relief). In 
June 1999, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit also ruled in favour ofNFTC's position, and also 
expanded on the District Court's ruling by unanimously holding that the Burma Law violated the 
foreign commerce clause, and was pre-empted by federal law regarding Burma. (National Foreign 
Trade Council v Natsios, No. 98-2304). The Supreme Court heard the case on March 22,2000, and 
upheld the Court of Appeals ruling on 19 June 2000. (National Foreign Trade Council v Natsios, No. 
90-474). These judgements can be located on the Find Law web site at http://caselaw.findlaw.com. 
14 The panel was established on 16 June 1999, and handed down its report on IMay 2000. 
(WTIDSI631R, Korea - Measures Affecting Government Procurement). The principal finding was that 
the various agencies responsible for the construction of the airport were not covered by Korea's 
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clearly illustrates the continuing desire of states to use their procurement for 
secondary purposes such as encouraging good human rights standards, and 
promoting the development of domestic firms. 
New issues surrounding the GPA's approach to secondary policies are also on the 
horizon. The Republic of South Africa has recently embarked upon an ambitious 
programme of procurement reform. IS As will be seen in Section 10 of this 
Chapter, the use of procurement is envisaged by the Green Paper on Procurement 
Reform as an essential tool for the development of black South African's and the 
promotion of equality. Those actors responsible for the policy are also insistent 
that the new measures will strike the appropriate balance between the economic 
benefits which open procurement can produce, and the strong reliance on 
procurement power for achieving socio/economic objectives. While South Africa 
is not even a WTO Member, it is likely that it will begin accession negotiations in 
the foreseeable future. It is also seeking to 'export' its procurement methods to 
developing countries and economies in transition. The question of the GP A 
compatibility of the South African reforms may therefore have a bearing on 
GPA's prospects of attracting new members. The reforms are fully explored in a 
case study at the end of this Chapter. 
Section 1 of this Chapter describes the secondary objectives which are pursued 
through procurement rules. No attempt is made to exhaustively enumerate all the 
Appendix I of the GP A, and therefore did not have to conduct their procurement in accordance with the 
Agreement. The report can be located on the WTO document dissemination facility at 
http://www.wto.org. 
15 See the '''Green Paper on Public Sector Procurement Reform in South Africa", GN No.691 GG17928 
of 14 April 1997. On the reforms, see D. Letchmiah, "The Process of Public Sector Procurement 
Reform in South Africa" (1999) 1 Public Procurement Law Review 15. 
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secondary objectives which have been pursued through procurement. 16 The 
principal reason for this is that the content of secondary objectives, and the 
manner in which procurement power is deployed in this context varies 
immensely. In this Chapter, the author therefore links broadly defined categories 
of secondary objectives, with the various procurement based methods (such as 
qualification criteria, contractual conditions, preferences, offsets and the offer-
back mechanism) which can be used to contribute towards these objectives. The 
extent to which the various methods for pursuing secondary objectives can be 
operated compatibly with the GP A is examined in detail. 
1. The secondary policies which have been pursued under procurement rules 
a) Social Policies 
Governments have used procurement as a tool of social policy either as a 
mechanism to enforce existing legal obligations or to promote standards of 
behaviour in the private sector going beyond those required by law. The term 
'contract compliance' has been used here to describe the use of procurement as 
an instrument of social policy. While the term has become closely linked to 
achieving equality of opportunity between different groups, such as gender, race 
and religion, the term is widely applied more generally to any policy of a social 
character which governments identify as important. There are therefore 
innumerable social policies which can be identified and potentially pursued under 
procurement rules. 
16 Even a detailed study in this area, restricted to the Member States of the EU acknowledged that it did 
~ o t t necessarily identify all secondary uses. ~ f p ~ o c u r e m e n t t actually in operation. See C. McCrudden, 
Public Procurement and Equal Opporturuties In the European Community, A Study of "contract 
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Many social policies are directed at specific segments of the population which are 
identified as being disadvantaged in some way. Thus some policies have, for 
example, focused on the long term unemployed. Several local authorities in the 
UK during the mid-1980s required participating firms to demonstrate that, 
employment under the contract would be given to those living within the council 
area. Liverpool City Council required their contractors to prove that reasonable 
steps were taken to recruit local labour through job centres and/or trade unions. 17 
Disabled workers have also been targeted by procurement based policies. 
Provisions in the Spanish law on public procurement,18 for example, provide that 
covered authorities may give preference to firms whose total labour force 
includes at least two per cent of disabled workers. This preference can apply 
only in those cases where the offers presented by these firms are equivalent to the 
most economically advantageous offers made by other tenderers. 
Ethnic minorities may also be targeted by social policies. For example, since 
1991 in the US, there has been a Government-wide goal of awarding five per cent 
of the total value of all contracts and sub-contracts to small businesses owned and 
operated by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals.19 In 1994, 
compliance" in the Member States of the European Community and under European Community law", 
~ ~ d ~ ~ conducted for the European Commission (1995) unpublished, at p.111. 
Ibzd, at p. 110. It is clear, following the Local Government Act 1988, that such offset type 
requirements, are not permitted under UK law. Section 17 imposes a duty on local authorities to 
exercise their functions in relation to public supply or works contracts "without reference to matters 
which are non-commercial. Under Section 17(5}(a}, such non-commercial considerations include 
~ 8 0 n d i t i o n s s imposed on contractors relating to the composition of their work forces, 
19 Ley 13/1995 of May de Contractos de las Administrativas publicas. 
Office of Federal Procurement Policy, Policy Letter 91-1,56 Fed. Reg. 11796 (Mar. 20, 1991). 
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Congress authorised federal government agencies to apply a ten per cent price 
preference for such businesses.2o 
Other policies may be based on protecting, or improving, the rights of the general 
population. Thus some policies focus on protecting labour conditions relating to 
remuneration, health and safety at work or security on site. For example, contract 
compliance was used in this sense in the UK to promote fair wages and 
conditions in the private sector up until 1983. From 1990, the application of the 
conditions were extended to apply to employees of sub-contractors as well as to 
the prime contractors' own employees. Despite the fact that compliance was 
specified as a term of the contract, often with a right to terminate for breach, the 
policy was largely ineffective due to a lack of awareness among workers of their 
rights and consequent non-enforcement.21 
Policies aimed at environmental protection have also become increasingly 
important in recent years.22 Procuring entities may, for example, seek to specify 
the characteristics of the products they require in terms of the environmental 
impact of the production methods used for those products, or in terms of the 
extent to which they can be recycled when they reach the end of their life-cycle. 
Here, the environmental considerations are directly relevant to the actual products 
which are procured. Entities may, however, pursue broad environmental goals 
not specifically connected to the subject matter of the contract. For example, 
20 PL 103-335, 108 Stat. 3243. 
21 For further details of the policy, see S. Arrowsmith, "Public Procurement as an Instrument of Policy 
and the Impact of Market Liberalisation" (1995) 111 Law Quarterly Review 235, pp. 242-243. 
22 For a discussion of the compatibility of environmental considerations with both the EU and GP A 
rules, see P. Kunzlik, "Environmental Issues in International Procurement", irJ S. Arrowsmith and A. 
Davies eds. Public Procurement: Global Revolution (Kluwer; 1998). 
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entities could impose a qualification requirement that employees should have 
access to secure storage, and shower facilities to encourage them to cycle to 
work. 
States may also use their procurement power to promote human rights 
internationally. Thus the Massachusetts law23 mentioned above forbade 
procuring entities from purchasing goods and services from any company doing 
business with Myanmar, because of the country's poor human rights record. The 
policy under the law operated by imposing a ten per cent price penalty on bids 
from firms which deal with Myanmar. 
b) Economic/Industrial Policies24 
Procurement may also be used to pursue policies of an economic or industrial 
character. These policies are generally related in some way to industrial 
development objectives. There may be a significant overlap, however, between 
the social policies described above and the economic policies described here. For 
example, it has already been seen, in the US examples of preferences for minority 
owned businesses provided above, that one way of promoting disadvantaged 
segments of the population, is to favour firms which are owned or operated by 
these social groups. The upliftment of disadvantaged groups clearly has a social 
dimension. There is also an economic aspect in that the growth of the targeted 
23 Massachusetts "Act regulating State contracts with companies doing business in or with Burma" of 
June 25, 1996, Chapter 130, S.s.l, 1996 Mass. Acts 210, codified at Mass.Gen. Laws, Chapter 7, 
S.s.22G-22M. 
24 Jeanrenaud has provided a classification of the various functions procurement can playas a policy 
instrument in the area of economic and industrial policies. See C. Jeanrenaud, "Marches publics et 
politique economique" (1984) 72 Annales de I,Economique Publique, Sociale et Cooperative, No.2, 
151 at pp. 154-156. An English language version of this classification can be found in J.M. Fernandez 
Martin, The EC Public Procurement Rules, A Critical Analysis, supra, note 10, at pp. 46-47. 
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businesses IS likely to be promoted. A complete separation of social and 
economic policies, is therefore not possible. 
Economic policies may pursue various different objectives. The policy may be 
central to reviving the economy as a whole. Thus procurement has been 
extensively used in the field of trade-cycle regulation. In times of economic 
recession, an increase in procurement can help to increase overall demand and 
thereby stimulate economic activity. Among the range of goods and services 
purchased, orders with an investment character such as construction of buildings, 
or civil engineering works are the ones most frequently used in budgetary 
policies which respond to cyclical effects. Thus, a general post-war trend in 
Europe was the adoption of large programmes of public works to fight 
unemployment. 
Procurement may also be used to improve the competitiveness of domestic 
industry. This tends to occur in industries where the government is the largest 
purchaser operating in the sector which normally coincides with high technology 
industries such as information technology, telecommunications and defence. 
Providing some government business to these industries is seen as important, 
because these sectors normally provide the technological innovations capable of 
stimulating the economy as a whole by boosting foreign investment and 
providing skilled jobs. 
Economic policies may also seek to encourage the participation of SMEs in 
procurement procedures given the importance of these enterprises to national and 
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regional economies. The Green Paper on Public Procurement in the European 
Union25 estimated that SMEs account for over 65 per cent of turnover generated 
by the private sector in the European Union. However, the number of contracts 
won by SMEs remains limited, which was regarded as a significant limitation to 
the overall success of the EU procurement regime. Economic policies may 
therefore be used to foster the development of SMEs, and to promote their actual 
participation in contract awards, given their importance to national economies. 
In the US, set asides have been established for small businesses on a legislative 
basis under the Small Business Act 1953,26 with the objective of preparing these 
businesses to be able to compete in open markets independently of government 
assistance. The Federal Acquisition Regulations (F AR)27 implements the 
requirements of the Small Business Act. It requires generally that the maximum 
practicable procurement opportunities be afforded to small business concerns, 
small disadvantaged business concerns, and women owned small business 
concerns.28 More specifically, the FAR requires that all contracts for supplies or 
services between $2000 and $100,000 be automatically reserved for small 
businesses. The automatic set aside will not apply, however, where the procuring 
entity determines that there is not a "reasonable expectation of obtaining offers 
from two or more responsible small business concerns that are competitive in 
terms of market prices, quality and delivery".29 The FAR also seeks to ensure the 
25 Green Paper, Public Procurement in the European Union: Exploring the Way Forward. Commission 
of the European Communities, Brussels, 27.11.1996 COM(96) 483 fmal, at p. 30. 
26 15 USC § 631. 
27 See FAR Part 19 ("Small Business and Small Disadvantaged Business Concerns"). The FAR can be 
viewed on the US General Services Administration's home page at http://www.gsa.gov. 
28 FAR Part 19.201. The legislative requirements have also been accompanied by a government wide 
policy goal of awarding 20 per cent of the total value of all prime contracts to small businesses. See, 
Office of Federal Procurement Policy, Policy Letter 91 -1,56 Fed. Reg. 11796 (Mar.20, 1991). 
29 FAR Part 19.502-2. 
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participation of small businesses as sub-contractors. Prime contractors 
responsible for contracts of over $100,000 in value must therefore undertake to 
provide small businesses with the maximum practicable opportunity to 
participate. 30 
Finally, many economic policies may be motivated by the desire to isolate or 
shelter national industry from foreign competition. For example, protection is 
afforded to domestic industry under the Buy American Act. 31 Under the Act, the 
basic legal requirement on federal purchasers since 1933 has been that 
procurement of materials, supplies, articles, or (since 199032) services be 
substantially American, except m exceptional circumstances. Such 
circumstances exist, for example, where the goods concerned are unobtainable in 
the US, "in sufficient and reasonably available commercial quantities and of 
satisfactory quality" or when the head of a procurement agency determines that 
domestic procurement is "inconsistent with the public interest, or the cost ... 
unreasonable". The operation of the Act is suspended where the procurement in 
question is covered by the GP A which provides an incentive towards membership 
especially as the US is likely to be a major source of export opportunities for 
many prospective members. 
c) Trade and Competition Law Policies 
30 FAR Part 19.702. 
31 Buy American Act 193347 Stat. 1520 (1933) (codified at 41 USC § 10a-10d (1976)). On the Buy 
American Act, see D.P. Amavas and W.J. Ruberry, Government Contract Guidebook (1994; Federal 
Publications Inc., 2nd • edn) chapter 6. 
32 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1998, PL 100-418, tit. VII (amending the Buy American 
Act). 
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Procurement rules may also be used to strengthen trade law or competition law 
policies. For example, a group of firms may tacitly collude in tendering for 
government contracts and the procuring entity may wish to reject tenders from 
these firms. Alternatively firms may be dumping goods on the procuring 
government's market. The government would normally deal with this situation 
by imposing antidumping duties on the imported goods. However, it may also 
wish to reject low tenders which are part of a dumping strategy, or even refuse to 
qualify, or reject the tenders of firms whose exports have attracted an 
antidumping investigation in the past. The question here is to what extent these 
problems can be tackled consistently with the obligations contained both in the 
GP A and wider WTO obligations. The distinct issues here are addressed 
separately in Chapter Four. 
The manner in which procurement obligations are implemented may also give 
effect to certain trade policies. The US implementation of the GP A provides an 
example of trade bargaining, in that all non-GP A countries are precluded from 
participating in any tenders for US government contracts subject to the 
Agreement. 33 The same was done in the US implementation of the Tokyo 
Code.34 The US is the only GP A member required by law to exclude bids by 
non-members from consideration, and appears to operate the Act stringently. 
Both Hong Kong and Singapore were removed from the "designated country list" 
of GP A members when the new Agreement came into effect. There has been 
33 See 19 USC 2S12(a), entitled Authority to Bar Procurementfrom Non-Designated Countries, which 
requires the 'President to prohibit the procurement of products originating from countries not parties to 
the OP A or to other reciprocal trade agreements. The prohibition does not apply to less-developed 
countries. An exception also applies when there are no offers of products from the United States or 
from OP A countries, or where such offers are inadequate. 
34 Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 302(a)(I). 
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some debate of the compatibility of such national measures with the GP A and 
broader WTO obligations.35 
The bar on non-GP A participation could lead some states to re-consider their 
non-membership because of the limitations on export opportunities which it 
imposes. An Australian study has cited the example of one Australian company 
which reported a loss in export business of around US £350,000 annually because 
of the Trade Agreements Act.36 Australia has yet to join the GPA however, 
which indicates that it still inclined to the view that ant benefits are outweighed 
by the disadvantages. 
2. The means by which procurement power can be deployed to pursue 
secondary objectives 
a) The qualification stage 
i) The purpose and operation of qualification procedures under the GPA 
The qualification of suppliers involves the identification of those suppliers who 
are deemed to be capable of performing the contract as defined in the tender 
documentation. Article VIII(b) of the GP A, makes it clear that entities are 
permitted to set minimum standards for participation in the award procedure 
relating to the financial, commercial and technical capacity of suppliers. These 
considerations will invariably be relevant, regardless of the type of tendering 
procedure which is used.37 Where the open procedure is used, all interested 
suppliers may submit a tender, without any further action from entities beyond 
35 See, A. Reich, "The New GATT Agreement on Government Procurement. The Pitfalls of 
Plurilateralism and Strict Reciprocity". (1997) 31 (2) Journal of World Trade 125. 
36 World Trade Organisation Agreement on Government Procurement, Review of Membership 
Implications. http://www.pa.gov.aulpolicy/wto/rpv.ht. 
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the invitation to participate. Selective tendering involves the submission of 
tenders only by those suppliers which have been invited to participate, while 
limited tendering involves entities contacting suppliers individually in the face of 
unusual circumstances such as an absence of tenders, or the receipt of non-
responsive or collusive tenders.38 In all tendering procedures, a qualification 
procedure needs to be carried out at some point before the contract is awarded in 
order to ensure that the successful supplier possesses the minimum acceptable 
attributes to perform the contract. 
The qualification procedure will not necessarily take place before suppliers 
submit their tenders. This will ordinarily be the case where selective tendering is 
employed, and here it will be open to entities to request tenders from some, or all 
of the firms included in lists of qualified suppliers, where such lists are 
maintained. However, where the open procedure is used, the same considerations 
relating to financial, commercial and technical capacity will often be applied after 
suppliers have submitted their tenders. Price will sometimes be the single most 
important award criterium where the open procedure is used, since contract 
award and delivery of the supplies or services would be considerably delayed by 
having to compare the relative merits of tenders submitted by a large number of 
firms, on the basis of expansive award criteria. Where the open procedure is 
used, entities would then be expected to identify the best tenders, and then check 
whether the firms submitting those tenders have the requisite qualifications to 
perform the contract at the price tendered. Those firms not possessing these 
37 The tendering procedures under the GP A are described in Article VII. 
38 The circumstances in which limited tendering may be used are laid down in Article XV. 
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qualifications would be disqualified. This position is expressly envisaged by 
Article XIII:4(a) on the Award o/Contracts which provides as follows: 
"To be considered for award, a tender must, at the time of opening, conform to 
the essential requirements of the notices or tender documentation and be from a 
supplier which complies with the conditions for participation ... " 
The GP A leaves the matter of when and how entities should satisfy themselves 
that participating firms have the competence to perform the contract in question, 
to national implementation. The Agreement's main concern is to ensure that 
qualification procedures which are employed, do not discriminate against, and 
among foreign suppliers. For example, Article VIII( c) incorporates a safeguard 
by providing that, 
"the process of, and time required for, qualifying suppliers shall not be used in 
order to keep suppliers of other Parties off a suppliers list or from being 
considered for a particular intended procurement. .. " 
The GP A does, however, provide some guidance on the use of lists of qualified 
suppliers, and the process of selecting suppliers to participate from those lists. 
Qualification lists are of relevance to both open and selective tendering 
procedures where the entity wishes to limit the number of tenders to manageable 
proportions, which will normally be the case. Where the open procedure is used, 
entities may be content to receive tenders from all interested suppliers. 
Qualification conditions would then normally be used to disqualify suppliers 
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prior to contract award. However, entities may also choose to use the open 
procedure and receive tenders only from all interested firms who are included on 
qualification lists. The entity would then be relieved of having to check the 
minimum qualifications of listed supplier who submitted a tenders. 
Where the limited tendering procedure is exceptionally used under the conditions 
provided for in Article XV, entities are given the discretion to apply any 
procedure for contacting suppliers individually, provided the procedure is not 
used, "with a view to avoiding maximum possible competition or in a manner 
which would constitute a means of discrimination among suppliers of other 
Parties or protection to domestic producers or suppliers.,,39 It can therefore be 
inferred that entities may either contact suppliers which are. included on 
qualification lists, or contact any other supplier, and ensure that the favoured 
supplier can perform the contract by checking its qualifications at some point 
prior to award. The author now considers the provisions which regulate the use 
of qualification lists. 
Article IX:9 establishes that qualification lists are permitted under the GP A 
where the selective tendering procedure is employed. It requires that where 
entities do maintain permanent lists of qualified suppliers, they must publish the 
lists with references to the products or services to be procured through the lists. 
Entities must also provide details to suppliers on the conditions they must fulfil, 
with a view to their inclusion, and specify the period of validity of the lists. 
39 Article XV: 1. 
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Article X on Selection Procedures provides for various safeguard for the use of 
qualification lists to ensure that they do not operate to restrict competition among 
suppliers, or to restrict the participation of foreign suppliers. Article X:2 
provides that, "[ e ]ntities maintaining permanent lists of qualified suppliers may 
select suppliers to be invited to tender from among those listed. Any selection 
shall allow for equitable opportunities for suppliers on the lists." The latter 
sentence suggests that a system of rotation could be used whereby preference 
would be given to those suppliers who have not previously been invited to bid. It 
is clear from Article X: 1 that any selection method employed would have to 
operate in a "fair and non-discriminatory manner". 
Article IX:9 of the GP A which deals with Invitation to Participate Regarding 
Intended Procurement, enables entities to use a notice of a qualification system, 
as an invitation to participate. The principal purpose of Article IX is to ensure 
that entities publish invitations to participate in all cases of intended procurement, 
in order to alert suppliers of forthcoming opportunities. Paragraph 4 permits an 
invitation to participate to take the form of a notice regarding a qualification 
system.40 Where this is done, information relating to the contract must be 
provided to interested suppliers to enable them to decide whether to proceed 
further to be considered for inclusion on qualified supplier lists. This information 
includes details of the subj ect matter of the contract, details of the economic and 
technical qualifications which may be required of suppliers, and details of how 
40 Only entities in Annexes 2 and 3 may use a notice regarding a qualification system as an invitation to 
participate. These Annexes cover sub-central government entities and all other covered entities 
respectively. Central government entities must, in contrast use a notice of proposed procurement, as 
the invitation to participate. 
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the awarding entity should be contacted.41 It is also necessary to include a 
statement that the notice regarding the qualification system constitutes an 
invitation to participate.42 In the event that an entity uses a "qualification 
system", the following conditions apply: (1) if the duration of the qualification 
system is three years or less, and (2) the duration of the system is made clear in 
the notices and (3) it is also made clear that further notices will not be published, 
then (4) it is sufficient to publish the notice only once, at the beginning of the 
qualification system, rather than for each individual procurement. This is subject 
to the safeguard that, "Such a system shall not be used in a manner which 
circumvents the provisions of this Agreement.,,43 
Entities therefore have the discretion to use qualification lists from which firms 
may be invited to submit tenders. Where qualification lists are used, the 
safeguards detailed above must be complied with. However, where qualification 
lists are in existence, there is no obligation to invite tenders only from suppliers 
on those lists. Entities can choose to advertise the contract to all suppliers and, 
where this is the case, if firms not included in lists seek to participate, they must 
be permitted to do so. In other words, 'Optional Lists' are entirely compatible 
with the GP A. Equally, it would seem that entities are impliedly permitted under 
the GP A t'o insist upon registration on qualified supplier lists as a pre-condition 
41 Article IX, paragraphs 6-8 provide details of the type of information which should be made available 
to suppliers. The extent of the information which must be made available, depends on what form the 
invitation to participate takes. All entities may use a notice of proposed procurement, which imposes 
the most burdensome requirements in that all the information specified in paragraph 6 must be 
provided. However where a notice of planned procurement as the invitation to participate, slightly 
relaxed requirements apply. All entities other than central government entities may use a notice of 
planned procurement. Where this is the case, Article IX:7 requires that the information referred to in 
paragraph 6 must be published where it is available. In any case where a notice of planned 
procurement is used, it must contain certain basic information provided for in paragraphs 7-8 relating 
to the subject matter of the contract, and time limits for tender submission. . 
42 Article IX:9( e). 
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43 Ibid. 
for possible further participation in contract awards which are covered by the 
lists. There is nothing in the GP A which prohibits the use of such Mandatory 
Lists, provided they are operated compatibly with the above safeguards. 
b) Can secondary objectives influence the qualification of suppliers under 
the GPA? 
To this point the author has described the various ways in which qualification 
systems can be operated under the GP A. The extent to which secondary 
conditions can be relevant to the qualification of suppliers is now considered. 
Entities may wish to refuse the qualification of suppliers prospectively because of 
their anticipated failure to meet secondary objectives. Those secondary 
objectives may relate to factors which are internal to firms, such a$ the extent to 
which they are owned or operated by targeted disadvantaged groups. They may 
also relate to performance requirements, such as where some firms are refused 
qualification because of their anticipated failure to engage targeted labour. 
Effectively, certain contracts would be completely reserved, or set aside, for 
firms who have demonstrated their ability to fulfil the secondary objectives in 
question. Set asides will be particularly restrictive of trade where their purpose is 
to protect domestic firms from competitive pressures on at least part of their 
business, since this will normally entail the complete reservation of a quota of 
contracts for domestic firms. 
Entities may also wish to remove suppliers from qualification lists as a remedial 
sanction. Thus they may seek to disqualify suppliers because of their 
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unacceptable or criminal business conduct, whether or not the nature of the 
offensive conduct has any bearing on the ability of firms to perform the contract. 
More broadly, entities may wish to use the qualification process to pursue any 
secondary objectives which have some bearing on the obligations to be 
undertaken by suppliers, or their internal characteristics. 
If disfavoured suppliers can be excluded at the qualification stage, then this 
would provide a significant method for pursuing secondary objectives. It would 
also mean that other mechanisms, operated at later stages in the award process, 
would become less important, as only those suppliers able to meet the secondary 
objectives would remain after the qualification stage. 
Article VIII deals with the considerations which entities can have regard to in the 
process of qualifying suppliers, and provides that, "any conditions for 
participation in the tendering procedure shall be limited to those which are 
essential to ensure the firm's capability to fulfil the contract in question" 
(emphasis added). It is arguable that "the contract in question" can include 
contractual conditions relating to secondary objectives. On this basis, provided 
these contractual conditions are stated in tender documentation, then ability to 
perform the secondary objective can be used to qualify suppliers. 
Article XII:2 states that, "Tender documentation provided to suppliers shall 
contain all information necessary to permit them to submit responsive tenders ... 
" The following paragraphs list the specific information which must be 
provided. For example, paragraph (a) requires that tender documentation include 
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the "address of the entity to which tenders should be sent", and paragraph (f) 
requires that, "any economic and technical requirement, financial guarantees and 
information or documents required of suppliers" be included. In addition, 
paragraph (j) requires "any other terms or conditions" to be specified. This latter 
provision could be read as suggesting that qualification conditions relating to 
secondary objectives can be included in tender documentation. 
Whether this is the case depends upon whether such an interpretation would be 
compatible with the overall framework of rules under the GP A. Thus, it would 
have to be shown that the disqualification of suppliers on the basis of their 
inability to undertake secondary objectives, could operate on a non-
discriminatory basis consistently with Article III. The discriminatory effect of 
policies is discussed in detail below. More specifically, the question of whether 
secondary objectives can be specified in tender documentation as qualification 
conditions, depends on whether Article VIII should be understood as permitting 
this. 
Support for the view that Article VIII permits the achievement of secondary 
objectives to be specified as qualification conditions, is provided by the fact that 
Article VIII does not impose any express limitations on the kinds of conditions 
which can be imposed as qualification criteria beyond the requirements that any 
conditions for participation, "shall be no less favourable to suppliers of other 
Parties than to domestic suppliers, and shall not discriminate among suppliers of 
other Parties".44 Read on its own, therefore, Article VIII does not appear to 
44 Article VIII(b). 
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preclude qualification conditions dealing with secondary objectives. Non-
exhaustive examples are provided. Conditions relating to "technical capacity are 
specified as being potentially relevant. The phrase is also used in the EC 
Directives, and it has been argued in this context that it relates to the ability to 
carry out the contractual conditions, broadly defined as including the 
perfonnance of secondary objectives.45 
One view of Article VIII is therefore that entities have a broad discretion to 
specify the achievement of secondary objectives as contractual conditions, and 
can refuse to qualify finns which cannot fulfil these contractual conditions. This 
may be either because there is no limitation (in Article VIII or elsewhere) on the 
kinds of contractual conditions which can generally be imposed, or because the 
"technical capacity" of suppliers includes their ability to give effect to defined 
secondary objectives. 
It is considered that this VIew of Article VIII cannot be maintained when 
considered in the overall GP A context. This is because failure to meet 
qualification criteria has the absolute effect of excluding finns from further 
participation in the contract award. The expansive use of qualification criteria 
relating to the achievement of secondary objectives can therefore have a serious 
effect on competition and limit the value of the GP A in contributing towards the 
liberalisation of procurement markets. Even if it could be demonstrated that 
45 See C. M<;:Crudden, "Social and Policy Issues in Public Procurement: A Legal Overview" in S. 
Arrowsmith and A. Davies eds. Public Procurement: Global Revolution (Kluwer; 1998). The author 
acknowledges, however, that this is probably not a tenable view, at least where social conditions are 
concerned, because the European Court of Justice has held that a condition relating to the use of the 
long term unemployed was not a matter of technical capacity. See Case 31187, Gebroeders Beentjes B V 
v The Netherlands [1998] ECR 4635, paragraph 28. 
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disqualification of firms would be done on a non-discriminatory basis, it would 
continue to be inappropriate to use secondary considerations as qualification 
conditions. Even though all firms, domestic and foreign could potentially meet 
the required secondary objectives, it would be inappropriate to disqualify 
suppliers who are unwilling to undertake those objectives. To do so would still 
have a detrimental effect on competition, especially as some of these firms may 
be able to present highly competitive tenders in terms of price, or the quality of 
the required works, supplies or services. Suppliers should only be disadvantaged 
by their unwillingness to undertake secondary objectives at the award stage when 
the relative merits of tenders are considered. 
A further reason against a broad view of Article VIII, is that some secondary 
objectives can only be pursued under procurement rules by imposing 
requirements which resemble offsets. As will be discussed below, Article XVI 
prohibits developed Parties from seeking offsets, and restricts their use for 
developing countries. 
The better view, therefore, is that the purpose of Article VIII(b) is to restrict 
qualification conditions to those which relate directly to the provision of the 
works, supplies or services. An appropriate test would be to ask whether it is 
possible to perform the contract competently, without imposing secondary 
objectives as contractual conditions in tender documentation, and using those 
conditions to qualify suppliers. Thus it is not essential to the performance of the 
contract that the long term unemployed be engaged, nor that only firms owned by 
targeted groups can qualify. It will always be essential, however, that 
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participating firms are financially sound, and that they possess the necessary 
expertise to perform the contract. It is these essential considerations which can 
be used as qualification conditions, where they have been notified to firms in the 
invitation to participate and tender documentation. 
Sometimes, the issue of whether contractual conditions can be regarded as 
essential considerations (and therefore be imposed as qualification conditions), or 
be regarded as extraneous secondary objectives, will depend on the context in 
which the conditions are imposed. The example of the construction of a nuclear 
power plant may be considered. Here, entities may wish to impose requirements 
relating to the environmental impacts of the construction, operation and 
decommissioning of the plant. These requirements would be part of the technical 
specifications, included in the tender documentation. The reqllirements could be 
specified as award criteria, so that the non-price factors would include the quality 
of the responses developed to the environmental challenges of the project. 
In a recent essay, however, Kunzlik goes further than this.46 The author suggests 
that where contractual conditions such as those above are imposed, then further 
conditions relating to the general environmental performance of potential 
participants, such as whether they have infringed environmental protection 
legislation, can also be specified as qua1ification criteria. Convicted firms would 
either be refused qualification, or removed from the lists. The additional 
conditions are appropriate in the context of the above example, since they are 
46 See P. Kunzlik, "Environmental Issues in International Procurement" in S. Arrowsmith and A. 
Davies (eds.) Public Procurement Global Revolution (Kluwer International; 1998, at p.205. 
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closely connected with the ability or "technical capacity" of potential participants 
to deliver the contract as specified in the technical specifications. 
However, in a different context, entities may consider that environmental 
concerns are less important, and therefore not refer to matters such as production 
methods or the extent to which a product can be recycled, in the technical 
specifications. In such cases, additional conditions relating to the general 
environmental performance of potential participants cannot be imposed as 
qualification criteria. Here, such additional conditions must be regarded as 
extraneous secondary considerations because they do not support clear 
environmental objectives expressed as part of the technical specifications. 
Where there is doubt in any context as to the compatibility of a qualification 
condition with Article VIII, the question should be w h ~ t h e r r that condition is 
relevant to the efficient delivery of the subject matter of the contract. This 
conclusion is permissive of the use of procurement for environmental protection 
objectives. Entities will invariably be able to include conditions relating to 
environmental performance in technical specifications, regardless of the subject 
matter of contract. The nuclear power plant may have innumerable 
environmental impacts. The office desk may also have such impacts in terms of 
the extent to which a product can be recycled, or whether the wood used for its 
construction has come from sustainable forests. Given that considerations such 
as these can form part of the technical specifications, secondary objectives 
relating to the general environmental performance of firms, may also be stated as 
contractual conditions, and therefore operate as qualification criteria. This is 
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because the general conditions support the specific requirements set out in the 
technical specifications. 
Because of the reasons stated above relating to the overall context of the GP A, it 
is submitted that Article VIII should not be understood as permitting non-
environmental secondary objectives to be used as qualification conditions. This 
should be the case even where those conditions have been permissibly included 
in some part of the tender documentation. 
Assuming that the US complaint over the procurement practices of the Korean 
Airport Construction Authority does proceed to panel proceedings, authoritative 
guidance on the correct interpretation of Article VIII should be available in the 
near future. The complaint currently being pursued jointly by the US, the EU and 
Japan, is based partly on multiple infringements of Article VIII. Two points in 
particular have been raised in the consultation process as being incompatible with 
Article VIII, as well as various other provisions. Firstly, in order to qualify, 
suppliers must have manufacturing facilities in Korea. Secondly, qualification is 
made subject to domestic partnering requirements such as the engagement of 
Korean firms as consortium members, or sub-contractors. On the analysis 
presented above these qualification conditions should be regarded as 
incompatible with Article VIII(b) which requires that any conditions for 
participation in contract awards must be limited to those which are essential to 
ensuring the capability of suppliers to fulfil the contract in question. As the 
Korean conditions are not relevant to the efficient delivery of the subject matter 
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of the contract, it is submitted that they are likely to be found to breach Article 
VIII. 
c) Disqualification of firms as a sanction in addition to other legal sanctions 
While the usual position is that qualification conditions must relate directly to the 
ability of firms to provide the works, supplies or services required, Article VIII 
appears to envisage that suppliers can be disqualified because of their business 
conduct. Article VIII(h) provides specific examples of how the business conduct 
of firms could be relevant to their presence on qualified supplier lists, and some 
of the examples provided do not appear to have any bearing on the ability of 
firms to fulfil the contract. Thus, " ... grounds such as bankruptcy or false 
declarations ... " are envisaged as reasons for exclusion. While bankruptcy clearly 
affects the firm's ability to perform the contract, it is not so clear that false 
declarations have a similar effect. 
In providing the example of false declarations, Article VIII therefore seems to 
envisage that exclusion could operate punitively against unacceptable or criminal 
business conduct, independently of the firm's ability to perform the contract. 
While it does not appear to be a precondition of exclusion that the business 
conduct in question has been criminalised, the examples provided are 
distinguished in that their existence must be affirmatively established. The non-
discrimination obligation contained in Article III GP A is pivotal to the 
Agreement's operation. It would be most unusual if procuring entities were 
permitted to punish firms by disqualifying them. without affirming that 
94 
participants had actually committed the legal wrong in question. To suggest 
otherwise would be to vest too much discretion in the procuring entity, and to 
allow for the possibility of discriminatory treatment. Thus it is submitted that the 
mere suspiCion that firms have been involved in false declarations is not 
sufficient to lead disqualification, which provides a safeguard against 
discriminatory treatment and lack of transparency in the decision making process. 
Similarly, it is likely that the GP A requires that the existence of other legal 
wrongs (such as breach of environmental protection legislation, or insider 
dealing) be objectively ascertained before any action is taken against firms under 
the rules for their involvement in collusion. 
3. The award stage 
There are various mechanisms which can potentially be applied at the award 
stage in order to favour suppliers deemed to be capable of meeting defined 
secondary objectives. A selection of these mechanisms are analysed below. 
a) Price preferences 
A price preference will normally involveJhe acceptance of a favoured firm's bid, 
even if it is higher than other bids submitted. The granting of price preferences 
may be conditional on the ability of suppliers to meet various kinds of secondary 
objectives. The preference may establish a price margin whereby the domestic 
bids will be favoured provided they do not exceed the price of other tenders by 
more than a designated amount. Here, the secondary objective pursued can be 
bro'adly described as the promotion, or protection of domestic industry by 
affording domestic suppliers an artificial advantage over foreign competitors. 
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Beyond this example, price preference programmes may differ markedly in the 
content of secondary objectives to be achieved. The secondary objectives may 
relate to matters which are internal to firms such as whether they are owned or 
operated by members of a targeted group, or whether they have a good 
environmental record. Considerations which are external to the characteristics of 
the firm may also be relevant. Preferences might therefore be conditional on 
willingness to sub-contract parts of the contract to targeted groups. 
b) Preferences in award procedures based on points allocation 
Entities may seek to award contracts on the basis of points gained by tenderers in 
the evaluation process. Participating firms will receive points for the price 
tendered and the lowest tender will gain the most points. Points would also be 
awarded, however, for ability to undertake a secondary objective, and the extent 
to which such objectives can be undertaken. Where there is a weighting of 
available points in favour of undertaking the secondary objectives, the firms 
which are able to perform those objectives to the greatest extent are effectively 
preferred over their competitors. For example, where a maximum of thirty points 
are available for price tendered, but a maximum of seventy points are available to 
firms which can engage targeted labour, then the firms which are able to 
undertake this objective to the fullest extent will gain a strong competitive 
advantage over other firms. 
c) Can preferences be used to pursue secondary objectives? 
The general response to the question of whether preferences can be given to firms 
which can meet secondary objectives is that, where the preference operates in a 
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discriminatory manner, the ability of suppliers to fulfil the preference cannot be 
taken into account in evaluating their tenders. This is not apparent from Article 
XIII itself, however, which deals with the award of contracts. 
Article XIII:4(b) requires that the contract be awarded either to the firm with the 
" .. .lowest tender or the tender which in terms of the specific evaluation criteria 
set forth in the notices or tender documentation is determined to be the most 
advantageous." It is not therefore necessary for a procuring entity to demonstrate 
any price saving to itself in the application of the contract award criteria. Article 
XII:2(h) requires that, "the criteria for awarding the contract, including any 
factors other than price ... " be included in the tender documentation." No attempt 
is made to circumscribe the type of non-price factors which may be specified as 
relevant and there is no express indication that these need relate specifically to 
the firm's ability to perform the contract. 
Arguably therefore, the procuring entity may be able to impose contractual 
conditions in tender documents requiring firms to undertake secondary 
objectives, as a condition of being granted a preference. If a firm cannot give 
such an undertaking, then this will weigh against them when the relative merits of 
the bids are compared. The procuring entity cannot, however, impose any 
absolute conditions at the award stage, such as to reject all tenders from firms 
which have not been able to give the required undertakings. Article XIII itself 
would therefore appear to permit the use of price preferences and non-price 
preferences. All other things being equal a tender from a supplier which is 
capable of employing a high proportion of targeted groups in performing the 
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contract, for example, will be looked at more favourably than tenders from 
suppliers only able to take on a low proportion, or none at all. 
It is clear, however, that preferences which have a discriminatory effect cannot 
operate as award criteria. This is because Article VII: 1 applies across the board 
to all tendering rules and provides that, "Each Party shall ensure that the 
tendering procedures of its entities are applied in a non-discriminatory manner 
... " Also, Article III: 1 provides for a general non-discrimination obligation, 
which is applicable to all aspects of procurement laws and procedure, in the form 
of a national treatment provision. The Massachusetts Law described above47 was 
also attacked by the complainants as breaching Article III: 1. Thus it was argued 
that the Law did not provide to the suppliers of other Parties, immediate and 
unconditional treatment no less favourable than that accorded to domestic 
services and suppliers, and that accorded to services and suppliers of any other 
party. It was therefore argued that Article III: 1 was breached. As noted above, 
the Panel was disbanded in response to the eventual non-implementation of the 
Law. One of the broad questions raised by the Massachusetts proceedings, 
however, was whether and when laws which apply to both domestic and foreign 
firms should be understood as breaching the GPA's non-discrimination 
requirements. This broad issue will also need to be visited should the recently 
instituted complaint over the Korean Airport Construction Authority's 
procurement practices prove to be less abortive than the Massachusetts 
proceedings. Given that the offset requirements upon which the complaint is 
partly based apply equally to Korean and foreign firms, the dispute may lead to 
47 See pp. 69-70. 
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panel guidance on whether Article III applies to formally identical treatment 
which nevertheless has an indirect discriminatory effect. 
Certain general observations on the requirements of the non-discrimination 
obligations can already be made however. Some kinds of price preferences will 
always have a discriminatory effect. Protectionist preferences establishing a 
price margin available only to domestic firms, or which are dependent on 
performance requirements which only domestic firms can meet, clearly 
discriminate against foreign firms. They cannot therefore operate where the 
contract is covered by the GP A, because they breach both Article III: 1 and 
Article VII: 1. 
However, price preferences linked to other secondary objectives, may not have 
such an obvious discriminatory effect. Where the granting of the preference is 
linked to the achievement of conditions which are external to the suppliers 
themselves, such as the engagement of targeted labour, or use of locally 
manufactured components, it may be open to the entity to demonstrate that the 
secondary conditions are no more difficult for foreign firms to meet than 
domestic firms. The possibility of preferences linked to secondary objectives 
operating on a non-discriminatory basis is analysed fully below. However, in the 
context of external secondary conditions, even if it is possible to show that the 
external secondary objective has no discriminatory effect, a further and 
sometimes fatal barrier remains. Secondary objectives which are external to 
fin:i1s, will often fall within the GP A definition of offsets under Article XVI. The 
fact that some form of preference is granted to firms which are capable of 
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fulfilling the secondary objective does not mean that the preference operates 
outside of Article XVI's remit. As Article XVI contains a general prohibition on 
offsets, it would be inconsistent with this to interpret Article XII(h) broadly to 
permit the inclusion of award criteria, dealing with external secondary objectives 
which resemble offset requirements, in the tender documentation. This 
conclusion applies even if entities could demonstrate that imposing the secondary 
requirements could be done on a non-discriminatory basis.48 
A different conclusion applies, however, where the granting of the pnce 
preference is linked to the achievement of secondary objectives which are 
internal to potential suppliers. Examples here would be the firms' level of 
compliance with equal opportunities legislation or the ethnic composition of their 
staff, or whether they have trading links with countries which have been black 
listed. As requirements of this nature do not resemble offsets in any way, only 
the non-discrimination provisions are relevant to determining the compatibility of 
the preference with the GP A. It may be possible for entities to establish that 
internal secondary conditions do not breach the non-discrimination requirements 
and the possibilities here are analysed below in Section 4. 
The conclusion here is that entities can give a price preference at the award stage 
to firms which can meet internal secondary conditions, and external objectives 
which do not resemble offset requirements, provided this does not breach the 
non-discrimination requirements. At this point, the author refers back to a point 
made in the section on qualification to the effect that, Article VIII could not be 
48 The author considers what kind of external secondary objectives should be regarded as falling within 
the prohibition on offsets in a separate section on offsets below. 
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read as permitting secondary objectives to be used as qualification conditions. 
Yet it is concluded here that internal secondary objectives can be relevant at the 
award stage, and that entities may even grant those suppliers which can meet the 
secondary objectives preferences to increase their chances of success. 
These apparently conflicting conclusions can be reconciled by reference to the 
different effect which conditions have at the qualification and award stages. 
Qualification conditions operate on an absolute basis. If suppliers cannot meet 
qualification conditions, they are excluded from further participation in the 
contract award. Excluding potential suppliers because they cannot meet 
conditions which are unrelated to the subject matter of the contract, could have a 
significant adverse effect on competition between suppliers, and on procurement 
market liberalisation in general. In contrast, award criteria can only be used to 
compare the relative merits of tenders received. Thus one tender may be more 
attractive than another because it is responsive to the required secondary 
objectives. This will only be one relevant factor among many however. Tenders 
which are responsive to the secondary objectives may be significantly more 
expensive than other tenders, and even any price preferences granted to favoured 
suppliers may not offset the additional expense of their tenders. Even though 
suppliers which are able to meet secondary objectives are favoured, competition 
between suppliers is retained. It can also be recalled that secondary objectives 
can only be relevant at the award stage in so far as they do not have a 
discriminatory effect, which further safeguards the competitive process. 
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It can be doubted however whether such a clear demarcation of the different roles 
of qualification conditions, and award criteria can be maintained. Where a price 
preference of five to ten per cent is granted to firms which can operate defined 
secondary objectives, then those firms will still have to present commercially 
realistic tenders in terms of price. However, the price preference could also be 
set at such a high level as to negate any real competition on price, and, 
effectively, exclude or disqualify all firms who cannot undertake the secondary 
objective. The same disqualifying effect could also be achieved where a points 
system is used in the award of contracts. Here an overwhelming weighting of 
available points for secondary objectives could be set, which would make price 
almost irrelevant. It is submitted that it would be an abuse of award procedures 
to make the achievement of secondary objectives so important, as to disqualify 
those who cannot undertake those objectives. The purpose of the award 
procedure is to compare the relative merits of bids. It should clearly not be 
possible to use award criteria to effectively disqualify certain suppliers for 
reasons connected with their inability to undertake secondary objectives, when 
those same reasons cannot be invoked to disqualify them during the qualification 
process under the provisions detailed above. 
Of course, while the argument in favour of a clear demarcation between 
qualification and award procedures is appealing, it is rather more difficult to 
specify how such a demarcation should be achieved. The author would submit 
that where secondary considerations are used as award criteria, they should 
always be relatively insignificant, in comparison with price and other award 
criteria which relate directly to the performance of the. contract. Entities should 
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not be permitted to depart too far from the 'economic rationale' for procurement 
which is to produce savings in public expenditure, where the procurement in 
question is covered by the GP A. Where secondary considerations are given an 
overriding significance in any part of the procurement process, firms have little 
incentive to compete on the basis of price. The inefficiency of firms would then 
be perpetuated, which would be especially damaging for the competitiveness of 
firms which rely heavily on government contracts for their business. If 
governments insist on setting aside contracts on the basis of secondary 
considerations, they may only do so for contracts which are not covered by the 
GP A, either because they fall under the financial thresholds, or because of 
negotiated derogations. 
The author would also hope that governments would not routinely desire to 
remove competitive pressures from the procurement process, even where the 
achievement of secondary objectives is a priority. There is some evidence that 
pursuing development objectives and securing value for money need not be 
mutually exclusive. For example one of the principal objectives of the 
procurement reforms proposed by the South African Green Paper49 is to minimise 
any premium payable for incorporating socio-economic objectives into projects. 
In August 1996, the State Tender Board approved the piloting of the 'Affirmative 
Procurement Policy'SO on all construction projects. For the 15 month period 
between August 1996 and October 1997, 3423 building and civil contracts were 
49 Green Paper on Public Sector Procurement Reform in South Africa, GN No.691 GG 17928 of 14 
April 1997. 
50 The term 'AffIrmative Procurement' is used to by the Green Paper to describe the new method of 
procurement which is envisaged. The objective is to increase the engagement of small, medium and 
micro enterprises, especially those owned by members of 'previously disadvantaged groups'. 
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awarded using the Affirmative Procurement Policy specifications. Around 45 per 
cent of the total financial values of these contracts went to targeted enterprises 
(described in the Green Paper as Affirmable Business Enterprises), either as 
prime contractors on smaller projects or as joint venture partners, subcontractors 
and service providers on larger projects. The average financial premiums for 
contracts falling within various bands, ranging from RO to 45 000, to R2 000 000 
and over, was 1.2 per cent. The lowest premium was 0.2 per cent for contracts in 
the lowest band, and the highest was 1.5 per cent for contracts in the R100 000 to 
R500 000 band.51 These statistics clearly indicate that procurement can be used 
for development objectives while still promoting competition and securing value 
for money. 
In conclusion to this section, the author's VIew is re-stated that the correct 
interpretation of the GP A is that entities cannot use award criteria to effectively 
disqualify suppliers on the basis of secondary considerations. However, under 
the present rules, the difficulty lies in identifying when award criteria should be 
regarded as disguised qualification conditions. It is suggested that a clear 
demarcation of the purpose of award criteria and qualification conditions could 
be achieved by ensuring that entities do not grant a price preference of more than 
five to ten percent to firms which can undertake secondary objectives. In the 
context of a points based system for contract award, the same safeguard could be 
achieved by ensuring that points available for undertaking secondary objectives 
do not exceed a set percentage of total points available. The percentage would 
Secondary objectives are, however, to be achieved in a manner which does not compromise the 
principles of, "fairness, competition, cost efficiency and inclusion." 
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need to be independently set or approved to ensure an appropriate balance 
between the importance of the secondary objectives on the one hand, and price 
and factors relating directly to the delivery of the contract, on the other hand. It 
follows that some kind of approval or validation mechanism would be required, 
to ensure that preference policies would not operate with the effect disqualifying 
suppliers during the award process. Such an approval mechanism would also be 
required to ensure that secondary considerations operate on a non-discriminatory 
basis, regardless of the precise procurement mechanism used. The need for such 
a validation mechanism is further considered in Section 9. 
Aside from preferences, there are other ways in which suppliers capable of 
meeting secondary objectives can be favoured at the award stage. These 
mechanisms are considered below. 
d) The offer back mechanism 
A further way of favouring certain suppliers is for entities to consider all bids 
equally but then to give preferred tenderers the opportunity to match the lowest 
bid submitted. An example of the use of this mechanism is the Priority Supplier 
Scheme which operated in the UK between 1979 and 1994.52 This involved a 
network of factories employing severely disabled people under sheltered 
conditions, and the Prison Service Industries and Farms. Entities were required 
to award contracts to a priority supplier if the cost was no greater than the most 
economically advantageous tender received from other suppliers. If a priority 
51 These figures are taken from S.M. Gouden, "Implementation of the Affirmative Procurement Policy 
on Construction Projects by the National Department of Public Works." Paper presented at the 
Conference on Project Partnership, Johannesburg 1997. 
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supplier's tender was equivalent to others, but more expensive, the contract 
would be "offered back" to the priority supplier. If the priority supplier could 
match the lowest responsive tender received its tender would be accepted. In 
1994, the scheme was withdrawn due to its incompatibility with the EU 
procurement rules. 
The result of using the 'offer back' mechanism, is that preferred firms capable of 
undertaking secondary objectives will not win the contract if their final bids are 
any higher than the most commercially competitive received. However, it does 
afford the preferred firms an advantage over their competitors, in that only they 
are able to 'step in' after all tenders have been opened and given a chance to 
improve their own bids. 
It is clear that permitting preferred firms to 'step in' is not a practice which is 
permitted by the GP A. Article XN deals with Negotiation. Paragraph 4 
provides generally that, "Entities shall not, in the course of negotiations, 
discriminate between different suppliers." Specific examples are provided of 
how discriminatory treatment must be avoided. In particular, paragraph 4( d) 
provides that, when negotiations are concluded, all participants remaining in the 
negotiations shall be permitted to submit final tenders in accordance with a 
common deadline." Clearly, the 'step in' practice breaches this provision, since 
only the preferred firm is permitted to amend the price of its bid. Paragraph 3 
provides that entities "... shall not provide information intended to assist 
particular participants to bring their tenders up to the level of other participants." 
52 As publicised through the Treasury's Public Procurement Committee papers PPC(79)5 and 
PPC(79)8. 
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Again, this provision is breached since the 'step in' practice involves entities 
supplying information on the lowest tender received to the preferred tenderer, 
with a view of permitting the preferred tenderer to lower its own bid. 
e) Offsets53 
The general rule under the GP A is that governments cannot adopt measures 
which amount to offsets, to encourage local development or improve the balance 
of payments. The GP A defines offsets as follows: 
"Offsets in government procurement are measures used to encourage local 
development or improve the balance-of-payments accounts by means of domestic 
content, licensing of technology, investment requirements, counter-trade or 
"1 . ,,54 SImI ar reqUIrements. 
Numerous estimates on the economIC significance of offsets exist, although 
precise figures are not available. Martin cites various estimates on the proportion 
of world trade which offset requirements account for. 55 These range from a 
minimum of $80 million or some five per cent of world exports, to much higher 
figures of twenty to thirty per cent of the roughly $2 trillion of total world trade. 
Both these estimates date from 1983. 
Article XVI: 1 contains a general prohibition against offsets in the following 
terms: 
53 On the subject of offsets, see S. Martin ed. The Economics of Offsets, Defence Procurement and 
Countertrade, (1996; Harwood Academic Publishers). 
54 GP A Article XVI, fn. 7 
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"Entities shall not, in the qualification and selection of suppliers, products or 
services, or in the evaluation of tenders and award of contracts, impose, seek or 
consider offsets." 
However, Article XVI:2 goes on to provide a limited exception to this prohibition 
for developing countries as follows: 
" ... having regard to general policy considerations, including those relating to 
development, a developing country may at the time of accession negotiate 
conditions for the use of offsets, such as requirements for the incorporation of 
domestic content. Such requirements shall only be used for qualification to 
participate in the procurement process and not as criteria for awarding contracts." 
The latter sentence here means that absolute conditions can be applied at the 
qualification stage, and if a firm is not prepared to undertake an offset 
requirement, it can be excluded from the particular contract award or from 
qualification lists. At the award stage, the ability to perform an offset cannot be 
relevant. Therefore, if one firm offers more by way of offset than other firms, its 
tender cannot be regarded as more advantageous. 56 
55 See s. Martin, "Countertrade and Offsets: An Overview of the Theory and Evidence", in S. Martin 
ed. supra note 51, at p. 17. 
56 As will be seen below, the manner in which this exception has been formulated has significant 
implications for the compatibility of the procurement regime developed in South Africa (which forms 
the subject matter of a case study below), with the GP A. 
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Paragraph 2 is a new provision and represents a more prescriptive approach to the 
use of offsets than the rather vague and general provision in the Tokyo Round 
Agreement. This provided in Article V:14(h) that, 
"entities should normally refrain from awarding contracts on the condition that 
the supplier provide offset ... opportunities ... In the limited number of cases 
where such requisites are part of a contract, Parties concerned shall limit the 
offset to a reasonable proportion within the contract value ... " 
Typically, offset agreements will commit the selling firm to undertake some 
performance requirements, which are not indispensable to the provision of the 
works supplies, or services, in order to secure the contract. In this way, the 
purchasing government can recoup, or offset some of its investment. The inward 
investment created by offset work is one of the ways in which vote sensitive 
governments can appease concerns over high public spending, which would 
otherwise generate few benefits to the domestic economy. The extra 
requirements which are imposed may be linked to various related policy 
objectives. 
Offset requirements may be used to support employment and regional policies. 
Thus the successful contractor may have to make use of domestic content or 
domestic labour. There may even be a requirement that labour or components be 
obtained from specific regions. In the UK during the mid 1980s, several local 
authorities required firms tendering for council work to demonstrate that, where 
possible, employment under the contracts would be given to residents within the 
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Council's area. For the construction of the Birmingham International Convention 
Centre, a local labour clause required contractors to ensure that a minimum of 
thirty per cent of those employed be local residents. 57 The contractor may have to 
purchase manufactured components from domestic firms. The successful firm 
may well have entered into sub contracts to purchase these components even 
without the offset, but may instead have relied on favoured suppliers from its 
own state for the components needed. Offsets of this nature, where the 
components purchased actually contribute toward the final product, are known 
generally as direct offsets. In contrast, the successful firm may have to purchase 
goods and services from firms in the buying country which are unrelated to the 
goods or services which are procured. The offset requirement would then be 
indirect. 
Offsets may also be used as a means of securing investment in domestic industry. 
Australia, for example, has numerous industrial development programmes in 
place which are arguably incompatible with the prohibition on offsets contained 
in Article XVI.58 These include the Endorsed Supplier Programme, where 
suppliers must be endorsed before the Commonwealth Government will consider 
listing their products on its common use contracts. Becoming an endorsed 
supplier involves demonstrating commitment to long term value adding in 
Australia, which amounts to an offset requirement. The system of 'two envelope 
tendering' is also arguably incompatible. This applies to all contracts of more 
57 See C. McCrudden, supra note 14, at p. 111. Following the Local Government Act 1988, contractors 
are required not to have regard to non-conunercial considerations, thus preventing offset type 
conditions from being imposed at any point in the contract award process. 
58 See Purchasing Australia, "Wodd Trade Organisation Agreement on Government Procurement, 
Review of Membership Implications" http://www.pa.gov.aulpolicy/wto/rpv. 
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than $10 million and requires a supplier to submit information about the bid's 
impact on the development of Australian industry. 
The procurement practices of the Korean Airport Construction Authority, noted 
above, provide a less systematic example of offset requirements directed at 
industrial development. The qualification conditions of requiring firms to have 
manufacturing facilities in Korea, and of domestic partnering are now likely to be 
the subject of panel proceedings because they allegedly breach both Article VIII 
(on the Qualification of Suppliers), and the prohibition on offsets in Article XVI. 
Another major policy objective may be the transfer of technology into the 
domestic economy. Many offsets provide a direct stimulus to technology transfer 
in that the selling firm agrees to operate a domestic facility or license a domestic 
firm to produce certain components of the final good. Technology transfer may 
lead to an upgrading of the average skill level of the domestic work force, and the 
exploitation of any technological spill-overs to other industries that may result 
from domestic design and production. Offsets are not necessarily the most 
efficient way of acquiring new technology. However, it has been suggested that 
their use here might be more efficient than a straightforward purchase. 59 The 
argument is that, with a direct purchase, the buyer bears all the risk associated 
with a failure of the technology. However, when the technology transfer is part 
of a wider contract, the risk is shifted to the vendor who will have a greater 
incentive to transfer the technology successfully, for fear that failure will tarnish 
his 'reputation for the provision of the entire system. 
59 See S. Martin, "Countertrade and Offsets: An Overview of the Theory and Evidence", in S. Martin 
ed. supra note 51, atp. 38. 
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Offset requirements aimed at supporting industrial development policies in the 
ways identified above are effectively prohibited by the GP A, where the entities 
and sectors fall within the Agreement's coverage, and where the contracts are 
above the thresholds. However, where states remain outside the GP A, or where 
the contract in question is not covered, states are free to operate offsets relating to 
the performance of government contracts. Industry development measures, 
pursued through offset requirements, are consistent with WTO obligations in that 
they apply to government purchasing for government consumption within Article 
III:8(a) of GATT 1994, which excludes government procurement from the GATT 
national treatment provision. 
However, where offset requirements are imposed in the general trade context, and 
do not relate to the performance of government contracts, they are subject to the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures. The Agreement applies to 
investment measures related to trade in goods only, referred to as "TRIMs". 
Article 2 prohibits Members from applying any TRIM that is inconsistent with 
the National Treatment provision contained in paragraph 4 of Article III of 
GATT 1994. An illustrative list of TRIMs that are inconsistent with this 
provision is contained in the Annex to the Agreement. The illustrative list 
provides, inter alia, that TRIMs which require, "the purchase or use by any 
enterprise of products of domestic origin or from any domestic source ... " are 
inconsistent with Article 111(4) of the GATT. Thus offsets requiring the use of 
local products are effectively prohibited. 
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n The scope of the offset prohibition 
The analysis above on the use of procurement for secondary objectives, 
concluded that GP A members are not generally permitted to pursue secondary 
objectives. At the qualification stage, it was argued that the relevant provisions 
should not be interpreted so as to allow the rejection of suppliers for their 
inability to meet secondary objectives. This was because ofthe detrimental effect 
on the competitive process which could be precipitated by the outright rejection 
of suppliers for non-commercial reasons. 
In the context of award procedures however, it was argued that entities should 
generally be permitted to take secondary considerations into account when 
comparing the relative merits of bids at the award stage. This wa& because firms 
would continue to compete on price (and non-price factors specified as relevant) 
even where some firms were advantaged by their ability to meet specified 
secondary objectives. However, the rules prohibiting discrimination were 
thought to often preclude this possibility. It was noted that where preferences are 
only available to domestic firms, they will always breach Article III where the 
particular contract is covered by the GP A. However, the granting of preferences 
may be linked to secondary objectives other than the protection of domestic 
firms. Where this is the case, the state operating the preference may be able to 
demonstrate that domestic and foreign firms have the opportunity to compete for 
the contract on equal, or at least reasonably equal terms.60 As far as concerns the 
non-discrimination obligations, it is arguable that the state would then be 
permitted to operate the preference. 
60 The precise requirements of the GPA's non-discrimination requirements are discussed further below. 
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The further problem identified, however, was that certain secondary objectives 
strongly resemble offsets. For example, the granting of a price preference may be 
conditional on the use of targeted labour, or the use of components or raw 
materials from a targeted area. It was then suggested that the secondary objective 
fell within Article XVI and was thereby prohibited. Article XVI contains a clear 
and broad prohibition of offsets. To permit entities to favour firms which can 
meet secondary objectives which impose offset requirements, would clearly 
breach the provision. This would be the case regardless of what mechanism is 
used to pursue the secondary objective, and regardless of what stage in the 
tendering process that mechanism is employed. The relevant question is whether 
the manner in which the entity seeks to achieve the secondary objective amounts 
to an offset requirement, as defined in the GP A. 
Of course, not all of the secondary policies enumerated at the beginning of this 
Chapter amount to offsets. Firms supplying government markets may have to 
meet legislative or extra-legislative requirements which have no connection to 
encouraging local development or improving the balance of payments. Where 
this is the case, the prohibition on offsets has no application. Thus the use of 
procurement power to improve labour standards, or the environmental 
performance of firms, is not affected by Article XVI. These kinds of secondary 
objectives are internal to firms. In contrast, where the secondary considerations 
are external to firms, they will invariably involve preferred suppliers committing 
themselves to performance requirements which are merely incidental to the 
delivery of the contract. It is difficult to envisage any external secondary 
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objective which would not be connected to encouraging local development or 
improving the balance-of-payments. Most external secondary objectives would 
therefore fall within the definition of offsets. It is further submitted that it would 
not be open to an entity to demonstrate that the offset prohibition is not 
applicable where the secondary policy operates on a non-discriminatory basis. It 
is clear that the overall WTO policy is that offsets are impermissible in the 
context of international trade. There is no suggestion, in any of the WTO 
Agreements, that they are less objectionable, or permissible, where they do not 
have a discriminatory effect. 
It is arguable that a more relaxed approach to the use of offsets should be taken in 
the context of an Agreement which has attracted so few members, and where one 
of the reasons for this may be the desire of states to retain some flexibility in the 
placement of contracts to encourage local development or improve the balance-
of-payments. States can at present negotiate derogations from the GPA's 
obligations, and can therefore pursue development objectives where the contracts 
are excluded from coverage. However, negotiated derogations are the exception 
to the rule that offset requirements cannot be imposed. Once the contracts fall 
under the GP A, the same development objectives cannot be pursued because they 
often amount to offsets. Removing or relaxing the prohibition on offsets could 
therefore encourage prospective members to join, and increase the coverage of 
the Agreement. Under such a relaxed approach, where entities seek to favour 
suppliers which can meet secondary objectives, the validity of the mechanism 
used could be determined by the non-discrimination rules, even where the 
secondary objectives in question resemble offsets. 
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It is submitted that this is an attractive argument from the point of view of 
expanding both the membership, and the coverage of the Agreement for existing 
members. However, the value of increased membership, would be significantly 
diminished, if provisions which are fundamental in both the GP A, and overall 
WTO context were departed from. While the use of offsets on a non-
discriminatory basis would remove some of the concern surrounding their use, it 
would have no impact on increasing their efficiency as an instrument of 
socio/economic policy. This is an example of the conflicting interests which 
would need to be balanced if a validation mechanism were introduced into the 
GP A framework, for the approval or review of secondary policies. The economic 
efficiency of award stage mechanisms, and the possibility of adopting a 
validation mechanism are examined below. The author now questions whether 
secondary policies can be operated compatibly with the national treatment and 
non-discrimination obligations of the GP A. 
4. Can secondary policies be operated compatibly with the national 
treatment and non-discrimination obligations of the GP A? 
The particular focus of this section is on whether secondary policies can be 
operated compatibly with the national treatment and non-discrimination 
obligations of the GP A. This is an important question since, to the extent that 
compatibility with these provisions can be demonstrated, it is arguable that any 
other rules in the GPA which still preclude the pursuit of secondary objectives 
should be relaxed, since one of the major objections to the secondary uses of 
procurement will then have been removed. If these further rules could be 
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relaxed, this would go at least some way toward addressing the impediment to 
increased membership caused by the perceived limitations which the Agreement 
imposes on the use of procurement for secondary objectives. 
However, it is not considered that increased membership should be achieved at 
any cost. An Agreement to which more, or most WTO Members accede to 
would be rather meaningless unless it sought to promote realistic cross-border 
opportunities for suppliers, and genuine competition between them. Even if it 
could be shown that secondary policies would not breach the national treatment 
and non-discrimination obligations, this would not necessarily mean that they 
should be permitted. A further issue is whether the policy in question would 
actually be effective to achieve its aims. Some kind of forum would be required, 
whereby secondary policies could be validated by balancing their costs against 
the benefits produced. A relevant question would be whether the same benefits 
could be realised more efficiently, and in a manner less restrictive of trade, by 
using a means other than targeted procurement. There would also be a need to 
ensure that policies operate on a transparent basis, that they do not operate as a 
form of disguised protection for domestic suppliers, and that they do not continue 
beyond the point at which they are no longer necessary. These issues are 
considered fully below. The initial question however, is whether secondary 
policies can, in any circumstances, be operated consistently with the GPA's 
fundamental provisions. The answer depends on what kind of treatment of 
foreign suppliers is actually required by the GPA's national treatment and non-
discrimination obligations. 
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Article III: 1 sets out the general obligation of non-discrimination, in the form of a 
National Treatment clause, in the following terms: 
"1. With respect to all laws, regulations, procedures and practices regarding 
government procurement covered by this Agreement, each Party shall provide 
immediately and unconditionally to the products, services and supplies of other 
Parties offering products or services of the Parties, treatment no less favourable 
than: 
(a) that accorded to domestic products, services and suppliers; and 
(b) that accorded to products, services and suppliers of any other Party." 
More specific obligations of non-discrimination are provided for in vanous 
provisions. Article VII begins with the exhortation that Parties must ensure that 
their tendering procedures are applied in a non-discriminatory manner. Article 
VII is supplemented by various other provisions. Thus Article X: 1 requires that, 
in selective tendering procedures (those in which a limited number of suppliers 
are invited to tender) firms must be selected in a "fair and non-discriminatory 
manner." Article X:2 provides that where participants are chosen from 
qualification lists, "Any selection shall allow for equitable opportunities for 
suppliers on the lists." Article XIII:3 on the Opening of Tenders, requires that, 
"The receipt and opening of tenders shall ... be consistent with the national 
treatment and non-discrimination provisions of this Agreement." Finally, Article 
XIV on post tender negotiations between entities and suppliers, requires that, 
"Entities shall not, in the course of negotiations, discriminate between different 
suppliers." 
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It is clear from these provisions that governments cannot exclude foreign firms 
from procurement procedures, or only give preferential treatment to domestic 
firms using any of the award stage mechanisms described above. However, what 
kind of treatment as between foreign and domestic suppliers do the above 
provisions require, when the disparity of treatment is not as pronounced as in 
these situations? For example, do the provisions apply where it is possible in 
principle for foreign firms to meet the content of secondary objectives, even if 
their costs are increased by doing so, where the costs of domestic firms are not 
increased? Do the provisions apply prohibit secondary policies where any 
increased costs that are incurred are not markedly higher than any increased costs 
which domestic firms must also bear? Is all unequal treatment prohibited, or do 
the rules permit some limited disparity in treatment? Regrettably, there is, as yet, 
no guidance on the requirements of the relevant provisions under the GP A. 
However, there is a considerable jurisprudence under the GATT on the national 
treatment provision provided in Article 111:4 of that Agreement. The general 
principles which have been established by some of the leading Panel decisions, 
and their relevance in the procurement context, are described below. 
Article 111:4 of the GATT provides that, 
"The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory 
of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than 
that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations 
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and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, 
transportation, distribution or use ... " (emphasis added). 
Numerous Panel decisions have dealt with the meaning and requirements of the 
obligation to treat imported products no less favourably than imported products.61 
It should be noted that the GATT Article III:4 does not apply in the procurement 
context.62 However, as has been seen, the GPA Article III:1 does apply to 
procurement covered by the Agreement, and requires inter alia, that foreign 
products and suppliers be treated no less favourably than domestic products and 
suppliers. The requirements of the GATT provision are clearly, therefore, 
relevant to the requirements of the equivalent GPA provision. 
One of the most significant rulings which dealt with the meaning of GATT 
Article III:4 was the 1958 Panel Report on "Italian Discrimination against 
Imported Agricultural Machinery,,63 which examined the consistency with Article 
III:4 of an Italian law providing special credit facilities to farmers for the 
purchase of tractors, provided they were manufactured in Italy. 
The Panel considered that there was a clear breach here as the provision required 
imported products to be treated in the same way as like domestic products once 
they had cleared through customs. The fact that the preferential credit facilities 
were only available for the purchase of Italian machinery amounted to unequal 
61 See generally, the Analytical Index: Guide to GATT law and practice, 6th ed. (1994; World Trade 
Organisation) pp. 148-157. 
62 The GAIT Article III contains an express exception for government procurement in paragraph 8( a) 
which provides that, "The provisions of this Article shall not apply to laws, regulations or requirements 
governing the procurement by governmental agencies of products purchased for governmental 
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and discriminatory treatment. In the Panel's opinion, paragraph 4 covered both 
laws and regulations directly governing the conditions of sale and purchase, and 
(more broadly) any laws or regulations which might adversely modify the 
conditions of competition between domestic and imported products on the 
internal market. The Panel suggested that if the object of the Law was to 
stimulate the purchase of tractors by small farmers and co-operatives in the 
interest of economic development (as Italy had argued), then the breach could 
have been removed by extending the credit facilities to the purchase of imported 
tractors. 
A more recent case arose out of a complaint by the EC that Section 337 of the US 
Tariff Act 1930 violated Article 111.64 The case involved proceedings directed 
towards prohibiting unfair and damaging competition and acts in the importation 
of goods into the US. Such unfair practices include the importation or sale of 
goods that infringe US patents. Alleged patent infringements by imported 
products were under the joint jurisdiction of federal district courts, and the US 
International Trade Commission; an independent administrative agency of the US 
Government. Where imported products are concerned, the complainant had the 
choice of which forum to proceed before. In contrast, products of US origin 
could only be challenged on grounds of a patent infringement, before a federal 
district court. The EU maintained that the differences between the two 
proceedings were such that the treatment accorded to imported products was less 
favourable than that accorded to the products of US origin. 
purposes and not with a view to commercial resale or with a view to use in the production of goods for 
commercial sale." 
63 GATT Panel Report Adopted October 23, 1948 7th BISD 60 (1959). 
64 GATT Panel Report Adopted November 7, 1989 36th Supp. BISD 345 (1990). 
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The Panel noted that effective equality of treatment and competitive opportunities 
for imported products was required by GATT Article 111:4; its purpose being to 
protect, "expectations on the competitive relationship between imported and 
domestic products." It was also noted that there could be cases of formally 
identical legal provisions which would, in practice, accord less favourable 
treatment to imported products. The Parties were still required however, to 
ensure that the treatment of imported products was, in fact, no less favourable 
than that accorded to domestic products. There will therefore sometimes be a 
positive obligation to apply formally different rules to domestic and imported 
products in order to ensure equal treatment. Additionally, it was not open to 
Parties to derogate from Article 111:4 in some cases, on the ground that more 
favourable treatment had been accorded to imports in other cases. If this were 
permitted it would enable a contracting party to derogate from Article 111:4 in one 
case, or with respect to another state, on the ground that more favourable 
treatment had been accorded in some other case, or with respect to some other 
Contracting Party. Whether Article 111:4 had been contravened was a question 
which had to be asked in each and every case. Therefore an element of more 
favourable treatment would only be relevant if it would always accompany, and 
offset an element of differential treatment causing less favourable treatment. 
The effect of Article 111:4 is not limited to rectifying the less favourable treatment 
of imports after the event. A crucial question is whether the law itself is capable 
of' having a discriminatory effect, not whether the presence or absence of 
discriminatory effects can be demonstrated in past cases of the application of any 
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particular law. On this point, it has been noted that " ... a mandatory law which 
might result in a GATT violation, violates the GATT and no negative impact 
needs to be shown" (emphasis added).65 There is clearly no need to demonstrate 
an actual discriminatory effect. However, does this mean that any law which 
could potentially be applied in a discriminatory manner, automatically breaches 
Article 1I1:4? Arguably such a law would be capable of having a discriminatory 
effect contrary to the provision. 
It is submitted that where a state seeks to show that a law is capable of having a 
discriminatory effect, it will in fact be necessary for it to adduce evidence that the 
law is likely (if not very likely) to produce discriminatory effects. In the above 
case, the Panel found that that the difference in the procedures available to 
complainants for attacking patent infringements, between imported and domestic 
products, was capable of producing discriminatory effects by reason of six 
factors. 66 Taken together, these factors made the possibility of inequality of 
treatment at least likely, notwithstanding that no actual discrimination had been 
shown. 
Translated to the procurement context, the following observations may be made. 
It seems that it would not be possible for a state or entity to argue that, because of 
the manner in which a preferential policy has been applied, there has in fact been 
no discriminatory effect. It would also not be possible to argue that less 
65 J.H. Jackson, W.J. Davey and A.O. Sykes, Jr, Legal Problems of International Economic Relations, 
Cases Materials and Text, (1995; American Casebook Studies, West Publishing Co.), at p. 518. 
66 These included the non-availability of opportunities under S337 to raise counterclaims, as is possible 
in proceedings under federal district court, and the possibility that general.exclusion orders may result 
from proceedings under the USITC under S337, where no comparable remedy was available against 
infringing products of US origin. 
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favourable treatment of a foreign supplier, product or service was permissible in 
any particular instance, on the basis that more favourable treatment had been 
accorded in another instance. Elements of less and more favourable treatment 
can only be offset against each other to the extent that they always arise in the 
same cases, and necessarily would have an offsetting influence on each other. It 
can be suggested that situations of this kind would be of the rarest occurrence. 
If it is established that the procurement law or purchasing policy does in fact lead 
to inequality of treatment which is sufficiently serious to affect the competitive 
opportunities afforded to foreign suppliers or foreign goods or services, then 
GP A Article III: 1 will be breached. If the procurement law or purchasing policy, 
could potentially be applied in a discriminatory manner, and inequality of 
treatment is likely to result, then Article III: 1 would also be breached. A high 
threshold is therefore established for any state attempting to establish that the use 
of procurement for secondary purposes is compatible with the GP A. It will be 
difficult to establish that the operation of the relevant policies, either does not, or 
is unlikely to restrict the equality of competitive opportunities afforded to foreign 
suppliers. Clearly, the propositions formulated above are unlikely to be 
especially helpful to those involved in formulating, and applying procurement 
laws and practices. It will always be a question of degree whether alleged 
inequality in treatment will be sufficiently serious to amount to discriminatory 
treatment. Given the strictness with which the GATT has been interpreted, 
however, it can be suggested that there is little scope under the GP A for 
procurement laws and practices which actually, or potentially make it any more 
difficult for foreign firms to participate than their domestic counterparts. As will 
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be seen below, however, states may seek to retain some of their secondary uses of 
procurement, even for covered procurement, by removing the discriminatory 
effect of policies, and therefore avoiding the application of Article III. 
5. What can states do to remove or reduce the discriminatory effect of 
secondary policies? 
The question considered here is whether secondary policies can be formulated 
with the objective of minimising their discriminatory effect. To the extent that 
the removal or reduction of discrimination against foreign suppliers is possible, it 
is asked whether the strict standard of national treatment described above can be 
met. 
The discriminatory effect of many secondary policies could be reduced by simply 
extending the benefit of the policies to foreign firms. For example, where the 
secondary objective is to reduce the numbers of long-term unemployed, the 
ability of firms to employ such persons either from their own territory, or the 
territory of the state which is letting the contract, could be specified as relevant to 
the award criteria. Where the secondary policy is designed to target members of 
a disadvantaged group existing only in the territory of the awarding state, then, 
the discriminatory effect of the policy could be removed by defining the targeted 
group more broadly to include the particular targeted domestic group, and 
equivalent or similar groups from other states. Foreign suppliers would therefore 
be given the option of meeting the secondary objectives on their own territory, as 
a condition of receiving favourable treatment at the award stage. Because of this, 
much of the actual and potential discriminatory effect of the policy is removed. 
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It is clear that any possibility of disguised discrimination would have to be 
removed from secondary policies. For example, a requirement to employ black 
South Africans imposes the same formal obligation on South African and other 
firms. It is clear, however, that the stringent equality of treatment which is 
probably required by GP A Article III: 1 would be breached. The local knowledge 
of domestic firms will give them some advantage in knowing how to make the 
best use of domestic resources or labour, which would probably be sufficient to 
distort the competitive process. The letting state could argue that the cost of 
foreign firms would be increased, but that they would not be increased 
significantly more than the costs of domestic firms who would also have to 
engage the same labour force. This would especially be the case where domestic 
firms would not have chosen to engage the targeted labour. Here, domestic firms 
will have no greater expertise, and no advantage over foreign firms. However, 
domestic suppliers would still retain at least a potential advantage. This would be 
sufficient to breach the GP A, Article III: 1. In the above example, the 
requirement to employ black South Africans, would have to be extended to other 
similarly disadvantaged groups in other territories. Only then would it be 
arguable that the policy could be operated consistently with Article III. 
This means of avoiding discriminatory treatment, by applying the same 
secondary conditions to foreign firms to be attained on their own territories does 
have its limitations. The impact of the policy on the national level, would of 
course be reduced by such an approach when contracts are awarded to foreign 
firms, since the benefit of the policy would only then be realised in the territory 
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of the foreign finn. In fact the benefit of the policy may not be realised at all, 
since the entity awarding the contract to a foreign supplier would have a reduced 
incentive in monitoring the achievement of the objectives, where they are 
required to be carried out on foreign territory. 
Governments could consider it critical that the benefits of secondary policies be 
realised domestically, and would therefore wish to award the contract 
domestically. The operation of the secondary objectives would then be clearly 
contrary to the GP A. Whether it would be critical for contracts to be awarded 
domestically, would depend to some extent on the objectives of the secondary 
policy. Where the granting of the preference is conditional on factors which are 
internal to finns, such as their having good environmental or equal opportunities 
records, the achievement of the objective is not unduly hampered by awarding 
some contracts to foreign finns. The use of procurement power makes some 
contribution to the achievement of the secondary objective every time entities are 
able to award contracts domestically, and the other available mechanisms, such as 
the use of the criminal law, are reinforced. 
However, where the perfonnance requirement is external to suppliers themselves, 
such as their ability to use targeted labour, it is submitted that there would be a 
greater desire to award contracts domestically. The use of procurement power to 
achieve external objectives would be highly inefficient, unless entities could 
routinely award contracts to domestic suppliers capable of undertaking the 
specified commitments. Awarding contracts to domestic suppliers on a non-
discriminatory basis, as and when this could be justified under all the relevant 
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award criteria, would be unlikely to have any noticeable, and sustained effect on 
external objectives such as alleviating long term unemployment, or regional 
economic depression. This leads to the interesting conclusion that when efforts 
are made to remove the discriminatory effect of secondary policies, their 
effectiveness at achieving their objectives may be significantly reduced. 
Apart from the potential limitations of this means of avoiding discriminatory 
treatment, the critical question in this section is whether the approach described 
would be compatible with the national treatment obligation of GP A Article III: 1. 
In other words, would foreign suppliers be treated any less favourably than 
domestic suppliers? Would the use of the method described above be capable of 
adversely modifying the conditions of competition between foreign and domestic 
suppliers, such as to breach Article III: 1 ? 
On these questions, it is submitted that states could establish that policies 
operating in the manner described above do not breach Article III. The 
secondary objectives specified as award criteria would impose additional, non-
commercial performance requirements. However, these requirements would 
apply equally to domestic and foreign firms. They would therefore receive 
treatment "no less favourable" than domestic firms, and, arguably, there would be 
no real possibility of departure from this standard. It is submitted that any 
nominal advantage held by domestic firms because of their increased experience 
with operating secondary objectives of the kind in question would not be 
sufficient to produce discriminatory effects contrary to GP A Article III: 1. 
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It is, therefore, at least arguable that GP A Members can operate secondary 
policies compatibly with the national treatment obligation of Article III: 1. It is 
therefore submitted that states can use their procurement power to pursue internal 
secondary objectives, because such policies can operate without a discriminatory 
effect. For internal objectives, their compatibility with the non-discrimination 
rules is the only relevant concern. However, it will be recalled that the 
prohibition of offsets precludes the use of procurement for external secondary 
policies notwithstanding the absence of discriminatory effect. An important 
question is therefore whether there can be any justification for relaxing this 
prohibition for secondary policies which operate on a non-discriminatory basis? 
It is submitted that a key question in this regard is whether discriminatory 
procurement can be regarded as an efficient instrument for achieving secondary 
policies. 
6. The efficiency of discriminatory procurement as an instrument of 
secondary policy67 
A large number of considerations can be identified as relevant to the efficiency of 
discriminatory procurement policies. Thus it is relevant to ask whether 
discriminatory procurement is likely to produce the intended benefits to national 
economies, such as boosting the profitability of local firms, or reducing 
unemployment or the transfer of technology. It is also relevant to consider 
whether such benefits, if achieved, are likely to be outweighed by trade effects 
which harm efforts towards multilateral liberalisation. The efficiency of 
procurement also needs to be considered in relation to the efficiency of other 
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instruments such as subsidies and tax-breaks. The questions in this area have a 
strong bearing on the validity of the GPA's general requirements of non-
discriminatory competitive tendering, compared to other possible approaches to 
regulation, which would be more permissive of the secondary uses of 
procurement. In this section, the author describes the conclusions which 
economists have reached on leading recent studies which have been undertaken. 
A recurrent theme which can be detected is that the efficiency of procurement in 
any given case, will depend on all the relevant market conditions. Given the 
uncertainty which is inherent in this area, it can be tentatively suggested that the 
GPA's general requirements of non-discriminatory competitive tendering, are 
probably correct from the perspective of enhancing both national and global 
welfare. 
One of the most prominent motivations for discriminatory procurement is the 
desire to isolate or shelter domestic firms from foreign competition. It has been 
pointed out, however, that preferential procurement may sometimes fail 
completely to displace foreign trade with national supply. Trionfetti has 
explained that a discriminatory procurement policy will not necessarily amount to 
a barrier to trade, and will not necessarily affect international specialisation, or 
produce any of the anticipated national welfare benefits.68 Government 
procurement will generally only be effective to protect domestic producers where 
government demand is greater than domestic supply. There are a number of 
indicators for the presence of this market condition. For example, the higher the 
67 Section 6 has been summarised in part from an overview of the relevant issues presented by, S. 
ArrOWsmith, J. Linarelli, and D. Wallace Jr., Regulating Public Procurement: National and Regional 
Perspectives, forthcoming Kluwer International, Chapter 5 at pp. 240-253. 
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proportion of Gross Domestic Product that is attributable to government 
procurement, the more likely it will be that government demand will exceed 
domestic supply. The existence of small national supply markets, and the lack of 
availability of the kinds of goods and services required by government, also 
indicates that discriminatory procurement will be more likely to generate the 
anticipated trade effects. 
If, to the contrary, government demand is less than domestic output, the 
economic outcome is that discrimination in the filed of government contracts, 
merely raises the prices paid by governments. A further negative consequence is 
that private purchasers shift their demand towards cheaper imports. Where trade 
effects are produced, the consequence is to increase the profitability of domestic 
firms. However, this does not mean that the policies are beneficial even from the 
national perspective, since there are significant costs which must be offset against 
the benefits. There are firstly the higher prices which will be paid for domestic 
goods or services. Secondly, the shift in production towards protected domestic 
industry, may involve a shift away from production of those goods and services 
for which a state enjoys a comparative advantage. Thirdly, the protectionist 
effect reduces competitive pressures so that the incentive towards efficiency and 
innovation is also reduced. States with discriminatory procurement policies are 
themselves more likely to be discriminated against thereby producing further 
welfare losses. 
68 F. Trionfetti, "The Government Procurement Agreement and International Trade: Theory and 
Empirical Evidence", paper written for the World Trade Organisation (1997)(unpuhlished). 
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Economists have also suggested that the benefits of discriminatory procurement 
policies can outweigh the costs in certain limited cases. In particular, 
discriminatory procurement can be an efficient tool where the government is 
seeking to develop an industry operating in imperfect market conditions. 
However, these benefits are hard to achieve in practice as governments are 
frequently likely to be motivated more by the political pressures they are exposed 
to, than by the desire to choose the optimum policy for the situation at hand. 
There are clear reasons why governments persist with discriminatory 
procurement policies despite the probability that foreign trade will not be 
displaced with domestic supply, in most market conditions, and despite the 
negative consequences which are brought about, even when the. desired results 
are achieved. The demand for protectionist measures among national firms, is far 
more vocal and concentrated than the diffuse interests of tax payers who lack the 
individual incentive to organise themselves politically. Thus Deltas and Evenett 
note that, even small price preferences can generate large economic rents which 
are " ... concentrated in those domestic firms that bid for government contracts. 
These rents may generate a constituency which can actively defend its interests in 
the political arena. In contrast, the benefits of joining the GP A are widely 
dispersed among tax payers who would pay less on average for government 
purchases. ,,69 Even where market conditions mean that the policy is unlikely to 
produce the desired trade effects, domestic firms still derive the benefit of 
guaranteed government business, at increased cost to the government, and 
ultimately to taxpayers. 
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The indications are therefore that where market conditions are such that 
discriminatory procurement can lead to the desired trade effects, accompanying 
adverse effects on international trade are among the probable side-effects. 
Whether a preference based mechanism, or offset requirements are used, 
economic activities will tend to be shifted towards areas where states do not 
enjoy a comparative advantage. In the long term, this effect is likely to damage 
both national and global welfare. 
The WTO has clearly taken the stance that it is more appropriate to generally 
prohibit the use of discriminatory procurement as a policy instrument, than to 
provide states some leeway in their use, until such time as their trade effects are 
more fully understood. It is submitted that this is an entirely appropriate 
approach. To relax the GPA's prohibition on discrimination would be too high a 
price to pay for increased membership and would devalue the WTO's 
achievements to date in the field of regulated procurement. Some flexibility 
could however be built into the GP A, by providing for a validation mechanism 
where the efficiency and transparency of proposed secondary uses of 
procurement could be tested on an individual basis. The possibility of adopting 
such a validation mechanism is explored in section 9. The author now examines 
the means by which GP A Members do in practice use procurement for secondary 
objectives via negotiated derogations. 
69 G. Delatas and S. Evenett, "Quantitative Estimates of the Effects of Preference Policies" in B.M. 
Hoekman and P. Mavroidis eds. The WTO Agreement on Government Procurement 73 (Michigan; 
1997). 
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7. The use of procurement for secondary objectives by way of securing 
derogations or exemptions from the GPA's obligations 
The extent to which secondary policies are, in practice, pursued under the GP A is 
now examined and the positions of developed, and developing countries is 
compared. The general position is that secondary policies often cannot be 
pursued where the contract is covered by the GP A, since this will normally entail 
breach of the GPA's fundamental or procedural obligations, in the ways 
described above. Generally, for secondary policies to be permissible, the contract 
must either be under the financial thresholds, or excluded from coverage in some 
other way. 
States may secure derogations and exemptions for procuring entities, or certain 
products or services, from the strict obligations of the Agreement, in accession 
negotiations, in order to use procurement for secondary objectives. Under the 
Agreement, developed and developing members are formally placed in a different 
position in this regard. Thus there is no express legal basis in the Agreement's 
text which permits developed country members to depart from the strict non-
discrimination obligation in Article III. In contrast special provisions in Article 
V apply to developing and least developed members, and Article V:4 lays down 
rules relating to Agreed Exclusions. 
It might therefore be thought that there is no scope for developed members to 
pursue secondary objectives where this involves the less favourable treatment of 
foreign suppliers, whereas developing countries can do so subject to the 
safeguards in Article V. This is not the case however.. In considering the issues 
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here, the positions of all states generally will firstly be considered before 
considering the special provisions included for developing countries. 
a) The 2eneral position 
Most GP A members discriminate against foreign suppliers for some of their 
procurement, and many maintain domestic preferences. Both developed and 
developing countries can discriminate against foreign firms, either when the 
procuring entity is not subject to the GPA's obligations, or where the entity is 
covered, but where derogations from Article III are negotiated and contained in 
the Annexes. 
i) Exclusion of an entity from coverage 
With respect to entity coverage, Article 1 of the GP A specifies that, 
"This Agreement applies to any law, regulation, procedure or practice regarding 
any procurement by entities covered by this Agreement, as specified in Appendix 
I." (emphasis added) 
It is clear therefore that entities which are not covered by the Agreement can 
discriminate against foreign firms and apply domestic preferences. Entities not 
covered by the GP A must also be regarded as free to use offsets despite the 
absolute prohibition on their use (for developed countries) under Article XVI. 
Where the procurement in question is not covered by the GP A, it might be 
thought unlikely that the awarding state would apply a preference, when it can 
exclude all foreign participation by using a set-aside. In practice however, states 
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are more likely to use preferences because they are more economically efficient 
than set asides. Preferences entail that targeted firms continue to be subject to 
competitive pressures which may benefit their development. Where entities are 
completely excluded from coverage, they may, if they so wish, advertise their 
contracts, and consider tenders from all participating suppliers. However, no 
GP A supplier has a right to compete for business from these entities. The more 
common situation, however, is where the entities are, in principle, covered by the 
GP A. However, whether these entities are opened to suppliers in any particular 
state, depends on whether reciprocal rights of access have been agreed upon in 
bilateral negotiations. The issues here are explored below. 
ii) Derogations from the GPA 
Even where the entity in question is covered by the GP A, most states have 
secured derogations from Article III, and the GPA's procedural obligations. 
These derogations take two forms. Firstly, there are derogations on entity 
coverage on the basis of reciprocity. Secondly, there are complete or blanket 
derogations, for particular policies, not connected with any reciprocity 
requirement. 
As regards reciprocity derogations, the current GP A, unlike the Tokyo Code, 
does not have a uniform opening of all listed procurement opportunities to all 
signatories. Rather, the coverage of the GP A as between any two individual 
states depends on the outcome of bilateral negotiations. Negotiations are 
conducted on a reciprocity basis. In other words, the derogations which are 
agreed upon are accompanied with the declaration that they will be withdrawn 
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only at such times as the respective signatory has accepted that the other party 
has given comparable access to its suppliers. Members are therefore invited to 
conclude bilateral deals between each other within the framework of the GP A. 
Sometimes, not even this much is done, and agreements reached are not 
incorporated into the GP A. 70 
There are numerous examples of reciprocity derogations contained in the GPA's 
Annexes. Korea's Annex V provides that, it will not extend the benefit of the 
GP A as regards the award of contracts in the rail, airports and urban 
transportation sectors to EU Member States and Austria, Norway, Sweden, 
Finland and Switzerland, until such time as Korea has accepted that those 
countries give comparable and effective access for Korean undertakings to their 
relevant markets. The US originally denied access to its state governments and 
the electric utilities to suppliers from the EU, Canada, Austria, Switzerland, 
Norway, Sweden, Finland and Japan. The only signatories left to which the GPA 
would apply, were Israel and South Korea. Only in April 1994 was a bilateral 
agreement reached between the US and the EU to extend coverage.71 Reciprocity 
derogations may also have the effect of increasing the relevant financial 
thresholds for particular states. For example, while the normal threshold for 
construction services is SDR 5 million, the General Notes to the US' Annexes 
specify that the threshold is SDR 15 million for Korean suppliers. 
70 For example, an agreement was reached in 1996 between the Ee and Israel to bilaterally open up the 
procurements of the telecommunication sector to their respective suppliers. This agreement was not 
incorporated into the GP A Annexes. 
71 [1995] 0.1. L 134/25. 
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The position is even more restrictive in the services sector, where coverage is 
limited exclusively to certain listed services, and then only subject to "strict 
reciprocity" clauses. This means that access will not be provided to service 
providers of Parties which themselves have not included the specific service 
category in question in their coverage. Thus the procurement of legal services, 
and hotel and catering services, which are, in principle, opened up by Canada to 
all GP A Members, are in effect closed to all of them except the US, as a result of 
the strict reciprocity clause. This is the case even though other parties may have 
included alternative services of equivalent importance as the services included by 
Canada. 
Overall, a significant proportion of contracts are not open to most GP A members. 
Derogations are numerous and complicated. The coverage of the Agreement 
between individual states can only be determined by consulting the Annexes, 
assuming that bilateral arrangements are included in the Annexes which is not 
always the case. This position has attracted sometimes trenchant criticism. 
Perhaps most notably, Reich has noted that the GP A, 
" could quite accurately be described as an accumulation of preferential 
bilateral agreements between a limited number of parties somehow brought 
together under one shaky roof.'.72 
Arrowsmith concurs that the position as regards coverage is far from ideal. 
However, the author also notes that the flexibility inherent in bilateral 
72A. Reich, "The New GATT Agreement on Government Procurement, The Pitfalls ofPlurilateralism 
and Strict Reciprocity", [1997] 31(2) Journal of World Trade 125. 
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negotiations IS, at least amenable to expanded membership because the 
Agreement's scope and coverage is open to negotiation rather than set in stone.73 
On the other hand, the need for bilateral negotiation between prospective 
members and each existing member is likely to be seen by many states as 
extremely complex and expensive. Also, ironically, the GPA's flexibility may 
have the effect of dissuading prospective members from joining. This is certainly 
Australia's view, which regards the various derogations from the non-
discrimination principle maintained by most members as one of the impediments 
to membership because of the consequent reduction in export opportunities to 
. d' 74 major tra mg partners. 
Ultimately, however, this flexible approach was the only possible starting point to 
ensure the beginnings of effective regulation and further liberalisation through 
continued negotiations on coverage, and possible moves towards the adoption of 
a Most Favoured Nation (MFN) principle. Article 111:1, set out above in Section 
7 already provides MFN obligations. The MFN principle here, however, refers 
only to the treatment of products, services and suppliers to which the state of the 
products, services and suppliers in question is given access under the Agreement. 
It has not been applied to determine the coverage of the Agreement between 
states. Each state must effectively negotiate with each other state on a bilateral 
basis, to determine the coverage of the Agreement for them. 
73 S. Arrowsmith, "Prospects for the Wodd Trade Organisation Agreement on Government 
Procurement: Obstacles and Opportunities" [1997] 1 Malaysian Journal of Law and Society, 13, p. 17. 
74 Purchasing Australia, "Wodd Trade Organisation Agreement on Government Procurement, Review 
of Membership Implications". http://www.pa.gov.aulpolicy/wto!t:pv. 
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Arguably, the necessity for such negotiations is a consequence of the approach 
which the WTO has taken to liberalising procurement markets. The reason why 
some states are unwilling to open all listed procurement opportunities to all 
signatories is because they desire to retain national control over their 
purchasing.75 Where the procurement is not covered, then the state is free to use 
that procurement for secondary objectives. Once the procurement is covered, it is 
generally subject to a compulsory regime of international competitive tendering. 
It is submitted that the present structure of the GPA's coverage, which resembles 
a series of detailed bilateral agreements, is the price which has been paid for the 
present insistence on non-discriminatory procurement. An alternative approach 
to regulation might therefore be to transitionally permit discriminatory 
procurement (subject to safeguards), but to insist upon a general opening of all 
procurement opportunities. The attractiveness of such an alternative approach 
would depend upon several factors. For example, there would need to be general 
confidence that any system of safeguards, against a lack of transparency, or the 
prolonged use of procurement for secondary purposes, could operate to the 
satisfaction of all GP A Members. The strength of the system of safeguards put 
into place would be crucial to the success of such an alternative approach. The 
validation mechanism discussed in Section 9 could have a strong role in this 
regard. 
It was mentioned above that states retain control over their purchasing where the 
procurement is not covered. However, it is arguable that derogations on the basis 
of reciprocity present little opportunity for pursuing secondary objectives on a 
75 Some states, in contrast, may be prepared to open all or most procurement opportunities to foreign 
suppliers, but will not do other than on a reciprocity basis. 
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routine basis. Secondary objectives will often infringe Article III (as interpreted 
above), because they involve foreign suppliers being treated less favourably than 
domestic suppliers. The usefulness of procurement power to achieve secondary 
objectives is very much curtailed if the procuring entity is not free to routinely 
pursue the objective in question. This will be the case where some suppliers can 
be excluded from the contract award, because of deficiencies in their country's 
entity and sector offers, but where other suppliers have to be treated in an 
equivalent manner as domestic firms, because of their country's willingness to 
open their corresponding entity and sector to competition from the awarding 
state's firms. Derogations on the basis of reciprocity are not amenable to such 
routine discrimination. It can therefore be suggested that they have more to do 
with trade bargaining and extracting reciprocal concessions than retaining the 
secondary uses of procurement. This is in contrast to 'blanket derogations', 
which do not operate on a reciprocity basis. Again, such derogations can be 
maintained by both developed and developing nations. 
Where the procuring entity is free to discriminate against foreign suppliers by 
virtue of 'blanket derogations' then procurement potentially becomes an 
important tool for achieving secondary objectives. Many states have negotiated 
derogations from the GPA, to cover certain secondary objectives. This is the 
situation where the contracting authority may be covered by the GP A, but the 
particular policy is excluded from the GPA's disciplines. 
While all signatories have excluded the procurement of certain kinds of goods 
and services from the GP A and all maintain state specific derogations, Canada, 
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Korea and the US76 are the only three signatories which have provided for 
complete derogations from the GPA in order to further their socioleconomic 
objectives. The General Notes to the Annexes of Canada and the United States 
provide that the Agreement does not apply to set-asides for small and minority 
businesses. Korea's Annexes I to In77 contain derogations in similar terms. The 
US also maintains derogations aimed at the development of distressed areas and 
businesses owned by women, minority groups, and disabled veterans in its Annex 
2. These states are thus free to award contracts to the targeted firms, outside of 
the GPA's international competitive bidding regime. 
As it is clearly possible to negotiate for the complete exclusion of targeted firms 
from the Agreement's operation, one might think it anomalous ifit is not possible 
to negotiate for the use of preferences. Preferences are less restrictive of trade 
than set asides, because foreign firms can participate in the contract awards where 
preferences are used, albeit that they may be disadvantaged. Also the targeted 
domestic firms are subject to at least some competition, which should be 
beneficial to their development. In practice, some of the derogations from the 
GP A for the promotion of small businesses have operated through price 
preferences, which is perhaps indicative of the belief that preferences are more 
beneficial to these businesses than the complete reservation of some government 
business for them. For example, in the US, since 1991, there has been a 
government-wide goal of awarding five per cent of the total value of all contracts 
76 For an ~ n a l y s i s s of the US legislative and administrative measures which deal with the secondary uses 
of procurement, see D.P. Amavas and W.J. Ruberry, Government Contract Guidebook (1994; Federal 
Publications Inc., 2nd. edn) chapter 6. 
77 For all GPA Members, Annex I applies to central government entities; ~ I \ n n e x x II applies to sub-
central government entities and Annex III applies to all other entities which procure in accordance with 
the GP A. In practice Annex III applies to the utility providers. 
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and sub-contracts to small businesses owned by socially and economically 
disadvantaged individuals.78 In 1994, Congress authorised agencies to apply a ten 
per cent price preference for such businesses.79 Even though some policies 
operate through price preferences rather than set asides, no GP A Member has 
negotiated for the use of preferences. Rather, they have negotiated to exclude the 
policy from the GPA's coverage altogether. The question therefore arises 
whether states can negotiate for the use of preferences, in the absence of any 
mandate to do so in the text of the GP A, and in the absence of any state practice 
in this area. 
Where the procurement is excluded from GP A coverage, it is submitted that 
states are permitted to operate domestic preferences. It can equally be argued 
that there is no reason why Members should not impose offset requirements 
where the procurement is excluded from coverage. Thus states may negotiate to 
have the entity, product or service completely excluded from coverage, but 
continue to advertise the contracts, opening them to foreign competition, while 
specifying the level of the domestic preference, or the content of the offset. 
Alternatively, the sector or entity in question could fall under the GP A, but 
derogations from Article III (and the tender procedure rules which support Article 
III), as well as the offsets prohibition in Article XVI could be negotiated for the 
use of preferences and offsets. In this way states would have to follow the GPA's 
procedural obligations in terms of advertising contracts, and permitting the 
participation of firms on a non-discriminatory basis. However, because of 
negotiated derogations, they would also be able to give the benefit of the 
78 Office of Federal Procurement Policy, Policy Letter 91-1,56 Federal Regualtion 11796 (March 20, 
1991). 
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preference only to domestic firms, or only to those firms which can meet defined 
secondary objectives (including offset requirements). 
Of course, it does seem peculiar that states should undertake negotiations to have 
some procurement completely excluded from coverage, but also be prepared to 
subject the excluded contracts to most of the GPA's obligations, save any of the 
rules which prevent it from treating some firms less favourably than others, or 
from imposing offsets. This is the direct consequence of the approach to 
procurement regulation which the GP A presently takes however. It is clear that 
the use of procurement for secondary objectives is intended to be temporary and 
exceptional. 
In conclusion, it is submitted that all GP A Members may negotiate to retain the 
right to use procurement for secondary objectives. This may mean that foreign 
suppliers have no right to participate in contract awards. However, where states 
only negotiate derogations from Article III, or the offset prohibition, the other 
procedural obligations of the GP A will apply. GP A suppliers do then have the 
right to participate although they can expect that their tenders may be treated less 
favourably than suppliers which are able to meet defined secondary objectives. 
The author now considers the position of developing countries, and questions 
whether they are in a different position as regards their ability to pursue 
secondary policies. 
8: Developing countries and the use of procurement for secondary objectives 
79 PL 103-355, 108 Stat. 3243. 
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Thus far the means by which both developed and developing countries can retain 
their ability to favour national firms have been investigated. Developing, and 
least developed countries, are, at least formally, placed in an advantageous 
position by Article V, which provides for Special and Differential Treatment for 
Developing Countries. It is provided that, existing members are enjoined to have 
regard to the needs of developing countries in accession negotiations. However, 
the extent to which developing countries can secure derogations very much 
depends on how accommodating existing members are prepared to be. They 
might be expected to be unsympathetic to discriminatory procurement policies 
whose objectives are unclear and which do not operate transparently. The 
provisions of Article V are described below. 
Article V: 1 provides the basic principle that Parties should take into account the 
needs of developing countries in relation to their balance of payments, 
establishment and development of domestic industries, general economIC 
development, the support of units dependent on procurement, and the 
development of regional and global arrangements among those countries. Regard 
should be had to these factors in, "the implementation and administration" of the 
Agreement. 
Article V:4 also allows developing countries negotiating to accede to the 
Agreement to agree upon, "mutually acceptable exclusions from the rules on 
national treatment for certain entities, products and services which are included in 
its coverage lists ... " Existing members must have regard to the particular 
circumstances of each case, and must take account of the considerations in 
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Article V:l. Therefore, it seems that (subject to successful negotiations) 
developing countries can pursue secondary objectives by negotiating exemptions 
from Article III, and the tender procedure rules which support it. However, 
where there are external secondary objectives which resemble offsets, the state 
will have to negotiate an exemption to the offsets prohibition. 
Under Article V:5 developing countries may modify their entity, products or 
services coverage lists, after their accession to the Agreement. This is subject to 
the modification rules contained in Article XXVI:6, which requires notification to 
the Committee on Government Procurement. This means that if circumstances 
change, and developing countries feel that they need to operate set asides to 
promote infant industries, for example, they may modify their coverage lists to 
exclude some of their procurement. Article V:5 also allows developing countries 
to request the Committee on Government Procurement to grant exclusion from 
the national treatment rules after their accession to the Agreement. 
This is an important provision, since Article V can, for the most part, be subject 
to the criticism that it amounts to little more than a vague commitment of good 
faith to the developing world. Any benefit derived from it depends very much on 
the negotiating attitude taken by the developed countries. Developing countries 
may feel that they have not secured enough scope to operate preferences in 
accession negotiations. If they are still prepared to join the GP A, then they may 
seek to further their ability to operate secondary policies compatibly with the 
GP A through liaison with the Committee, thereby circumventing the need for 
negotiations with existing members. It is submitted, however, that the provision 
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should be strengthened to allow the Committee to authorise derogations from the 
rules on national treatment even before the developing country joins. Of course, 
this could be subject to conditions such as the apparent failure of negotiations for 
the use of preferences. The developing country might also have to convince the 
Committee that the preference is necessary in order to achieve a particular 
secondary objective and that it will operate in a transparent manner. These are 
questions which could be considered in the context of a possible validation 
mechanism for authorising, and reviewing permitted secondary uses of 
procurement. 
In conclusion the author would argue that developed and developing countries are 
only formally placed in a different position regarding their ability to use 
procurement power for secondary objectives. In practice, because of the broad 
scope for developed countries to negotiate derogations, either from the GP A in its 
entirety, or from particular provisions, it is argued that all GP A Members are 
effectively in the same position. The only difference is that developing countries 
are expressly given the right to negotiate for derogations from the rules on 
national treatment by Article V, and also given to right to negotiate for the use of 
offsets by Article XVI. 
9. Approval or review mechanisms as a means of controlling secondary 
policies 
At various points in this Chapter, the possibility of an approval or reVIew 
mechanism to authorise and control the use of procurement for secondary 
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objectives has been suggested. The validation of secondary policies could be 
dealt with by an appropriate body on either an ex post facto review basis, or on a 
prior approval basis. Such a validation process could bring about three distinct 
advantages. Firstly, there would be the potential of increasing the GPA's 
membership and coverage, if states were permitted to use procurement for 
secondary purposes. Indeed, moves could be made towards the uniform coverage 
of the GP A for all its Members, as one of the principal reasons for the current 
bilateral negotiations on coverage would then have been removed. Secondly, 
states would be required to ensure the transparency of the secondary policies 
operated by them. The validation of secondary policies could, for example, be 
made conditional on transparency requirements being met. The third possible 
advantage would be to engender an understanding that p r o c u r ~ m e n t t is often a 
relatively inefficient instrument for the achievement of socio/economic 
objectives. States would then hopefully rely increasingly on other instruments 
which are more appropriate for achieving socio/economic objectives, and the 
GP A would make a greater contribution toward reducing public expenditure. 
As was suggested in Chapter 2, one of the explanations for the GPA's lack of 
success in this area is that prospective members are aware that their ability to use 
procurement for secondary objectives is greatly curtailed once the procurement in 
question in covered. The approach which the GP A currently adopts to balancing 
the demands of the GPA's obligations, with the reality of limited membership, is 
to allow the negotiated derogations which were described above. It is arguable 
that allowing negotiated derogations is not the optimal way of building flexibility 
into the GP A. An alternative approach would be. to permit states to pursue 
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secondary objectives, even for covered procurement. The secondary uses of 
procurement would however be subject to appropriately formulated safeguards. 
A third possibility (which the author favours) would to retain the use of 
negotiated derogations, but, at the same time, permit covered procurement to be 
used for secondary objectives. Rather than alternatives, these two means of 
building flexibility into the GP A, would operate as steps towards the exposure of 
procurement to the GPA's full obligations. It was established above that the 
GP A does permit Members to pursue secondary policies through negotiated 
derogations. It was also argued that members should in theory be able to 
negotiate derogations only from certain provisions, such as Article III and Article 
XVI, so that the procurement would otherwise be covered. by the GPA's 
procedural obligations. However, this must at present be regarded as a 
possibility, given that no Member has actually sought to secure such a limited 
derogation. The other possibility is, regrettably, that the GP A does not provide 
any compromise between allowing states to use their procurement power for any 
purpose they desire, when the procurement is not covered, and requiring 
adherence to all of its obligations when the procurement is covered. If this is the 
true position, then permitting states to transitionally pursue secondary objectives, 
subject to safeguards, would be a most welcome development from the point of 
view of expanding membership and coverage. An approval/review mechanism 
would have a strong role to play in this, and other, respects. It is envisaged that it 
could have one or more of the following objectives: 
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• It could have the limited purpose of ensuring that secondary objectives are 
pursued in a manner which is compatible with the GP A. Thus it would have to 
be demonstrated that secondary objectives do not have a discriminatory effect, 
and that the tender procedure rules are not circumvented in any way. 
• Beyond the matter of GPA compatibility, states might also have to demonstrate 
that procurement can be an efficient instrument through which to pursue 
secondary objectives. Even where procurement cannot be regarded as the 
optimal instrument through which to pursue the policy in question, it could be 
open to states to demonstrate that the benefits generated by the use of 
procurement still outweigh any adverse trade effects. A proportionality test could 
be developed for use in this context. 
• To the extent that the efficient or proportionate use of procurement can be 
demonstrated, it could be open to states to argue that the GPA's rules should be 
relaxed to enable the secondary objective to be pursued, even where the 
procurement is covered by the GP A. Thus, an appropriate review body could 
consider it reasonable not to require the application of the GPA's strict non-
discrimination obligations, or the prohibition on offsets, to approved secondary 
uses of procurement. 
• The relaxation of the GPA's strict obligations could be granted on a transitional 
basis for states which are unable to accede immediately to the full rigours of 
international competitive tendering which the GP A envisages. The use of a 
validation mechanism would have a clear application to developing countries 
with a desire, or tradition of using procurement for secondary purposes. It would 
give them an opportunity to expose previously excluded procurement to 
international competition, while also retaining at least some of the secondary 
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policies previously pursued. Relaxation of obligations could also be granted on 
an interim basis, subject to the periodic demonstration of the continued 
usefulness of procurement for achieving the secondary objective. 
These are some of the objectives which a validation mechanism could pursue. 
There could however be significant, and even insurmountable, practical problems 
surrounding the operation of an approvaVreview mechanism. A strong indication 
of the nature of these potential problems is provided by the WTO's experience in 
the context of reviewing the compatibility of regional trade agreements with 
Article XXIV ofthe GATT 1994. 
a) Practical problems in the review of re2ional trade a2reements under 
GATT Article XXIV80 
Article XXIV of the GATT provides for the most important exception to the most 
favoured nation (MFN) obligation provided for in GATT Article 1. Article 
XXIV operates by way of exception to the MFN obligation, in recognition of the, 
"desirability of increasing freedom of trade by the development ... of closer 
integration between the economies of the countries party to such agreements.,,81 
The exceptions for trade groupings applies to free trade areas,82 customs unions,83 
and interim agreements leading to one of the above. Article XXIV:5 provides 
that the GATT should not be interpreted as preventing the establishment of the 
80 For an account of the growth of regionalism, and an indication of the benefits and dangers of 
bilateralism to the international trading order, see H. Jackson, W.J. Davey and A.O. Sykes Jr., Legal 
Problems ofIntemational Economic Relations (1995; West Publishing, American Casebook Series) pp. 
464-471. 
81 Article XXIV:4. 
82 A free trade area, as defmed in Article XXIV:8(b) involves an association of nations with duty free 
treatment for imports from members. 
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above trade groupings. However, certain safeguards are incorporated to ensure 
that the purpose of the trade grouping is to facilitate trade between its members, 
rather than to create new, or increased barriers to trade for non-members. To this 
end the general obligation is that any new duties and regulations introduced at the 
commencement of any trade grouping, and applying to non-members, "shall not 
on the whole be higher or more restrictive" than the duties and regulations 
applicable before the formation of the trade grouping. This obligation applies to 
free trade areas, customs unions and interim agreements leading to the formation 
of either of these. 84 Additionally, interim agreements must contain a "plan and 
schedule" for the formation of the trade grouping within a "reasonable period of 
time." 
Article XXIV:7(a) requires prospective members of trade groupings to notify 
GATT Parties of their intention to do so, and "make available to them such 
information regarding the proposed union or area as will enable them to make 
such reports and recommendations to contracting parties as they may deem 
appropriate." Paragraph (b) then goes on to provide that if the GATT Parties 
consider that a customs union or free trade area is unlikely to result within the 
period contemplated by the Parties, or the contemplated period is not a reasonable 
one, " ... the CONTRACTING PARTIES shall make recommendations to the 
parties to the agreement." The parties to the trade grouping are then required, 
"not to maintain or put into force ... such agreement if they are not prepared to 
modify it in accordance with [the] recommendations." 
83 A customs union as defined in Article XXIV: 8(b) amounts to a closer association of nations than the 
free trade area. Not only is there duty free treatment of imports from wit.lrin the union, but a common 
level of external tariffs for imports from non-members is also applied. 
84 Article XXIV.5(a) and (b). 
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There are clear parallels between the review of trade groupings under Article 
XXIV, and the possible adoption of a validation mechanism for secondary 
policies under the GP A. Most obviously, the experience under Article XXIV 
provides some insight into what body should have the responsibility of 
conducting any validation process. Also, the issues which have been raised in 
proceedings on the correct interpretation of the MFN exception, would be 
relevant in the context of a GPA validation process. Thus under Article XXIV :5, 
a trade grouping may begin with an interim agreement which includes a "plan 
and schedule" for its formation within a "reasonable length of time." This would 
involve the gradual elimination of internal trade barriers between the trading 
partners. This situation can be compared with the gradual elimination of the 
discriminatory effect of secondary policies, or their removal when they have 
either achieved their objectives, or where there are concerns that they are unlikely 
to make any contribution towards those objectives. Additionally the GATT 
Parties can make recommendations concerning the implementation of trade 
groupmgs. An appropriate body might also be empowered to make 
recommendations concerning the use of procurement for secondary objectives. It 
would be essential that the approvaVreview body should have the power to 
impose conditions on the secondary uses of procurement, or ultimately to declare 
the policies to be incompatible with the GP A. The effect of the recommendations 
made in the GATT context under Article XXIV:7, provides some indication of 
how the powers of validation should be formulated under the GP A. A brief 
consideration will now be given to some of the practical and political problems 
which have arisen in the GATT context, and of the extent to which these 
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problems would also be likely to anse under a possible GP A validation 
mechanism. 
b) What body should be entrusted with the review process? 
The review of free trade areas, customs unions, or interim agreements has been 
carried out on an ad hoc basis by working parties, which report their findings to 
the GATT Parties. Typically, they do not reach any firm conclusions and, while 
numerous trade groupings have been considered, few have been approved by any 
formal action of the Parties. For example, the GATT Parties have never taken a 
position on the compatibility of the EC, or its three enlargements, with Article 
XXIV despite extensive discussions on the matter. In 1992, it was stated that, 
"over fifty previous working parties on individual customs unions or free-trade 
areas had been unable to reach unanimous conclusions as to the GATT 
consistency of those agreements. On the other hand, no such agreements had 
been disapproved explicitly.,,85 
At the very least therefore, it can be stated that Working Parties have not been 
uniformly successful in reviewing the compatibility of trade groupings with 
Article XXN. In order to address concerns in this area, a Committee on 
Regional Trade Agreements was established in February 1996.86 The Committee 
was primarily created to centralise the effort of working parties in one body, and 
to perform detailed examinations of regional trade agreements notified to the 
WTO, including those related to trade in services. The Committee is also to 
provide a forum to discuss ways of dealing with the issue of regionalism in the 
85 Analytical Index: guide GA IT law and practice, 6th ed. (1994; World Trade Organisation) p. 760. 
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WTO. To date, 184 regional trade agreements have been notified to the WTO, of 
which 109 are still in force. By the end of 1998, the Committee had commenced 
examination of 58 regional trade agreements. At the time of writing, no 
examination has yet been completed. 
The review process has also been strengthened by the confirmation that the 
compatibility of regional trade agreements with Article XXIV can be raised in 
dispute settlement proceedings. The Uruguay Round Understanding on Article 
XXIV provides that, 
"The provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII of the GATT 1994 may be invoked 
with respect to any matters arising from the application of those provisions of 
Article XXIV relating to customs unions, free-trade areas or interim agreements 
leading to the formation of a customs union or free-trade area." 
In the future therefore, we may have panel reports discussing the compatibility of 
regional agreements with Article XXIV. There are significant unresolved 
questions here of what the working relationship between the investigation 
conducted by the Committee on Regional Agreements, and any investigation 
conducted under the Dispute Settlement Understanding, will be. In particular, 
there is considerable uncertainty over whether a Dispute Settlement Panel will be 
able to reach a conclusion on the issues before it, when the review decision of the 
Committee on Regional Agreements is still pending. 
86 The general information on the Committee provided here is extracted from the WTO's page on 
regionalism at http://www.wto.orgldevelop/regional.htr 
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There is no guidance on this matter at the time of writing. The only complaint 
alleging violation of Article XXIV, and the Understanding on Article XXIV, was 
settled by a mutually agreed solution between India and Poland notified in 1996. 
The questions here go far beyond the remit of this Chapter. It is therefore merely 
suggested that if panels were prepared to express conclusions as to the Article 
XXIV compatibility of regional agreements, this would represent a surprising 
departure from their position prior to the enactment of the Understanding of 
Article XXIV. Panels have uniformly adopted a non-interventionist approach 
where questions have come before them which have yet to be resolved by 
Working Parties. An example is provided by the unadopted panel report on the 
EU's tariff treatment of Mediterranean citrus products.87 On the question of the 
Article XXIV compatibility of the bilateral agreement before it, the Panel 
considered its role as limited to providing an advisory opinion on the Article 
XXIV conformity of an agreement, or an interpretation of specific criteria under 
Article XXIV. However this guidance could only be provided to assist the 
GATT Parties to make their own findings or recommendations under Article 
XXIV:7(b), through the Working Parties. 
In the context of validating the use of procurement for secondary objectives, it 
would be essential for the body entrusted with this task, to be able to reach a clear 
and timely determination of the GP A compatibility of the secondary policy in all 
cases. It is submitted that this would be a realistic task in this context. It is the 
political sensitivity of reviewing regional agreements which has made it 
extremely difficult for Working Parties to reach authoritative conclusions. In the 
87 Ll5776 (unadopted, dated 7 February 1985), para. 4.6. 
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procurement context, however, the issues involved would be more amenable to 
definition, and more manageable, than the complex process of reviewing regional 
agreements. One could envisage that GP A Members would have to prepare 
detailed submissions on their proposed policies, including an analysis of such 
factors as: what objectives the secondary policy is intended to achieve; why it is 
necessary or desirable to use procurement power rather than other instruments; 
what mechanisms will the state establish to monitor the achievement of the 
objectives and how long procurement will be used to pursue the secondary 
policy. Thus much of the burden would fall on the GP A Members themselves, 
and the role of the designated body would be to validate the plans laid before 
them, where appropriate. It is submitted that under the GP A the existing 
Committee on Government Procurement could assume the role of validating 
secondary policies, given the expertise on the GPA's operation which this body 
has already accumulated. 
c) Interim agreements and eliminating internal trade barriers within a 
"reasonable time" 
As noted above, under GATT Article XXIV:5, a customs union or a free trade 
area may begin with an interim agreement which includes a "plan and schedule" 
for the formation of the union or free trade area within a "reasonable length of 
time." The question of what constitutes a reasonable period would also be 
, 
relevant to validating secondary policies on a transitional basis, and removing 
them when they have achieved their objectives, or gradually removing their 
discriminatory effect. Again, significant difficulties have been faced in the 
GATT context in reaching firm conclusions on what amounts to a "reasonable 
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length of time". The notion of reasonableness in this context has been described 
as "so vague as to defy meaningful enforcement", 88 and numerous Working Party 
reports have highlighted the fact that no determination on appropriate time limits 
has been reached by the GATT Parties.89 The Uruguay Round Understanding on 
Article XXIV does now, however, provide that, "[t]he 'reasonable length of time' 
should exceed 10 years only in exceptional cases".90 The Understanding also 
provides that if an interim agreement does "not include a plan and schedule, 
contrary to Article XXIV:5(c), the working party in its report shall recommend 
such a plan and schedule.,,91 
A common conclusions reached by many Working Parties, is that the 
reasonableness of the time periods envisaged by the members to the proposed 
trade grouping, depends on the relative levels of economic development of the 
members. Where there are marked discrepancies in the levels of development, 
Working Parties have been tolerant of lengthy deadlines for meeting defined 
objectives, or even an absence of firm deadlines for meeting o ~ j e c t i v e s . . Related 
to this is the further common conclusion that plans and schedules initially drawn 
up need not be precise and exhaustive where the members to the trade grouping 
are at different levels of economic development. The plans can therefore be of an 
"evolutionary" nature and be adapted over time to reflect the progress which is 
being made towards the achievement of the customs union or free trade area. 
88 H. Jackson, W.J. Davey and A.D. Sykes, op.cit. p472. 
89 See, for example, the 1972 Report of the Working Party on "European Economic Community -
Agreement of Association with Turkey" Ll3750, adopted on 25 October 1972, 19S/I02, papa. 8. 
90 Paragraph 3. 
91 Paragraph 10. 
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The Association Agreement between Greece and the European Economic 
Community (the Athens Agreement), provided for a transitional period of twenty-
two years plus ten years for certain products.92 The parties to the Agreement 
indicated such a protracted transitional period was required because of the 
marked difference in the degree of development of the members. The 1962 
Working Party on the Athens Agreement expressed doubt as to whether the 
period envisaged, "could be considered a reasonable length of time for the 
realisation of the customs union".93 However, the submissions of the members to 
the Agreement, that the time period envisaged was in the nature of a guarantee, 
and that strict procedures were laid down for the achievement of the customs 
union within that maximum time limit, were accepted and the time limits upheld 
on this basis. 
The 1972 Report of the Working Party on the Association of Malta with the 
European Economic Community, recorded different views on the need for a 
"plan and schedule".94 Certain members of the Working Party maintained that the 
Agreement lacked the necessary precision on the elimination of duties, in 
particular, on the elimination of restrictions into the Community of agricultural 
and textile products from Malta. Because of the importance of these product 
groups to Malta, the benefits accruing to it from the Association Agreement could 
have been significantly impaired by the lack of clear plans. The majority of the 
Working Party were of the contrary view that an evolutionary time-table, was 
preferable to a prescriptive schedule where the members concerned differed in 
92 Association of Greece with the European Community, GATT, 11th Supp. BISD 149 (1963). 
93 Ll1829, adopted 15 November 1962, IIS/149, 150, para. 6. 
94 Ll3665, adopted 29 May 1972, 19S/90, 92-93 paras. 10-12. 
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their level of economic development and that there was no reason to doubt the 
political will of the parties to achieve a customs union. 
Even where the parties to trade groupings have been of equivalent level of 
economic development, they have successfully argued for extended periods 
where import restrictions could be maintained or re-introduced. For example, in 
the Working Party report on the Free Trade Agreement between Canada and the 
United States, several members expressed concern about the measures which 
allowed a 'snapback' to the imposition of non-tariff barriers on fresh fruit and 
vegetables over a period of twenty years, and the lack of a time-table for the 
phasing out of Canadian import permits for grain and grain products.95 
States entering into interim agreements are not therefore required to draw up 
detailed plans for the realisation of customs unions or free-trade areas. It would 
also seem that they have a broad discretion to decide for themselves what periods 
for the realisation of the trade grouping should be reasonable. From the Working 
Party Reports outlined above, it can be suggested that timetables for achieving 
free-trade areas or customs unions would need to be entirely beyond the realms of 
reasonableness to result in a Working Party recommendation of incompatibility 
with Article XXIV. The Working Parties have been highly reluctant to interfere 
with the plans to establish interim agreements, or even to require that detailed 
plans be drafted before the interim agreement is introduced. 
95 Ll6927, adopted 12 November 1991, 28S/47, 63, para. 52. 
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d) Can the review of regional ag;reements actually result in a declaration of 
incompatibility? 
The extent of the obligations which the parties to interim agreements must 
undertake are therefore rather uncertain. There is also a lack of clarity on what 
Working Parties (or the new Committee) can do, or recommend, in the face of 
questionable arrangements for achieving a customs union or free-trade area. As 
noted above, Article XXIV:7(b) provides that if the GATT Parties consider that a 
customs union or free trade area is unlikely to result, within the period 
contemplated by the Parties, or that the contemplated period is not a reasonable 
one, " ... the [GATT Parties] shall make recommendations to the parties to the 
agreement." The parties to the trade grouping are then required, "not to maintain 
or put into force ... such agreement if they are not prepared to modify it in 
accordance with [the] recommendations." 
There is no case which has resulted in a final and unanimous disapproval of plans 
for the establishment of a customs union or free-trade area. Article XXIV is 
intended to provide a safeguard against blatant abuse where states seek to avoid 
their MFN obligations by creating the superficial impression that a customs union 
or free-trade area will be created.96 The normal position is that Working Party 
Reports have contained no definite conclusions, because the information 
available at the time of the review does not enable any conclusions to be drawn. 
It is also unclear what the nature and quality of additional information, which 
96 This was the approach towards the application of Article XXIV envisaged during discussions on the 
GATT at the Geneva session of the preparatory Committee. It was noted here that: "If the [GAIT 
Parties] find that the proposals made by the country that is making them will in fact lead towards a 
Customs Union in some reasonable period of time, why they must approve it. They have no power to 
object. It is simply a mechanism foreseeing, if necessary, that some Member does not find a way out 
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would enable a definitive conclusion, would have to be. There must surely now 
be sufficient information available on the operation of the European Union to 
determine whether it can justifiably claim a derogation from MFN under Article 
XXIV, given that this question was first investigated all of three decades ago. 
There is also doubt as to the legal status of regional agreements which have not 
been expressly approved or disapproved. The position is probably that their legal 
status remains open until it is authoritatively determined. Working Parties have 
commonly come to this conclusion, as did the unadopted panel report on the 
EU's tariff treatment of Mediterranean citrus products mentioned above.97 This is 
not, however, a conclusion which is generally shared by the parties to regional 
agreements. For example, the above panel conclusion was .criticised in the 
GATT Council on the basis that, "Article XXN agreements had to be presumed 
to be in conformity with the General Agreement as long as the [GATT Parties] 
had not made a recommendation on them. ,,98 
It is repeated that the limited impact which working Parties have faced, reviewing 
regional agreements, is strongly indicative of the political difficulty of interfering 
with the establishment of trade groupings, or interim agreements intended to 
mature into customs unions or free-trade areas. These political difficulties were, 
for example, raised by the unadopted 1985 Panel Report cited above, which 
described the review process as involving, " ... an assessment of all the duties, 
regulations of commerce and trade coverage as well as the interests and rights of 
of its obligations under Article I under the guise of entering into a Customs Union when it is really not 
likely that a Customs Union will eventuate". EPCTffACIPV/11,p. 37 .. 
97 Ll5776 (unadopted, dated 7 February 1985), para. 4.6. 
98 1M C .186, pp. 9,10,16,17. 
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all [the parties to the agreement in question] ... and not just the interests and 
rights of one party raising a complaint.,,99 Concerns about the political 
sensitivity of a finding of incompatibility with Article XXIV, are not as 
prominent in the context of validating secondary policies. The validity of a 
secondary policy is of immediate and direct importance to the state implementing 
the policy. Of course, all other GP A Members also have an interest in the 
validity of the policy, in so far as it affects their ability to access, and compete in 
foreign markets. Is is submitted, however, that the conflicting interests here are 
more amenable to definition and resolution. 
In the procurement context, the Committee on Government Procurement (or other 
appropriate body) ought to be more prepared to refuse to validate, or strike down, 
a proposed or current use of procurement for secondary purposes. This might be 
done on several bases. A refusal to approve a secondary policy could be based 
on the Committee's lack of satisfaction with the plans laid before it. The 
Committee could be required to give reasons for its decision and, possibly, to 
make recommendations on the steps which would need to be taken before re-
submitting the secondary policy for the Committee's consideration. In the 
context of a periodic review of existing policies, the Committee may be 
dissatisfied with evidence presented that the use of procurement power is 
achieving the desired outcome/s, and that the continued use of procurement is 
necessary and proportional. The Committee could also make recommendations 
on how the discriminatory effect of secondary policies could be gradually 
removed. 
99 L/5776 (unadopted, dated 7 February 1985), para. 4.18. 
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e) The criteria for the validation of secondary policies 
The above comments raise the issue of what criteria should be adopted by the 
designated validation body when reviewing, or approving secondary policies. It 
is submitted that a proportionality test could be developed, and applied in this 
context. The principle of proportionality is firmly established in EU law as a 
means of reviewing the acts of public authorities,loo albeit that Emiliou points 
towards disagreement as to its precise legal origin. IOI Broadly stated, the various 
elements of the proportionality principle can be expressed as follows, 
"Measures adopted by public authorities should not exceed the limits of what is 
appropriate and necessary in order to attain legitimate objectives in the public 
interest; when there is a choice between several appropriate measures recourse 
should be made to the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused (to the 
individual) should not be disproportionate to the aims pursued.,,102 
The proportionality principle is composed of three separate components. The 
first component is the suitability of the measure for the situation to which it is 
applied. In the EU context, judicial deference to the judgement of the institutions 
100 On the principle of proportionality in EU law see, N. Emiliou, The Principle of Proportionality in 
European Law, A Comparative Study, (1996; Kluwer); T. Tridimas, The General Principles of EC Law 
(1999; Oxford EC Law Library) Chapters 3 and 4. 
101 N. Emiliou, supra note 98, at pp. 134-139. The author identifies three possibilities for the origin of 
the proportionality principle in EU law. The frrst is the combined effect of the Right to Liberty and 
Right to Choose Trade, Occupation or Profession in the German Grundgesetz. The second is that 
proportionality is derived from a general principle ofEU Law, that the individual should not have his 
freedom. of action limited, beyond the degree necessary in the general interest. The third possible 
source is an express and clear provision of the Treaty, being Article 40 (now Article 34) of Title II on 
Agriculture, which, in the context of common organisations of the market in agricultural products, 
permits only the use of those measures which are necessary for the attainment of the objectives under 
Article 39 (now Article 33). 
102 N. Emiliou, supra note 98, at p. 2. 
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has generally meant that the suitability of a measure has been assessed in such a 
manner as to limit interference. Thus the Court has generally only gone so far as 
to question whether the " ... measure is manifestly inappropriate having regard to 
the objective which the competent institution is seeking to achieve.,,103 
The second component is necessity, which requires that when there is a choice 
between several appropriate measures, recourse should be had to the least 
onerous. In the procurement setting, where the secondary objective can be 
pursued using a variety of instruments, the state or individual purchaser would 
need to employ the instrument which is among the most efficient, in achieving 
the desired ends. 
The third component is proportionality stricto sensu. In addition to the suitability 
and necessity of the chosen instrument, the EC] has questioned the extent to 
which the measure in question interferes with the fundamental right concerned. 
Again, the Court has formulated its responsibility here in such a manner as to 
constrain the review process to narrow limits. As long as the measure does not 
constitute, "with regard to the aim pursued, a disproportionate and intolerable 
interference impairing the very substance of those rights", it is lawful. 104 In the 
EU context, this component of the proportionality principle has been applied 
where a measure encroaches upon a Treaty right, or a fundamental human right 
forming part of the general principles of EC Law. Under the GP A, the 
fundamental right would be the right of suppliers to be treated in a non-
discriminatory manner during all stages of the contract award process. A state 
103 Case C-331188 Fedesa [1990] ECR 1-4023, p. 4063 per curiam. 
104 Case 5/88 Wachauf[1989] ECR 2609, p. 2639 per curiam. 
165 
could argue that procurement would be a particularly efficient way to achieve a 
secondary objective so that both the necessity and suitability criteria would be 
satisfied. However, the use of procurement could entail significant encroachment 
on the fundamental right to non-discriminatory treatment. It is here that 
proportionality stricto sensu would be applied, to balance the pros and cons of 
using the most efficient instrument, and the instrument which is least damaging to 
obligations of non-discrimination. The question of how the proportionality 
principle would apply in the context of a GP A validation mechanism, will now be 
considered. 
o The principle of proportionality in the context of a GP A validation 
mechanism 
As noted above, one of the factors which would affect the success of any review 
of secondary policies, is the rigour with which the review body would examine 
the reasons underlying proposed secondary policies. In the EU context, the ECl 
has been prepared to apply the proportionality principle to assess the legality of 
normative and administrative acts, although it has been generally unwilling to 
examine the merits of the measures before it. This is because of the limitations 
inherent in the separation of powers embodied in the institutional structure of the 
Community. The ECl is therefore understandably reluctant to evaluate the 
economic facts and circumstances underlying the acts of the institutions. Under 
the EU approach, it is for the administration to evaluate the basic primary 
information before it accurately. It must then consider what options are available 
to it, balance the pros and cons of those alternatives, and choose the one which, in 
its view, will best serve the public interest. 
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In contrast, the ECJ may only assess the legality of a measure. Of course, it is 
impossible to maintain a clear division between the legality and the merits of the 
choices which are made by the institutions. Thus it has been noted that, " ... where 
rights of constitutional importance are affected, or where private interests have 
special strength, an appraisal of administrative action may properly have an 
intensity which reduces the gulf between legality and merits"I05 The same author 
also notes that the standard of review in the EU context has tended to be more 
intensive for administrative measures than for legislative acts. 106 From the 
description of the components of proportionality given above, it is clear that the 
threshold of illegality (or disproportionality) is generally set at a high level. It 
can also be noted that should the ECJ find a measure to be illegal, it may not 
require that the policy be pursued using a more appropriate instrument. This is a 
decision for the Community institutions or Member States depending on whose 
act is being reviewed. 
Concerns about the doctrine of separation of powers limiting the evaluation of 
secondary policies, and hence the effectiveness of a validation mechanism, ought 
to be avoidable in the procurement context. This is because the GP A Parties 
would not be given any general legal authority to use procurement for secondary 
objectives. The legal authority to do so would only exist in so far as the policy in 
question is expressly approved by an appropriate body. The situation would be 
rather different from the EU context where the institutions have been vested with 
the legal authority to pursue legislative and administrative measures for the 
105 N. Emiliou, supra note 98, at p. 173. 
106 Ibid. at p. 181. 
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harmonisation of laws necessary for the achievement of a single market. There is 
therefore less objection to allowing a validation body to review the merits of a 
proposed secondary use of procurement where the Parties do not have the legal 
authority to use procurement power in this way, in the absence of express 
approval. 
Nevertheless, the suggestion that a validation body should be able to review the 
merits of a proposal by a GP A Party, does raise distinct difficulties. A state could 
declare that it considers the proposed secondary use of procurement meets all the 
requirements of proportionality, taking account of the particular socio/economic 
conditions present in its territory. There is a strong argument here that the state 
itself is the best judge of what measures are appropriate and necessary to achieve 
its legitimate ends, notwithstanding that the state has no legal authority to 
implement the policy unless it is approved. Concern about a validation body 
'second guessing' a state's determination of the measures which are deemed to be 
suitable, and necessary and proportional, can however be dispelled by reference 
to how a validation process could potentially operate. 
It would not be open to a state to merely make a declaration that the proposed 
secondary uses of procurement conform with the proportionality requirements. 
States would have to justify and explain their reasons for reaching their 
conclusions in a detailed manner. The burden would be firmly on them to 
demonstrate that their proposals are not disproportionate. 107 The review body 
\o7This is a reversed burden of proof to that which operates in the EU context. In assessing the 
proportionality of measures of the EU institutions, it is the applicant affected by the measure which 
must produce evidence supporting an allegation of excessiveness of the disadvantages of the contested 
measure, in relation to its advantages. 
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would need to have the expertise to assess the contents of the proposals made to 
it, as well as the contents of alternative instruments which could be used. 
However, from the detailed submissions made to it, a review body with the 
relevant expertise would gain a clear impression of the validity of the policy 
without having to perform its own economic analysis; a task which would 
probably be beyond the resources of any designated body. In practice therefore, 
it is likely that states would be permitted considerable discretion in formulating 
their policies, and the role of the review body would be limited to identifying any 
manifest errors in the analysis leading to a state's conclusions. 
This is not to say, however, that a validation body would routinely approve 
proposed secondary uses of procurement. It can be suggested that states carrying 
out a thorough analysis of the economic merits of using procurement for 
achieving secondary policies, would frequently find that procurement is an 
inefficient instrument, and that other, more efficient, instruments which are less 
restrictive of trade should be employed. Perhaps one of the principal merits of 
requiring states to undertake a study of the proposed secondary use of 
procurement, for the attention of the validation body, would therefore be to 
promote an understanding that, in many (if not most) circumstances, procurement 
is not the optimal instrument for the pursuit of secondary objectives, however 
convenient its use might seem. 
g) Could a GP A validation mechanism for secondary policies operate 
successfully? 
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The overall success of any validation process would depend on two broad factors. 
Firstly, the Committee on Government procurement (or other review body) 
would have to be prepared to undertake an inquisitive and critical examination of 
the secondary uses of procurement, rather than act as a mere conduit through 
which GP A Members would be able to exercise their own discretion. This ought 
to be possible. As noted above, it is unclear what the consequences of a Working 
Party conclusion of incompatibility of a regional agreement with Article XXIV 
would be. However, if a secondary policy were determined to be non-GP A 
compliant, the clear consequence would be either the entire removal of the 
policy, or the removal of that part of it which breaches the GP A. There would be 
no question of retaining the policy in the face of the Committee's non-approval, 
and attempts to do so could be subject to consultations and inter-governmental 
dispute settlement under the DSU. The alternative would then be to seek a 
negotiated derogation, either for the policy, or for the procurement under which 
the policy is most frequently applied. It is understandable that there is some 
doubt about the role of the review of regional agreements under GATT Article 
XXIV. The deference of the ECJ to the judgement of the political institutions 
when applying the proportionality principle is equally understandable. However, 
there are legitimate reasons why the intensity of the review processes have been 
limited in the different contexts which have been considered. The author has 
argued that these same concerns are present, although not as prominent, in the 
context of validating secondary policies. The problems which would be 
encountered in the procurement context, it is submitted, would not be 
insurmountable. 
170 
The success of any validation mechanism would also be dependant on the good 
faith of the OP A Parties. It would require that states refrain from seeking the 
validation of policies whose only real objective, is the isolation of domestic 
industry from foreign competition. If the Parties consider that procurement 
should be used as an instrument of protectionism, then this should be done only 
where the procurement is not covered by the OP A. One of the advantages of a 
validation mechanism, however, is that states should be less inclined to seek to 
entirely exclude some of their procurement from coverage. The entire rationale 
for the validation mechanism would be to reconcile the secondary uses of 
procurement, with the demands of international competitive tendering. For 
secondary policies which are more meritorious than protectionism alone, it would 
be desirable that states only have recourse to the validation mechanism when they 
reasonably consider that the use of procurement can make a genuine contribution 
to the achievement of a secondary policy. Both the Parties themselves, and the 
review body would therefore have important roles in securing the success of the 
process. 
10. South African Procurement Reform and the attainment of social and 
economic objectives108 
a) The relevance of this case study 
It has been argued that one of the major reasons for the OPA's limited 
membership is the restrictions which it imposes on the use of procurement for 
secondary objectives. An important question is whether an approach to 
regulation more permissive of the secondary uses of procurement could be 
108 On the South African procurement reforms, see D. Letchmiah, "The Process of Public Sector 
Procurement Reform in South Africa" (1999) 1 Public Procurement Law Review 15. 
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adopted with a VIew to increasing both the Agreement's membership and 
coverage. This IS one of the Issues which the WTO's Working Group on 
Transparency in Government Procurement IS currently addressing. The 
desirability of an alternative approach would depend on the associated costs, in 
terms of departing from, or abandoning, the GPA's efficiency, and wealth 
creation objectives. 
The recent South African procurement reforms provide an important indication of 
these costs, since after the first democratic elections in 1994, the use of an 
'Affirmative Procurement Policy' was identified as one of the key instruments for 
the economic and social reconstruction of the nation. The new South African 
Constitution incorporates specific provisions on procurement, providing the basis 
for the radical changes proposedl09, while public sector reform is also the subject 
of a new Green Paper, I 10 which sets out strategies for achieving socio-economic 
objectives and good governance in procurement. 
The starting point of the South African reforms is that the objectives of value for 
money, transparency and the broad participation of suppliers on the one hand, 
and the use of procurement for secondary objectives on the other, are all 
desirable, and complementary objectives which can, and must be accommodated 
within the regulatory environment. This is in contrast to the GP A which sees the 
secondary uses of procurement as exceptional and generally undesirable. Thus 
109 Artic:;le 217 of the Constitution requires that procurement systems be fair, equitable, transparent and 
cost effective, while it is also provided that these objectives do not prevent procurirtg entities from 
adopting categories of preferences, or from protecting or advancing those disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination. 
\10 Green Paper on Public Sector Procurement Reform in South Africa, GN No.691 GG17928 of 14 
April 1997. 
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the refonns which are described below provide an important insight into how 
apparently conflicting objectives need not necessarily be regarded as mutually 
exclusive. For several reasons it is also important to ask whether the 
reconciliation of these objectives under South African refonns can be regarded as 
compatible with the GP A. 
First and foremost, the GP A compatibility of the refonns is of interest for all 
prospective GP A Members wishing to use their procurement for secondary 
purposes. The South African refonns have been carefully designed to balance 
development objectives with value for money considerations, and place a strong 
emphasis on monitoring, enforcement and evaluation of results. The extent to 
which such a carefully fonnulated strategy, which indeed addresses many of the 
fundamental concerns of the GP A itself, can be regarded as compatible with the 
existing Agreement, is therefore of general interest. From the South African 
perspective, compatibility is of interest since the Green Paper recognises that 
South Africa must begin to engage the issue of GP A membership directly, as 
pressure from major trading partners to join begins to mount. The Green Paper 
also recognises the need for a detailed analysis of the GP A, to explore the scope 
of its flexibility in pennitting the pursuit of secondary objectives. 
b) The background of oppression and the beginnings of reform 
Until the first democratic elections, the majority of the population was effectively 
prohibited from developing their potential and resources, by discriminatory laws 
Which socially and economically favoured the white minority. Black South 
Africans were prohibited from operating any business in a so-called white area 
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which constituted the larger part of the country's territory. Before the new 
government came into power the Reconstruction and Development Plan (RDP) 
was drafted and implemented to provide an overall strategy for South Africa's 
economic and social development. The RDP emphasises the role of public 
procurement in developing the economy. Procurement spending by National, 
Provincial and Local government departments is estimated at approximately 13% 
of Gross Domestic Product and as representing some 30% of all government 
expenditure. As the law has historically been used to systematically exclude the 
majority of the population from participating in the economy, the RDP regards 
procurement as an important legal instrument to contribute to the reversal of this 
discrimination. 
The marginalisation of the black majority, has meant that public tendering 
systems favoured the established and larger businesses, and it has been very 
difficult for any newcomer to enter into the system. Further, the participation of 
small and medium enterprises, and particularly those owned by 'previously 
disadvantaged individuals' on public sector projects has been negligible. Among 
the reasons why the established elite have continued to monopolise the 
procurement system, has been difficulty with access to tendering information and 
the complexity of tender documents. The process of adjudication of tenders has 
occurred under "a perceived veil of secrecy", while a lack of feedback to 
unsuccessful tenderers has made it difficult for emerging businesses to learn what 
is required of responsive and competitive tenders. Contracts have also generally 
been structured in such a manner that the large and well established contractors 
have been favoured. Thus contractors have traditionally been required to have all 
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the necessary resources, and technical and managerial skills to finance and 
perform the entire contract. Undertakings in certain impoverished regions, or 
those owned by members of minority groups, will not generally possess all the 
resources necessary to perform all aspects of the contract. They may, however, 
have the ability to perform some aspects of the contract and, may be able to do so 
at competitive prices. As will be described below, the reforms incorporate 
approaches to deal with this kind of situation. 
A further aspect of the procurement system is that contracts have traditionally 
been awarded to the lowest financial offer, as this has been considered to be the 
proper criterion to represent value for money. The lowest tender has only been 
excluded where the bid seems overly optimistic, or where the firm lacks the 
financial or technical capacity to undertake the contract. This narrow view of 
value for money, generally prevents a firm's ability to undertake socio-economic 
objectives from being taken into consideration, even where the resulting tender 
prices are only marginally higher than the lowest compliant tender submitted. 
Again, the reform proposals incorporate strategies to re-define what is meant by 
value for money in the South African context. 
Following on from the RDP, an urgent need for procurement reform was 
identified by the Ministry of Public Works after the national elections in 1994. 
Two concurrent approaches were implemented. It was decided that a series of 
short term strategies would have to be developed and implemented within the 
'ambit of existing legislation. This has led to the interim 10 Point Plan on 
procurement, which was adopted by procuring entities in June 1996. Along side 
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the 10 Point Plan, it was decided to develop new procurement policies linked to 
legislative reform. This has resulted in the publication of a Green Paper on 
Public Sector Procurement Reform, which incorporates all the principles 
contained in the 10 Point Plan. The following ten strategies have been 
encompassed: 
1. Improving access to tendering information. 
2. The development of tender advice centres. 
3. Broadening the participation base for contracts less than R7 500. 
4. The waiving of security/sureties on construction contracts having a value of less 
than R1 00 000. 
5. The unbundling oflarge projects into smaller contracts. 
6. The promotion of early payment cycles by government. 
7. The development of a preference system for small and medium enterprises owned 
by historically disadvantaged individuals. 
8. The simplification of tender submission requirements. 
9. The appointment of a procurement ombudsman. 
10.The reclassification of building and engineering contracts. 
The manner in which these strategies have been incorporated into the Green 
Paper, and the compatibility of the proposed reforms with the GP A will now be 
discussed. 
c) The Green Paper and its strate2ies for pursuin2 Socio-Economic 
Objectives 
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The Green Paper uses the term Affirmative Procurement to describe the new 
method of procurement which is envisaged. The objective is to increase the 
engagement of small, medium and micro enterprises (SMMEs), in government 
contracts. Of particular interest are those SMMEs owned by members of 
'previously disadvantaged groups', which may be geographically dispersed. In 
contrast, for construction projects, where procured assets have to be constructed 
in specific locations, area-based targeting of labour or enterprises is envisaged. 
This targeting may be coupled with the promotion of 'employment-intensive 
practices' in order to maximise employment and income generation among the 
poorest sectors of the community. 
The Green Paper attempts to ensure, however, that these objectives are achieved 
in a structured manner. Thus it requires programmes to be implemented in a 
manner which is, "definable, quantifiable, measurable, auditable and verifiable." 
At the same time, the principles of, "fairness, competition, cost efficiency and 
inclusion" cannot be compromised. For example, it is provided that measures 
which are adopted to secure participation by the targeted business groups should 
not result in a failure in delivery, or a deterioration in the quality of the goods 
services or works delivered. Also, businesses falling outside of the target group 
should not generally be excluded from the contract award process. 
Immediately, therefore, it is apparent that at least part of the Green Paper's remit 
is to reconcile the conflicting approaches to procurement, coined by Fernandez 
Martin as the 'Economic Rationale' and 'Instrumental' uses. The Green Paper 
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sets out three key strategies in attempting to achieve this reconciliation, as 
follows: 
• the 'unbundling' of contracts 
• the use of Human Resource Specifications (HRS), and 
• the use of a development objective/price mechanism adjudication system. 
d) 'Unbundling' 
Unbundling refers to the practice of splitting major contract requirements up into 
lots, so that the smaller individual contracts created are of a manageable size for 
targeted enterprises. SMMEs can participate in public procurement in several 
ways. Firstly, goods, services and works can be procured in the smallest 
practicable quantities. Where the risk is small, and where the contract can 
therefore be described as Micro or Minor, targeted enterprises can contract 
directly with the State. Thus where the period for completion of the contract is 
short, the value is relatively low, and the contractor's responsibility for 
appointment of sub-contractors is limited, there is no need to split the contract 
requirement up since targeted enterprises can safely undertake the contract on 
their own. 
Direct participation by targeted enterprises, and full responsibility for the entire 
project will not be routinely possible. Where there is a major contract, SMMEs 
will not have sufficient resources to perform the entire contract unassisted by 
'other larger enterprises. Indeed, where the contract is classed as 'International' 
the necessary resources may be beyond the capabilities of most large South 
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African firms. This is where unbundling becomes an important strategy to ensure 
the involvement of SMMEs, or larger South African firms, in the procurement 
process at some level. 
Where the contract requirement is too onerous for SMMEs to assume complete 
responsibility for performance, there are nevertheless broadly three possibilities 
to ensure their involvement. Firstly, the State can split the contract up into 
smaller manageable lots itself and award the smaller contracts to the targeted 
enterprises. The Green Paper proposes that contracts involving more than one 
product or service should be separately adjudicated, and handled by different 
contractors where this is practicable. Also, products and services should be 
categorised in terms of their complexity in order to allow SMMEs to access the 
procurement process by tendering for simpler contracts which involve lower 
risks. 
The second option is for the contract to be awarded to a domestic or foreign 
Prime contractor who then assumes contractual responsibilities for unbundling 
the contract it has been awarded by engaging targeted businesses. Here, the 
contract is between the contracting authority and the Prime contractor. However, 
as will be seen below, the prime contractor assumes contractual responsibilities 
for using SMMEs in performing the contract. The third option is to require joint 
venture formation between established businesses, and targeted emerging 
businesses. Here, the senior joint venture contractor will normally be a prime 
contractor with resources to perform all or most of the contract requirements. 
The junior partner lacks some of the necessary skills, but is able to develop them 
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through the joint venture. Joint ventures differ from the second option in that the 
SMME becomes jointly responsible to the contracting authority for performing 
the major prime contract. In contrast, the second option involves the SMME 
becoming responsible to the prime contractor for the performance of the specific 
responsibilities subcontracted to it. Unbundling is therefore one of the methods 
chosen to ensure the maximum possible participation of targeted enterprises, at 
an intensity which is appropriate for their level of development. 
i) The Compatibility of unbundling with the GP A 
The unbundling of contracts involves splitting procurement requirements up in 
order to maximise the involvement of SMMEs. The contracting authority may 
either split large contracts itself before they are awarded. Alternatively, it may 
award one large contract subject to contractual obligations undertaken by the 
successful firm to split the contracts. Both these different methods are motivated 
primarily by the aim of maximising the participation of SMMEs. The GP A 
contains rules on the splitting of contracts, and the aggregation of small contracts, 
which are relevant here. 
Article II of the GPA on the Valuation of Contracts reqUIres contracting 
authorities to add together the value of purchases made under a number of similar 
contracts. These are generally referred to as aggregation rules, and are intended to 
make it difficult for authorities to evade the GPA's application by splitting 
purchases up into smaller individual contracts, each of which falls below the 
'relevant financial threshold. Article 11:3 firstly contains an express prohibition 
against deliberate 'contract splitting' in the following terms: 
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"The selection of the valuation method by the entity shall not be used, nor shall 
any procurement requirement be divided, with the intention of avoiding the 
application of this Agreement." 
This provision deals with the situation where the authority seeks to award two or 
more separate contracts, rather than a single contract which would have been 
above the financial thresholds. It is likely to be of limited value however in 
promoting the effectiveness of the Agreement, because of the need to establish 
that the motive for splitting a contract into separate lots was to avoid having to 
advertise the contract internationally. Procurements may be carried out on a 
frequent and small scale basis for reasons other than a deliberate intention to 
avoid the rules, such as a lack of communication among government departments 
on their requirements resulting in inefficient purchasing. 
In the South African context, the primary motive for splitting large requirements 
will be to increase SMME participation. It is also crucial to the overall ethos of 
the reforms that they operate in a manner compatible with international 
competition, and the participation of foreign firms. If South Africa were to join 
the GP A, it could be argued that where unbundling involves splitting major 
contracts into smaller lots, Article 11:3 is not breached because the primary 
intention is not to evade the Agreement and preclude the participation of foreign 
firms. They are permitted to compete for contracts, albeit that domestic firms 
'sometimes have an advantage at the award stage, if the content of the secondary 
objective is more difficult for foreign firms to meet than domestic firms. 
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Whether, Article 11:3 is breached depends on how the overall package of reforms 
will operate in practice. If unbundling strategies are merely the first step in a 
procurement system which can be assessed as being incompatible with the GP A, 
then the splitting of contracts could be regarded as a means of avoiding the 
Agreement's application. This question cannot be answered by considering 
unbundling in isolation from the wider context of procurement reforms. 
However, the narrow question of whether contracts have been split with the 
intention of evading the Agreement is likely to be of limited importance under the 
GP A. This is because Article 11:4 reinfroces Article 11:3 by requiring "similar 
recurring contracts" to be aggregated regardless of the reason why they have been 
awarded separately, where it seems commercially reasonable. that the separate 
purchases should have been awarded in one single large contract. It is provided 
that: 
"If an individual requirement for a procurement results in the award of more than 
one contract, or in contracts being awarded in separate parts, the basis for 
evaluation shall be either, 
(a) the actual value of similar recurring contracts concluded over the previous 
fiscal year or 12 months adjusted, where possible, for anticipated changes in 
quantity and value over the subsequent 12 months; or 
(b) the estimated value of recurring contracts in the fiscal year or 12 months 
subsequent to the initial contract." 
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The contracting authority has the choice over which aggregation method to adopt, 
although it's choice must clearly be consistent with the obligation in Article II:3 
not to be motivated by the intention of avoiding the application of the Agreement. 
Whether, the authority is required to aggregate the contracts at all depends on 
whether an "individual requirement" can be identified, and of whether there have 
been "similar recurring contracts." It is submitted, however, that if "similar 
recurring contracts" can be identified, then this will be sufficient to establish that 
there has indeed been an "individual requirement" which has been split up. No 
guidance is provided by the GP A on when recurring contracts should be regarded 
as similar. To date, the same can also be said of the EC procurement regime, on 
which the GP A aggregation rules are broadly based. In the EC regime, slightly 
different formulations of the aggregation rules are provided in the different 
Directives. However, a common question is whether the separate contracts are of 
the same "type". This is analogous to the term "similar recurring contracts" used 
by the GPA. 
In the context of the EC rules, Arrowsmith has suggested that contracts can be 
treated as of the same "type" where the goods or services contracted for are 
typically available from the same supplier or service provider. I II Where the 
goods and services are generally only available from different specialist firms, 
then separate contracts should not be regarded as being similar or as being of the 
same type. On this basis, contracts for the supply of paper, correcting fluid and 
pens should be aggregated, whereas contracts for the supply of ambulances and 
III S. Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement (1996; Sweet & Maxwell) p.170. 
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fire engines should not be aggregated because these specialist vehicles would 
normally be sourced from different firms. Arrowsmith notes that, 
"Such a test reflects the objective of the rules, which is to ensure that purchases 
are advertised when it is commercially reasonable for those purchases to be 
packaged in a single contract which exceeds the threshold.,,112 
The author also acknowledges that while this is a sensible test, it still leaves a 
great deal of scope for differences in judgement in an area which is very 
important for achieving an open procurement market. 
It is important to emphasise that where an "individual requirement" must be 
aggregated, this does not force the authority to advertise and award one major 
contract. The authority may, if it chooses, continue to split the requirement up 
into smaller lots which are manageable for SMMEs, and which they can perform 
using their own resources. However, the effect of the aggregation rule is that all 
the separate contracts must be advertised and awarded under OP A procedures. In 
practice, the authority may consider this to be inefficient. It may therefore award 
a single large contract although this might limit the participation of SMMEs. 
A final option is still available however. The authority may divide the contract 
into lots to be awarded in a single procedure. Numerous separate contracts 
whose value would be aggregated could then be advertised and awarded at the 
'same time to different targeted firms. Administrative costs would be reduced 
112 Ibid. 
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since the tender documentation for all the contracts would be the same and 
duplication of award procedures would be avoided. SMMEs are also able to 
participate because the individual contracts can be packaged in manageable sizes. 
ii) Application of the aggreeation rules to unbundling strategies 
It can be noted that all of the unbundling strategies envisaged by the Green Paper 
are potentially compatible with the aggregation rules. Where procurement is 
conducted for the smallest practicable quantities, which requires large, above 
threshold requirements to be split into smaller lots, the aggregation rules come 
into operation. However, as noted above, SMME participation can still be 
preserved by splitting the contract up into smaller lots and awarding the lots in 
one procedure. 
In contrast, where the unbundling strategy involves a joint venture formation 
between SMMEs and larger, established contractors, the aggregation rules do not 
apply. This is because a major contract will have been awarded in one lot, which 
is covered by the Agreement if above the relevant thresholds, and not otherwise 
excluded. The same applies where the contract is awarded to a major contractor 
subject to contractual obligations to engage SMMEs in the performance of the 
contract. Here again, a single major contract is awarded and the splitting of the 
performance requirements later on has no bearing on avoiding the thresholds. 
e) Human Resource Specifications 
-Contractors are normally required to perform the contract according to a technical 
specification which lays down the characteristics of the goods or services to be 
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procured, such as quality, performance, safety, packaging and labelling. 
However, the Human Resource Specification is to be used in South Africa and 
has already been piloted for construction projects. Human Resource 
Specifications set goals for targeted SMME participation, or the engagement of 
targeted labour or resources. These goals must be achieved in a manner which 
can be quantified, measured, verified and audited, and the HRS will set out how 
these objectives, which all relate to the transparency of the procurement process, 
are to be achieved. All HRSs share these common characteristics. However, 
they differ in the exact goals which must be achieved and the methods for their 
achievement. 
As noted above, the participation of SMMEs can be provided for in different 
ways. SMMEs can be favoured at the award stage to increase their chances of 
winning smaller, manageable contracts which they are fully capable of 
performing using their own resources and expertise. Here the role of the HRS is 
to identify which SMMEs are to be regarded as Affirmable Business Enterprises. 
This is done by defining which businesses are owned and controlled by 
previously disadvantaged individuals. When firms possess the relevant 
characteristics, then they are favoured at the award phase of the contract. As will 
be seen below, however, certain firms are favoured via a system of allocating 
points to them for their characteristics, or for their ability to undertake secondary 
objectives defined by the HRS. The Green Paper makes no provision for the use 
of price preferences, or set asides, favouring a different method of awarding 
. contracts, which is more conducive to international competition. 
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The HRS will also incorporate provisions on the finns reaching predetennined 
turnover milestones, and may specify that they are no longer to be regarded as 
Affinnable Businesses for the purposes of the particular HRS under which the 
smaller contracts were gained. In this way, participation measures cease at the 
point beyond which they are no longer justifiable. Detennining when the HRS 
has achieved its objectives can be viewed as crucial in securing the confidence of 
South Africa's trading partners, and existing GPA members, in the transparency 
of the policies adopted. The GP A enjoins its members to recognise the 
development needs of developing countries. However, it is not expected that 
these members will tolerate protectionist measures which are not necessary to 
attain their objectives. 
Once finns reach pre-detennined levels of development, they can no longer 
expect to be favoured in the award of the smaller contracts under the HRS which 
led to their development. However, this does not mean that they immediately fall 
outside the scope of the Affinnative Procurement Policy. Emerging finns exiting 
the scope of one HRS can then move on to play a role in larger projects. 
Different HRSs will therefore enable the participation of South African finns at 
the level and intensity which is appropriate for their level of development. In this 
way, the Affinnative Procurement Policy serves to foster the sustainable growth 
of the targeted finns. 
As described above, the participation of Affinnable Business Enterprises can be 
'achieved by unbundling contracts. HRSs can be used here to impose minimum 
contractual obligations on the successful Prime· Contractor relating to the 
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unbundling of the contract. Where the HRS is used as a tool for unbundling, it 
will not take a prescriptive fonn. For example, the HRS will not state that finns 
must engage targeted enterprises in order to qualify. Rather, it will set 
Participation Goals. The Green Paper defines these as, "the net value of goods, 
services and works for the supply of which the finn contracts to engage targeted 
small, medium and micro enterprises in the perfonnance of the contract, 
expressed as a percentage of the tender value of the contract." A Participation 
Goal of 20% would therefore imply that 20% of the tender value of the contract 
should be funnelled through targeted enterprises. Domestic and foreign finns 
then have the discretion over how to meet or exceed the Participation Goal, and 
(obviously) over what price to tender. 
There are various ways in which the Participation Goal can be met. These 
include: 
• subcontracting portions of the contract to targeted SMMEs; 
• obtaining manufactured components or supplies and materials from targeted 
SMMEs; or 
• engaging professional, technical or managerial service providers who are 
targeted SMMEs; 
Alternatively, joint venture fonnation can be used to provide targeted SMMEs 
with experience of working directly with larger domestic or foreign finns. Here, 
the SMMEs become responsible for perfonning part of the contract using their 
own resources. As noted above, this involves the SMME becoming jointly 
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responsible to the contracting authority for performance of the major prime 
contract rather than being responsible to the prime contractor for the performance 
of the responsibilities subcontracted to it. Where the objective is to target local 
resources or to engage targeted labour in depressed regions, HRSs can again be 
used to require prime contractors to develop solutions to meet these goals. 
i) The Compatibility of Human Resource Specification with the GP A 
Human Resource Specification which define Affirmable Business 
Enterprises 
Where the HRS defines which enterprises are to be regarded as Affirmable 
Business Enterprises, and hence given favourable treatment at the award stage, 
the general rules prohibiting discrimination apply. Thus article. III: 1 requires that 
foreign suppliers be provided with the same competitive opportunities as 
domestic firms, which effectively prohibits the favourable treatment of those 
domestic firms which fall within the definition of Affirmable Business 
Enterprises provided by the HRS. The only means of avoiding a conflict with 
Article III would be to adopt a broader definition of Affirmable Business 
Enterprises to include equivalent disadvantaged groups in other States. However, 
this would probably be regarded as resulting in an unnacceptable detraction from 
the attainment of the secondary objectives on South Africa's territory. Thus 
where the HRS targets black owned South African firms, Article III is likely to be 
breached. Article VII l13 would also be breached because of the advantage 
afforded to targeted firms at the award stage. 
113 Article VII: 1 provides that, "Each Party shall ensure that the tendering procedures of its entities are 
applied in a non-discriminatory manner ... " 
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Human Resource Specifications involvine joint venture formation 
The HRS may require Prime contractors to enter into joint ventures with targeted 
domestic firms in order to gain development objective points at the award stage. 
Both large domestic, and foreign firms will have the opportunity here to compete 
for contracts, and both have a realistic chance of success. Domestic firms may 
have an advantage in formulating their proposals for the joint venture because of 
their local knowledge. However, it is submitted that domestic and foreign firms 
here are in a comparable position, and that any nominal advantage which foreign 
firms have would not be sufficient to amount to a breach of Article III, and other 
non-discrimination rules. However, the requirement to form joint ventures is 
likely to fall under the prohibition on offsets in Article XVI. As has been seen, a 
requirement to engage domestic firms in some way in the performance of the 
contract amounts to an offset. The effect of the HRS is that firms able to form 
joint ventures are favoured at the award stage. Article XVI provides that, 
"Entities shall not ... in the evaluation and award of contracts, impose, seek or 
consider offsets." Developing countries may negotiate for the use of offsets at 
the qualification stage. However, South Africa is not, at present a developing 
country in the WTO. Also, under the proposed reforms, the ability to form joint 
ventures, and hence perform the offset, is considered at the award stage, which 
will always breach Article XVI. 
Human Resource Specifications used as a tool for unbundline 
As noted above unbundling may involve several related strategies, such as 
'subcontracting portions of the contract to targeted SMMEs or obtaining 
manufactured components or supplies and materials from targeted SMMEs. 
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The HRS can be used to require firms to develop their own unbundling strategies 
as a condition of being granted development objective points at the award stage. 
However, this kind of HRS is subject to the same provisions as the joint venture 
HRS above. Even if the absence of a discriminatory effect could be 
demonstrated, all the unbundling strategies involve objectives which amount to 
offsets under the GP A and are therefore prohibited. 
o Awardin2 Tenders in Terms of a Development Objective / Price 
Mechanism 
Numerous domestic and foreign prime contractors will be capable of unbundling 
contracts to ensure SMME participation. Equally the same contractors would be 
able to enter into joint ventures with targeted SMMEs, just as many SMMEs will 
fall within the definition of an Affirmable Business Enterprise for the purposes of 
awarding small contracts directly to them. How then is the contracting authority 
to decide which prime contractor to award the work to? The most innovative 
feature of the Green Paper is its mixing of socio-economic objectives with 
competitive pressures, through evaluating tenders both in terms of meeting 
development objectives, and the price tendered. 
The development objective/price mechanism is a points scoring system where 
firms are awarded points firstly, for the price tendered, and secondly, for their 
offer to meet or exceed socio-economic objectives, or their current enterprise 
status. Where tenderers must address socio-economic objectives these will be set 
'out clearly in the tender documentation. The HRS will thus establish the 
adjudication criteria, and the manner in which points are to be awarded. 
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Tenderers may, for example, be awarded development objective points for their 
ability to sub-contract to Affirmable Business Enterprises, or use targeted labour 
or resources. The Green Paper seeks to ensure the transparency of the 
adjudication process by requiring that a qualified independent observer would be 
able to understand and identify the decision making process, and reach a similar 
result were they to perform the adjudication themselves. 
Points may be awarded for what firms are prepared to do in terms of fulfilling 
specified development objectives. This involves no price preference in favour of 
domestic firms, and no discriminatory effect. If foreign and domestic firms 
present tenders fulfilling development objectives in a similar manner, then they 
will receive equal points in the tender adjudication. Points will also be awarded 
for price and in this situation, the lowest priced tender will win the contract, 
subject to the successful firm's financial and technical capacity. Both have the 
opportunity to compete on equal terms to be prime contractors, or joint venture 
contractors, in presenting their development objective and price offers. There is 
no reason, therefore, to regard the adjudication process as creating any inequality 
in the competitive opportunities between domestic and foreign suppliers. 
Consequently, there is no discriminatory effect. 
The same cannot always be said, however, where development objective points 
are awarded for a firm's current enterprise status. If firms are awarded points on 
the basis of being owned or controlled by black South Africans, then this 
, amounts to a form of preference and this will clearly impact heavily on a foreign 
firm's chances of success. There is therefore a discriminatory effect here which 
192 
would breach Articles III and VII: 1. A possible response here would be to argue 
that the whole rationale of awarding points for a finn's enterprise status is to 
enable targeted finns to win relatively small contracts, which are unlikely to be of 
international interest, and which one would expect to fall below GP A thresholds. 
However, this does not avoid the incompatibility as these small individual 
contracts would need to be aggregated under Article 11:4. Having been 
aggregated, the contract or contracts, would then have to be awarded under the 
GPA's procedures which require non-discriminatory treatment. 
It should also be emphasised that foreign finns are not precluded from bidding 
for these contracts, even though they may be unable to gain any points for their 
enterprise status. If domestic finns present grossly uncompetitive tenders, the 
advantage which they gain from their enterprise status may be outweighed by the 
high price, and foreign finns may win the contracts. Even if foreign finns are 
disinclined to bid for small contracts, domestic finns are still subject to strong 
competition from all domestic finns sharing the same enterprise status, and 
subject to some competition from all the other domestic finns who are able to 
perfonn the contract. Therefore, the preferred domestic finns are prevented from 
submitting grossly uncompetitive tenders even if foreign and many domestic 
finns are disadvantaged in the adjudication process. 
The principal objective of the chosen adjudication method is to minimise any 
premium payable for incorporating socio-economic objectives into projects. 
'There is already evidence that it has been successful in this regard. In August 
1996, the State Tender Board approved the piloting of the Affinnative 
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Procurement Policy on all construction projects. For the 15 month period 
between August 1996 and October 1997, 3423 building and civil contracts were 
awarded using the Affirmative Procurement Policy specifications. Around 45% 
of the total financial values of these contracts went to Affirmable Business 
Enterprises, either as prime contractors on smaller projects or as joint venture 
partners, subcontractors and service providers on the larger projects. The average 
financial premiums for contracts falling within various bands, ranging from RO -
45 000 to R2 000 000 + was 1.2%. The lowest premium was 0.2% for contracts 
in the lowest band, and the highest was 1.5% for contracts in the RI00 000 to 
R500 000 band. 114 These statistics clearly show that pursuing development 
objectives and securing value for money are not necessarily mutually exclusive, 
and have operated successfully together in the construction sector. 
g) The Compatibility of the award process with the GP A 
It need only be repeated that where the Prime contractor receives development 
points for the extent it can undertake secondary objectives, these secondary 
objectives amount to offsets which cannot be relevant at the award stage. Where 
firms receive development points for their current enterprise status, this involves 
discrimination against foreign firms which breaches Articles III: 1 and VII: 1. The 
proposed contract award system is therefore completely incompatible with the 
GP A in its present form, where the procurement is covered by the Agreement. 
h) Conclusion 
114 These figures are taken from S.M. Gouden, "Implementation of the AffIrmative Procurement Policy 
on Construction Projects by the National Department of Public Works," paper presented to the 
Conference on Project Partnership, Johannesburg 1997. 
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It is too early to tell as yet whether the South African reforms will be effective to 
their objectives. However, the reforms do demonstrate a clear commitment to 
formulating, and operating procurement laws and practices in such a manner as to 
permit the use of procurement for development objectives while minimising 
wasted expenditure through a lack of competition among suppliers. Even such 
carefully formulated strategies are likely to be incompatible with GP A 
membership in a number of respects. Even if the law or policy does not have a 
discriminatory effect, it will often fall foul of the GPA's prohibition on offsets 
where the procurement is covered by the Agreement. Thus GP A membership is 
unlikely to be regarded as a serious prospect for any nation wishing to routinely 
use procurement for development objectives. 
The reforms do provide a positive indicator for any new instrument which may 
result from the ongoing work within the Working Group on Tmasparency. The 
reforms indicate that a new initiative could contain certain obligations to 
minimise the extent of departure from the important objectives of the existing 
GP A. Thus, a possible transparency agreement, could require its members to 
prioritise Value for Money in procurement, and to pursue secondary objectives in 
such a manner as to minimise discrimination. Members could also be enjoined to 
monitor the effectiveness of their secondary policies. It would be up to 
individual states to decide on the extent to which they would be prepared to meet 
these obligations of best endeavour. They would, however, have to publish the 
content of their procurement laws and practices to engender a transparent 
, environment. 
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11. Conclusions and recommendations 
Unless a significant proportion of WTO Members accede to the GP A, the 
Agreement will not even be potentially capable of achieving the liberalisation of 
procurement markets on the global level. A large part of the explanation for the 
present limited membership, is the desire of states to use procurement for 
secondary objectives which often involve treating foreign suppliers, or goods and 
services, in a discriminatory manner. Sometimes, it will be possible to use 
procurement strategically without contravening the GP A in any way. However, 
adapting secondary policies to bring them into compliance with the GP A, results 
in the loss of freedom to routinely place contracts domestically. At present, many 
states may not be prepared to relinquish the freedom they enjoy in the 
procurement context. It will also frequently not be possible to adapt a national 
policy to ensure GP A compliance. Thus, it has been shown that many policies 
which governments do in fact operate, fall foul of the GPA's prohibition on 
offsets, notwithstanding the presence, or extent of any discriminatory effect. 
There are strong reasons for supposing that the GP A's general insistence on 
international competitive tendering on a non-discriminatory basis, is the correct 
approach from the point of view of enhancing both national and global economic 
welfare. Procurement is a relatively inefficient instrument for achieving 
secondary objectives, and its use will usually have adverse effects on the benefits 
which open international trade is capable of producing. In some market 
conditions, procurement may be efficient to promote some secondary objectives, 
. such as the protection of domestic industry. It has been suggested that a 
validation mechanism for secondary policies could be incorporated into the GP A 
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to give states the opportunity to defend their secondary uses of procurement. 
Ultimately, however, it is not considered that such a step would achieve much by 
way of attracting new members. More often than not, a validation mechanism 
would merely reveal that secondary policies are indefensible in the long term 
from the point of view of national and global welfare. The present situation is 
that most WTO Members appear to be prepared to forego the welfare benefits 
which procurement liberalisation can bring, in favour of the short term benefits, 
and flexibility of strategically placing government contracts. The GP A has 
largely failed to dissuade governments from regarding procurement as an 
appropriate instrument for achieving many legitimate objectives, which they 
indeed have a responsibility to the electorate to achieve. 
The approach, which the GP A currently takes to allow states to balance the 
liberalisation commitments undertaken, with their desire to promote national 
policy objectives, is to allow states to negotiate for the exclusion of some of their 
procurement from the GPA's coverage. Special provisions have been 
incorporated to give developing countries the express right to negotiate for such 
exclusions. It is clear however, that (for the most part l15) they are in a very 
similar position to developing nations in practice. It can also be suspected that 
developing countries may not be convinced of their ability to negotiate for 
enough by way of exclusions to the GP A, to make membership politically 
acceptable. The consequence of the GPA's current approach is that its coverage 
of contracts is determined through bilateral negotiations. Each new Member 
115 The only real difference between the position of developed and developing nations is that the latter 
are permitted under Article XVI:2 to negotiate for the use of offsets to be used at the qualification 
stage. Of course any state may choose to operate offsets where the contract in question has been 
excluded from the GPA's scope of coverage. 
197 
must conduct accession negotiations with all existing Members at the time of 
acceSSIOn. This makes it difficult for purchasers to determine whether the 
contract is covered by the GP A, and Increases the complexity and costs of 
accession negotiations. 
At the present time, the WTO is at a cross-roads regarding its activities in the 
area of regulated procurement. The GP A is not capable of making a significant 
contribution to opening up procurement markets at the global level, by reason of 
its limited membership. The question must therefore be asked what the future 
holds for procurement regulation among the WTO Members. As was noted in 
the introduction to the thesis, the WTO has itself determined that a new approach 
is necessary. At the 1996 Ministerial Conference at Singapore a Working Group 
on Transparency in Government Procurement was set up. Its mandate is to 
conduct a survey on transparency in government procurement practices and then 
to "develop elements for inclusion in an appropriate agreement.,,1l6 It can also be 
noted that the Asia pacific Economic Co-operation forum, has already produced a 
document on transparency in government procurement and illustrative practices. 
Guidance is laid down on the importance of sufficient, accessible and relevant 
information on procurement opportunities, and procedures. 117 The experience 
here is likely to provide an important reference point for developments at the 
WTO level. 
116 For an assessment of what the possible new Agreement might, and should contain, see S. 
Arrowsmith, "Towards a Multilateral Agreement on Transparency in Government Procurement", 
(1998) 47 The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 793. 
117 APEC Government Procurement Experts Group, Non-binding Principles on Government 
Procurement: Transparency (September 1997) The text is available on the Internet at 
http://www.apecsec.orgosg under "1997 CIT Annual Report to Ministers." See also S. Arrowsmith, 
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It will be noted that the Working Group's mandate refers only to transparency 
and not to non-discrimination. According to the Secretary of the WTO 
Committee on Government Procurement, the work so far has been directed, "not 
at the overt use of procurement practices for protective purposes but at the 
transparency of the procedures.,,118 Thus it is likely that any agreement emerging 
from the current study will be permissive of the freedom of states to engage in 
discriminatory procurement. Given this significant concession, the new 
agreement, if it comes to fruition, is likely to be multilateral or compulsory in 
character. There follows a brief overview of the possible content, and objectives 
of such a Transparency Agreement. 
Transparency in government procurement involves that the rules governing the 
conduct of contract awards be formulated with clarity and published using 
accessible media. It also involves that information on specific procurement 
opportunities be published in a timely manner, and that any factors which are 
likely to discourage foreign participation - such as price preferences or offsets -
be clearly notified to potential bidders. The detailed award procedures of the 
GP A would be less necessary in the context of an agreement based on 
transparency, since one of the main purposes of the GPA's rules is to prevent 
discriminatory procurement. Discrimination would probably be permissible 
under any new instrument, thereby obviating much of the need for detailed rules. 
There would however need to be a mandatory requirement to publish the content 
of the discriminatory policy, to enable suppliers to reach an informed decision on 
"The APEC Document on Transparency in Government Procurement" (1998) 7 Public Procurement 
Law Review CS38. 
199 
the extent to which the policy will affect their competitive opportunities. It has 
been strongly suggested that the any new instrument should not prescribe the 
precise content of national procurement rules. It should merely provide for 
certain fundamental obligations relating to the clarity and predictability of 
national rules, and require that those rules be published. This approach is 
reflected in the APEC transparency agreement, which has confined itself to 
laying down very broad principles and practices, in recognition of the belief that 
its individual members are in the best position to understand how the obligations 
should be incorporated into their national systems. 
A multilateral agreement limited to transparency could potentially avoid many of 
the concerns surrounding accession to, and implementation of the GP A, while 
also making a strong contribution to the GPA's principal objectives. While it is 
likely that states will be permitted to discriminate against foreign suppliers under 
the terms of a possible future agreement, it is important to emphasise that the 
participation of foreign suppliers will be a crucial objective of the transparency-
based obligations. Thus the current study is not indicative of the WTO's 
abandonment of its commitment to liberalising international procurement 
markets, by creating a regulatory environment which is conducive to realistic 
cross-border opportunities. On the contrary, the compulsory publication of 
procurement rules, and of contract opportunities, among all the WTO states, will 
make a vital contribution to promoting awareness of cross-border opportunities 
among the WTO Members. Given its limited membership, this is not something 
118 V. Kulacoglu, "Developments within the WTO since the Singapore Ministerial Conference", paper 
delivered to the conference Public Procurement Global Revolution, University of Wales Aberystwyth, 
September II-12th 1997. 
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which the GP A is potentially capable of achieving, beyond its small circle of 
existing members. 
An agreement limited to transparency obligations could also avoid some of the 
complexities of negotiations for accession to the existing GP A, and make it much 
easier for purchasers to determine whether the contract needs to be advertised 
internationally. The complex coverage of the GP A, in terms of the entities and 
types of contracts covered, is in part due to the fact that secondary policies can 
only generally be pursued to the extent that the procurement is excluded from 
coverage. If discriminatory procurement were permitted, then there ought to be 
little objection to subjecting a wide range of government procurement to the 
transparency agreement, nor in providing for uniform coverage. for all signatories. 
A transparency agreement could also emphasise the importance of value for 
money in procurement, by inviting states to formulate their secondary policies in 
such a manner as to minimise interference with the participation of interested 
suppliers, and hence increases in public expenditure. One of the most important 
aspects of the South African procurement reforms detailed above is that the 
secondary uses of procurement, and value for money are seen as crucial and 
complementary objectives. As was noted, one of the features of the reforms is its 
mixing of socio-economic objectives with competitive pressures, through 
evaluating tenders both in terms of meeting development objectives, and the price 
tendered. The experience to date in the construction sector indicates that 
'pursuing development objectives and securing value for money need not be 
regarded as mutually exclusive, and can operate together successfully. Despite 
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the commitment to value for money, and the participation of foreign suppliers, 
concerns were expressed above over the compatibility of the South African 
reforms with the GPA's rules. Given the discretion which would need to be 
afforded to WTO Members, over the precise content of their national 
procurement rules, these concerns would be eliminated in the context of a 
transparency Agreement. 
Finally, a transparency agreement might also invite, or require its Members to 
periodically monitor the operation of secondary policies, by incorporating aspects 
of the validation mechanism discussed above. Thus Members could be required 
to periodically question whether there is a continuing need to operate the 
secondary policy, whether the policy is actually effective to achieve its ends, and 
whether the same ends might not be achieved in a manner which is less restrictive 
of foreign participation. In order to make such obligations acceptable, it is 
suggested that the responsibility for carrying out a review process would be that 
of the Members themselves, and there would be no scope for interference in the 
decision making process, either by the WTO institutions or by other Members. 
A transparency agreement would be capable of addressing many of the concerns 
which have led the majority of WTO Members not to join the GP A. A new 
instrument could also remain faithful to the existing Agreement's objectives of 
introducing procurement disciplines into national systems, promoting efficiency 
in procurement practices, and increasing supplier awareness of contract 
'opportunities as well as their participation. Non-discriminatory procurement is 
one of the means by which these objectives can be safeguarded. However, the 
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present emphasis on non-discrimination need not be regarded as indispensable to 
their achievement. The WTO study currently in progress raises questions about 
the future, and continued existence of the GP A in its current form. Forthcoming 
developments in this area are therefore eagerly awaited. 
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Chapter 4 
The GPA's limitations on the instrumental uses of procurement as an 
explanation for its limited membership 
Part II 
Tackling private anti-competitive behaviour in public contract awards 
under the GPA1 
Introduction 
This Chapter examines how far government procurement practices regulated by 
the GP A can be used to limit or prevent anti-competitive behaviour by bidding 
firms in order to support a state's trade or competition policies. From the point of 
view of the GPA's prospects for liberalising international trade in procurement, 
the issues presented here are important from two perspectives. Firstly, certain 
kinds of anti-competitive behaviour can have a direct impact on distorting the 
competition between firms which cross-border participation in procurement is 
intended to achieve. This will be the case with the collusive behaviour which is 
described below. Secondly, governments may also wish to use their procurement 
power to support laws dealing with dumping and subsidisation. These practices 
may be evidenced by the submission of low tenders for government contracts. 
While such tenders may be desirable in terms of reducing costs, governments may 
feel that these benefits are outweighed by the need to reinforce their trade laws. 
I A version ofthis Chapter first appeared in (1998) 21 World Competition 55. 
Any limitations on the pursuit of trade policies under the GP A can be regarded in 
the same light as the limitations on the secondary uses of procurement which 
were considered in Chapter three. In other words, the strengthening of trade and 
competition policies (along with social, economic and environmental policies) are 
among the secondary uses which can be made of procurement power, and the 
present lack of acceptance of these limitations is a large part of the explanation 
for the GPA's limited membership. 
This Chapter firstly considers the kinds of business practices governments may 
wish to address through their procurement. Section two then reviews the limited 
scope of WTO law in so far as it currently regulates the competition and trade 
problems described. Section three considers how far the terms of the GP A permit 
the pursuit of competition and trade policies through the use of procurement 
power. Finally, it is questioned how far other WTO Agreements impose 
constraints which limit the freedom of governments to use procurement to tackle 
the identified problems, even if governments remain within the terms of the GP A 
itself. 
1. What kinds of business practices mi2ht governments wish to pursue 
through procurement? 
There are broadly three kinds of business practices which governments might 
wish to pursue through procurement as a means of strengthening their 
competition and trade policies. These can be described as collusive behaviour 
among participating firms, dumping, and the unauthorised subsidisation of firms. 
While both collusion and dumping will normally be due to independent decisions 
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among firms, unauthorised subsidisation will be the direct result of government 
action. 
Collusion may involve some identifiable agreement among firms to take turns to 
bid the lowest price for similar repeat contracts, to seek to artificially raise the 
cost of goods or services or agree to contest only their domestic markets. Such 
express collusion can clearly impact heavily on the competitiveness of 
procurement markets. 
Collusion may also occur tacitly, without any express agreement between firms, 
but where anti-competitive effects are nevertheless produced. Concern has been 
expressed that measures seeking to introduce international competition into 
public contracting may inadvertently have the effect of blunting the edge of 
competition between suppliers. The hypothesis here is that multiple contacts 
between firms are likely to strengthen the lines of communication between them 
when they bid for large procurement contracts, and that these 'multimarket' 
contacts are likely to decrease inter firm rivalry. Each firm then respects markets 
important to its competitors with the understanding that they will reciprocate. 
This tendency has been described as the "linked oligopoly theory,,2, and is 
sometimes evidenced by parallel pricing. Some authors anticipate that the 
opening up of procurement markets will further increase merger and acquisition 
activity, leading to the creation of global players producing scores of diverse 
procurement products. Inevitably mergers and acquisitions will mean a smaller 
2 On the linked oligopoly theory, see D. Konstadakopulos, "The linked Oligopoly Concept in the Single European 
Market:. Recent Evidence From Public Procurement", (1995) 5 Public Procurement Law Review 213. 
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number of firms will have increased contact in an increased number of markets. 
The linked oligopoly theory dictates that this multimarket contact is more 
conducive to collusion than competition. 
Whereas express agreement to collude normally results in higher tender prices, 
tacit collusion will normally result in the maintenance of uniform pricing levels 
among bidding firms. The impetus to address collusion through procurement 
rules applies equally to both express and tacit collusion however. Both can defeat 
any price savings derived from a competitive tendering process. Collusion, 
therefore, in contrast to the practices identified below, can directly damage the 
GPA's objective of securing competitive purchasing for governments. 
The second broad area which governments may wish to address through 
procurement rules is the subsidisation of firms. Where firms are in receipt of 
subsidies of some kind from their governments, they may be able to sell goods (or 
submit bids for government contracts) at price levels which do not reflect any 
competitive advantage they have over firms producing similar goods. 
Subsidisation may take the form of a direct transfer of funds by governments to a 
firm or firms within their territory whether by way of grant, loan or other means. 
Alternatively, governments may purchase goods at a premium from their firms 
and this, in some circumstances might amount to a sub'sidy. Releasing firms from 
their liability to taxation can also be regarded as a subsidy because of the 
financial benefit which is thereby conferred.3 
3 These are some of the examples which form part of the definition ofa subsidy in Article 1 ofthe WTO Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures Code. 
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Thirdly, governments may also wish to pursue their trade policies against 
dumping through procurement rules. Dumping occurs where firms export at 
prices below those charged on the domestic market, or even below cost price. 
Importing states may be particularly concerned where dumping is motivated by 
the 'predatory' intent of 'evicting' competitors from the market by selling to the 
customers of competitors at prices which are so low as to force them either out of 
the market completely, or into other areas of production. Predatory conduct is 
seen to threaten the capacity for domestic production and the interests of 
consumers. 
Dumping may result in the submission of low tenders for government contracts 
for the purchase of goods. In some instances, firms may also be able to submit 
low tenders due to the receipt of subsidies. On the face of it, acceptance of such 
low tenders would clearly be advantageous to a procuring entity under budgetary 
restraints. However, governments may wish to pursue policies against dumping 
or unauthorised subsidies through procurement rules. Thus they may wish to 
adopt a policy of rejecting low bids which are actually part of a dumping strategy, 
or, more broadly require procuring entities to reject all bids from a firm which is 
either suspected of dumping, or established as having dumped goods on an export 
market. 
There are concerns here that measures taken may have more to do with protection 
of particular firms which are already established, and have a political voice to 
lobby for antidumping duties, than protection of competition in the market place. 
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It is thus antidumping actions (rather than dumping) which is seen by some to 
have an anti-competitive effect4 by hindering the process of competition through 
allowing inefficient firms to survive, at the expense of the rationalisation of 
existing industry, or the development of more efficient industries in different 
areas of production. On this view dumping is unlikely to result in 'unfair' 
competition between firms beyond that which is an acceptable and beneficial 
effect of contact between firms in the market place. Further, it can be argued that 
the public interest in consumer welfare (generated by the availability of cheap 
imports), whilst not paramount, has generally been an underplayed consideration 
in antidumping actions. 5 Antidumping duties are arguably used too often as an 
unwarranted form of protection6, and the nature and operation of the laws 
currently in place are generally sympathetic to this process.7 
Where antidumping duties are used as a tool of protectionism and governments 
seek to pursue their antidumping policies through procurement rules, the pursuit 
of these policies could have a significant effect on future GP A accessions 
especially among developing countries. 
4 See, for example, G. Neils and A. Kate, "Trusting Antitrust to Dump Antidumping" (1997) 31 (6) Journal of 
World Trade 29. 
S See W.J. Davey, "Antidumping Laws: A Time for Restriction" in Jackson, Davey & Sykes. International 
Economic Relations. 673 (West Publishing Co.; 1995). 
6 For example, under the WTO Antidumping Code, lobbying by domestic producers can have a strong effect on 
the decision of whether to initiate antidumping investigations. Article 5.4 ofthe Code requires that an 
investigation shall not normally be initiated unless supported by the domestic industries who are collectively 
responsible for at least half of the domestic production of the like product, out of the total portion of domestic 
industry which responds with either support for, or opposition to the investigation. It is difficult to envisage that 
any representative of domestic industry involved in production of like products to those allegedly being dumped 
Would object to an investigation being conducted, and thereby forego the protection from foreign competition 
Which antidumping duties can afford. 
7 The Antidumping Code makes no attempt to reconcile the injury to domestic industry which dumping can cause, 
and the benefits to consumers which it can bring. The only input consumer groups might have is through making 
representations to national authorities following public notice of investigations as required by Article 12. Further, 
a frequently cited justification for antidumping laws is that they are a necessary response to 'unfair' competition 
from foreign firms. The competition is regarded as unfair because of access restrictions on the exporter's market 
of some kind which prevent arbitrage. Surprisingly, however, no enquiry is made of whether these access 
restrictions actually exist before antidumping duties may be imposed. 
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These states may be especially concerned to negotiate for the ability to pursue 
antidumping policies through procurement rules as a condition of GP A 
membership. It has been suggested that discriminatory procurement policies are 
only effective in protecting domestic producers under certain conditions and that 
these conditions are far more likely to be present in developing than in 
industrialised countries.8 A crucial condition here is that government demand for 
goods which are frequently procured must exceed domestic supply in order for a 
discriminatory procurement policy to be effective. This is more likely to be the 
case in developing countries which tend to be characterised by a shortage in 
domestic production of goods that governments procure heavily. Further, 
developing countries are frequently characterised by relatively large public 
procurement markets so that, in signing the GP A, they generally liberalise a larger 
market than an industrialised country would. For these reasons, the potential for 
firms in industrialised countries to affect production in developing countries by 
submitting low bids for government contracts, could be perceived by to be 
particularly threatening. 
While discriminatory procurement policies are likely to be relatively effective in 
protecting domestic producers in developing countries, it should be emphasised 
that such policies will usually be accompanied by a loss in efficiency, and 
innovation.9 In so far as governments may have to weather these negative effects, 
due to the political pressures they are exposed to from their protected industries, 
8 See F. Trionfetti, "The Government Procurement Agreement and International Trade: Theory And Empirical 
Evidence", paper written for the World Trade Organisation (1997)(unpubJished). 
9 Ibid. 
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and pursue their antidumping policies through procurement rules, questions are 
raised concerning the compatibility of such policies with GP A rules. 
These are the private and governmental restraints of trade which governments 
may wish to tackle through procurement rules as a means of strengthening their 
trade and competition laws. Before turning to consider the relevance of the 
GPA's rules, the current state of play under general WTO competition law 
disciplines will first be described, insofar as relevant to the specific problems 
noted above. 
2. Competition law disciplines under the WTO Ae:reements 
Competition policies have always been on the WTO· agenda as trade 
liberalisation, transparency and non-discrimination requirements all have greater 
competition as an objective. It is not surprising therefore that a large number of 
WTO Agreements contain provisions which either explicitly address private anti-
competitive practices,lo or provide mandates for the future examination of 
competition law issues. I I However, the further step of developing more general 
competition law rules on a systematic basis to deal with practices such as 
restrictive agreements, abuse of dominant market position and mergers, has yet to 
be taken. The WTO does incorporate rules relevant to some of the problems 
10 The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects ofIntellectual Property (TRIPs) contains provisions on the control of 
a n t i ~ c o m p e t i t i v e e practices or conditions in contractual licenses relating to the transfer of technology or of other 
proprietary information. The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) contains provisions on 
consultation and exchange of information and requires countries to ensure that monopoly service providers do not 
abuse their positions in activities outside the scope of their monopoly privilege. 
11 For example, Article 9 of the Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures provides for a review, to be 
conducted within five years of its entry into force, to consider whether the Agreement should be complemented 
With provisions on competition policy. This provision was included at the request of developing countries to meet 
their concern that governmental trade-related investment measures may be necessary in order to counter the anti-
competitive practices of multinational enterprises. 
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discussed in Section 1. Thus dumping is regulated under the Dumping Code l2 
and subsidies are subject to the Subsidies and Countervailing Duties Code. 13 
These Codes are analysed in Section 4. Regulation of anti-competitive business 
conduct is far from comprehensive however. 
The WTO has no rules on restrictive practices which could be used where express 
or tacit collusive tendering is suspected. There are no general rules on abuse of 
dominant position. As noted above, concern has been expressed that retaliatory 
measures against dumping in the form of antidumping duties have more to do 
with protecting national firms than protecting competition in the market place. 14 
Calls have therefore been made for the regulation of dumping through 
competition law disciplines, and the law relating to abuse of dominant positions 
has been mooted as an appropriate means of achieving this. IS Also, laws relating 
to abuse of dominant position might be used to attack parallel pricing among 
conglomerate firms where no agreement to collude can be established. Similarly, 
the law relating to mergers could be used where the proposed concentration of the 
industry raises suspicion that anti-competitive effects could ensue. Again, the 
WTO currently has no rules in this area, and the question of whether multilateral 
competition law rules should be adopted has formed the subject matter of a 
continuing debate.16 In this connection the European Commission proposed the 
12 For the text ofthe Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATT, see Law and Practice of the World 
Trade Organisation (Oceana Publication Inc.) loose leaf p. 131. 
13 For full text of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, see Law and Practice of the World 
Trade Organisation (Oceana Publication Inc.) loose leafp. 223. 
14 See W.J. Davey, supra note 5 and G. Neils and A. Kate supra note 4. 
IS See-J. Miranda, "Should Antidumping Laws be Dumped?" (1996) 28 Law and Policy in International Business 
255. 
16 See, for example, E.U. Petersmann, "The Need for Integrating Trade and Competition Rules in the WTO World 
Trade and Legal System" Programme for the study of International Organisation(s), WTO Series Number 3; M.C. 
Malaguti, "Restrictive Business Practices in International Trade and the Role ofthe World Trade Organisation" 
(1998) 32(3) Journal of World Trade 117; B. M. Hoeckman, "Trade and Competition Policy in the WTO System", 
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establishment of a Working Party to identify core competition rules or principles 
and procedures, which could be adopted at the international level. 17 To this end, 
the Final Declaration of the December 1996 Ministerial Conference in Singapore 
includes an agreement to establish a Working Group to study issues raised by the 
Members relating to "the interaction between trade and competition policy, 
including anti-competitive practices, in order to identify any areas that may merit 
further consideration in the WTO framework.,,18 Given the present limitations of 
WTO competition law disciplines, the scope for procuring entities to tackle 
objectionable practices under the GPA's rules is considered below. 
3. The possibility of pursuing policies relating to the business conduct of 
firms under the GP A 
Even though the GP A has no rules dealing specifically with the business conduct 
of finns seeking to participate in contract awards, several provisions can be 
identified as relevant. As will be seen below, the various provisions operate at 
different stages during the contract award process from the initial qualification of 
suppliers, to the eventual decision of who to award the contract to, and indeed, 
whether to award the contract at all. For the purposes of this section only the 
rules of the GP A are analysed. However, it is argued in Section 4 that the GP A 
should be interpreted in the light of other WTO Agreements. This nonnally 
Discussion Paper Series - Centre for Economic Policy Research London, 1996; E. Fox, "Competition Law and 
the Agenda for the WTO: Forging the Links of Competition and Trade" (1995) 4(1) Pacific Rim Law & Policy 
Journal 1; M. Matsushita "Competition Law and Policy in the Context of the WTO System" (1995) De Paul Law 
ReView 1097; D. Wood, "International Standards for Competition Law: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Yet 
Come", Programmefor the Study of International Organisation(s), WTO Series Number 2; I. De Leon, "The 
Dilemma of Regulating International Competition Under the WTO System", (1997) 3, European Competition Law 
Review, 162; M. Pullen and B. Ris, "Does the World Need a Global Antitrust System", (1996) 6 International 
Trade Lawyer 203. 
17 For details of the proposal, see L. Brittain and K. Van Miert, "Communication to the Council COM (96) 296 
final, 18.06.96. 
18 WTO Ministerial Conference Singapore, Final Declaration (Dec. 13 1996). 
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entails that the applicable Agreement and provisions are those which are most 
specific to the situation at hand, and this has a considerable effect on the scope 
for tackling private anti-competitive behaviour under the GP A. 
a) The qualification of suppliers 
Before the process of evaluating bids commences, procuring entities may wish to 
exclude certain firms from participation in the contract award because of their 
involvement in anti-competitive practices. Article vm GPA lays down 
conditions for the establishment and maintenance of lists of qualified suppliers 
from whom tenders may be requested if procuring entities choose to use such 
lists. It also lays down conditions for ad hoc qualification of suppliers for 
participation in individual contract awards. For the most part, these relate to the 
"financial, commercial and technical capacity of suppliers." While paragraph (b) 
provides that, "any condition for participation in tendering procedures shall be 
limited to those which are essential to ensure the firms capability to fulfill the 
contract in question"( emphasis added), paragraph (h) operates independently of 
this requirement. It provides specific examples of how the business conduct of 
the firms could be relevant to their presence on qualified supplier lists, and some 
of the examples provided do not appear to have any bearing on the ability of firms 
to fulfill the contract. Thus, " ... grounds such as bankruptcy or false 
declarations ... " are envisaged as reasons for exclusion. While bankruptcy clearly 
affects the firm's ability to perform the contract, it is not so clear that false 
declarations have a similar effect. 
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In providing the example of false declarations, Article VIII therefore seems to 
envisage that exclusion could operate punitively against unacceptable or criminal 
business conduct, independently of the firm's ability to perform the contract. The 
specific examples which are provided by Article VIII(h) are not expressed as 
being exhaustive. Collusive tendering can possibly be regarded as a similar type 
of business conduct as false declarations. It will not necessarily bear on a firm's 
ability to perform, but will always be unacceptable in its circumvention of the 
benefits of competitive tendering. Therefore, just as procuring entities may refuse 
to include firms on qualified supplier lists because they have submitted false 
declarations, it can be argued they may also refuse to include them because of 
collusion. 
While it does not appear to be a precondition of exclusion that the business 
conduct in question has been criminalised, the examples provided are 
distinguished in that their existence must be affirmatively established. The non-
discrimination obligation contained in Article III GP A is pivotal to the 
Agreement's operation. It would be most unusual if procuring entities were 
permitted to punish firms by refusing qualification, or rejecting tenders, without 
affirming that participants had actually colluded with each other. To suggest 
otherwise would be to vest too much discretion in the procuring entity, and to 
allow for the possibility of discriminatory treatment. Such discrimination could 
impact especially heavily on suppliers from states with weak competition law 
disciplines who might (rightly or wrongly) be under the greatest suspicion of 
involvement in collusion. Thus it is submitted that the mere suspicion that firms 
have been involved in false declarations is not sufficient, which provides a 
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safeguard against discriminatory treatment and lack of transparency in the 
decision making process. Similarly, it is arguable that the GP A requires that the 
existence of collusion has to be objectively ascertained before any action is taken 
against firms under the rules for their involvement in collusion. Certain problems 
are introduced by this suggested requirement of having to affirmatively establish 
collusion however. 
Bid rigging may be relatively easy to detect where there is express agreement 
between firms. Thus, they could agree to adopt a bid rotation by designating a 
winner and supporting this winner by submitting higher complementary bids. 
Detection of such collusion would require prompt investigation so as not to delay 
the procurement. Detection would be greatly facilitated by nation-wide systems 
for recording bids, and closer cooperation between investigating authorities. 
Computerisation of the information collectively available to all authorities would 
be desirable. 19 
Detection and enforcement problems become more acute where there is no 
express agreement between firms. This may be the case where firms behave in 
the manner described by the "linked oligopoly theory" noted above. As firm 
interdependence increases through encounters in more and more markets, inter 
firm rivalry is reduced. Each firm respects markets important to its competitors 
with the understanding of reciprocity. Firms may therefore consciously behave in 
a parallel manner without any express agreement to do so. This might result in 
19 For an assessment of national and EC detection and punishment of collusive tendering, see 1. Lang "Subsidiarity 
and Public Purchasing: Who Should Apply Competition Law to Collusive Tendering, and How Should they do 
it?" Paper presented at a British Council Meeting, London, March 1997. 
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the submission of very similar tenders for contracts which do not reflect the 
competitive advantages which distinguish the firms. 
The difficulty for the competition authority is whether it can intervene to 
challenge the distortion which results from parallelism even where there is no 
express agreement. In the EU collusion falls under Article 81 (formerly Article 
85) of the Treaty which prohibits agreements and concerted practices between 
undertakings which prevent, restrict or distort competition. It has been 
established that parallel behaviour does not amount to a concerted practice. It 
may be used as evidence of such a concerted practice, when the concerted 
practice is the only plausible explanation for this parallel behaviour. Thus experts 
might consider that simultaneity in price announcements was a natural 
characteristic of the market due to high levels of transparency in the market's 
operation. This was the situation in the Woodpulp case where the ECJ rejected 
the Commission's arguments of a concerted practice derived from parallel 
behaviour.20 
Where express or tacit collusion are subject to proVIsIOns In national laws 
however, there is no reason why an established case of collusion should not lead 
to a refusal to qualify a supplier. As a deterrent, it is submitted that if a firm has 
been found by national investigating bodies to have infringed laws dealing with 
collusion, the procuring entity should thereafter have the discretion to refuse 
qualification, or reject tenders from the infringing firms. 
20 See Cases C-89,104,114,116-7, 125-129/85, Re Wood pulp Cartel: A Ahlstorm Oy and Others v EC 
Commission, [1993] E.C.R. 1-1307, on which, see A. Jones, "Woodpulp : Concerted Practice and/or Conscious 
Parallelism. (1993) 14 European Competition Law Review, 273. 
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However, if the GP A does permit a punitive response against firms involved in 
collusion upon affirmative evidence of some kind of concerted practice, a further 
complication is what burden of proof would be required by the non-
discrimination principle in Article ill. It is submitted that a wide latitude should 
be afforded to states to determine whether collusion has occurred in accordance 
with the procedures and safeguards which national laws provide for. As the 
WTO has yet to develop common rules on concerted practices, it is suggested that 
the requirements of Article ill would be too intrusive if the validity of 
determinations made under national laws could be called into question. It is 
therefore suggested that the non-discrimination principle requires only that where 
national laws incorporate procedures for use in concerted practice cases, those 
procedures should be used and the procuring entity should not be permitted to 
reach its own determination independently of the procedures provided for by 
national laws. The corollary of this is that where a state does not have any laws 
dealing with concerted practices, Article ill requires that there be no scope for 
tackling collusive tendering through procurement rules. States would either have 
to develop laws and procedures for dealing with concerted practices or implement 
any multilateral rules developed within the WTO, as a pre-condition to using its 
procurement rules to address collusion in the case of procurement covered by the 
GPA. 
b) Rejection of tenders 
i) Rejection of abnormally low bids 
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It was suggested in Section 1 that central governments in some states may wish to 
impose on their procuring entities an obligation to reject tenders which are so low 
as to potentially have an impact on domestic production. Foreign tenders may be 
very low for several reasons. It may be because foreign firms are in receipt of 
subsidies or it may be because they have decided to dump certain products on 
foreign markets. Also, a firm in financial difficulties may be prepared to 
undertake a contract at a loss, or with minimal profit, either in order to retain its 
full work force for as long as possible, or to damage the position of its 
competitors. 
Article xm of the GPA on "Submission, Receipt and Opening of Tenders and 
Awarding Contracts" is relevant to all these forms of business conduct. Under 
Article Xill:4(a), a tender must conform to the essential requirements of the 
notices or tender documentation in order to be considered for award. It goes on to 
provide that, 
"If an entity has received a tender abnormally lower than other tenders submitted, 
it may enquire with the tenderer to ensure that it can comply with the conditions 
of participation." (emphasis added) 
Article XII deals with tender documentation which sets out the conditions of 
participation. Among the information which must be provided to suppliers are 
details of "economic and technical requirements, financial guarantees and 
information and documents ... " which may be required from them. If a firm 
submits a bid which is markedly lower than others, the procuring entity will be 
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put on alert, and may want to evaluate whether the firm can make a profit at the 
low price tendered. If enquiries with the firm reveal that it cannot make a profit 
at the tendered price, then the bid can properly be described as "abnormally low" 
within the meaning of Article vm. If on the other hand the firm can make a 
profit at the low tendered price (for example, because it has superior technical 
capacity by reason of new manufacturing techniques, or because it pays its 
employees less) then the bid should not normally be regarded as abnormally low. 
In such a case, enquiries with the firm should stop at this point and its bid should 
be considered along with all others. 
Where the bid is abnormally low, the procuring entity may wish to enquire as to 
the financial standing of the firm to evaluate whether it can perform the contract 
at a loss by drawing on its financial resources. Where enquiries reveal that the 
firm has submitted a hopelessly unrealistic bid, then there would clearly be a 
discretion to reject the tender because of the risk of failure to complete at the 
contract price. The GP A does not seem to remove this discretion. National laws 
may even provide for an obligation to reject in these circumstances. 
The more difficult situation is where the tender is abnormally low but the firm is 
able to sustain a loss on some contracts because of its strong financial standing. 
Here, it is submitted that, so far as the rules of the GP A are concerned, the 
procuring entity should still retain the discretion to reject the tender. There are 
several reasons for this. 
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Firstly, the procuring entity may be concerned that even financially sound firms 
could demand more money to complete the contract despite their ability to bear 
the losses. Secondly, due to the problem of attracting new members to the GP A, 
states should generally be permitted to retain their use of procurement for 
secondary objectives at least where this does not involve discriminating against 
foreign undertakings. Thus if a state has used its procurement to strengthen its 
antidumping policies, there is no reason (under the GP A) why it should not 
continue to do so under the abnormally low bids provision. For example, where a 
bid is part of a dumping strategy, it will often be abnormally low in the sense that 
it will not yield a profit. However, firms involved in dumping are likely to have a 
strong position at least on their domestic markets, and so are also likely to have 
the financial standing to sustain losses. Here it is submitted that the GP A permits 
the discretion to reject these abnormally low tenders, in the absence of any 
discriminatory effect, and in the interests of expanded membership. 
The position is complicated however, by the provisions in the Antidumping Code. 
If a tender is rejected because the firm cannot make a profit, but it is prepared to 
sustain a loss because the tender is part of a dumping strategy, then the tender is 
being rejected on a mere suspicion of dumping. On the issue of whether this is 
permitted when rules other than those in the GP A are taken into account, several 
possible approaches can be identified. 
The first approach is that the GP A should be interpreted in the light of the 
Antidumping Code, which does not envisage rejection of tenders, even where 
dumping has been established. On this view, there can be no scope for tackling 
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dumping under the GP A where this involves the rejection of tenders, simply 
because this is not a response envisaged by the Antidumping Code, which 
provides exhaustive rules for the conduct of antidumping investigations. 
An alternative argument starts from the proposition that the procuring entity must 
be able to protect itself from the possibility of a contractor demanding further 
payment before completion of a contract. It has therefore been argued that the 
correct interpretation of the abnormally low bids provision is that there is a 
discretion to reject all tenders which do not appear to be capable of yielding a 
profit. A possible consequence of this is that low tenders which cannot yield a 
profit, and are part of a dumping strategy will be rejected. It is arguable that the 
conflict with the Antidumping Code which is thereby produced must be tolerated. 
As noted above, interpreting the GP A in light of broader WTO obligations 
normally entails that the applicable provisions are those which are most specific 
to the situation at hand. The abnormally low bids provision is the most relevant 
to protecting the procuring entity from having to make further payment before 
completion of a contract. If application of the abnormally low bids provision 
leads to the indirect consequence that dumped tenders are sometimes rejected 
then it is arguable that this must be tolerated. Otherwise, the provision, as 
interpreted would surely be rendered redundant. 
A third argument can also be adopted which would permit the abnormally low 
bids provision to operate while also avoiding all conflict with the Antidumping 
Code. This could be achieved by interpreting the abnormally low bids provision 
to mean that tenders cannot be rejected if firms submitting low bids are prepared 
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to gIVe assurances that they will not demand any extra payments, and the 
procuring entity is satisfied with the assurances given. This is an approach which 
could be applied without any modification of the abnormally low bids provision. 
As noted, if the procuring entity receives a bid which it believes cannot yield a 
profit, it can enquire whether the firm can comply with the conditions of 
participation. These conditions may include financial guarantees where this has 
been notified to firms, in the tender documentation. 
If the procuring entity is satisfied that the firm will not require extra payment and 
is capable of sustaining a loss, then there is no need to apply the abnormally low 
bids provision since accepting the low tender will be advantageous and free of 
any risk. If, on the other hand, the procuring entity believes that extra payment 
will be required, then it will be appropriate to apply the abnormally low bids 
provision. Conflict with the Antidumping Code here is unlikely because firms 
which are involved in dumping are normally those with a strong market position, 
who are quite obviously capable of sustaining losses. It is submitted that this 
would provide a workable approach, and should be favored because the rules 
under the GP A and the Antidumping Code would thereby be restricted to their 
correct sphere of operation. 
Where a firm is receiving a subsidy, it will normally be able to make a profit on 
the contract at the price tendered, and one would not therefore expect the 
abnormally low bids provision to have any application. However, a purposive 
reading of Article VIII would enable the procuring entity to take account of the 
firm's financial position independently of the aid received. This is important 
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since under the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
(Article 4.7), prohibited subsidies may be subject to proceedings under the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding, and the Panel must recommend that the 
subsidizing member withdraw a prohibited subsidil without delay." The 
Subsidies Code also has a category of subsidies described as "actionable" in the 
sense of causing adverse effects to the interests of another member. Here, the 
subsidising member must either take appropriate steps to remove the adverse 
effects of the subsidy or withdraw it.22 
Enquiries with the firm could reveal that it would not be able to make a profit at 
the price tendered were it not for the subsidy. There may therefore be a real 
danger of the firm not being able to complete the contract at the price tendered 
upon withdrawal of a prohibited or actionable subsidy. Where this danger is 
foreseen, it is submitted that the GPA (independently with broader obligations) 
permits a discretion to reject tenders affected by a prohibited or actionable 
subsidy, because of the desirability of retaining the instrumental uses of 
procurement in so far as compatible with non-discrimination and transparency 
obligations. 
The problem of conflict with broader WTO obligations is once more encountered 
in the form of the Subsidies Code. As detailed in Section 4, the Code does not 
envisage rejection of bids as a possible response to subsidisation of a firm. Once 
again, it is arguable that there should be a discretion to reject tenders which may 
21 Article 3 defines prohibited subsidies as those which are contingent upon export performance or the use of 
domestic over imported goods. 
22 Article 7.8. 
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not yield a profit, because of the chance that the finn could demand further 
payments before completion. It is also arguable that conflict with the Subsidies 
Code must be avoided. It would then be inappropriate for a procuring entity to 
reject tenders on the basis of mere suspicion that they are prohibited or 
actionable. Such subsidies can be withdrawn, or attract countenneasures or 
countervailing duties, but only after panel proceedings or (in the case of 
countervailing duties) after an investigation by the appropriate national 
authority.23 
On this view, rejection of subsidised tenders cannot be an appropriate response, 
firstly because the detennination of whether a subsidy is prohibited or actionable 
involves a detailed consideration of the matter which the procuring entity is 
unlikely to be able to perfonn, and secondly, because rejection of tenders is not 
envisaged by the Subsidies Code. Regrettably, in the context of subsidies, there 
is no third argument capable of reconciling the operation of the GP A and the 
Subsidies Code. 
It is therefore submitted that the appropriate conclusion here is that a purposive 
reading of Article VITI should not be pennitted. The use of the abnonnally low 
bids provision should be restricted to the situation where enquiries reveal that the 
tenders is unlikely to yield a profit, and where the procuring entity believes that 
further payment will be demanded by the finn before completion of the contract. 
This conclusion restricts the GP A and obligations deriving from other 
Agreements to their correct sphere of operation. It also entails that there is no 
23 The procedures for investigating prohibited or actionable subsidies are described in Section 4. 
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scope for tackling dumping or subsidisation under the GP A. It is argued, 
however, that this is the correct approach since the procedures and safeguards of 
the Antidumping and Subsidies Codes would otherwise be circumvented. 
ii) Rejection through use of non-price factors in bid evaluation 
Under the GPA, it is arguable that considerable scope for rejection of tenders is 
provided through a broad use of non-price factors in the evaluation of bids. Thus, 
a procuring entity might be able to pursue policies relating to the business 
conduct of firms through specifying relevant non-price factors in tender 
documentation. 
Article XllI:4(b) requires that the contract be awarded either to the firm with the 
" .. .lowest tender or the tender which in terms of the specific evaluation criteria set 
forth in the notices or tender documentation is determined to be the most 
advantageous." It is not therefore necessary for a procuring entity to demonstrate 
any economic advantage in the application of the contract award criteria, sti11less 
any direct economic advantage to itself. Article XII:2(h) requires that, "the 
criteria for awarding the contract, including any factors other than price ... " be 
included in the tender documentation." No attempt is made to circumscribe the 
type of non-price factors which may be specified as relevant and there is no 
express indication that these need relate specifically to the firm's ability to 
perform the contract. 
Arguably therefore, the procuring entity may be able to impose contractual 
conditions in tender documents requiring firms to certify that they have not been 
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involved in collusion or dumping or have not received unauthorised subsidies. If 
a firm is unwilling to certify its conduct in these areas, or if the procuring entity 
becomes aware that firms have made false certifications, then this will weigh 
against them when the relative merits of the bids and of the firms submitting them 
are compared. What the procuring entity must not do is impose any absolute 
conditions at the award stage, or, for example, reject all tenders from firms which 
have been involved in any of the kinds of business conduct dealt with by this 
Chapter. 
This leads to the situation that the procuring entity could not even impose an 
absolute condition that bids affected by collusion could be rejected outright, even 
though collusion will always defeat the benefits sought from competitive 
tendering. However, tenders affected by collusion will normally be higher than 
those which have not been affected. Therefore, the procuring entity will normally 
choose from among the lower bids not affected by collusion, without needing to 
invoke Article XIII to reject any bids. It could be argued however that collusion 
would have to involve most, if not all firms bidding for a contract, in order for the 
collusion to be effective and to minimise the chances of detection. If this were 
the case, the inability of the procuring entity to impose absolute conditions in 
tender documents could be regarded as problematic. However, it is argued in 
section (iii) below that a provision permitting all tenders to be rejected in the 
public interest goes some way towards redressing this potential problem. 
The suggested scope for comparing the business conduct of firms at the award 
stage could be considered unnecessary because of the possibility of imposing 
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absolute qualification criteria. However, it should be remembered that the 
analysis in Section 3(a) is speculative. Collusion is arguably similar to the 
exclusion criteria specified as examples (in particular, the submission of false 
declarations), but the same cannot be said of dumping and subsidisation. If it is 
not possible to refuse to qualify suppliers on these grounds, then their relevance 
to assessing the relative merits of participating firms becomes especially 
important. 
If procuring entities are permitted to assess the relative merits of the business 
conduct of firms at the award stage, the danger would then be that comparisons 
made would operate (or appear to operate) as absolute conditions which can be 
used only at the qualification stage. A possible means of avoiding this would be 
to adopt a 'trade off between the merits of the bid and those of the firms. For 
example, award criteria could specify that tenders from firms receiving 
unauthorised subsidies will be accepted only if they are at least ten per cent 
cheaper than the next best. While this imposes a disadvantage on the subsidised 
firm, it avoids the possibility of an award criterion being challenged as having the 
same effect as an absolute qualification condition. 
It may be doubted however whether this 'trade off approach is practical or even 
permissible. Firstly, it could clearly have no application to collusion since the 
effect here would be to raise the price of the contract. Secondly, if procuring 
entities are not permitted to take dumping and subsidisation into account at the 
qualification stage, is it at all appropriate that they should to do so at the award 
stage? It is of course arguable that the award stage is distinguished from 
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qualification criteria in that absolute conditions cannot apply. It would still seem 
illogical, however, if award criteria can be used to attack subsidisation and 
dumping when qualification criteria cannot be used in a similar manner. The 
result after all is that the subsidised or dumping firm is not looked at as favorably 
as other firms whether this leads to refusal to allow it to participate at the 
qualification stage, or a decision to reject its tender at the award stage. 
A third consideration weighing against the broad use of factors relating to the 
relative merits of firms relates to the practical problems which would arise. It has 
been argued that the GPA's non-discrimination obligation requires that mere 
suspicion of any form of anti-competitive business conduct should be regarded as 
insufficient to warrant any negative response against a firm. Decisions here must 
be made by national investigating authorities so that it would be inconsistent with 
the GP A for procuring entities to reach their own determinations on whether 
tenders evidence dumping or subsidisation as part of the 'trade off process. No 
balancing of the merits of the bids and firms could operate consistently with the 
GP A without very close liaison between procuring entities and investigating 
bodies on a case by case basis. 
The conclusion here is that, on the one hand, there should be consistency in the 
considerations relevant at both the qualification and award stages. If dumping 
and subdisisation cannot be taken into account at the qualification stage, then they 
should also be irrelevant at the award stage.24 If, on the other hand, dumping and 
24 It is acknowledged however that this is only one approach among many, A markedly different approach was 
taken by the ECJ in the difficult case of Case 31/87 Gebroeders Beentjes BV v The Netherlands [1988] E,C.R, 
4635, Here it was held that a condition relating to the ability of participating firms to employ the long term 
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subsidisation can be grounds on which to refuse to qualify a firm, any response 
against these business practices should be done at this stage rather than at the 
award stage. A clear separation between the factors relevant at the two stages 
should be maintained in order to avoid the difficulties of how to reconcile the 
relative merits of the bids and the merits of participating firms at the award stage. 
iii) Rejection of all tenders in the public interest 
Under Article XIII:4(b), a procuring entity may decide not to issue the contract in 
the public interest. It is provided that, 
"Unless in the public interest an entity decides not to issue the contract, the entity 
shall make the award to the tenderer who has been determined to be fully capable 
of undertaking the contract ... " 
This provision might be invoked where circumstances change and the goods or 
services are no longer required or where the project appears to be too expensive 
when the procuring entity has seen the bids. Alternatively, the public interest 
may demand that the award procedure is abandoned and a new one commenced 
where the competitive process in the original award has been tainted in some 
way. 
unemployed was concerned neither with qualification criteria nor with award criteria. It was in the Court's own 
Words, "an additional specific condition" and therefore was compatible in principle with the Directive's provisions 
as it was not covered or explicitly prohibited by any of the terms." (para, 28 of the judgement). There is still some 
uncertainty over the precise legal basis on which criteria other than those specified in the Directive can be relevant 
when awarding a contract, and subsequent decisions have cast considerable doubt on the decision. See lA. 
Winter, "Public Procurement in the EEC", (1991) Common Market Law Review 741; C. McCrudden, "Social 
Issues in Public Procurement" Ch. 13 in S. Arrowsmith and A. Davies (ed's.) Public Procurement,' Global 
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Genuine competition between suppliers will certainly have been limited where a 
number of suppliers collude with the aim of raising prices. There could be little 
objection to abandonment of the award in the public interest on this ground. 
Procuring entities may also feel that the 'public interest' demands abandonment 
of the award where the process of competition has been distorted by the 
involvement of participating firms in dumping or subsidisation. Here, tenders 
submitted, however, attractive, may be regarded as having a distorting effect on 
competition. 
It is arguable that the 'public interest' might indeed extend to these kinds of 
business conduct. One of the rationales for antidumping legislation is the public 
interest in maintaining domestic production of goods· subject to foreign 
competition perceived to be 'unfair', and in offsetting the negative effects which 
some argue dumping can produce such as loss of employment in the affected 
industries. The public interest might also dictate that public procurement should 
not support firms with an unfair competitive advantage due to their receipt of 
unauthorised subsidies. Further still, it might even be considered that the public 
interest provision should actually be used to ensure that firms receiving 
unauthorised subsidies should not be awarded government contracts. This 
depends on how broadly the public interest provision in Article XIII:4(a) IS 
interpreted and applied. 
Revolution, (Kluwer; 1998); J.M. Feranadez Martin, The EC Procurement Rules. A Critical Analysis (1996; 
Clarendon Press, Oxford), pp. 58-63. 
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It is suggested that it would certainly not be an abuse of the public interest clause 
to reject all tenders where some have been involved in dumping or have received 
unauthorised subsidies. However, it is highly unlikely that the procuring entity 
would want to take such a drastic step, especially as it has been argued that the 
abnormally low bids provision indirectly permits a discretion to reject bids 
evidencing dumping or unauthorised subsidies. 
The GP A provides no guidance on how the public interest provision should be 
applied. However, an interesting comparison is provided by the UNCITRAL 
Model Law.25 This was drawn up under the auspices of the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), and is intended as a 
framework of rules to help states develop disciplines on public procurement with 
the view of promoting international competition and enabling purchasers to 
realise price savings. The Model Law expressly envisages that rejection of 
tenders could be an appropriate response to collusion in the procurement process. 
Article 12 deals with "Rejection of all tenders, proposals, offers or quotations." It 
provides that procuring entities may, "reject all tenders ... at any time prior to 
acceptance of a tender." There is also an obligation to communicate to the 
suppliers the reason for the rejection of the tender, although these grounds need 
not be justified. Further the decision to reject all tenders is not subject to the right 
to review provided under Chapter VI. The Model Law is accompanied by a 
25 UNCITRAL Model Law, Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 17 
(Al49117). For further readings on the Model Law see: J.J. Myers, "UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement" 
(1993) 21 International Business Lawyer 179; D. Wallace, "The UN Model Law on Procurement", (1992) 1 
PUblic Procurement Law Review, 406; and G. Westring, "Multilateral and·Uniiateral Procurement regimes: to 
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Guide to Enactment which provides advice on how the provisions should be 
applied and what their intended purpose is. In relation to Article 12, the Guide to 
Enactment provides that its purpose is to enable the procuring entity to reject all 
tenders for reasons of public interest. An example provided here is "where there 
appears to have been a lack of competition or to have been collusion in the 
procurement proceedings." 
The suggested approach of the Model Law thus differs from the GP A in that the 
Guide to Enactment expressly recognises that tenders may be rejected because of 
collusion. This lends support to the view that the public interest provision in the 
GP A should be regarded as encompassing, at least, the public interest against 
collusion in the tendering process. Both the Model Law and the Guide to 
Enactment require that all tenders be rejected where Article 12 is invoked. This 
will also be the case under the GP A where the procuring entity decides not to 
issue the contract in the public interest. Rejection of all tenders may well be 
appropriate where the tenders devised as a result of collusion are rejected, and an 
insufficient number remain to ensure competition between firms. Collusion, in 
order to be effective and minimise chances of detection, will have to involve 
most, and preferably all firms participating in the contract award. The public 
interest provision will clearly have an important role to play where this is the 
case. Here, rejection of all tenders would be advisable in order to ensure 
transparency in the procurement process, especially if it happened that only 
national firms remained after rejection ofthe collusive tenders. 
which camp does the UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement belong?" (1994) 3 Public Procurement Law 
Review 406. 
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However, there is no reason why the whole procurement should be abandoned 
and recommenced where a sufficient number of tenderers remain to ensure a 
competitive process. Provided the contract had been advertised properly in the 
first place, it might be unrealistic to expect that a new contract notice in the same 
form would attract a different or broader class of tenders and, presumably, the 
procuring entity would be unprepared to accept new tenders from the previously 
rejected firms. Therefore, there will not normally be any reason to invoke Article 
Xill:4(b) where some of the participating firms have colluded to raise the price of 
the contract. If there are tenders not affected by collusion then these would be 
likely to be the most competitive and will be accepted. 
While the Model Law is prescriptive in its requirement to reject all tenders, the 
rather vague language in the Guide on the circumstances in which Article 12 may 
be invoked is in sharp contrast to this. Similarly, the GP A provides no guidance 
on the circumstances in which its public interest clause may be invoked. As 
noted above, under the Model Lawall tenders may be rejected ''where there 
appears to have been a lack of competition or to have been collusion in the 
procurement process" (emphasis added). This suggests that rejection could 
operate on suspicion of collusion unsubstantiated by investigation into the matter. 
It has already been argued that such a discretion (whether applied to collusion, 
dumping, or subsidisation) would be too broad creating at least the possibility of 
discriminatory treatment. This lack of transparency would not be improved by 
the requirement to give reasons. Because of the proviso that reasons need not be 
justified, the explanation provided would be unlikely to go beyond a mere 
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statement of suspicion of collusion which finns would not be able to challenge in 
review proceedings. 
Conversely, it could be argued that procuring entities would be unlikely to use 
their discretion in a discriminatory manner, where the consequences would have 
to be rejection of all tenders, and either abandonment or re-commencement of the 
procurement. Procuring entities might be expected to think carefully before 
incurring the wasted expenditure involved in such a decision, and it is submitted 
that this should be sufficient to allay fears of discriminatory treatment. 
In conclusion, it is suggested that the GPA's public interest clause pennits a 
broad scope for penalising finns for anti-competitive business conduct. Its 
practical use is likely to be limited to contract awards where all or most of the 
tenders are affected by collusion. Where there are only a small number of 
tenders, there will rarely be any reason to invoke the provision since tenders not 
affected by collusion will nonnally be the lowest and most attractive. Also the 
requirement to reject all tenders means that the provision can have little 
application to dumping and subsidisation since the objective here will be to 
eliminate only those tenders which evidence these practices. Procuring entities 
will be understandably reluctant to penalise some finns, where others have 
submitted competitive and responsive tenders, and to incur extra cost and delay in 
commencing a new award. This is not a significant problem however, because of 
the wide scope for rejecting tenders under the abnonnally low bids provision. 
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4. Tacklin2 private restraints of trade throu2h procurement rules and 
compatibility with WTO obligations 
While the procurement rules highlighted would appear to permit some scope for 
pursuing policies relating to anti-competitive business practices, such policies 
would have to be compatible with broader WTO obligations. At the outset, it can 
be noted that the ability of a procuring entity to pursue policies relating to 
collusion is unaffected by any conflicting obligation under WTO law. This will 
be the case where collusion seeks to raise prices, or where firms seek to rotate 
their chances of success by agreeing to allow one bid to appear more attractive 
than others. Equally, there is no reason in WTO law generally why procurement 
rules should not be used to challenge parallel pricing resulting from tacit 
collusion. Collusion defeats the efficiency gains envisaged by competitive 
tendering, and is not subject to specific rules under any WTO Agreement. 
The GP A also permits considerable scope for tackling dumping and unauthorised 
subsidisation. It has already been suggested that the Antidumping and Subsidies 
Codes impact heavily on the possibility of doing so. It was argued, however, in 
relation to the abnormally low bids provision, that strict adherence to the 
procedural obligations of the Codes is not always possible because of unnecessary 
complications in the application of the Agreement which would then be 
produced. The effect was that states could indirectly strengthen their trade laws 
dealing with dumping and subsidisation through the abnormally low bids 
provision. This was regarded as exceptional. Normally it will be inappropriate 
for the procedural safeguards outlined below to be circumvented. 
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a) The Antidumping Code 
The Antidumping Code is a multilateral Agreement containing detailed rules on 
the determination of whether injurious dumping has occurred and on the 
imposition of antidumping duties. The determination of injury is based on the 
volume of dumped imports, their effect on the price of like domestic products and 
their impact on domestic producers. The emphasis is on actual or potential threat 
to domestic industry with no reference to injury to consumers or a recoupment 
test.26 Article 5 on Initiation and Subsequent Investigation would seem to permit, 
in principle, that a procuring entity could initiate and conduct a dumping 
investigation "on behalf of the domestic industry." The only strict requirement 
would be that all procuring entities competent to investigate would have to be 
designated by national governments to the Committee on Antidumping Practices 
as required by Article 16. 
However, the responsibility of the investigating body in determining the existence 
of dumping, injury resulting therefrom, and a causal connection in accordance 
with the rules would be far too burdensome for procuring entities without 
considerable investment In qualified investigating personnel. National 
governments will probably see the role of procuring entities as limited to alerting 
the designated investigating authority of a case of suspected dumping, and be 
unprepared to train procurement officials to be able to conduct investigations 
themselves. 
26 Recoupment tests are generally used as indicators of predatory behaviour where low pricing strategies are dealt 
with under competition law standards, rather than antidumping laws. They are used to determine whether the 
alleged predator firm could possibly recoup losses sustained during the predation episode by raising prices once 
the firms under attack have been forced to leave the market. The absence of a recoupment test in antidumping 
cases, together with the lack of any enquiry into whether the predator actually has sufficient market power to 
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There is little incentive in any case to designate procurement officials as 
competent to carry out dumping investigations, because rejection of tenders or 
refusal to qualify firms would not be a proper outcome of these investigations. If, 
following investigation, all the requirements of a dumping duty have been met, 
the low tender (and other tenders from the exporting state for the same products) 
may attract a dumping duty. Thereafter, the Antidumping Code would appear to 
require that tenders from the exporter be treated in the same manner as all other 
tenders. It would not be open to the procuring entity to reject tenders from the 
exporter even following a finding that injurious dumping had occurred. This 
would be equivalent to banning imports where the exporter has dumped on a 
foreign market, a practice which is not envisaged by the Antidumping Code. A 
complication is that the contract will normally have to be awarded before the 
dumping investigation is complete.27 Rejection of a tender will still be 
inappropriate here, in that the procedural safeguards established by the Code 
would be circumvented. The procuring entity must either treat the tender in the 
same manner as all others or reject the tender on some ground independent of the 
suspected dumping. 
Dumping is distinguished from cases of collusion where rejection of a tender is 
an entirely appropriate response as a punitive measure with a deterrent effect. 
Dumping, in contrast should be dealt with by imposing an antidumping duty. The 
Code demands this, it is the primary piece of legislation operating in this area and 
nudge its competitors out of the market has led many commentators to o b ~ e r v e e that antidumping actions are far 
more likely to succeed than predation actions in competition law. 
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it grants no exemptions to policies pursued by government procurement or by any 
other means. Secondly, certain kinds of dumping are arguably not injurious even 
in the narrowest sense of causing harm to domestic industry. For example, 
dumping that involves the absorption of differences between transport costs or 
tariffs among various suppliers to the importing economy will involve no injury 
to the domestic producers of that importing economy. Where an export market is 
served by suppliers from various states, the domestic price on the import market 
will be that of the cheapest supplier. This will be the supplier facing the lowest 
transport and/or tariff costs to enter the export market. All other importers would 
then have to compress their prices to accommodate any larger transport or tariff 
costs they may face, if they wish to retain a share of the export market. This may 
mean that the exporters sell on the export market at a lower price than on their 
domestic markets. In so doing however, they are merely meeting the market price 
in the country of import. Whatever injury domestic industry suffers by way of 
low prices is unrelated to dumping (provided that the price charged by the market 
leader is undumped).28 It is suggested that such dumping is undeserving of any 
response beyond that expressly envisaged by the Code. 
b) The Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Code 
Where a firm is able to submit a low tender by reason of its receipt of a 
government subsidy or a tender which compares favourably with other tenders 
due to receipt of the subsidy, then the response of the procuring entity dealing 
27 Art. Icle 5(10) provides that "investigation shall, except in special circumstances, be concluded within one year, 
and in no case more than 18 months, after their initiation. 
28 Th' IS is recognised by Article 3.5 of the WTO Antidumping Code which provides that, authorities must examine 
"any known factors other than the dumped imports which at the same time are injuring the domestic industry, and 
the injuries caused by these other factors must not be attributed to the dumped imports." 
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with that tender would have to be consistent with the Subsidies Code. As with 
the Antidumping Code, the nature of the obligations set out would make it 
unrealistic for a procuring entity to investigate foreign industries suspected of 
receiving subsidies. 
Article 1 of the Code defines a subsidy as "a financial contribution by a 
government or any public body within the territory of a member", which includes 
direct transfer of funds and relief from taxation, as well as the purchasing of 
goods by a government. The concept of a "specific" subsidy is introduced by 
Article 2. This is important since subsidies must be specific in order to be 
actionable in the sense of being capable of attracting countervailing duties. In 
order for a subsidy to be specific, its availability must be explicitly limited by the 
granting authority, or by the legislation governing the granting authority, to 
certain enterprises rather than generally available to all. Subsidies will not be 
specific (and hence will not be actionable) where strict conditions are established 
governing the eligibility for, and the amount of a subsidy. Where application of 
the above criteria indicate that a subsidy is non-specific, yet there are reasons to 
believe that the subsidy may in fact be specific Article 2.1 (c) provides further 
criteria by which the correct categorisation of the subsidy can be established. For 
example, despite the appearance of non-specificity provided by paragraphs (a) 
and (b), the subsidy may nevertheless be specific where regard is had to certain 
enterprises receiving "disproportionately large amounts of subsidy" and, "the 
manner in which discretion has been exercised by the granting authority." 
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The Agreement stipulates that no member shall cause, through the use of 
subsidies, adverse effects to the interests of other signatories in the form of injury 
to domestic industry of another signatory. Certain non-actionable subsidies are 
also enumerated (Article 8). These can either be non-specific subsidies (as 
described above), or specific subsidies in some circumstances. Thus subsidies 
assisting research activities are considered as non-actionable provided a list of 
conditions are satisfied relating to the proportion of the total cost of the research 
which the subsidy covers, and the exact purposes to which the money is to be 
applied. 
The definition of non-actionable subsidies also encompasses assistance to 
disadvantaged regions given as part of "an internally consistent and generally 
applicable regional development policy.,,29 Again, this is subject to specific 
conditions to ensure that the granting of non-actionable status for a subsidy is not 
abused. 
The Code recognises that subsidies may play an important role in economic 
development programmes of LDCs and in the transformation of centrally planned 
economies to market economies. Article 27 therefore provides for "special and 
differential treatment for developing Country Members" in the form of time 
bound exemptions on prohibited subsidies. Thus while subsidies conditional on 
export performance, or the use of domestic over imported goods are prohibited by 
Article 3, article 27 recognises that such subsidies may be used by LDCs where 
29 Article 8.1 (b) of the Subsidies Code. 
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consistent with its development needs and subject to an agreed phasing out 
period. 
The use of countervailing measures on subsidised goods is detailed in Article 19. 
All relevant economic factors must be taken into account in assessing any injury 
to domestic industry caused by the subsidy, and causality between the subsidy and 
alleged injury must be established. Resort may only be had to countervailing 
duties where reasonable efforts to complete consultations have failed and if the 
subsidy causing injury is not withdrawn. Article 21 provides that countervailing 
duties may only remain in force "as long as and to the extent necessary to 
counteract the subsidisation which is causing injury". 
Article 24 creates a Committee to hear representations from the Members and 
give advisory opinions on any subsidy proposed to be introduced or one which is 
currently in force. As is the case with the Antidumping Code, Members must 
also notify to the Committee the national authorities which are competent to carry 
out investigations?O There is therefore no reason why a procuring entity should 
not conduct investigations. However, the onerous nature of the procedures would 
render it impractical for a procuring entity to be directly involved in 
investigations unless Members were prepared to invest heavily in qualified 
personnel. Again, the practical role which procuring entities might play is limited 
to alerting national authorities where a low tender raises concerns about possible 
receipt of actionable or prohibited subsidies. Also, the procuring entity could not 
reject bids from firms even where they are found to be subsidised in an 
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unacceptable manner. Once the countervailing duties have been attached to the 
subsidised firm's imports, its bids must be treated equally with all others. An 
outright ban on imports from subsidised firms is not a solution envisaged by the 
Subsidies Code so that a rejection of bids from such firms would circumvent the 
policy of the Code. 
It has been argued that any policy pursued by a procuring entity in relation to anti-
competitive business practices would have to be done consistently with 
obligations under the WTO Agreements. The GP A contains no explicit rules on 
pursuit of such policies. Further, neither of the Codes described above contain 
any exemptions for policies pursued via government procurement. Purchasing 
policies must therefore, in general, take place subject to express WTO 
obligations. While the ability of procuring entities to penalise firms for 
involvement in collusion is unaffected, the possibility of pursuing policies against 
dumping and subsidies would appear to be precluded by the Antidumping and 
Subsidies Codes. If future WTO negotiations reveal that there is a desire among 
existing or prospective GP A members to pursue their trade policies through 
procurement rules, then efforts will have to be directed towards clarifying the 
relationship between procurement rules and those of the above Codes?! 
5. Conclusion 
The reduction of traditional government barriers to trade through periodic GATT 
negotiating Rounds has led to private restrictions on trade to assume a new 
30 Article 25.12 of the Subsidies Code. 
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significance. While anti-competitive business conduct has always existed, its 
effects are becoming increasingly prominent as government barriers have been 
progressively rolled back. It is now widely thought that multilateral competition 
law rules will form part of the agenda for the next Round of WTO negotiations, 
and the EU's proposal for common disciplines placed before the Singapore 
Ministerial Meeting may go some way towards ensuring this. Given the present 
absence of general competition rules and any express guidance in the GP A, this 
Chapter has examined the extent to which the GPA's rules can be applied to the 
business conduct of firms in support of existing trade and competition laws. 
The GP A permits considerable scope for attacking collusion among participating 
firms, both through the initial stage of qualification of suppliers and the public 
interest provisions (even though the rejection of all tenders was envisaged as a 
rare and drastic step). This is to be welcomed since collusion among suppliers 
can defeat the benefits of competitive tendering and therefore limit the success of 
any procurement agreement seeking to open markets to genuine international 
competition. The Agreement can be regarded as deficient in its treatment of 
collusive practices however. Aside from Article XV: 1 (a) which permits the use 
of limited tendering when collusive tenders are received, there is no reference to 
how firms suspected of collusion should be dealt with. In the absence of express 
provisions, this Chapter has analysed the range of possible responses which 
existing provisions would appear to provide for. Concrete guidance on the 
appropriate responses to collusion would be most welcome however. 
31 The author is aware that Chinese delegates expressed considerable interest in pursuing their dumping policies 
through procurement rules at a conference Public Procurement: Global Revolution, organised by the Public 
Procurement Research Group at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth on the 12-13 September 1997. 
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Some scope for tackling the anti-competitive effects of dumping and 
subsidisation is also provided by the GP A itself. However, if the argument that 
the GP A must be interpreted in the light of other WTO Agreements is accepted, 
then the scope for tackling dumping and subsidisation (otherwise than under the 
abnormally low bids provision) is severely limited by the procedural obligations 
and safeguards in the Antidumping and Subsidies Codes. Here, it has been 
argued that, as a matter of national law, procuring entities will normally have only 
the limited role of alerting national investigating bodies of their suspicion that 
tenders received form part of a dumping or subsidisation strategy. Even then, 
rejection of such tenders will not be an appropriate response. 
The fact that the GP A should not be interpreted as permitting a broad scope for 
the strengthening of trade policies against dumping and subsidisation, should not 
however be regarded as a deficiency in the Agreement, or as a reason for 
supposing that it will fail to liberalise international procurement markets. There 
are several reasons for this. Firstly, this Chapter has shown that it is rather 
difficult to reconcile the tender procedure rules which the GP A provides for, with 
a desire to use those rules to reinforce trade policies. This difficulty presents a 
good reason for maintaining as clear a separation as possible between the 
procurement function, and that of trade laws and policies. GP A Members should 
therefore be persuaded to rely exclusively on their appropriate national laws when 
dealing with suspected cases of dumping and unauthorised subsidisation. 
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Secondly, the restrictive interpretation of the relevant provisions which has been 
suggested in this Chapter, should not be regarded a reason for the reluctance of 
states to accede to the GP A. This is the case even for those states with a strong 
desire to use their procurement power to strengthen their trade laws. The reason 
for this is that the suggested interpretations have been motivated by the need to 
maintain a consistency between the GP A, and the broader obligations of the 
Dumping and Subsidies Codes. States lose their ability to use their procurement 
power in connection with trade policies, by reason of their WTO membership and 
the binding nature of the multilateral Codes, rather than through GP A accession. 
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Chapter 5 
The use of Information and Communication Technologies in procurement 
procedures covered by the GP A 
Introduction 
The WTO is currently in the process of examining the issues surrounding the 
potential uses of Information and Communication Technologies (lCTs) in the 
procurement process. The work in this area is being guided by the Committee on 
Government Procurement under the GPA's built-in agenda. This is provided by 
Article XXIV:8 which calls on the Parties to consult regularly on developments 
in the use of information technology, and to negotiate modifications to the 
Agreement if necessary. While the GP A was not drafted with the use of ICTs in 
mind, Article XXIV:8 provides a clear acknowledgement of the need to 
investigate their potential usages. To date, work within the Committee has been 
limited to compiling the broad issues needing consideration. Progress here has 
been informed and influenced by experiences of electronic procurement at 
national and regional level. The Secretariat, on behalf of the Committee, has also 
prepared a factual note identifying those provisions of the GP A needing to be re-
examined to permit certain uses of ICTs compatibly with the GP A.I At the time 
of writing, it can be said that the WTO has yet to fully examine and define the 
extent of its role in promoting the use of ICTs in GP A covered procurement. 
Clear goals, and a timetable for their achievement have yet to be put in place. 
Any analysis of how ICTs will operate in the context of GP A covered 
procurement can only therefore be tentative at the present time. 
1 WTO, Committee on Government Procurement, "Provisions of the Agreement which might need to 
be re-examined in the light ofInformation Technology." GPAlWI25, 22 August 1996. 
This Chapter will firstly highlight how the use of ICTs can potentially contribute 
towards the achievement of the GPA's objectives. It also describes how 
significant difficulties have been encountered at national and regional levels, to 
the extent that ICTs have failed to streamline procurement processes and produce 
the anticipated efficiency savings. National and regional difficulties are 
important from the WTO perspective, because they are also likely to affect the 
contribution of ICTs to the liberalisation process envisaged by the GP A. For 
example, if national suppliers do not have sufficient confidence in the operation 
of their national databases to routinely use them, then ICTs are unlikely to 
promote the inclusion and participation of foreign suppliers in cross-border 
opportunities. 
Following on from the problems that have been experienced at national and 
regional levels, section 2 considers the challenges which face the WTO in 
promoting the development of national and regional systems in such a manner as 
to strengthen the GPA's role in opening up international procurement markets. 
As emphasised by Article XXIV:8, the main challenge for the WTO will be to 
oversee that ICTs are not implemented in such a manner as to threaten the GPA's 
non-discrimination and transparency obligations. The accessibility of 
procurement information, and the interoperability of different databases are 
identified as crucial to the safeguarding of these obligations. The possible extent 
of the WTO's involvement in the development of national and regional systems 
is questioned, and the positive steps which the WTO can take in connection with 
the accessibility and interoperability objectives are identified. 
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Section 3 considers how the GP A needs to be adapted to accommodate and 
maximise the potential benefits of leTs. These questions are asked both from the 
perspective of adapting the Agreement to permit current procedures to be 
operated via electronic means, and from the perspective of adaptations necessary 
to accommodate new methods of procurement made possible only through the 
use of leTs. While Section 2 considers the potential problems of accessing 
information electronically, Section 3 deals with opposite scenario of an 
unmanageable level of supplier response to electronically posted notices. 
Section 4 presents a tentative VIew of the long term developments in the 
regulation and practice of government procurement, which may occur as 
experience and confidence in the operation of electronic procurement systems 
develops. The end of the first phase of developments will be marked by the 
operation of existing procedures via electronic means. It has been suggested that 
to stop here would be to deny the full contribution which leTs can make to the 
GPA's objectives.2 With new methods of procurement, however, come new 
difficulties in securing the transparency of procedures and the non-discriminatory 
treatment of suppliers. 
1. Public Procurement and ICTs: The Potential Benefits and the need for 
caution 
a) The potential benefits to the GPA's success which ICTs can achieve 
The use of leTs can potentially contribute to achieving some of the fundamental 
goals which will be crucial to the GPA's success. Their use may allow for the 
closer integration of procurement markets. This could be achieved by increasing 
the accessibility of procurement related information regardless of supplier 
location. Thus suppliers may be able to search databases for relevant calls for 
tender notices, or be automatically informed of relevant opportunities. Suppliers 
would then be able to receive information on a real time basis, and avoid the 
possible delays of hard copy communication by mail. Having identified 
opportunities of interest, suppliers could then proceed to download the tender 
documentation, and even submit tenders electronically. The wider and 
potentially cheaper accessibility of procurement information, could therefore 
promote the broader inclusion, and participation of suppliers, increase the choice 
for purchasers, and contribute towards the price savings which the liberalisation 
of procurement markets can achieve. Another related benefit is that supply side 
competitiveness could be increased as a result of greater contact between firms in 
the market place.3 In these respects, the implementation of ICTs could play an 
important role in the overall success of the GP A for existing members, and boost 
the attractiveness of membership for non-members, to the extent that they have 
prioritised the achievement of the above benefits. 
Not only does procurement information become available to suppliers more 
quickly, but ICTs can also make it easier to find that information once available. 
Suppliers could, for example, be able to search databases using various different 
methods, to which the database would respond by compiling relevant 
2 See A. Haagsma, "Information and Communication Technology Issues in International Public 
Procurement", in S. Arrowsmith and A. Davies eds. Public Procurement Global Revolution, 161 
~ K l u w e r r Law International; 1998) at p. 162. 
Conversely, such increased contact would also raise the possibility of decreased competition should 
the linked oligopoly theory described in Chapter four have its predicted effect. (See Chapter 4, pp. 149-
159. 
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procurement opportunities. The US Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)4 
requires Federal agencies to identify proposed contract actions and contract 
awards in hard copy form in the Commerce Business Daily (CBD). This hard 
copy publication is supported by the CBDNet which is the government's official 
free version of the CBD, operated via an on-line database, and accessible via the 
Internet. Suppliers have several options for searching the database for 'proposed 
contract actions' including searching for all notices from a specific geographic 
area, searching via the date the notice was posted, and searching for all 
opportunities for set asides for small and minority businesses. Suppliers may also 
search via the Federal Supply Classification codes by which notices appearing in 
the CBD and CBDNet must be arranged. These codes are divided into Supplies 
and Services, which are described under broad headings, the latter being 
supported by examples. Thus category P refers to Salvage Services and lists 
demolition and salvage of aircraft as examples. Category 31 on supplies refers 
only to ball bearings. The use of classification codes is effectively mandated by 
the FAR whose part 5.207 provides that, 
"Each synopsis shall classify the contemplated contract action under the one 
classification code which most closely describes the acquisition. If the action is 
for a mUltiplicity of goods andlor services, the preparer should select the one 
category best describing the overall acquisition based upon value. Inclusion of 
4 The FAR is the primary regulation for use by all Federal Executive agencies in their acquisition of 
supplies and services with appropriated funds. It became effective on April 1, 1984, and is issued 
under the joint authorities of the Administrator of General Services, the Secretary of Defence, and the 
Administrator for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, under the broad policy 
guidelines of the Administrator, Office of Federal Procurement PQlicy, Office of Management and 
Budget. The FAR can be viewed on the US General Services Administration's home page at 
htm:llwww.gsa.gov. 
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more than one classification code, or failure to include a classification code, will 
result in rejection of the synopsis by the Commerce Business Daily." 
The cost of obtaining information electronically may also be significantly lower 
than the use of hard-copy publications. While many databases have subscription 
charges, and optional services for the retrieval and presentation of information at 
extra cost, these costs are at least potentially lower than subscription costs to the 
periodicals which currently carry the contract notices of GP A Parties. At present, 
keeping up to date with procurement information in all the Parties to the 
Agreement, involves subscription to a large number of publications. Individual 
states frequently maintain several different publications where central and federal 
entities are required to publish their notices in different publications. In 
Switzerland, for example, Annex 1 entities publish their Notices in the Swiss 
Official Trade Gazette, whereas Annex 2 entities must publish their Notices in 
the designated Official publication of every Swiss Canton of which there are 
twenty six. The impracticality of keeping up to date with relevant procurement 
information, can be regarded as a significant impediment to the opening up of 
procurement markets, and may be one of the reasons for the low involvement of 
SMEs in contract awards. It is difficult to envisage that larger firms hold many of 
the publications from among their non-major trading parties, and completely 
unrealistic to expect SMEs to subscribe to these publications. It can also be 
recalled that membership of the GP A is very disappointing at present, both in 
terms of the number, and balance of Parties involved. The accessibility of 
information will involve an ever-burgeoning list of publications as more states 
hopefully accede to the GP A. 
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b) The need for caution in the implementation of leTs at national and 
regional levels 
The mere adoption of ICTs cannot automatically bring about the above 
mentioned benefits. It is clear from the various electronic procurement projects 
which have been piloted that significant problems have been encountered. The 
US has perhaps accumulated more experience with electronic procurement than 
any other nation. It is therefore not surprising that the key authorities are already 
acutely aware of the barriers which have blighted the successful implementation 
of their electronic procurement initiatives. There follows a description of the 
leading electronic procurement initiative in the US, and of the problems which 
have been encountered in its implementation. The US example provides a clear 
indication of the typical problems that individual WTO Parties are likely to face 
in developing their national strategies. The desirability of WTO policy guidance 
to minimise the problems which states will face, and maximise the benefits of 
GP A membership, can also be questioned. 
It is notable that a legislative mandate exists m the US for streamlining 
procurement through the use of electronic commerce, in the form of the Federal 
Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 (F ASA). Title IX of F AS A, enacted on 
October 13, 1994, provides the statutory framework for the establishment of a 
Federal Acquisition Computer network (F ACNET) system to enable government 
agencies and suppliers to do business electronically in a standard way. F ACNET 
is intended primarily for contracts let by federal agencies valued at between 
$2,500 to $100,000. Its main objectives are to provide, widespread public notice 
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of contracting opportunities and awards; a means for suppliers to electronically 
review, request information on, and respond to solicitations; and record keeping 
on each procurement action. F ASA also requires that if practicable, F ACNET 
provide other capabilities, such as issuing orders under existing contracts and 
making payments. 
There is a degree of functional overlap between F ACNET and the CBD referred 
to above. The CBD is a bulletin board for tender notices. F ACNET also 
provides suppliers with tender notices. However, tender documentation (also 
known as solicitations in US terminology) cannot be obtained directly from the 
CBD or the CBDNet. Suppliers interested in tender notices located from the 
CBD, can get a copy of the tender documentation from the persons designated as 
the point of contact in the notice. While tender notices are available both from 
the CBD and FACNET, in practice, the two systems are completely separate. 
Proposed procurement actions need not be posted to the CBD where the contract 
will be awarded through FACNET. Contracts covered by FACNET are 
exempted from the general requirement to publish tender notices in the CBD.5 It 
follows that suppliers can only be alerted of procurement opportunities valued 
between $2,500 and $100,000, and receive tender documentation for federal 
contracts within these thresholds by accessing FACNET. This exclusive 
availability of information is intended to avoid duplication of work by contracting 
authorities, and encourages the use of F ACNET by suppliers. 
5 Federal Acquisition Regulation 5.202 paragraph 13. 
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Responsibility for the management and implementation of F ACNET has been 
spread across several bodies. The Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) 
has responsibility for overall policy direction and leadership of the F ACNET 
programme. The Electronic Commerce Acquisition Programme Management 
Office, (ECA-PMO) has been chartered to co-ordinate and oversee F ACNET 
implementation throughout the federal government, while several agencies have 
been tasked to lead specific government wide F ACNET projects. It was expected 
that F ACNET would contribute towards many benefits including expanded 
business opportunities for small businesses, increased competition and lower 
prices, and reduced contract processing times. However, a report by the General 
Accounting Office (GAO)6 found that the difficulties of doing business through 
F ACNET, overshadowed any observable benefits. 
By way of background a brief explanation of the way in which information flows 
between federal agencies and suppliers will be provided. It should be emphasised 
that, under F ACNET, suppliers cannot directly access procurement information 
from the agencies themselves. Agencies and suppliers communicate with each 
other through private firms which are licensed to receive and process 
procurement information. These firms provide Value Added Networks (VANs), 
of which there are around 35 at the time of writing. Purchasers electronically 
prepare and transmit requests for quotations, and tender documentation, and the 
F ACNET infrastructure then performs several functions automatically. These 
include translating the data into standardised formats which can be understood by 
6 United States General Accounting Office, Acquisition Reform, Obstacles to Implementing the 
Federal Acquisition Computer Network, GAO/NSIAD-97-26, January 1997. The report can be down 
loaded from the home page of the US Government Printing Office at http://www.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
lLinigetdoc.cgi?dbname=gao&docid=f:ns97026.txt.pdf. 
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the computers receIvmg the data, and relaying the information to VANs. 
Communication between agencies and the VANs is always via Electronic Data 
Interchange (EDI). This is a descriptive term for the computer-to-computer 
exchange of routine business documents using standardised data formats. It is an 
older technology than the Internet, and is thought to provide a more secure 
channel for the flow of information than the latter can presently provide. 
In order to receive information, suppliers must subscribe to a F ACNET certified 
VAN, and buy the ICT tools necessary to establish an electronic linkage with the 
chosen VAN. Communication between V ANs and suppliers is normally EDI, 
although there is nothing to prevent the use of other technologies such as e-mail 
or the Internet to handle the connection. Suppliers must also register on the 
Government's Central Contractor Registration (CCR) site, as a pre-condition to 
receiving any information, which can be done over the Internet. 
The presentation and content of the information received from the V AN will 
depend on how much suppliers want to spend on Value Added Services from 
their VAN. The GAO Report found that VAN charges varied tremendously from 
about $70 to several thousand dollars monthly for V AN services depending on 
the volume of transactions and types of services. The greater the expenditure, the 
more tailored the information is likely to be to the specific interests of individual 
suppliers. V ANs may monitor F ACNET for requests for quotations which they 
have been told are of interest to their customers, and alert them of relevant 
opportunities via fax or e-mail. Tender documentation may then be obtained 
through the VAN. Ensuing bids are faxed to the V AN, which will then post the 
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bids back to the agency. In turn, a purchase order is transmitted to the successful 
supplier, and a broadcast message is transmitted to the VANs for distribution to 
participating suppliers. Through the infrastructure described above, one of the 
key goals ofFACNET is to present a "single face to industry." This involves that 
suppliers, having registered once in the CCR database, can have access to 
F ACNET information from any single point of entry (in practice any certified 
VAN) using the single set of standards for the electronic transmission of 
information provided by EDI. 
As mentioned above, the General Accounting Office Report on the obstacles to 
the implementation of FACNET, found that there were serious difficulties with 
its operation. These problems were reflected in the fact that federal agencies had 
executed relatively few transactions through FACNET. Data for 1995 indicated 
that less than two percent of about two million federal 'procurement actions,7 
valued between $2,501 and $100,000 were accomplished through FACNET. The 
concerns which the Report drew attention to are highlighted below. 
c) Concern with the operation of the US Federal Acquisition Computer 
Network (FACNET) 
i) Operational problems throu2hout the F ACNET Infrastructure 
The confidence of users in F ACNET was greatly undermined by malfunctions in 
sending and receiving transactions, with common experiences of late, lost and 
duplicate transactions. For example, in 1996, a senior purchaser at the Army's 
Training and Doctrinal Command stated that F ACNET did not function well 
7 The Report defmes procurement actions as including purchase orders, and other new contract awards 
as well as orders under existing contracts. 
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enough to support the Command's requirements. Outgoing calls for tender had 
been lost, or received as long as two weeks after transmission, and timely 
responses by suppliers had only been received after the closing date in many 
cases. The lack of supplier confidence in (and even awareness of) F ACNET was 
reflected in the fact that very few had actually registered on the CCR. It was 
therefore found that agencies were forced in practice to fulfil their requirements 
from non-registered suppliers, and frequently cancel F ACNET solicitations 
because of lack of vendor response. Lack of confidence in F ACNET' s operation, 
and V AN costs, were found to impact most heavily on small businesses who 
would need to sell large quantities to the government to justify the expenses 
involved. 
ii) The emergence of other electronic procurement methods 
It was found that the usefulness of F ACNET as the single mechanism for 
electronic procurement had been limited by the emergence of other electronic 
purchasing methods found to be more reliable, cheaper and faster. For example, 
since the F ASA was drafted, purchase cards (government issued commercial 
credit cards); the internet; on line catalogues and other commercial alternatives 
have been introduced into government contracting. Indeed it was noted that most 
federal agencies were co-operating in the development of internet based 
initiatives. The emphasis is now on moving away from a single electronic 
solution for all procurement needs, in favour of allowing agencies the flexibility 
to employ the best technology for any particular procurement. Policy-makers are 
now encouraging purchasers to use all types of electronic procurement depending 
on which makes the most business sense. However, the report emphasised that 
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the single face to industry goal would remain a key policy objective. Regardless 
of the electronic tools used, procurement information should be readily accessible 
using common standards for data transmission. 
iii) The le2islative requirements underlying FACNET may not be sound 
As mandated by F AS A, F ACNET implementation has focused primarily on 
competitive contract awards, requiring agencies to exchange information with a 
large number of often unknown vendors. However, the technology of choice for 
implementing F ACNET has been Electronic Data Interchange (ED I). This is a 
technology that has been successfully used to support a high volume of routine 
one-to -one transactions, between organisations with established and close 
working relationships. Examples of such transactions include delivery orders 
under existing contracts, and invoices exchanged between a company and its 
suppliers. The report highlighted that federal agencies had made considerable 
use of EDI in streamlining their procurement, but that this had occurred only in 
the context of one-to-one transactions, and therefore outside of the F ACNET 
project. Incompatibility with the F ACNET objectives was also found in the fact 
that the organisations processing these one-to-one transactions were primarily 
using proprietary solutions, or non compliant standards, and therefore not 
presenting the required single face to industry. Difficulties with adapting existing 
uses of EDI to the one-to-many situation envisaged were found to stem from this 
being a 'government-unique' application of the technology. 
The report therefore recommended that legislative relief be sought if a consensus 
were to be found that FASA's requirements - such as providing widespread 
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public notification, and exchanging infonnation with multiple vendors -
represented impediments to the government wide electronic commerce strategy. 
iv) Leadership and mana2ement problems 
Both government agencies and suppliers consistently cited the lack of clear 
leadership, direction and adequate programme management as major reasons for 
delays in problem resolution and implementation of FACNET. It is therefore 
likely that, without a coherent overall strategy and proper and continuous training 
of managers and purchasers, ICTs will only duplicate or exacerbate the problems 
experienced with current methods of procurement. The Report noted that a 
government wide strategy for implementing F ACNET has yet to be convincingly 
communicated. Individual agencies have been left to adopt their own 
implementing strategies with neither the OFPP nor the ECA-PMO operating as a 
focal point of central guidance and accountability. As a consequence, the 
development of key components ofFACNET such as the CCR database, business 
infonnation to attract suppliers, and policy guidance for using F ACNET, have not 
been clearly linked. 
2. Problems with implementin2 electronic procurement from the 
international perspective 
The GAO Report detailed above provides a clear indication of the problems 
which can beset moves towards electronic procurement at the national level. This 
section considers the challenges which face the WTO, in promoting the 
development of national and regional systems in such a manner as to strengthen 
260 
the GPA's role in the liberalisation of international procurement. The possible 
responses to these problems, at the WTO level, are also considered. 
a) International electronic procurement: the likely problems 
From the international perspective, the problems surrounding the use of ICTs in 
procurement are related to the need to ensure non-discriminatory treatment, and 
the transparency of procurement procedures.8 The fear is not that ICTs would be 
used to systematically and deliberately favour national suppliers, or even that the 
non-discrimination obligations of the GP A would necessarily be breached. 
Concern has however been expressed that the use of ICTs could widen the gap 
between those who can and do participate in contract awards, and those who face 
difficulties in accessing the relevant information and preparing tenders to the 
required standard. The fear is therefore that a situation of de facto discrimination 
could arise against SMEs in all states, and suppliers in developing countries not 
having ready access to the necessary technology, or unwilling to incur the 
necessary expenses, perhaps in the expectation of minimal returns. The 
possibility of ICTs having the effect of reducing the broad participation of 
suppliers (or at least failing to improve the presently limited cross-border 
participation) could arise from problems relating to the accessibility and 
interoperability of national and regional databases. Conversely, concerns have 
also been expressed that the immediately increased accessibility of procurement 
information electronically, could boost supplier participation to unmanageable 
proportions. The task will often then be one of eliminating all but the most 
8 The Committee on Government Procurement recognised these concerns at an early stage of its work 
on electronic procurement. See Information Technology: Compilation ofIssues, Note by the 
Secretariat GPA/W/I5 10 May 1996. 
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appropriate suppliers in a non-discriminatory manner. The possible responses to 
this problem are considered further in Section 3. 
Regarding the issue of accessibility, suppliers will need to subscribe to a number 
of databases, available either over the Internet, through VANs, or other means of 
electronic communication in order to keep abreast of GP A covered procurement 
information. Information will generally be available for free where it is obtained 
directly from a government maintained database, although suppliers are likely to 
encounter varying costs when they obtain information from private providers 
who process information to the needs of individual suppliers. Established 
government suppliers, and suppliers in developed countries are likely to be in a 
stronger position to access the various sources of procurement information, than 
SMEs and suppliers in developing countries. Suppliers are also likely to discover 
inconsistencies in the procurement covered, both in terms of entity and sector 
coverage. They may not yet be able to readily identify GP A covered contracts 
(even though entities are formally required by Article IX: 11 to specify in tender 
notices whether the contract is covered by the Agreement) or know whether 
foreign tenders will be considered for contracts which are not covered. Suppliers 
may also find that the search facilities available vary in their usefulness. As 
regards interoperability, problems may also be encountered with different 
computer languages used for electronic communication 
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b) The WTO's role and possible responses to these problems 
i) The limitations of the WTO's involvement 
The WTO is unlikely to have any direct involvement in the evolution of national 
and regional systems. Indeed, in many instances, even national governments 
have assumed only joint involvement in the development and management of 
their databases, as activities in this area become increasingly devolved to the 
private sector. For example, Korea's database is operated by a private firm. 
Procurement information at all levels of government can be obtained via the 
GINS (Goldstar Information Network Service). The government does however 
intend to establish its own network on government procurement. In Finland, four 
private databases exist where a company can obtain information - stored on the 
EU's Tenders Electronic Daily database (TED) - about tender notices. In 
Canada, the operation of the database has been contracted out to private firms. In 
contrast, the databases in Japan and Chinese Taipei are managed by a public 
authority. 
In the context of EU developments, the Commission has suggested that the 
development of the necessary ICT tools should take place as much as possible 
within the private sector. There will be no Community wide obligations on the 
implementation of electronic procurement. The Commission has suggested that 
Member States draw up individualised electronic procurement plans. These plans 
are to contain a listing of all steps to be taken and a time-table for 
implementation. The only general expectation is that Member State's should 
commit themselves to conducting 25 per cent of their procurement electronically 
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by 2003.9 It was also noted that this approach of minimum central intervention 
was in line with the international consensus in the discussions in the G7 meeting 
on electronic commerce. 10 
Perhaps one of the strongest reasons for the policy of limited governmental 
intervention is provided by the GAO Report described above. Policies which 
earmark particular technologies for the implementation of electronic procurement 
are likely to fail by reason of the availability of newer and better technologies. 
Another lesson from the Report is the need to retain flexibility, so that entities 
can choose to use the procedures and technologies which are the most appropriate 
for the particular procurement in question. A formal tender procedure (whether 
conducted electronically or by paper based means) may be appropriate for 
complicated contracts where entities seek innovative responses to the need 
identified. However, entities may also desire to purchase their routine 
requirements from on-line catalogues from which the market price can be easily 
determined. The optimum technology differs according to the nature of the 
procurement activity in question. New methods of procurement made possible 
only because of leTs (such ,as the use of electronic catalogues) also raise 
implications for the content of the GPA's rules, which generally insist upon a 
formal tender procedure, for all covered procurement. These implications are 
discussed in Section 3(b). 
9 
See The Implementation of Electronic Procurement in the EU, Working Document, Advisory 
COmmittee on the Opening-up of Public Procurement, 9 July 1998. 
10 Ib'd I at p.4. 
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ii) A strong residual role for the WTO 
Within the constraint that individual states will have primary responsibility for 
the development of their electronic procurement systems, it is suggested that the 
WTO should have a strong residual role. As noted above, WTO efforts will need 
to be centred upon ensuring that there is sufficient uniformity among GP A 
Parties, concerning the use of ICTs, to protect, and strengthen, the general 
obligations of transparency and non-discrimination in GP A covered procurement 
procedures. 
It will be crucial to the achievement of these objectives that the single face to 
industry approach emphasised in the GAO Report, is ultimately developed across 
all the GP A Members. Procurement information will need to be reliably and 
readily accessible across national frontiers, in order to secure the confidence of 
suppliers. Regardless of the precise technology which is used, and regardless of 
the source from which information may be obtained, suppliers with access to the 
necessary ICT tools should be able to obtain the same procurement information 
under the same conditions, regardless of geographical location. It is therefore 
suggested that the development of national databases which are accessible on a 
world wide basis is the single most important policy objective which the WTO 
needs to emphasise. Advances in electronic procurement are presently occurring 
most rapidly at national and regional levels. Understandably, perhaps, the 
primary concern has been to improve the efficiency of procurement at these 
levels. 
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Even at present however, it is encouraging that national and foreign suppliers 
alike are being pennitted access to most of the procurement databases currently 
in operation or under development. This is usually achieved through Internet 
access. For example, the ED initiative in the area of electronic procurement 
known under the acronym SIMAP (Systeme d'information pour les marches 
publics) is now moving towards making procurement infonnation available to all 
interested suppliers over the Internet without charge through the SIMAP 
homepage. 11 Any ED contracting authority can now submit its tender notices 
through filling in the interactive standard fonns available through SIMAP. In 
tum, suppliers can use the Search and Retrieval Mechanism provided on the 
SIMAP homepage to search for infonnation on specific procurement 
opportunities. These are seen as first steps towards the development of a fully 
electronic tendering system, going beyond the electronic publication of tender 
notices, and encompassing the exchange of tender documents, bidding and 
contract payment. The objective is to encourage the central availability of 
national procurement infonnation through the single point of entry provided by 
the SIMAP homepage. However, SIMAP will not be the exclusive source 
through which procurement infonnation can be obtained. This possibility would 
be inconsistent with the nature of the Internet as a medium of communication. It 
can therefore be expected that private finns will soon be seeking to obtain details 
of available contracts, with the view of processing and marketing the infonnation 
to suppliers. 
II See the SIMAP home page at http://simap.eu.int. For a brief discussion of the remit of the SIMAP 
project and of recent developments, see M. Dischendorfer, "New Functionalities of the SIMAP Web 
Services", 1999(1) Public Procurement Law Review CSl. 
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As has been seen, the US has chosen the different route of licensing procurement 
information to VANs. However, all of the VANs maintain Internet sites which 
describe the various services, relating to information retrieval and presentation, 
which are available. Any supplier may register with a V AN and receive tender 
notices and documentation either over the Internet or via ED!. It can be 
suggested that one of the value added services which VANs may be able to offer 
in the near future, would be the identification of procurements open to 
international competition by virtue of the GP A or other procurement agreements. 
Canada has also chosen the approach of making procurement information 
available to suppliers through intermediaries. The central source of federal 
government opportunities is through a database known as MERX, which also 
provides information on provincial and municipal governments. 12 MERX 
provides various services including an Opportunity Matching service, which 
notifies suppliers via e-mail or fax when an opportunity becomes available which 
corresponds to the supplier profiles provided. Suppliers can also order tender 
documents from MERX as well as a list of other interested suppliers to enable the 
identification of possible partnering opportunities. The basic monthly 
subscription charge is $7.95 per month, not including nominal charges for the 
above services. Again, suppliers from all geographical locations may subscribe 
to MERX with a view to keeping abreast of Canadian opportunities, although 
there are no current moves towards the earmarking of GP A covered contracts. 
12 The MERX home page can be visited at http://www.merx.cebra.com. 
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It IS also interesting to note the existence of finns providing procurement 
infonnation on both US and Canadian opportunities. Some of these place a 
particular emphasis on helping small businesses to access government 
opportunities. 13 
The vast and rapid proliferation of sources from which GP A covered 
procurement infonnation can already be obtained, is the most striking 
characteristic of developments now in progress. The alternatives available to 
suppliers could easily lead to confusion even in the context of retrieving 
exclusively national procurement infonnation from a national database. The 
potential for 'infonnation overload' is all the greater in the context of providing 
infonnation on cross-border procurement opportunities, notwithstanding the 
GPA's present limited membership. From the earliest stages, the Committee on 
Government Procurement could have a strong role in improving access to GP A 
covered procurement opportunities and reducing the scope for confusion. 
The Parties could be invited to provide addresses of any sites on the Internet that 
give infonnation on procurement opportunities in their countries. These 
addresses could be published in the GP A Annexes, or on the WTO homepage. 
Agreement could also be sought on the identification of GP A covered 
opportunities in a standard manner across all the databases maintained by the 
Parties. This would involve the strengthening of Article IX: 11 which already 
requires that entities identify contracts which are covered by the GP A. The next 
step could then be to seek agreement on the incorporation into national databases 
13 See, for example, the services offered by Business Information & Development Services at 
http://www.bidservices.comlhome.html. 
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of information on procurement opportunities contained in the databases of other 
GP A Members. Through data swaps, national databases would provide summary 
or bulletin information of related contract opportunities held on other databases, 
and perhaps, information on how detailed information could be accessed. Data 
swaps could be automated if contracts for specific supplies and services could be 
identified by commonly recognised codes for the description of supplies and 
services. At a more advanced stage, provision could be made for all national 
sites to be accessible through a single point of entry. Thus the addresses 
contained in the GPA Annexes or WTO home page could be 'hyper- linked' to 
provide immediate access to them via the single interface. 14 The WTO might 
later maintain a search engine for GP A covered contracts, which would 
interrogate all national databases for the types of contract which suppliers search 
for. Again, the efficiency of such a facility would be greatly improved by the use 
of common codes for the recognition of contracts. 
There is therefore much that the WTO can do to facilitate access to international 
procurement information. This is not likely to be an easy task however. 
Arranging the data swaps noted above, could be severely hampered by the 
commercial desirability of the information, and the fact that the V ANs have paid 
for the procurement information in question. A recent SIMAP report on the 
performance of pilot projects noted that, "Closer co-operation between host 
partners has not come about, mainly for reasons of commercial competition.,,15 
One could therefore envisage that data swaps will occur among the VANs, as a 
14 It is notable that many national within, and outside, the EU can already be directly accessed through 
the EU's SIMAP home page at http://simap.eu.int. . 
15 The Report entitled "Evaluation of SIMAP Pilot Projects" can be viewed on the SIMAP web site at 
h!tp://simap.eu.int and is contained in the "About SIMAP" section. 
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service for the benefit of customers who are interested in international 
procurement opportunities. 16 The WTO would then have the residual role of 
encouraging data swaps between those databases providing information without 
charge directly from the government agencies or departments in question. At any 
rate, the establishment of a single WTO database, through which all GP A related 
procurement information can be obtained seems unrealistic at present, given the 
diversity of approaches to the provision of information, and the division of 
responsibility between public and private sectors, currently in evidence. 
Problems with the accessibility of information and the ease of use of databases 
are likely to remain, therefore, as long as information is retrieved from separate 
national databases. This is again a consequence of the speed of developments at 
national and regional levels, and the implementation of different leT solutions in 
response to the problems encountered. It is unlikely, however, that databases will 
become fully interoperable, in terms of the structure and content of the 
information, and the search facilities available, even when a WTO strategy for 
electronic procurement is finalised. Suppliers will probably still have to 
familiarise themselves with how individual national systems can be accessed, and 
how they work, depending on the solutions which individual states develop to the 
challenges faced. As indicated above, while the manner in which databases 
operate is likely to differ significantly between states, the problems which 
suppliers encounter could at least be reduced by the development or adoption of a 
commonly recognised procurement vocabulary for the description of goods and 
services. 
16 Around a third of the government certified VANs in the US currently make information from other 
VANs available to their customers. 
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iii) The adoption of a commonly recognised procurement vocabulary 
A fundamental indicator of the success of electronic procurement systems will be 
how easily purchasers can describe the goods and services they require, and how 
easily suppliers can identify contracts of interest to them. The tasks of searching 
for relevant and current opportunities, or of researching the procurement needs of 
various authorities, could be greatly simplified by the designation of codes for the 
description of goods and services. The multilingual nature of these codes would 
facilitate both the translation of the most important elements in tender notices, as 
well as the compilation of statistics on the characteristics of procurement 
markets. While most of the tools for the implementation of electronic 
procurement have long been in existence, the WTO should have a strong role in 
promoting the recognition of a commonly recognised vocabulary, with the view 
of enhancing the usefulness and interoperability of different databases. While 
there is no multilingual vocabulary commonly recognised among all WTO 
Members, many states do have established systems or initiatives in this area. In 
particular, the European Union has had a Common Procurement Vocabulary 
(CPV) since 1993.17 While the CPV dates from 1993, it was developed from the 
EU's Classification of Products by Activity (CPA) nomenclature which has been 
used primarily for collating statistics on trade flows, and includes services and 
works as well as goods. This was thought to provide a sound base from which to 
build upon, being focused on the supply/producer side and therefore reflective of 
the industrial structure ofthe EU. 
17 Both the CPV and its Supplementary vocabulary can be downloaded from the SIMAP Internet site at 
h!tp:llsirnap.eu.intl. On the CPV, see T. Laudal, "Advantages of a Common Product Nomenclature in 
Public Procurement and Recent Developments in Norway" (1995) 5 Public Procurement Law Review 
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Today's CPV dates from 1998 and is a more comprehensive and accurate way of 
describing goods and services than the CP A. It describes goods and services by 
reference to some 8300 separate nine-digit codes. The CPV provides for a higher 
level of specificity than the CPA, which was limited to six digits. Related goods 
and services are split into some 100 divisions. The first two digits define the 
product or service division. Thus 30 is the division for office, computing 
machinery, equipment and supplies. The greater the number of zeroes after the 
first two digits, the greater the level of the Code's generality. A ninth digit is 
inserted in order to allow users to verify that the eight other digits are correct, 
which is a further innovation over the CP A system. 
Individual divisions vary markedly in the extent of their sub-division. Some 700 
sub-divisions are required for Division 45 which deals with Construction Work, 
whereas a mere 70 are adequate to describe Division 21 which deals with pulp, 
paper and paper board. The existing CPV will continually evolve to meet the 
changing needs of its users. Thus many new divisions and sub-divisions are 
likely to be created, adapted or removed. It can be noted that the current version 
of the CPV dates from 1998 and replaces an earlier version in effect from 1996. 
The SIMAP web pages note that Division 30 has changed considerably between 
these two versions of the code. A whole new section has been created entitled 
"Various office equipment and supplies". A supplementary vocabulary also exists 
along side the CPV, designed to allow the subject matter of contracts to be 
described as comprehensively as possible. It includes a first letter defining the 
CS 112; T. Street, "The Common Procurement Vocabulary (CPV): Development of the Community 
Nomenclature" (1995) 4 Public Procurement Law Review CS 86. 
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general field concerned, and four other digits, the fourth providing a check for the 
accuracy of the code. A British or Irish entity might, for example, want to 
specify that it requires "Left-hand drive" vehicles by using supplementary code 
XOOO-9. 
It is important to emphasise that (in contrast to the US Federal Supply 
Classification Codes) the use of the CPV is optional. The Directives do, however 
contain some references to the compulsory use of the CPA codes;18 an obligation 
which contracting authorities have not generally followed. Moreover, the CPV 
has not formally replaced the CPA. The Commission has strongly urged 
authorities to use the CPV when drafting procurement notices, while stopping 
short of proposing amendments to the Directives to compel compulsory use. 19 
The EU's Green Paper on procurement questioned whether use of the CPV 
should be made obligatory, or whether a charge should be imposed on those 
entities which have not used the CPV and the standard electronic forms to 
identify the products or services required, and the procedure to be used.2o The 
charge envisaged would be proportional to the extra costs of processing those 
notices. 
The author would suggest that the use of the CPV needs to be established on an 
exclusive and compulsory basis, if it is to have any meaningful impact on 
streamlining procurement processes. Its ad hoc use is unlikely to promote 
familiarity with the content of the vocabulary, or the potential benefits its use can 
18 
For example, Supplies Directive 93/36/EEC. OJ. 1993, Ll99/1, requires public authorities to identify 
their likely annual procurement requirements in indicative notices, by reference to the CPA. 
19 Commission Recommendation 0.1. 1996, C 255/8. 
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bring. It can also be noted that the EU would be in a much stronger position to 
recommend the use of its CPV among all the WTO Parties, were it able to 
demonstrate its successful use, and the realisation of its intended benefits. It 
would be beneficial for the WTO to adopt a credible procurement vocabulary 
already in common usage among some of its Members, and which has a proven 
track record. 
The most critical concern over the CPV, however, which is as true of the present 
version as of its predecessors, is that it is firmly producer based. The usefulness 
of the CPV for purchasers is limited by the difficulty of organising specifications 
according to the physical nature of the requirement. Thus while a classification 
for concrete products might be beneficial for firms specialising in the supply of 
concrete materials, it is less helpful for the purchaser of railway sleepers 
concerned more with the performance and cost of the product, rather than their 
material of construction.21 In the procurement context, the CPV does more to 
help suppliers to identify the contract opportunities of interest to them, than it 
helps purchasers to describe their requirements through a numerical code for their 
specifications. 
The present bias of the CPV reflects the difficulty of formulating a code in such a 
manner as to be universally useful to both purchasers and producers. A shift of 
bias in favour of enabling suppliers to select a code to identify the required goods 
or services, according to performance based specifications, would shift a greater 
burden onto suppliers in identifying the contracts of interest to them. To use the 
20 Green Paper, Public Procurement in the European Union: Exploring the Way Forward. Commission 
of the European Communities, Brussels, 27.11.1996 COM(96) 483 ftnal, at p. 22. 
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21 Till 
above example, where the code is for railway sleepers with particular 
performance based characteristics, the producer of concrete products would have 
to search for the codes for all the products they are capable of providing. They 
would then need to determine whether the manufacture of those products from 
concrete would be capable of meeting or exceeding the performance based 
specifications. The policy questions are therefore, whether such a change of 
emphasis would be desirable, and whether any attempt to reconcile purchaser and 
producer interest would render the CPV rather meaningless to both groups. 
The use of a commonly recognised vocabulary could certainly streamline 
procurement procedures under the GP A at least by facilitating the identification 
of procurement opportunities by suppliers, and reducing the barrier of 
multilingualism. Indeed, it can be suggested that developments in this area will 
be necessary to maximise the benefit gained from electronic publication of 
notices, since their availability over databases is unlikely to be helpful unless 
easily identifiable and retrievable. There are still concerns however that the CPV 
does not serve the needs of purchasers, and indeed, over whether it would be 
possible to adapt the Code to make it responsive to the needs of both producers 
and purchasers. Any benefits which the CPV is presently capable of producing, 
would be unlikely to be realised in the context of GP A covered awards, unless 
established on a compulsory and exclusive basis. If it were thought desirable to 
implement the CPV, or equivalent vocabulary, it is suggested that the text of the 
Agreement could perhaps be changed to require use of the codes after a 
transitional period during which entities should be encouraged to use, and gain 
s example is taken from T. Street, supra note 16. 
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familiarity with the codes. This raises questions relating to the time tabling of 
changes to the GPA's rules as moves are made towards electronic procurement. 
c) The development of a timetable for the application of leTs to GPA 
covered procurement 
In order to fulfil its mandate of protecting the transparency of the Agreement, and 
the non-discriminatory treatment of suppliers, the WTO will need to establish a 
timetable for the application of ICTs to GP A covered procurement. One of the 
aspects here would be to set out time periods for the adoption, and use of a 
common vocabulary, if and when such an instrument is hopefully agreed upon. 
Beyond this specific example, there is also a more general need to clearly set out 
the duration of transitional periods during which traditional, and electronic forms 
of communicating procurement information will co-exist. A timetable for the 
phasing out of paper based methods will also need to be developed. The 
likelihood and danger is that national and regional systems will develop at 
differing rates. A GP A Party may consider that its system has developed 
sufficiently to permit paper-based forms of communication to be phased out 
altogether. However, to do this may be highly disadvantageous to suppliers not 
having the necessary technology to access the relevant databases. 
At the same time, it would probably be unworkable to insist that all GP A 
suppliers had access to national databases before permitting the exclusive use of 
electronic communications. An interesting question here is whether Parties 
breach the GP A if they implement the use of ICTs at their own pace, when the 
situation of de facto discrimination against suppliers not having access to the 
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necessary technology potentially arises. The question is relevant firstly from the 
perspective of the requirements of the GPA in its present form, and secondly, 
from the perspective of how the Agreement may need to be changed to 
incorporate additional safeguards against discrimination. Two different situations 
can be identified here, as follows. 
i) Is the GP A breached when parts of the procurement process are operated 
both electronically and by paper based methods? 
This is the situation where procurement procedures such as the dissemination of 
information, and tender submission and award, are operated both by traditional 
means, and electronically. Both foreign and domestic suppliers can participate 
under the assurances provided by the GP A. However, most domestic suppliers 
and some foreign suppliers are advantaged because they have access to the 
electronic databases, by virtue of the technology available to them. Thus they are 
alerted to procurement opportunities more quickly than other suppliers who 
depend, for example, on an unpredictable postal service. Article III: 1 effectively 
provides that, in respect of all matters relating to GP A covered procurement, the 
suppliers of other Parties shall be treated no less favourably than national 
suppliers, and no less favourably than the suppliers of any other Party. Is this 
provision breached by the use of ICTs when some foreign suppliers are 
disadvantaged in their ability to retrieve information, and participate in contract 
awards? It is submitted that there is no breach of Article III in this situation. 
It is firstly arguable that there is no disparity in treatment between domestic and 
foreign suppliers. Many domestic suppliers (especially SMEs) will be subject to 
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the same disadvantages as foreign suppliers in the same position of not having 
access to the necessary technology. Indeed, the possible disadvantage to 
domestic suppliers would be a strong reason for the co-existence of electronic 
and paper-based methods. Moreover, if it were the case that all suppliers must 
have the opportunity of receiving procurement information simultaneously, then 
existing procedures would breach Article III given that divergences in the quality 
of telecommunication and postal services, mean that some suppliers are alerted to 
procurement opportunities earlier than others. Complete equality of access does 
not exist now, and it will probably never arise even through the use ofICTs. 
ii) Is the GP A breached when procurement information is only available 
electronically and when entire procurement cycles are conducted by 
electronic means only? 
This is the situation where tender notices and even tender documentation is 
available electronically and the Party in question is sufficiently satisfied with the 
operation of the system to use ICTs as the exclusive means of delivering this 
information. The analysis also applies to electronic procurement where a large 
part of the procurement process is conducted electronically. At the outset, it can 
be stated that if the databases are only open to domestic suppliers, then Article III 
of the GP A is breached. Article III clearly covers the situation where the 
inability of foreign suppliers to participate is the direct result of a discriminatory 
law or policy. 
The more difficult situation is where national databases are, in principle, open to 
foreign suppliers, but, in practice, many of them are excluded for want of access 
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to the necessary technology to retrieve infonnation relevant to them. It was 
concluded above that Article III was not breached partly because there was no 
disparity in treatment between domestic and foreign suppliers. There is more 
likely to be such disparity in the scenarios described here. Before moving on to 
the exclusive use of leTs, the states operating the databases will presumably be 
satisfied that national suppliers, at least, will be able to access the databases. 
Where this is the case, states would probably be reluctant to delay the phasing out 
of paper based processes. The rationale for their investments would be savings in 
public expenditure, which would be partly defeated by the operation of two 
juxtaposed systems. There is therefore a stronger case for arguing that the 
exclusive use of leTs leads to a discriminatory effect by affecting the 
competitive opportunities open to foreign finns. 
However, while the disparity in treatment is greater in the case of exclusive use 
of leTs, than in the case of the co-existence of old and new methods, the reason 
for the disparity is the same. That is, lack of access to the necessary technology. 
It would therefore appear to be illogical to conclude that Article III is breached in 
one situation but not the other, when the underlying cause of possible de facto 
discrimination is the same in both cases. This is especially the case when, in 
neither scenario, is there an express or even tacit policy of excluding foreign 
suppliers. They do have the opportunity to participate on equal tenns with 
domestic suppliers. The conclusion is therefore that Article III is not breached, 
even where entire procurement cycles are conducted exclusively by electronic 
means, provided that all suppliers are, in principle, able to access the relevant 
infonnation and participate on equivalent tenns to domestic suppliers. This may 
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create a problem in the immediate future if some states become particularly 
advanced in the use of leTs, and regard themselves as ready to dispense with 
paper based procurement in some areas.22 Some GPA Parties would be 
understandably reluctant to accept lengthy delays before the exclusive use of 
leTs, when they consider that the operation of two procurement systems, would 
be wasteful. 
d) Towards a possible solution 
The dilemma is therefore to try to protect the position of SMEs generally, and 
suppliers in developing countries, while at the same time ensuring that that the 
GP A does not become an anachronistic inconvenience for some states. One 
could begin with a note of optimism. The tumbling prices of leT tools, and the 
universal awareness of the importance of computer literacy, may mean that the 
difficulties referred to above, relating to equality of access to information, may 
not arise. Most GP A suppliers are likely to have access to the necessary 
technology by the time national and regional databases replace paper-based 
methods of procurement. 
It is unlikely, however, that such optimism would be sufficient to allay fears of 
unequal access to information. This is especially the case when one recalls the 
need to increase the GPA's membership, especially among the developing 
nations who are likely to be less advanced in the use of leTs. The answer might 
22 The necessary technology for electronic procurement is already available, and will become more 
a ~ v a n c e d , , and cheaper at a rapid rate. The following extract is taken from W. Rowan, Guaranteed 
Electronic Markets - the Backbone of a twenty-First Century Economy? (Demos; 1997) 
"Computerisation gurus talk about a seven-for-one rule; on year in the life of on-line developments 
currently involves sweeping transformations that would take seven times as long in any other aspect of 
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therefore be seen to lie in the incorporation of new safeguards to take account of 
the problems noted above. In terms of changing the provisions of the GP A in 
some way, it is difficult to see how the Agreement could be amended to 
safeguard the right of the suppliers of all members to access, and respond to 
procurement notices. Article III already provides a strong safeguard against the 
exclusion of foreign suppliers, and Article XXIV:8 requires that leTs be adopted 
in such a manner as to promote the aims of "open, non-discriminatory and 
efficient government procurement through transparent procedures .. ". While the 
possibility of textual change is not excluded, it is considered that the solution 
here will have more to do with political compromise, than modifications to the 
GPA. 
It is suggested that the WTO strategy should be based firstly on a detailed 
examination of the timetables for the implementation of leTs, which the Parties 
impose on themselves. The efficient operation of electronic procurement, and the 
realisation of public savings, demands that suppliers which service government 
markets have ready access to relevant information. All national and regional 
systems will be characterised by timetables for implementing the use of leTs, 
and for the gradual phasing out of paper based methods. The WTO should 
impress upon the Parties the need to ensure that the use of leTs does not breach 
Article III, in the sense of databases being accessible only to national suppliers. 
It has already been suggested that the single most important policy objective 
which the WTO needs to emphasise, is the development of databases which are 
accessible on a world wide basis, regardless of the technologies which are 
human endeavour. The increasing power of computers, matched by real falling prices for the level of 
power delivered, is rewriting some of the rules of economic development". 
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employed. It can be added here that Article III, as understood above, requires 
such universal access, in so far as the procurement is covered by the Agreement. 
Efforts should then be made to find a consensus among GP A Members on 
minimum time periods for the co-existence of paper based and electronic forms 
of communication. The focus should be on minimising any de facto inequality in 
treatment, even if such inequality does not entail breaching the GP A in any way. 
The immediate need is for a minimum time period beyond which states would be 
permitted to publish invitations to participate exclusively via electronic means. 
As the amount of information available over national databases increases, 
minimum time periods would also be required for the exclusive availability of 
tender documentation electronically. When fully e l e c t r o n i ~ ~ tendering systems to 
cover tender submission, and information exchange during the life of the contract 
including invoicing and payment becomes possible, minimum periods would 
ultimately be required for the phasing out of paper based procedures altogether. 
It is difficult to predict how forthcoming a consensus on minimum time periods 
would be in any future negotiations. While the EU Green Paper23 envisaged a 
transitional period of several years, before the phasing out of the obligation to 
publish tender notices in the Official Journal, there have been rapid developments 
here. The S supplement to the Official Journal, which is where contract notices 
and Periodic Indicative Notices appear is now only available on CD-ROM and 
via the SIMAP home page. It can be anticipated that the transitional periods 
envisaged by other GP A Members will vary depending on their level of 
experience with the use ofICTs. 
23 Green Paper, Public Procurement in the European Union: Exploring the Way Forward. Commission 
of the European Communities, Brussels, 27.11.1996 COM(96) 483 fmal, at p.25. 
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3. How does the GP A need to be changed in order to accommodate 
electronic procurement? 
In order to accommodate and maximise the potential benefits of leTs, changes 
need to be made to the regulatory regIme. The need for change can be 
understood from two perspectives. 24 Reforms may involve slight changes in 
detail to existing provisions to ensure that electronic means of communication are 
expressly envisaged. Whether or not leTs eventually revolutionise procurement 
practice and regulation, these changes in detail will be a first and necessary step. 
There is a need, for example, to remove any doubt that tender notices can be 
posted electronically onto designated internet sites, and that tenders can be 
submitted electronically. Under this limited approach, only those changes which 
would enable leTs to be used within the current procedures are in fact made. 
Such changes are necessary both to ensure that the Agreement does not 
"constitute an unnecessary obstacle to technical progress" (one of the 
requirements of Article XXN:8), and to allow for at least the potential of 
streamlined procurement procedures. The downside of going only this far, is that 
the detailed (and often cumbersome) nature of the present regulatory regime is 
retained. 
Far more drastic changes to procurement regulation have therefore been 
envisaged. The more ambitious approach starts from the proposition that leTs 
can revolutionise the manner in which some procurement is conducted. This 
approach foresees entirely new methods of procurement, made possible only 
24 These two perspectives were first described by A. Haagsrna, supra note 2. 
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because of leTs. Purchasers now define their requirements in tender 
specifications and publish tender notices to which suppliers respond. For routine 
purchases this may be regarded as a cumbersome method of determining the 
market price. An available option here would be for the purchaser to choose 
from among existing offers in electronic catalogues maintained by suppliers. It 
has been noted that such purchasing methods will tend to involve an increased 
involvement of end users in purchasing operations, allowing the purchasing 
department to concentrate more on strategic and managerial tasks.25 
The use of electronic catalogues could obviate the need for a formal tender 
procedure. Significant savings would then be made possible on both sides. 
Purchasers avoid having to formulate and write down complex technical 
specifications, and the cost of publishing tender notices. When routine goods or 
services are required, purchasers could access the on-line catalogues and obtain 
the spot price. They would then have the choice of whether to purchase 
immediately or wait for a possible drop in prices. On the supply side, the costs of 
formulating tenders and sending them to the purchaser are avoided. As might be 
expected, there are significant legal questions on the extent to which such new 
methods of procurement can operate compatibly with regulatory regimes which 
envisage only traditional tender procedures. These questions will be addressed at 
a later point. The author now turns to consider the changes in detail to the GP A 
necessary to permit states to implement the first steps towards electronic 
procurement compatibly with the Agreement. 
2S 
See J. Gebauer, C. Beam and A. Segev, "Impact of the Internet on Procurement", (1998) Acquisition 
ReView Quarterly 167 at p.17 4. 
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a) Provisions of the GPA which require re-examination in the light of 
information technology 
The first step towards harnessing the benefits of ICTs will be to expressly pennit 
electronic means of communication. The GP A is not completely silent as to the 
importance of ICTs, even though its tender procedures do not presently envisage 
their use. Article XXIV:8 was added in the final stages of negotiations of the 
1994 GP A to acknowledge that the Agreement did not take account of rapid 
developments in the use of ICTs in procurement. It provides as follows, 
"With a view to ensuring that the Agreement does not constitute an unnecessary 
obstacle to technical progress, Parties shall consult regularly in the Committee 
regarding developments in the use of infonnation technology in government 
procurement and shall, if necessary, negotiate modifications to the Agreement. 
These consultations shall in particular aim to ensure that the use of infonnation 
technology promotes the aims of open, non-discriminatory and efficient 
procurement through transparent procedures, that contracts covered under the 
Agreement are clearly identified and that all available infonnation relating to a 
particular contract can be identified. When a Party intends to innovate, it shall 
endeavour to take into account the views expressed by other Parties regarding 
any potential problems." 
The prOVIsIOn has already led to discussions within the Committee on 
Government Procurement. At its meeting on 4 June 1996, the Committee 
requested that the Secretariat prepare a note on the aspects of the GP A requiring 
re-examination in the light of ICTs. The Agreement's provisions were 
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considered under five headings as follows: (i) pUblication requirements; (ii) 
submission of tenders and other communications between the tenderer and the 
procuring entity; (iii) selective tendering; (iv) deadlines; and (v) non-
discriminatory treatment. Under these headings the Secretariat identified 
provisions which will have to be modified or clarified in order to permit the 
possibility of electronic dissemination of tender notices, and eventual moves 
toward electronic procurement. At present, many provisions do not allow for 
electronic forms of communication, mainly because they were drafted with hard-
copy communications in mind. The Secretariat also identified how the express 
provisions would need to be adapted, in order to harness the full benefits of 
electronic procurement. The new dangers which may be created were also 
referred to. There follows a summary of the issues which were presented. 
i) Publication requirements 
The Secretariat first considered the various prOVISIons imposing publication 
requirements and noted that many of these are neutral as to the form of 
publication which is required. It was noted that the provisions were undoubtedly 
drafted with hard copy forms of communication in mind, but that the means of 
permissible publication were not "explicitly prejudged". Article XI provides for 
the main publication requirements relating to publishing invitations to participate, 
summary notices and lists of qualified suppliers. Paragraph 1 is typical of the 
form of these provisions providing as follows, 
"In accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3, entities shall publish an invitation to 
participate for all cases of intended procurement, except as otherwise provided in 
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Article XV (limited tendering). The notice shall be published in the appropriate 
publication listed in Appendix II". (emphasis added) 
The limiting factor here is therefore at the discretion of the Parties depending on 
the means of publication they have decided upon and expressly designated in 
Appendix II. The publications listed here are largely hard-copy periodicals, 
although there are some exceptions such as MERX in Canada, the Commerce 
Business Daily in the US, and the Government Internet Tendering Information 
System in Singapore. In order to remove any ambiguity here, support has been 
received for the suggestion to add a footnote to the Agreement defining 
"publication" to include electronic and paper based methods. It was also 
suggested that the electronic publication would have to be available on the 
Internet, or from one location, and accessible world-wide by telephone. It might 
also be suggested that these two requirements could be identified as pre-
conditions for the deletion of hard copy forms of publication. 
ii) Tender Submissions and purchaser supplier communications 
The Secretariat then turned their attention to the rules relating to the submission 
of tenders and other communications between suppliers and purchasers. It was 
found that the situation here was more restrictive of electronic means of 
communication. Many of the relevant provisions implicitly exclude electronic 
means of communication by listing the forms of communication which are 
appropriate. Thus Article XIII:l(a) provides that, "tenders shall normally be 
submitted in writing directly or by mail" (emphasis added). Tender submission 
by telex, telegram or facsimile is also permitted, although no mention is made of 
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electronic submission over the Internet. Various suggestions have been received 
here with a view to permitting electronic submission of tenders. It is clear that 
Article XIII:l(a) needs to be amended to add "electronic means" to the list of 
possible methods of receiving bids already listed. Submissions were also 
received that where the term "writing" is used in the GP A, it should be 
understood to include any worded or numbered expression which can be read, 
reproduced, and later communicated, and includes electronically transmitted and 
stored information. 
There are various other provisions of Article X, XIII, XIV and XIII dealing with 
aspects of communications between suppliers and purchasers. These provisions 
either require that the communication be in writing or expressly envisage that 
telex, telegram or facsimile may be used as means of communication, to the 
exclusion of Internet based communications. Again, there is a need here to 
remove any ambiguity regarding the use of electronic means. 
iii) Selective tenderine 
The Secretariat drew attention to observations that procurement authorities may 
rely more heavily on selective tendering procedures due to the increased volume 
of bids generated by electronic procurement. There would then be a need to 
ensure that foreign firms would be able to compete on an equal basis with 
domestic firms in selective tendering procedures operated via leTs. Experience 
with the operation of electronic procurement in some markets, certainly illustrates 
an explosive growth in tenders submitted following the posting of notices on 
accessible Internet sites. As described above,. the US has been moving towards 
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electronic procurement for federal contracts since 1994. One of the lessons 
learned thus far is that adjustments are needed to the traditional procedures when 
operated using ICTs, due to the receipt of thousands of tenders in some cases. It 
has been noted, however, that this finding need not lead to undue alarm in the 
GP A context.26 The US government procurement market enjoys a far higher 
degree of integration than that found within the EU, and greater still compared to 
that found among GP A signatories. For this reason, fears of a vastly increased 
number of tenders need not be over emphasised. 
At the same time, however, significant problems would be created for many 
entities if an electronically published notice yielded only a moderate increase in 
responses. Clearly such a large number of tenders would be completely 
unmanageable for many, if not most, entities, and competition between suppliers 
on such a large scale would be unnecessary to ensure that the best price is 
obtained. One possible response to an increased volume of tenders is to rely on 
selective tendering, which largely reflects existing practices in any case. While 
the Secretariat called for a possible re-examination of Article X (which deals with 
selective tendering) to ensure the equal participation of foreign firms, it is 
difficult to see how the provision itself could be strengthened with the view of 
securing this objective. A genuine competition among suppliers and their equal 
participation are already fundamental to paragraph 1 which provides as follows, 
"To ensure optimum effective international competition under selective tendering 
procedures, entities shall, for each intended procurement, invite tenders from the 
26 Ibid. at p170. 
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maximum number of domestic suppliers and suppliers of other Parties, consistent 
with the efficient operation of the procurement system. They shall select the 
suppliers to participate in a fair and non-discriminatory manner." 
The more simple and routine a contract is, the greater the number of suppliers 
which will be interested in participating in the award. Where contracts are for 
routine items the most significant element is likely to be price. Where price is the 
determining element, the number of tenders could be rendered largely irrelevant 
if all tenders submitted electronically could be filtered through a software 
package to produce a short list of potential suppliers. Of course, for many 
contracts price will be but one of the relevant elements. As the contract becomes 
more complicated, the qualifications of suppliers and the characteristics, and life-
cycle costs of the goods or services required, assume a greater importance. Here, 
the Secretariat pointed toward submissions received by some parties that the 
emphasis should be on reducing the number of suppliers who are attracted to the 
contract, in a non-discriminatory manner. 
The principal means whereby the number of participating suppliers could be 
reduced would be to allow them to de-select themselves though careful and 
precise formulation of technical specifications, and qualification criteria. In this 
way, suppliers who do not have a chance of success may be deterred from 
bidding. However, there will be a need for a significant investment in training 
here, as defining requirements in a clear and comprehensive manner is one of the 
most difficult tasks purchasers face. This was one of the findings of a SIMAP 
pilot project on electronic notification of tender notices, which started in 1995 
290 
and ran until October 1996.27 The software used for the pilot project obliged the 
user to fill in all elements correctly and exhaustively. While the software did 
provide guidance for this task, incorrect notices were routinely rejected, and the 
participating authorities were often content to send these notices to the 
Publications Office by fax or mail, which would then be published as presented 
in the Official Journal. This is one of the areas in which the adoption of a 
commonly recognised code could potentially engender consistency in the 
description of goods and services. As noted above, the translation of the most 
important elements in tender notices, would also be facilitated. 
A further means by which ICTs could be used to allow firms to de-select 
themselves would be the on-line availability of Contract Award Notices (CANs), 
in order to increase awareness of the characteristics of the market. Using CANs, 
ICT tools could then be developed to compile statistics on the types of products 
or services bought by particular authorities, the prices normally paid and the 
average number of submissions. If suppliers know that their prices are much 
higher than those paid by authorities either domestically or in another state, they 
will be unlikely to bid. On the other hand, competitive firms could also be 
attracted to markets where authorities have overpaid for their requirements. 
Article XVII of the GPA already requires entities to publish CANs not later than 
72 days after covered contract awards. Among other things, entities must publish 
the details of the winning firm, the value of the awarded contract and the highest 
and lowest offers taken into account. On request, individual participants must 
also be provided with details of why, for example, their application to qualify was 
27 See the Report on the "Evaluation of SIMAP Pilot Projects" on the SIMAP home page at p. 11. 
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rejected or on the relative merits of the winning tender. The usefulness of CANs 
for enabling suppliers to learn the characteristics of the markets they seek to 
enter, would be greatly improved if suppliers could immediately access 
information through classification using commonly recognised codes. Further 
information of interest to suppliers could also be provided by 'purchaser 
profiles'. Where authorities maintain Internet sites, part of the information 
provided could relate to the type of procurement opportunities which are likely to 
be made available to the private sector, and annual purchasing plans. Suppliers 
would then be in a better position to judge whether particular entities are likely to 
provide them with a significant source of business. Purchaser profiles are an 
important part of the EU's SIMAP programme noted above. 
Beyond the suggestions above, it can also be noted that intermediaries such as 
VANs already have an important role in absorbing the increased burden on public 
authorities which would otherwise be brought about by the use of ICTs. 
Intermediaries may act as a filter in the contract award process by operating 
qualification procedures. An authority may, for example, inform its certified 
VANs that all participating suppliers must have an annual turnover above a 
certain threshold. The relevant contract notices will then only be made available 
to the appropriately qualified suppliers. Article VIII of the GP A which deals 
with the qualification of suppliers does not preclude bodies other than the 
procuring entity itself from conducting qualification procedures provided the 
safeguards set out are followed. 
iv) Deadlines 
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The Secretariat noted the possibility of reducing the minimum time periods 
required at various points in the procurement procedure, with a view to 
improving the overall efficiency of the procurement process. Reductions are 
made possible because suppliers can be alerted to procurement opportunities by 
electronic means more quickly than by periodical hard copy publication. Time is 
also saved if tender documents can be downloaded, and if tenders can be 
submitted electronically. Suppliers then have more time to prepare responsive 
tenders. The idea is that reducing deadlines could be promoted as one of the 
advantages of leTs, and be seen as an incentive for authorities to use electronic 
forms of communication. 
Beyond the minimum time periods described below, authorities can set deadlines 
which they deem to be appropriate, but in doing so, they are guided by Article 
XI: 1. In referring to publication delays, and the need to ensure that time limits 
permit suppliers of all Parties sufficient time to prepare and submit tenders, 
Article XI: I clearly envisages hard-copy publication of notices and submission of 
tenders, rather than the near instantaneous publication made possible by 
electronic communication: 
"(a) any prescribed time-limits shall be adequate to allow suppliers of other 
Parties as well as domestic suppliers to prepare and submit tenders before the 
closing of the tendering procedures. In determining any such time-limits, entities 
shall, consistent with their own reasonable needs, take into account such factors 
as the complexity of the intended procurement, the extent of subcontracting 
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anticipated and the normal time for transmitting tenders by mail from foreign as 
well as domestic points. 
(b) Each Party shall ensure that its entities shall take due account of publication 
delays when setting the final date for receipt of tenders or of applications to be 
invited to tender." 
(emphasis added) 
Regarding paragraph (a) above, the Secretariat received suggestions to delete the 
words "by mail" from the last sentence, in order to acknowledge that leTs will 
generally permit suppliers a longer lead time in which to prepare their tenders. 
The minimum time periods are dealt with in Article XI:2, which sets out the time 
allowed to potential suppliers to prepare and submit tenders and, in the case of 
selective tendering, to submit an application to be invited to tender. Thus Article 
XI:2(a) envisages a minimum period of 40 days for the receipt of tenders in open 
procedures. The 40 day period runs from the date of the invitation to participate. 
Paragraph (b) provides that where selective tendering is employed, suppliers be 
provided at least 25 days to apply to be invited to tender, again running from the 
date of the invitation to participate. Selected suppliers must also have a 
minimum of 40 days to submit their tenders, running from the date of the 
invitation to tender. The Agreement does envisage that these deadlines can be 
reduced in some circumstances. For example Article XI:3(b) envisages that 
where there are recurring contracts, the 40 day limit for receipt of tenders may be 
reduced to not less than 24 days. 
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Support has been expressed for reducing the minimum time periods above to 
reflect the quicker dissemination of procurement information made possible by 
ICTs. Consensus has yet to be reached on the extent to which the deadlines 
should be reduced. Suggestions received have ranged from reducing all 
deadlines by 10 days, to reducing the deadline for receipt of tenders to as little as 
one day, in the case of repeat invitations to participate for recurring contracts 
dealt with in Article XI:3(b). At the present time, the EU Commission envisages 
that, for its own procurement rules, time limits for tender receipt should be set so 
as to reflect the complexity of the transaction, and the extent to which translations 
will be required. The standard period for receipt of tenders is likely to be set at 
30 days, but with a reduction to 15 days for 'off the shelf goods and services'. 
Where tender notices are posted electronically, and where the entity has a 
purchaser profile in place, a deadline of 10 days may be made available. 
While the emphasis on reducing deadlines for the GP A is clear, notes of caution 
were also received by the Secretariat, to the effect that time gains arising from 
electronic transmission of documents could be relatively small compared to the 
total time needed for the preparation of responsive bids. It may well be that the 
time periods saved through electronic communications between authorities and 
potential suppliers will not be sufficient for any significant reductions in 
minimum time periods. On a related note, the Green Paper on procurement 
reform in the EC, drew attention to a studJ8 which indicated that tight deadlines 
can severely prejudice the participation of SMEs in contract awards. It was 
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found that late communication of contract documents by contracting authorities 
prevented SMEs from presenting a valid bid in over 50 per cent of the cases 
studied. The same problem of late transmission could also persist when ICTs are 
used. There will always be a human element involved in deciding when to send 
information, regardless of how quickly that information can be transmitted once 
the decision has been made. This is an additional reason for the need for caution 
in reducing deadlines for tender submission, especially as changes will impact 
more heavily on SMEs than on larger firms. Negative impacts on SMEs are 
especially critical when their increased participation has been identified as crucial 
to the success of procurement rules in increasing supply side competitiveness, 
and when SMEs are already relatively disadvantaged in their ability to participle 
by factors such as unpredictable payment cycles, and ad hoc standards for their 
work as subcontractors.29 
4. New methods of procurement and their GPA compatibility 
As mentioned above, the use of ICTs can make new methods of procurement 
possible which are more reflective of the realities of public purchasing. For 
complicated procurements, such as construction projects, following detailed 
procedures may be necessary from the point of view of giving all qualified 
suppliers the chance to participate and to allow those suppliers to present 
innovative solutions to the needs clearly identified in tender documentation. 
However, for simple and routine purchases, the formality of tender procedures 
28 Euro Info Centre Aarhus County, "Analysis of irregularities occurring in tender notices published in 
the Official Journal of the European Communities 1990 -1993." Study presented to the Commission in 
1996. 
29 Green Paper, supra note 22, at pp. 29-33. 
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can be regarded as excessively burdensome, and capable of significantly pushing 
up procurement costs. 
One of the new buying mediums for routine items made possible through leTs 
are electronic catalogues. Through these Internet based catalogues, purchasers 
can monitor fluctuations in prices, and source their requirements from the 
cheapest suppliers offering the required items. Actual prices may depend more 
on the level of discount available on a daily basis from individual catalogues, 
than on the standard set prices. Purchasers who can exactly identify the items 
they require, would clearly desire to take advantage of spot prices, and would 
clearly wish to limit the repetition of any formal tender procedures on each 
occasion suppliers or services are required. It can therefore be questioned 
whether electronic catalogues can be used compatibly with the GP A. If the GP A 
could be understood as permitting the use of the 'framework arrangements' 
described below then this would go some way towards facilitating the use of 
electronic catalogues. 
A framework arrangement is a term to refer to various types of arrangements 
whereby purchasers and sellers agree to the contractual terms of future dealings 
without committing themselves to any specific orders at the time the framework 
is set up. The essence of framework arrangements is that transaction costs are 
saved by allowing part of the award process for future requirements to be 
eliminated in a single stage by setting up the framework with one, or a multitude 
of suppliers. There are many potential uses for framework arrangements, which 
can vary considerably in terms of the obligations undertaken by purchasers and 
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suppliers, and the procedural steps leading up to contract award and later 
conclusion. Purchasers may wish to enter into frameworks where they can set the 
basic terms of future contracts, but where it is difficult to predict who will be able 
to present the best bid at the time when actual requirements arise. The fluctuating 
prices of electronic catalogues provide an example of this stuation. Purchasers 
may wish to use frameworks to dispense with the initial stages of the contract 
award process (such as the definitions of the supplies or services required, and 
the qualifications of suppliers) while leaving other elements (such as price) to be 
determined at a later time when actual requirements arise. Purchasing needs 
could then be periodically met by 'call-offs' under existing contractual terms, 
without the need to repeat initial contract award stages on each occasion. The 
author only deals with framework arrangements here in so far as they are directly 
relevant to the potential usages of electronic catalogues.3o 
The use of frameworks to take advantage of changing prices in catalogues 
involves several steps being taken in the contract award process. The first step is 
the advertisement of the framework itself, as if it were a contract covered by the 
GP A. Purchasers may either conclude single or multi-supplier frameworks. 
Where a single supplier offers a very wide range of products, entities may be 
satisfied to conclude a single-supplier framework, considering that any premium 
paid for individual items would be offset by the convenience of the broad 
availability of items from one reliable source. In contrast, multi-supplier 
~ o o A comprehensive analysis of the different kinds of framework arrangements, and their compatibility 
with the EU Directives has been undertaken by S. Arrowsmith. The author draws considerably on the 
analysis presented in these papers. See S. Arrowsmith "Framework Purchasing and Qualification Lists 
under the European Procurement Directives: Part I" (1999) 3 Public Procurement Law Review 115; S. 
Arrowsmith "Framework Purchasing and Qualification Lists under the European Procurement 
Directives: Part 2" (1999) 4 Public Procurement Law Review 161. 
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frameworks involve two or more suppliers which would enable advantage to be 
taken of the different prices offered. Both kinds of frameworks can involve 
different obligations being undertaken by purchasers and suppliers. Purchasers 
may undertake to source all future requirements which may arise during the 
lifetime of the framework from among the framework suppliers. These suppliers 
could in tum undertake to make themselves available to supply. There are 
various other options, ranging from firm commitments to purchase or supply 
being provided on one side only, to frameworks for future orders binding neither 
the suppliers nor the purchaser. 
Given the GPA's current silence on the use of frameworks, there is considerable 
uncertainty over when a regulated contract arises under these various options. 
The same uncertainty also exists under the EU public sector Directives, and in 
this context it has been argued that, for each of the above options, a contract to 
which the Directives apply does not arise until a single supplier is selected to 
fulfil a specific order placed under the framework. 3! The principal reason for this 
conclusion is that the procedures of the directives envisage the selection of a 
single supplier for each order, and cannot be applied to contracts which have yet 
to identify a single supplier. This reasoning applies equally in the GP A context 
so that, for the above options, the framework itself should not be regarded as a 
contract. However, as noted above, the framework does have to be advertised as 
if it were a regulated contract. This is because Article IX of the GP A provides 
that the obligation to publish an invitation to participate arises "for all cases of 
intended procurement." The desire of purchasers to enter into frameworks is 
3) See S. Arrowsmith, "Framework Purchasing and Qualification Lists under the European 
Procurement Directives: Part 1" ibid, at pp. 133-141. 
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clearly indicative of future intended procurement. Thus an authority intending to 
conclude a framework will breach the GP A if it fails to advertise the framework 
itself, even though the regulated contract does not arise until a framework 
supplier is selected for a specific requirement. 
After the initial step of advertising the framework, purchasers may be content to 
conclude a framework with only one supplier. In contrast, where a multi-supplier 
framework is favoured, there may be a desire to conclude frameworks with all 
qualified bidders submitting compliant offers. This situation is more likely where 
it is anticipated that prices or other terms will vary greatly over time, and where 
there is a need to retain flexibility in the placement of call-offs. All the qualified 
suppliers would then be notified of actual requirements when they arise and 
asked to submit their current price for the specified requirement. It is only at this 
stage that the award criteria, advertised when qualified framework suppliers were 
initially sought, are applied to the bids received. 
The more likely situation however will be where the purchaser wants to limit the 
number of framework suppliers. This will involve different and additional 
procedural steps, between the advertisement of the framework and the selection 
of a supplier, to those identified above. The number of framework suppliers 
could be reduced to a manageable level, by advertising a framework inviting 
suppliers to submit prices based on a sample requirement. The framework would 
then be concluded only with the suppliers rating most highly on the specified 
award criteria, in response to the sample requirements. Unlike the first stage of 
the procedure above, the first stage here involves the application of award criteria 
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to the hypothetical need identified. The next stage will then be to notify the 
selected suppliers of the actual need which has arisen. The framework suppliers 
will then prepare offers in response to the actual need identified, basing their 
offers on current catalogue prices. An individual supplier will then be awarded 
the specific contract. 
This kind of multi supplier framework is striking for two reasons. Firstly, it 
involves the application of the award criteria at two distinct stages, and for two 
separate purposes. At the first stage, the aim is to identify the suppliers who are 
most likely to present competitive bids for future requirements, by evaluating 
their responses to sample requirements. At the second stage, the objective is to 
identify the most competitive supplier for the actual requirement which has 
arisen. There is no provision in the GP A to prevent the splitting of the award 
procedure into two stages. Arrowsmith has also argued, in the context of the ED 
rules, that there are strong policy reasons for permitting this kind of procedure. 
Thus the author argues that multi supplier frameworks using a split award 
procedure should be permitted, because the only viable alternative of concluding 
a framework with a single supplier, would be no more transparent, inhibit the 
achievement of value for money, and would be likely to produce less 
competition.32 
The second peculiarity of this kind of multi-supplier framework is that the 
successful firm is not awarded the contract on the basis of the original bid 
submitted in response to the hypothetical need identified. The successful 
32 Ibid, atpp.134-135. 
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contractor, along with all other members of the framework, is gIven the 
opportunity to amend its bid. This is entirely permissible where the GPA's 
limited tendering procedure is exceptionally available, since purchasers can then 
choose what kind of tender procedure to operate. However, where the limited 
procedure is not available, the compatibility of this kind of framework with the 
GP A depends on the extent to which bidders can be permitted to change their 
bids following expiry of the original deadline, and the opening of bids. The GP A 
provides for considerable flexibility on post tender negotiations, subject to the 
safeguards provided. There is no reason, under the GP A itself, why bidders 
should not be permitted to amend their tenders (even on price) after the expiry of 
the original deadline. Article XIV provides that entities may conduct 
negotiations if this intention has been indicated in the invitation to participate. 
Negotiations should be primarily used to identify the strengths and weaknesses in 
tenders. This is arguably applicable to the situation where suppliers are required 
to provide their current prices, since the intention here is to assess the relative 
strengths of tenders in response to actual requirements. The other safeguards are 
directed at ensuring that negotiations are conducted on a non-discriminatory 
basis. There is no reason why the framework contemplated above should 
produce any discriminatory effects. In particular, all framework suppliers are 
permitted to submit final tenders in accordance with a final deadline as required 
by Article XIV :4( d). 33 
33 It can be pointed our that the EU public sector directives are probably more restrictive of post tender 
negotiations than the GPA. A joint Council and Commission declaration ([1994] OJ. L1111114) 
currently provides that "all negotiations with candidates or tenderers on fundamental aspects of 
~ o n t r a c t s , , variations in which are likely to distort competition, and in particular on prices, shall be ruled 
out." Discussions may be held with bidders, "but only for the purpose of clarifying or supplementing 
the content of their tenders or the requirements of contracting authorities, and provided this does not 
involve discrimination." To the extent that the declaration limite; the use of multi supplier frameworks, 
it has been strongly criticised on the basis that the restrictive approach is not necessary to address 
transparency concerns, and many defeat the price savings which frameworks can produce. See S. 
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On the basis of the above considerations the GP A would appear to pennit 
purchasers to enter into frameworks with suppliers offering electronic catalogues. 
Frameworks may either be concluded with all suppliers responding to advertised 
frameworks, or with those suppliers likely to offer the best value for money for 
future requirements. However, important questions concerning the application of 
the GPA's rules to frameworks arise given that the Agreement was clearly not 
drafted with their use in mind. Perhaps the most important concern is over the 
need for safeguards to ensure that frameworks do not unjustifiably prevent new 
suppliers from entering foreign markets. Frameworks of excessive duration 
could clearly limit the competition for contracts contemplated by the GP A. There 
is therefore a need to consider whether existing tender procedure rules directed at 
the transparency of award procedures, and the non-discriminatory treatment of 
suppliers are sufficient, or whether specific rules are required to prevent the abuse 
of frameworks. There is some uncertainty over how the aggregation rules 
contained in Article II of the GP A should apply to frameworks. The position is 
particularly complicated in the case of 'multi user frameworks' where a number 
of entities fonn a consortium, and then set up a joint framework with one or more 
suppliers, or where there are separate sub-units of a single entity. The question 
on which policy guidance or new rules may be required is therefore at what level 
the aggregation rules apply. 
These concerns are relevant to the use of frameworks in general. A particular 
uncertainty, however, relates to the usefulness of frameworks concluded with 
suppliers providing electronic catalogues. It was noted above that frameworks 
can go some way towards facilitating the use of electronic catalogues by avoiding 
Arrowsmith "Framework Purchasing and Qualification Lists under the European Procurement 
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the repetition of parts of the contract award procedure for each contract 
periodically placed under the framework. Once the framework itself has been 
advertised, and framework suppliers have been selected, the specifications of the 
goods and services required and the qualification of suppliers will have been 
determined on a once and for all basis for the duration of the framework. The 
need to advertise each and every call off will then be avoided. However, it is 
clear that the existence of the framework only obviates the need for separate calls 
for competition, and that the remaining contract award procedures must be 
followed. For the frameworks which are most likely to be used in connection 
with electronic catalogues (those involving the submission of current prices for 
actual requirements arising) the procedural rules require that framework suppliers 
be notified of the actual requirement which has arisen, and given the opportunity 
to present new bids. Thus Article IX:6(a) requires that where there are recurring 
contracts, each notice of proposed procurement shall provide, "an estimate of the 
timing of the subsequent tender notices." This provision exemplifies a policy of 
taking active steps to inform suppliers of new requirements which have arisen. 
However, it would clearly defeat the purpose of the framework if entities were 
required to publish a formal tender notice for each call-off. There is therefore a 
need to clarify the GP A on how the framework suppliers need to be notified of 
individual requirements, and whether this can be done by fax or E-Mail. 
The GP A provisions dealing with the right of suppliers to formally submit 
tenders also casts some uncertainty over the usefulness of frameworks for the 
exploitation of electronic catalogues. For example Article XI:3(b) envisages that 
where there are recurring contracts, suppliers must be provided with at least 24 
Directives: Part 1" supra note 30, at pp. 136-137. 
304 
days to submit their tenders. The GP A does not define what is meant by a 
recurring contract although it is arguable that this phrase would cover periodic 
orders for the same or similar goods or services. If the provision is applicable to 
the use of electronic catalogues, the period of 24 days for tender submission 
could be regarded as unnecessarily long given that the framework will have 
finalised most aspects of the transaction other than price. This particular aspect 
of the apparent inflexibility of the rules could be dealt with by relying on the 
approach to the regulation of periodic call-off suggested above. That is, the 
submission of an up to date tender could be regarded as a negotiation based on 
the original bid. The relevant provision is then Article XIV :4( d) which permits 
entities to set their own deadline for the submission of final tenders. Clarification 
over the scope of these provisions would be most welcome. however. 
While it is clear that the use of a framework removes the need for each 
requirement to be advertised via a formal tender notice, it is unclear how the 
remaining procedural obligations should be applied. There is therefore a need for 
discussion and guidance on what safeguards are necessary when framework 
suppliers are periodically selected. It is clear however that the GPA does not 
permit purchasers to simply check electronic catalogues for up to date prices for 
their requirements, and immediately conclude a contract with the supplier 
advertising the lowest price. For routine purchases, this is arguably an option 
which purchasers would want in order to take advantage of spot prices offered by 
electronic catalogues. While frameworks do remove some of the formalities of 
tendering procedures, it is arguable that they do not go far enough to allow the 
advantages of new purchasing methods to be fully exploited. To allow 
purchasers to select suppliers based on their own assessment of market prices 
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could be seen to reduce the transparency of award procedures, and increase the 
potential for discriminatory treatment. It is therefore not suggested that the 
GPA's procedural obligations should be dramatically revised at this stage. 
However, the wider issue which needs to be addressed is the extent to which 
these disadvantages can be outweighed by the commercial advantages of building 
more flexibility into the regulatory framework. In the EU context, the 
Commission has recently announced that it will soon be inviting Member States 
to devise pilot projects on electronic procurement at the sub-threshold level. This 
could provide an opportunity for testing the extent to which the equal treatment 
of suppliers, and the transparency of award procedures are compromised by new 
and flexible procurement methods regulated only by the Treaty's fundamental 
obligations rather than the detailed rules of the Directives. 
Conclusion 
There is no doubt that the use of ICTs for procurement covered by the GP A can 
make a significant contribution to the Agreement's objectives. The operation of 
existing procedures via electronic means has the potential to facilitate both the 
identification of procurement opportunities, and the retrieval of tender 
documentation. Supplier awareness of national and cross-border procurement 
opportunities could be enhanced, thereby contributing towards the price savings 
which membership of the GP A, and adherence to its procedural obligations, is 
capable of achieving. Contracting authorities may also benefit from reduced 
deadlines at various points in the procedures thus enabling goods and services to 
be obtained more quickly than via existing paper-based procurement methods. 
These are some of the potential advantages which can improve the benefits of 
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GP A membership. This Chapter has considered whether these benefits are likely 
to be achieved in the short to medium term. 
It is concluded that the use of ICTs is unlikely to enhance the benefits of GP A 
membership at least in the short to medium term. This is primarily due to the 
emphasis which has been placed upon streamlining procurement processes at 
national and regional levels. To date, these developments have done little to 
make procurement opportunities covered by the GP A easier to discover. Thus 
national and regional databases do not at present earmark contracts covered by 
the GP A which would clearly indicate to foreign suppliers that their participation 
is permitted, and their non-discriminatory treatment required. Nevertheless, the 
development of national and regional databases, which are.in principle accessible 
to all suppliers, are likely to be of benefit to larger established firms, with access 
to the necessary ICT expertise, and the desire to serve international procurement 
markets. There are therefore legitimate concerns that ICTs will widen the gap 
between established government suppliers, and suppliers who face difficulties in 
the identification of procurement opportunities and the preparation of tenders to 
the required standard. 
The division of responsibility for the development of databases between the 
public and private sectors, is regarded as entirely appropriate as it is the private 
sector which will offer the most innovative solutions to the problems which are 
encountered. However, an inevitable consequence of private sector involvement 
is that procurement information will become a tradable commodity, and the 
quality of information available to suppliers will depend on the level of services 
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which are purchased from VANs or equivalent information providers. It is those 
suppliers which currently serve government markets that are likely to be in the 
best position to absorb the costs of the more sophisticated services on offer, and 
which will therefore be the most responsive to procurement needs. It is therefore 
suggested that the frequently cited benefit of leT implementation in increasing 
SME involvement is likely to prove illusory in the short to medium term. 
The role of the WTO as moves are made towards fully electronic procurement 
will be rather limited. Its most immediate task will be to give effect to Article 
XXIV:8 by removing the barriers to electronic forms of communication currently 
found in some provisions, to avoid the Agreement being seen as an impediment 
to the rapid developments in progress. It is clear that the WTO has already 
recognised this need in proposing the changes outlined in section 3. A more 
difficult question is the extent of the WTO's involvement in promoting the use of 
leTs in such a manner as to enhance the transparency of procurement procedures 
and minimise any discriminatory treatment of foreign suppliers. The limited 
steps which the WTO will be able to take here will take the form of either 
additions to the GPA's text, or mutually agreed policies, with priority likely to be 
devoted to the latter. The importance of ensuring that electronically available 
procurement information can be accessed by all suppliers having access to 
commercially available leT tools is the most important policy objective which 
the WTO needs to emphasise. This policy could be strengthened by pointing out 
that Article III will clearly be breached when databases are only accessible to 
national suppliers. Article III would also be breached if it were significantly 
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easier for national suppliers to access their databases because of the use, for 
example, of national standards for electronic communication. 
However, the use of commercially available ICT tools for accessing databases is 
the limit of Article Ill's non-discrimination requirements. It does not prevent the 
rapid implementation of ICTs in such a manner as to result in de facto 
discrimination against those suppliers not having access to the necessary 
technology. An internationally recognised timetable for the implementation of 
ICTs and the phasing out of paper based forms of communication, could do much 
to minimise the effects of de facto discrimination. As regards the insertion of 
new provisions, it has been noted that the ease with which procurement 
information can be identified and retrieved could be enhanced by the adoption of 
internationally recognised codes for the description of goods and services. Such 
a code would need to allow purchasers to accurately and comprehensively define 
their requirements. A provision to require procuring entities to describe their 
requirements by reference to the CPV developed by the EU could be considered. 
However, while the current CPV is among the most comprehensive codes for 
describing goods and services, legitimate concerns over its responsiveness to the 
needs of purchasers remain. The credibility of the CPV will need to be 
improved, and its use within the EU established on a compulsory and exclusive 
basis, before meaningful calls for its adoption at the international level can be 
made. 
It can finally be noted that the GP A can be interpreted as permitting the use of the 
new purchasing medium provided by electronic catalogues. However while 
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frameworks could be set up with a number of suppliers to facilitate the use of 
electronic catalogues, it is arguable that they do not pennit sufficient flexibility to 
fully exploit the potential savings available. Greater flexibility however leads to 
legitimate concerns over how to safeguard the non-discriminatory treatment of 
suppliers and the transparency of contract awards. Such is the importance of 
these concerns that it is entirely inappropriate to accommodate new purchasing 
methods made possible by leTs within the framework of existing rules which 
were not drafted with recent developments in mind. There is therefore a need for 
debate over what kind of tender procedure rules should govern the use of 
electronic catalogues, with a view to ensuring that they can be fully exploited 
consistently with appropriately fonnulated transparency and non-discrimination 
obligations. 
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Chapter 6 
Remedies and enforcement under the GP A l 
Introduction 
The effectiveness of the GP A remedies and enforcement systems will be crucial 
to its overall success and of primary concern to both aggrieved suppliers and the 
member governments. The importance of enforcement systems is indicated 
clearly by the EU's experience in this area. It was found in 1996 that the 
ineffectiveness of enforcement measures was a key reason for failure of the 
original rules on procurement adopted in the 1970's.2 The enforcement and 
remedies under the GP A, which are analysed in this Chapter, can be understood 
from two perspectives. 
Firstly, there is the need to ensure that the procurement procedures established are 
followed in individual cases. While the Agreement guarantees suppliers the right 
to participate in covered procurement without being discriminated against, this 
assurance alone would be unlikely to inspire the confidence necessary to engender 
cross-border participation, without the means to verify that that the required 
procedures have been followed. Beyond a mere process of verification, it is also 
important that suppliers should be able to enforce their rights in a meaningful 
manner, with suitable remedies for breaches of the rules being provided. It is the 
1 On remedies under the GPA see M. Footer, "Remedies under the New GATT Agreement on 
Government Procurement" (1995) 4 Public Procurement Law Review 80; C. Schede, "The 
"Trondheim" Provision in the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement: Does this "Major 
Revision" live up to the needs of the Private Sector?" (1996) 5 Public Procurement Law Review 161; 
A. Davies, "Remedies for Enforcing the WTO Agreement on Government procurement from the 
perspective of the European Community - A critical view" (1997) 4 World Competition 113. 
2 Euro Strategy Consultants, "The Single Market Review Series, Subseries III, Dismantling the Barriers: 
Public Procurement", Chapter 8 on Remedies and Enforcement, published on the European 
Commission's internet pages under The Single Market Review Series, Subseries III - Dismantling of 
Barriers: Public Procurement, July 1996. http://europa.eu.intlcommldg15/studies/stud26.htm 
considerable number of suppliers who can potentially respond to GP A 
procurement opportunities, who are in the best position to detect breaches of the 
rules in individual cases. It is therefore important that suppliers be given the 
proper incentive to challenge suspected cases of non-compliance, or pass their 
concerns on to investigating authorities. 
Under this first perspective, it is clearly the suppliers themselves who assume 
primary responsibility for taking action to protect their rights. In contrast, under 
the second perspective to the enforcement process, it is the member governments 
who take up complaints against other member governments. The purpose of the 
complaint may overlap with that of the first perspective; in other words it may 
also be concerned with the observance of the rules in individual cases. The 
second perspective is distinguished however, in that it may be primarily 
concerned with issues of whether the Agreement has been properly implemented, 
and of whether particular provisions are understood in the same sense between 
the members. It is in these areas that the strength of inter governmental dispute 
settlement procedures potentially lie. The role of the member governments will 
also be complemented, however, by the involvement of individual suppliers. 
They too will be concerned to take action against implementation failures, 
through challenging individual decisions made under putatively unlawful 
legislation. 
The GPA's present enforcement provisions are derived from two sources. Firstly, 
there is the general consultation and dispute settlement procedure (DSU), a 
compulsory and binding system of dispute settlement. It is the Contracting 
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Parties to the GP A which bring disputes under the DSU, to challenge specific 
procurements, or the general non-implementation of GP A obligations. The DSU 
is therefore concerned with the second perspective to enforcement identified 
above. Section 1 of this Chapter considers whether the GPA's proper 
implementation and the observance of its procedural obligations is likely to be 
reinforced and enhanced through actions by signatories under the strengthened 
DSU rules. It is suggested that the DSU is unlikely to provide aggrieved 
suppliers with effective redress, and that this should not be understood as its 
principal objective. Rather, the DSU is more likely to be an effective instrument 
for clarifying points of uncertainty concerning the meaning and requirements of 
the GP A, and for obtaining rulings against Parties who fail to fully, or properly, 
implement the Agreement. 
Section 2 considers the remedies derived from the obligation to provide for 
national challenge procedures under Article XX. This represents a major revision 
by requiring the Parties to provide for procedures whereby aggrieved private 
entities can challenge awarded contracts. The GP A is one of only a few WTO 
Agreements requiring that national remedies be provided to individuals affected 
by breach,3 although provision for such procedures had already been established 
in the regional agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA)4, and under the EU's procurement regime. It will be suggested that the 
3 National remedies must also be made available under Part III of the Agreement on Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights which requires the Parties to make civil judicial proceedings for 
the enforcement of intellectual property rights available to "right holders". These proceedings must 
permit the taking of effective action against any act of infringement covered by the Agreement 
including the provision of remedies such as injunctions and damages. 
4 NAFTA, published in the Free Trade Law Reports (CCH Int'l) Special Report Number 36. The text 
can also be viewed on the NAFTA home page at http://www.nafta.netlnaftagre.ftm. For an analysis of 
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Article XX procedure is an important step forward. However, there is cause for 
concern over the level of discretion given to the Parties in implementing their 
obligations, and over their ability to determine their own timetable for dealing 
with complaints. This is especially so as rapidity and cost of relief are likely to be 
pivotal to the success of the national challenge procedures. 
Section 3 deals with the relationship between international and national dispute 
settlement, and how the, 'exhaustion of local remedies rule' affects this position. 
The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) and national courts may, in some 
circumstances, find that they are adjudicating on the same dispute in a situation 
where neither the GP A nor the DSU gives any guidance on which ruling should 
take precedence. This raises the issue of whether governrhents should be able to 
commence inter-governmental proceedings against a breach of the Agreement, 
when their national suppliers may be challenging the same breach before the 
review bodies of the breaching party. 
Finally, section 4 suggests that the existing framework for enforcement and 
remedies may be inadequate to secure the observance of the Agreement and the 
confidence of potential suppliers. Recent proposals towards alternative and 
complementary enforcement mechanisms are examined. 
1. The Dispute Settlement Understanding 
a) The changinf;! nature of international dispute settlement 
NAFTA's treatment on public procurement, see most recently, A. Reich, International Public 
Procurement Law: The Evolution of International Regimes on Public Purchasing (1999; Kluwer Law 
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Prior to the adoption of the Uruguay Round texts, the dispute settlement 
framework reflected the emphasis on mutual negotiation and agreed solutions 
rather than intemationallitigation with binding results. Most strikingly, until the 
1989 improvements5 the GATT Members ultimately had the possibility of 
blocking both the decision to establish a panel, and the adoption of a panel report. 
Although the use of the veto had been rare, it has been noted that that it was not 
so much the blocking itself which stagnated the system, but rather the possibility 
ofblocking.6 
The new DSU creates an integrated system of dispute settlement under the 
authority of a newly created entity - the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) 
composed of WTO Members' representatives.7 The DSU applies equally to all 
the multilateral and plurilateral trade agreements. This is made clear by Article 
II:2 of the WTO Agreement8 which provides that, "the DSU is an integrated part 
of this Agreement, binding on all Members". However the GPA contains special 
dispute settlement rules and procedures, which prevail over the corresponding 
DSUrules. 
Several key improvements are introduced by the new DSU. In many respects, 
these are mere codifications of existing practices. For example, while S 11 of the 
International) Chapter IX. 
s 1989 Dispute Settlement Procedures Improvements, BISD 36S/61 (1990) 
6 J. Bourgeois, The Uruguay Round of GATT: Some General Comments from an EC Standpoint, paper 
fresented at the University of Michigan alumni reunion, Florence, 3 June 1994. 
The DSB is in charge of the establishment of panels, the adoption of panel and Appellate Body 
reports, the making of recommendations or rulings on the disputes and the surveillance of 
!mi>lementation of rulings and recommendations. See GPA, Article XXII:3. 
8 Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation, published in (1994) OJ L336/3. 
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new Understanding still stated that panel members would "preferably be 
governmental", Petersmann9 notes the almost exclusive recourse, since 1952, to 
"panels of independent experts" for a strictly "rule oriented" settlement of 
disputes. Accordingly, the new text lO provides that "panels shall be composed of 
well-qualified governmental and / or non-governmental individuals .... ", and goes 
on to emphasise the importance of ensuring the independence of the members. 
The arbitral quality of panels in the GP A context is further enhanced by the 
requirement that panels should include persons qualified in the area of 
government procurement. II 
Other changes are completely new however. Of these, the most significant is, 
firstly, the introduction of an Appellate Review procedure. Secondly, there is a 
new requirement that there be a negative consensus to block the adoption of a 
panel report. Thirdly, complaints are subject to far stricter procedural deadlines. 
Finally the DSB can impose sanctions in the form of suspension of concessions if 
rulings are not implemented. The significance of these improvements in the 
procurement context is discussed below. 
b) The Dispute Settlement Process 
i) Consultations 
The Parties are encouraged to enter into preliminary consultations aimed at 
clarifying and, where possible, settling disputes by agreement. Consultations 
remain a prerequisite for invoking the multilateral DSU process, and, "should not 
9 E.U. Petersmann, "The Dispute Settlement System of the WTO and the Evolution of the GAIT 
dispute settlement system since 1948" (1994) 31 Common Market law Review 1157. 
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be intended or considered as contentious acts.,,12 Nevertheless, several 
provisions, contained in the DSU itself, limit the autonomy of the parties to reach 
solutions bilaterally. Article 3(5) provides that, solutions to matters raised under 
the DSU, " ... shall not nullify or impair benefits accruing to any member under 
[the covered Agreements] nor impede the attainment of any objective of those 
agreements." Article 4(4) further provides for all requests for consultation to be 
notified to the DSB in writing specifying the legal basis for the complaint. 13 
These provisions greatly reduce the risks of "power oriented" dispute settlement 
where the solution reached may be influenced more by the imbalance of the 
economic power of the parties than by genuine compromise. 
ii) Panel proceedines 
Panel proceedings are central to the strengthening of the multilateral system. 
Accordingly, Article 23 DSU gives a firm exhortation against unilateral 
measures, whereas the explicit right of WTO members and of the DSB to 
challenge bilaterally agreed dispute settlements and arbitration awards (Article 
3(6)) underlines the multilateral nature of the WTO Agreement. The right to a 
panel following the failure of consultations is virtually automatic. Article 6(1) of 
the DSU confirms that only a negative consensus of the DSB will prevent a panel 
from being constituted. The terms of reference are governed by Article XXll:4 of 
the GP A unless the parties to the dispute agree otherwise within 20 days of the 
10 DSU, Article 8. 
11 GPA, Article XXII:5 . 
I? DSU, Article 3(10). 
13 GP A Article XXII envisages two causes of action resulting from the misconduct of a member state in 
the form of either a "violation complaint" or a "non-violation complaint." DSU Article 26 clarifies the 
Use of non-violation complaints, and places them on a very limited basis by providing that the 
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establishment of the panel. Otherwise, the panel will examine the dispute and 
make, "such findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in 
giving the rulings on the matter." 
The GP A also modifies the DSU in respect of the timetable for DSB decisions 
with a view to accelerating final decision. Article XXll:6 requires that, "every 
effort be made" to reduce the period from the date of establishment of the panel 
until the date the DSB considers the panel or appellate report for adoption from 9 
months to 7 months in the case of a panel report and from 12 months to 10 
months in the case of an Appellate Body report. In the case of disagreement as to 
the existence or consistency with a covered agreement of measures taken to 
comply with recommendations and rulings, the panel shall attempt to issue its 
decision within 60 days. 
It is suggested that even these deadlines are too long if one expects proceedings 
under the DSU to lead to an effective remedy in procurement related disputes. 
Suspension of the award procedure or rescission of a wrongfully awarded contract 
can only really be available as remedies within the first few weeks of the 
wrongful act leading to the proceedings. Following this period, the works or 
services envisaged by the contract are likely to have commenced, and any 
remedies other than compensation become increasingly impractical to grant, or 
disproportionate to the wrong committed. The limitation of the final remedy 
where the contract has been concluded, or where contractual performance has 
complaining party must present a detailed justification in support of the complaint relating to a measure 
which does not violate the covered agreement in question. 
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commenced, will frequently be justified by the inconvenience of delay and the 
prejudice caused to the successful (and potentially blameless) supplier to whom 
the contract has been awarded. The difficulties connected with granting an 
effective final remedy are further considered in Section 2(a)(iii) of this chapter 
below. 
iii) Nee;ative consensus required to block report adoption 
The single most important achievement of the new DSU is the requirement of 
negative consensus of the DSB to block adoption of panel reports. Politically 
impalatable reports have been blocked in recent times. In the procurement 
context, of the small number of panel decisions handed down to date, one of 
them, the 1992 Sonar Mapping Decision remains unadopted to this day.14 The 
blocking of panel report adoption by a single state (normally the losing state) is 
no longer possible, or, at least, cannot be done compatibly with international 
obligations under the DSU. Articles 15 and 16 provide that a panel shall submit 
its report to the Parties for initial comments and then re-issue its findings and 
conclusions at an interim review stage to the Parties. If no further comments are 
received then the interim report is issued as a final report and circulated to all 
WTO members for their consideration. Article 16(4) requires adoption at a DSB 
meeting within 60 days after the date of circulation to all Members, unless one of 
the Parties notifies the DSB of its intention to appeal. At the Appellate Body 
level, Article 17(14) leads to an effect similar to that of Article 16(4). 
14 Re Procurement of a Sonar Mapping System: European Community v United States GATT 
document GPR. DS1/R April 23, 1992, reported at [1992] 3 CMLR 573. For a detailed consideration 
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While this clear shift towards rule oriented dispute settlement can be regarded as 
essential to the promotion of confidence and credibility in the GP A dispute 
settlement process, it is to be expected that the "quasi automatic,,15 adoption of 
panel reports will lead to problems where members are forced to accept reports 
which condemn domestic policies. There is already clear evidence of uneasiness 
about the move away from decision making by consensus. The US, for example, 
has proposed implementing legislation which may force it to leave the WTO if 
too many adverse and legally questionable decisions are adopted against it. 16 
Questions must then be raised about the role of panel proceedings in procurement 
disputes. It seems unrealistic to expect that an individual contractor will receive 
an effective and timely remedy from panel proceedings when one considers the 
framework of rules in which the DSU operates. It is the Contracting Party to the 
GP A which brings the proceedings; the aggrieved contractor possessing only the 
limited possibe role of alerting its government of a possible infringement of the 
Agreement. Further, when one considers the actual remedies available to 
contractors un<ier the DSU (discussed below), which are very limited in nature, it 
becomes clear that the DSU cannot be expected to routinely provide contractors 
with effective remedies. Indeed it may be doubted whether the provision of 
effective relief for the individual case should be regarded as the principal purpose 
of the DSU in the procurement context. Proceedings under the DSU are likely to 
be more effective at providing for the repeal of legislative or regulatory measures 
of this case, see M. Footer, "GATT: Developments in Public Procurement Procedures and Practices" 
(1993) 6 Public procurement Law Review CS 193. 
15 The term is Petersmann's, supra note 9. 
16 See G.N. Horlick, "WTO Dispute Settlement and the Dole Commission" (1995) 6 Journal of World 
Trade 45. 
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which are inconsistent with the GP A, secunng non-repetition of wrongful 
procurement practices, and providing interpretations of the requirements of GP A 
provISIOns. 
iv) Specific remedies under the DSU in the context of procurement disputes 
Article 19(1) DSU requires the panel to, "recommend that the Member concerned 
bring the measure into conformity with that Agreement." The Panel may also 
recommend ways in which the member concerned could implement the 
recommendation. Further, Article XXII:3 GPA provides that the DSU, "shall 
have the authority to ... make recommendations or give rulings on the matter", 
referred to it. However, when the rulings and recommendations the panel can 
actually make are considered, it becomes apparent that the new GP A has missed 
the opportunity to strengthen the system of remedies which had caused concern in 
panel proceedings under the Tokyo Round Agreement. Additionally, it is 
unlikely that a new provision under Art XXII(3) allowing the DSB to "authorise 
consultations regarding remedies when withdrawal of measures found to be in 
contravention of the Agreement is not possible" will markedly improve matters. 
This latter provision was inserted because of the unsatisfactory experiences that 
signatories to the Tokyo Round GPA had with panel decisions finding GPA 
violations, but not offering any satisfactory remedy to the country discriminated 
against, or its unsuccessful tenderer/so However, GP A Parties are likely to be 
unimpressed with the results of authorised consultations due to the severe 
limitations on the scope of the possible outcomes described below. The 
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proceedings which led to the introduction of the new provision in Article XXII:3; 
the Trondheim Panel Report,17 will first be considered. 
The case involved a contract relating to electronic toll collection equipment 
which had been single tendered to a domestic firm as a research and development 
contract. The US claimed that the Norwegian Government had excluded 
competition from a capable US supplier, and thereby violated the GP A. The 
Panel concluded that the single tendering of the contract could not be justified 
under any provision of the Agreement. However, it recommended merely that the 
Committee on Public Procurement18 request Norway should take measures 
necessary to ensure that its entities conduct their procurement in accordance with 
the Panel's findings. It did not follow the US' request to provide it with what it 
called a "sufficient remedy" providing a deterrent effect. Specifically, the US 
requested a panel recommendation that Norway negotiate a mutually satisfactory 
solution with the US that took into account the lost opportunities of US 
companies. This solution, it suggested, "could take a number of forms, such as 
annulment of the contract, the provision of additional opportunities to bid for 
future contracts and assurances about future conduct.,,19 In case event of the 
proposed negotiations failing to produce the envisaged result, the US requested 
the recommendation that the Committee be prepared to withdraw benefits under 
17 Report of the Panel on ''Norway - Procurement of Toll Collection Equipment for the City of 
Trondheim", GATT Doc. GPR.DS21R, 28 April 1992. For a detailed examination of the issues in the 
case, see C. Schede, supra note 1. 
I ~ ~ This is the body representing all signatories, to adopt panel reports and supervise the application of 
the Agreement, which (under GPA Article XX: 1) is now only responsible for "affording Parties the 
opportunity to consult on any matters relating to the operation of [the GP A] or the furtherance of its 
objectives", while the dispute settling function is now managed by the Dispute Settlement Body, GPA 
Article XXII. 
19 Report of the Trondheim Panel, supra note 17, at pp.14-15. 
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the Agreement from Norway with respect to opportunities to bid of equal value to 
the Trondheim contract. 
However the Panel chose instead to require from the Norwegian Government 
what amounted to little more than a guarantee of non-repetition of the wrongful 
procurement practice. It refused to recommend that Norway take the necessary 
measures to bring its practices into compliance with the Agreement. Since all 
acts of alleged non-compliance had taken place in the past, bringing the 
Trondheim procurement into conformity with Norway's obligations would have 
meant annulling the awarded contract and recommencing the procurement 
process. 
The Panel considered that recommencement of the contract award would be 
inappropriate, in particular because, "the panel considered that in the case under 
examination such a recommendation might be disproportionate, involving waste 
of resources and possible damage to the interests of third parties."zo The ruling 
therefore did nothing to eliminate the wrongful act and its economic 
consequences. Further, except for the new provision in Article XXII:3 regarding 
authorisation of remedies neither the GP A nor the DSU provide additional 
remedies from those previously available. The unsatisfactory situation left to the 
complaining party by the Trondheim case may only be countered by authorised 
consultations regarding remedies under Article XXII:3. The likely impact of this 
provision will now be examined. 
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The most that the DSB can do is to authorise consultations which, along with any 
possible agreement, must take place on a voluntary basis. The GP A does not alter 
Article 19(1) of the DSU (detailed above). Therefore, even under the new GPA, a 
panel or the Appellate Body could not follow the US request in the Trondheim 
case which aimed at recommending that Norway negotiate a mutually satisfactory 
solution with the US. The emphasis is, therefore, very much on consensus both 
in terms of initiating the consultations, and their result. Annulment of the 
contract and recommencement of the procurement under the Trondheim provision 
remains a remote possibility. 
The US had also suggested that the provision of additional opportunities to bid 
for future contracts might be a possible remedy. However, this possibility is 
greatly curtailed by legal obstacles resulting from the basic principles of the GP A 
itself. Article ill:1(b) excludes any treatment less favourable than "that accorded 
to products, services and suppliers of any other Party." Therefore, any 
opportunity to bid that is provided to suppliers of one Party, would also need to 
be offered equally to suppliers of all other contracting Parties.21 
Of particular importance to the aggrieved supplier will be the possibility of 
obtaining monetary compensation under the Trondheim provision. Compensation 
can only be granted on a voluntary basis. This is explicitly mentioned in DSU 
Article 22, and must also be the case under the Trondheim provision given that 
20 Ibid. p. 21. 
21 Additionally any qualification requirements structured so that they could only be met by the suppliers 
from the state which was promised additional opportunities to bid, would most likely constitute a 
violation ofGPA Article VIII, which requires that only conditions which are essential to the firm's 
capability to fulfil the contract may be relevant to participation in the tendering procedure. 
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any solution reached must be by consensus. Under the non-discrimination 
principle of GP A Article III: 1, it is likely that the Party granting the monetary 
compensation will be obliged to make equivalent offers to all trading partners 
which have been similarly affected by the same GP A infringement. Plainly, this 
will hamper the potentially liable Party's willingness to give ground in 
negotiations. 
The practical value of the Trondheim provision is therefore likely to be very 
limited. Any consultations entered into must be on a voluntary basis and the 
outcome remains subject to the Parties' discretion. The situation is little changed 
from the pre-Trondheim position where the Parties were always free to reach a 
mutually acceptable agreement provided that this was consistent with the covered 
Agreements. All the new provision does is formalise this process and integrate it 
into the multilateral framework. This tends to confirm the observation made 
earlier that private entities should not focus their efforts on the DSU if they are 
seeking an effective remedy. Its role can more properly be seen as restricted to 
the giving of interpretations on the requirements of the GP A, and the repeal of 
national legislation or procurement practices found to be inconsistent with the 
Agreement. The time scale contemplated for panel proceedings, along with the 
nature of the remedies available are likely to mean that the DSU will perform the 
above functions while continuing to be an inappropriate source of effective 
remedies for private entities. 
v) Compensation and the suspension of concessions 
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The DSU Articles 22:1 and 2 expressly provide for compensation as a 
preliminary remedy, to be resorted to, "only if the immediate withdrawal of the 
measure is impracticable and as a temporary measure pending the withdrawal of 
the measure which is inconsistent with a covered Agreement". While the 
granting of compensation is voluntary and is of a temporary nature, the entering 
into negotiations on compensation is mandatory, if requested by the successful 
complainant. 22 
This contrasts with the Trondheim provision, where the entering into negotiations 
on compensation is voluntary, and where compensation seems to be envisaged as 
a lasting and final solution. It is unclear whether compensation must be granted 
on a non-discriminatory basis under Article 22; the DSU ordering only that 
compensation be, "consistent with the covered agreements." However, as stated 
by Lowenfeld, "compensation by the offending party would, it seems clear, have 
to be granted on a MFN basis, because it would not fit into any of the permitted 
exceptions to that fundamental principle ofGATT.,,23 
If there is a failure to comply with the panel's ruling or recommendation within a 
reasonable period of time laid down in Article 21, and ensuing negotiation under 
DSU Article 22 on, "developing mutually acceptable compensation" fail, then 
recourse may be had to Article 22(2) on Suspension of Concessions. On this 
matter the GP A provides at Article XXII:7 that a dispute under the GP A cannot 
result in the suspension of concessions or other obligations under any covered 
22 DSU, Article 22(2). 
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agreement other than the GP A itself. The practice of cross-retaliation is not 
therefore permitted under the GP A. 
However, if the panels restrict their recommendations to requiring only that 
Parties take measures necessary to ensure that their entities in future conduct their 
procurement in accordance with the findings of the panel, (as was the case in 
Trondheim), then this can easily be complied with and proceedings would never 
reach the Article 22 stage. It may finally be noted that it is unlikely to be 
possible to suspend concessions at all if negotiations towards compensation under 
the Trondheim provision come to an unsatisfactory end. This is because the 
consultations under the Trondheim provision are outside the system of dispute 
settlement which can eventually lead to suspension of concessions.24 These are 
available only where the mandatory negotiations under DSU Article 22 fail. 
vi) Conclusion 
The new WTO dispute settlement system overcomes, to a large extent, the 
procedural fragmentation of the processes which had characterised its 
predecessor. It also places great emphasis on a "rule oriented approach" to 
dispute settlement by an independent appellate body and "professional" dispute 
settlement panel with expertise in the field of procurement. However, it does 
nothing to enhance the remedies actually available beyond placing the relevant 
procedures on an integrated, multilateral level. 
23 A.S. Lowenfeld, "Remedies along with Rights: Institutional Reform in the New GATT", (1994) 88 
American Journal of International Law 477 at p.486. 
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Undoubtedly, this will enhance the process of intergovernmental dispute 
settlement insofar as one is seeking interpretations on the meaning and 
requirements of the GP A, or a ruling against a Party who has failed to implement 
a GP A obligation. However the institutional and procedural enhancements 
described are unlikely to benefit suppliers seeking effective remedies. As will 
now be explained, unfairly treated bidders would be better advised to concentrate 
on the newly provided domestic bid challenge systems. 
2. National Challenge Procedures Under Article XX GPA 
The challenge procedures are intended to introduce nationally available remedies 
which respond more closely to the nature of procurement disputes. The first step 
under Article XX: 1, is to encourage resolution of the complaint against the 
procuring entity by means of consultation but without prejudice to the instigation 
by the aggrieved supplier or service provider of an actual challenge procedure. 
Should consultations fail, the central obligation under Article XX:7(a) is to give 
suppliers with an interest in a procurement access to "non-discriminatory, timely, 
transparent and effective procedures" to challenge any alleged breaches of the 
Agreement in the context of that procurement. There follows an analysis of the 
remedies which must be accessible to suppliers before national review bodies, 
and of their likely effectiveness. 
a) The available remedies under Article XX 
24 This process consists of, consultations, paneVAppellate Body recommendation or ruling, adoption, 
and implementation. 
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The available remedies which must be available are set out in Article XX:7(a), (b) 
and (c). These three paragrpahs require that review bodies must have the 
competence to perform three separate functions in relation to the complaints 
which come before them. Firstly, under paragraph (a), review bodies must have 
the power to award interim or temporary measures, as soon as they are alerted of 
a complaint. Secondly, under Article paragraph (b), they must have the power to 
reach decisions on the merits of the complaint, and to determine whether the 
Agreement has in fact been breached. Thirdly, under paragraph (c), review 
bodies must have the power to actually grant a final remedy. 
i) The power to grant interim measures 
Article XX:7(a) requires that review bodies have the power to grant, "rapid 
interim measures to correct breaches of the Agreement and to preserve 
commercial opportunities". It is provided that this may result in the "suspension 
of the procurement process." However, it is also provided that such measures may 
be refused because of "overriding adverse consequences for the interests 
concerned, including the public interest." This proviso suggests that the interests 
served by providing interim measures, may be outweighed by other competing 
interests such as the inconvenience or expense of delaying the contract award. A 
safeguard is provided against the abuse of this provisio, by the requirement to 
provide ')ust cause" for not granting interim measures in writing. 
It is crucial that review bodies should be empowered to suspend the procurement 
process, pending the resolution of the complaint before them. The earlier review 
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bodies are able to intervene, the more effective and meaningful the final remedy 
is likely to be. Where review bodies are able to act swiftly to suspend a 
procurement process, they are likely to have a broad range of final remedies at 
their disposal, in the event of the complaint being upheld. In contrast, where the 
award procedure has been permitted to proceed without intervention, pending the 
resolution of the complaint, (perhaps even to the extent of the commencement of 
contractual performance) review bodies would be justifiably reluctant to annul an 
awarded contract as a final remedy. Where the contract has been concluded and, 
even more so, where performace has commenced "overriding adverse 
consequences" may militate increasingly against the holding up of the 
commencement or continuation of contractual performance. 
Article XX does not specify or suggest any cut-off beyond which the granting of 
interim measures should not be permitted. The Parties may therefore either 
specify an appropriate cut-off point themselves, or leave it to their national review 
bodies to decide when the need for interim measures is outweighed by the need 
for finality and certainty in the decisions made. 
It can finally be noted in relation to Article XX:7(a) that the reference to 
" .. .interim measures to correct breaches... " (emphasis added) in this provision 
is somewhat confusing. This is because the purpose of interim measures is to 
provide a breathing space, by delaying the procurement process. It is during this 
period that review bodies should proceed to the second and third steps of deciding 
whether the GP A has been breached, and, if so, what final remedy should be 
granted. As will be seen below, the final remedy may actually involve correcting 
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the breach, although actual correction is but one of several possibilities. Interim 
measures cannot therefore correct the breach; they merely provide a period during 
which the review body can decide whether, and how to correct the breach. 
ii) The power to reach a decision on the merits of the complaint 
Under Article XX:7(b) review bodies must be empowered to make, "an 
assessment and a possibility for a decision on the justification for the challenge." 
They must in other words be able to reach a decision on the merits of the 
complaint, and on whether, and in what way, the Agreement has been infringed. 
iii) The power to grant a final remedy 
Where it is found that the Agreement has been breached, review bodies must have 
power to grant the complaining supplierls a remedy. Article XX:7(c) requires 
that challenge procedures provide for, "correction of the breach of the Agreement 
or compensation for the loss or damages suffered, which may be limited to costs 
for tender preparation or protest." 
An important point here, recently made by Reich25, is that there is some 
ambiguity over who should decide upon the scope of available remedies. It is 
clear that Article XX:7(c) envisages two possible remedies, being either the 
actual correction of the breach, or damages to compensate for the breach. The 
question is then whether the Parties are permitted to impelment the GP A to the 
minimum apparent extent of providing for recovery of protest costs, or whether 
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this must be left to the discretion of review bodies in individual cases. The author 
would agree that, of these two possibilities, the latter interpretation should clearly 
be favoured from the perspectives of providing an incentive for suppliers to 
complain, and a deterrent against non-compliance with the GP A. Support for this 
position is also provided by the requirement in Article XX:2 that challenge 
procedures must be effective. 
It is however regrettable that there is any scope for ambiguity here. On a possible 
interpretation of Article XX:7(c), the Parties would be permitted to deny suppliers 
any remedy other than their protest costs, even in the face of serious breaches. 
Moreover, the low measure of damages could also be combined with restrictive 
conditions for recovery requiring suppliers to show that the contract would have 
been obtained, were it not for the infringement. Such a minimum interpretation 
would result in there being virtually no incentive for complaint, and little 
deterrence against non-compliance. 
Assuming that the Parties must provide their review bodies with discretion to 
choose between correction of the breach or compensation in individual cases, it 
remains to be asked how established breaches should actually be corrected. There 
are various possibilities here ranging from the removal of objectionable parts of 
the tender documentation (such as tender receipt deadlines which are too short, or 
discriminatory technical specifications) through to the annulment of a contract 
award, and finally the annulment of a concluded contract. The precise manner in 
25 A. Reich, International Public Procurement Law: The Evolution of International Regimes on Public 
Purchasing (1999; Kluwer Law International, Studies in Transnational Economic Law, Volume 12), 
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which the breach is corrected will depend upon the severity of the breach, and the 
timing of the complaint. In deciding how to correct the breach, and whether to 
grant only compensation in lieu of correction, review bodies will again need to 
weigh the desirability of a particular remedy, against the desire for certainty and 
finality in procurement decisions. 
Thus a minor breach (such as a tender receipt deadline which is a few days 
shorter than required) would arguable not justify the re-commencement of the 
award, where the entity has concluded a contract. Review bodies would be likely 
to regard such a minor breach as a fait accompli, and consider that compensation 
alone would provide an effective remedy. On the other hand, the need for finality 
and certainty would be less likely to outweigh a more serious breach, such as a 
failure to advertise a covered contract. In this situation, effective correction 
would be more likely to require the re-commencement of the procurement 
procedure with the required invitation to participate. 
Of the two options presented above (either the Parties can implement the GP A to 
the minimum apparent extent of providing for recovery of protest costs, or 
available remedies must be left to the discretion of review bodies in individual 
cases), the latter is therefore clearly preferable. However, the author would 
conclude that the actual position is somewhere in between these opposing points. 
In other words, a proper implementation of the GP A does not require that review 
bodies have an absolute discretion over whether to correct breaches, or grant 
compensation in individual cases. It is submitted that the Parties are permitted to 
pp. 310-311. 
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provide for a cut-off point when implementing the GP A, beyond which remedies 
may be limited to compensation alone. 
Thus it is argued that implementing laws limiting the remedy to compensation, 
where a contract has been concluded, or where performance has commenced, 
would be compatible with the Agreement. Such an implementation would reflect 
a judgement that the interests of certainty and finality in procurement decisions, 
generally prevail beyond such a late stage in the procurement process. This would 
be a satisfactory position subject to two provisos. Firslty there would need to be a 
system of rapid interim measures in place to halt the continuation of a 
procurement to eventual contract conclusion. Early suspension will avoid 
contracts being concluded in breach of procedure, and limit the incidence of the 
automatic restriction of available remedies. Secondly the compensation remedy, 
granted in lieu of correction, would, itself need to be an effective remedy to 
encourage complaint, and deter non-compliance. The author now turns to 
question the effectiveness of the compensation remedy. 
On the analysis presented above, the final remedy of a supplier may (compatibly 
with the GP A) be limited to compensation in two sets of circumstances. Firstly, 
national implementing provisions may provide a cut-off point beyond which only 
compensation is avaialble. Secondly, review bodies should otherwise have the 
discretion to decide whether correction of the breach, or compensation should be 
awarded in individual cases. At this point it can also be added that, when review 
boides can exercise a discretion, there is no reason why both correction and 
compensation should not be avaialble in appropriate cases. Where compensation 
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is avaialble, the effectiveness of the remedy will depend upon the measure of 
available damages, and the conditions for recovery. 
Article XX:7(c) expressly provides that "compensation for the loss or damage 
suffered", "may be limited to costs for tender preparation or protest." However, it 
is strongly argued that the GPA's requirement for effective challenge procedures 
in Article XX:2, would frequently be breached if the measure of compensation 
were limited to these possibilities in all cases, regardless of the severity of the 
breach. Indpendent review bodies should therefore have the discretion over the 
measure of damages. Effective compensation could, in some circumstances, be 
limited to protest costs alone where the complaint relates to a minor breach, such 
as a deadline which is a few days too short. This would be the case where the 
review body is also able or prepared to correct the breach, and where commercial 
opportunities remain intact. Allowing suppliers to recover their costs in these 
circumstances gives them some incentive to complain. A deterrent against non-
compliance would also be provided, especially if the conditions for recovery were 
limited to demonstrating an interest in the procurement in question. 
In the face of more serious breaches however, compensation for tender 
preparation or protest costs alone, would be inadequate. This would generally be 
the case where compensation is either automatically, or determined to be the only 
remedy. In such circumstances there is a strong case for allowing the recovery of 
lost profits. The difficulty is then to determine the appropriate conditions for 
recovery. 
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Damages for lost profits could be seen as an effective remedy when made 
available upon demonstrating a realistic chance of winning the contract. A 
genuine incentive to complain would be provided. Strong deterrence would also 
be provided by the prospect of having to compensate more than one supplier for 
their lost profits. On the other hand, the conditions for recovery could be so 
restrictive as to deprive Article XX:7( c) of any meaningful effect. Thus it would 
be extremely difficult to obtain any compensation (whether for lost profits, or the 
costs for tender preparation or protest) where the conditions for recovery require 
suppliers to show that the contract would have been obtained, were it not for the 
infringement. It is submitted that such restrictive conditions for recovery, where 
compensation is the only remedy, would render the challenge procedures 
ineffective, and therefore breach Article XX:2. 
The above paragraphs have analysed the effectiveness of the final remedies which 
the GP A requires to be provided, where alleged breaches are upheld. The author 
now turns to other factors relevant to the success of the national challenge 
procedures. 
b) Other factors relevant to the likely success of Article XX 
The GPA explicitly requires that review be completed in a "timely" fashion.26 
Similarly, under the EU procurement regime, the Member States are required to 
provide rapid remedies to redress breaches of procurement law,27 which is of 
particular importance in procurement disputes. If relief is not rapid, the contract 
26 GPA Article XX:8. 
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may be completed by the time of the hearing making correction of the breach 
through annulment of wrongful decisions more difficult. Also, the review bodies 
are unlikely to give interim measures to suspend contractual performance, 
because of the inconvenience to the public of holding up the contract for a long 
period.28 The Member States have generally not taken the need for rapid relief 
seriously in their implementation of the Remedies Directives, and it may be 
doubted whether experience under the GPA will be any better.29 Accordingly, 
one would have thought it better to have removed the timetable for relief from the 
discretion of the GP A Parties or, at least to have provided some targets to be met. 
The difference of approach here between the Article :xx procedure and the 
elaborate system of deadlines operating under the DSU is notable. 
It might also be expected that willingness to litigate will depend upon the 
confidence which firms have in the independence of the review. Here, the GPA 
provides that challenges must be heard either by a, "court or by an impartial and 
independent review body with no interest in the outcome of the procurement and 
whose members are free from external influence during the term of 
appointment. ,,30 
27 See Directive 89/665 [1989] OJ. L395/33, dealing with remedies for enforcing the rules applying to 
the public sector, and Directive 92/13 [1992] O.J. L76/7 on remedies in the utilities sectors of water, 
transport, energy and telecommunications. 
28 For an indication of the approach of the Court of Justice here, Case 45/87, Commission v Ireland 
(Dundalk), [1988] E.C.R. 4929; Case 194/88R, Commission v Italy (La Spezia), [1988] E.C.R. 5647; 
Case C-87/94R, Commission v. Belgium ("Wallonian Buses"), [1996] E.C.R. 1-2043. 
29 See S. Arrowsmith, "Public Procurement: Example of a Developed Field of National Remedies 
Established by Community Law", in H.W. and N. Reich (eds.), Public Interest Litigation before 
European Courts 125 (Nomos; 1996). 
30 GPA Article XX:6. 
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There may be questions about what constitutes independence for a review body 
which is not a court. Given the nature of procurement disputes, which may often 
be politically sensitive, the appearance of independence of the review bodies will 
be essential to allay any fears of executive influence over decisions. Accordingly, 
while complete security of tenure in a body which is not a court will be 
impracticable for most GP A Parties, it is arguable that a period of appointment 
subject to approval, renewal or termination by the executive could infringe the 
requirement for independence. The same might be said of a review body staffed 
by employees of the state, which could infringe the requirement of detachment 
from external influence. 
Weaknesses in the enforcement mechanisms may also transpire from the GPA's 
failure to regulate certain common practices. An example here is that, no 
restrictions on cash settlements provided by the successful firm, in return for an 
undertaking by the unsuccessful firm to drop its suit against the procuring body 
are imposed. This would appear to leave the way open to collusive behaviour 
whereby firms could strongly influence the bidding process by pre-determining 
which bid is the most favourable for individual contracts.31 
c) Enhancement of challenge procedures through recourse to internally 
available remedies 
The system of remedies required to be provided under Article XX should be 
enhanced, through the ability of GP A providers to enforce the internally available 
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remedies of the Parties. Under the non-discrimination principle of Article ill, it is 
necessary that, for contracts covered by the GP A, suppliers should be able to 
enforce all the existing national procurement regulations on both remedies and 
procedure.32 This will be of little assistance to providers where they seek to 
challenge contract awards in states which have not already developed their 
remedies. It will only be possible to hold these states to the GPA's minimum 
standards. Even some of the major Parties to the GPA, such as Japan, lack a 
tradition of bid protest mechanisms.33 
Conversely, the Article ill obligation may be of considerable benefit to providers 
challenging decisions before EU review bodies for example. The GP A does not 
expressly require that review bodies must have the power to set aside unlawful 
decisions up to the point of contract award. It has been strongly argued above 
that review bodies must in fact be given the discretion to exercise this power, as a 
means of correcting the breach under Article XX:7(c). Any uncertainty here is 
however resolved where the complaint is brought before an EU review body, 
because of the clear treatment of this remedy in the directives. Thus Article 
31 See A. Mattoo, supra note for a full explanation of this practice and further details of weaknesses in 
the GPA. For an analysis of the possible responses to collusion among suppliers under the GPA, see 
Chapter 4. 
32 In the EU context, the ability of GP A suppliers to depend upon the internally available remedies 
systems may be limited by the fact that the Member States have done nothing to formally extend the 
benefits of the national remedies to GPA suppliers. Nevertheless, it may be that these failures in 
implementation will not deprive GPA suppliers of domestic remedies in the interim. The precise 
remedies available depend on whether the award procedures, the national challenge procedures and the 
non-discrimination principle resulting from GP A Article III have direct effect in the legal systems of the 
Member States. On these issues, see, D.D. Dingel, A Harmonization of the National JudicialReview of 
the Application of European Community Law (1999; Kluwer International); D.D.Dingel, "Direct Effect 
of the Government Procurement Agreement" (1996) 6 Public Procurement Law Review 245; G. 
Roebling, "Invoking the Agreement on Government Procurement", (1999) 4 Public Procurement Law 
Review 187. 
33See J.H. Grier, "Japan's Implementation of the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement" 
(1996) 17 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Business Law 605. 
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2(1 )(b) of the the Remedies Directive34 requires the Member States to provide 
their review bodies with the power: 
"either to set aside or ensure the setting aside of decisions taken unlawfully, 
including the removal of discriminatory technical, economic or financial 
specifications in the invitation to tender, the contract documents or in any other 
document relating to the contract award procedure". 
The Utilities Remedies Directive35 also requires the same power to be made 
available in its Article 2(1 )(b). Accordingly, an aggrieved GP A supplier could 
seek the removal of discriminatory conditions, or the annulment of a decision to 
award a contract in breach of the GP A, by relying on the national law 
implementing the Directives.36 The UK Regulations, for example, expressly 
confer on the court a power to "order the setting aside of [a] decision or action" 
where this is taken in breach of an enforceable duty,,/7 although set aside, as with 
all other forms of non-financial relief, is not available once a contract has been 
concluded. This limitation on available remedies, where the contract has been 
concluded is clearly contemplated by the Directives. Article 2(6) of the Remedies 
Directive leaves the remedies available after contract conclusion to be determined 
by national law. The same provision of the Utilities Remedies Directive is 
34 Remedies Directive 89/665 EEC [1989] OJ. L395/33. 
3S Utilities Remedies Directive 92/13 EEC [1992] OJ. L/76/14. 
36 Where national laws have not correclty implemented the Directives, it is arguable that GP A Article 
III requires that GP A suppliers should be able to invoke the Directives themselves before the review 
body. In other word, to the extent that EU suppliers would be able to rely upon the direct effect of 
incorrectly implemented Directives before these review bodies, it is arguable that GP A suppliers should 
also have the right to do so by virtue of the non-discrimination principle in GP A Article III. 
37 Works Regulation 31 (6)(b)( i); Supply Regulation 25 (5)(b )(i); Services Regulation 32 (5)(b )(i); 
Utilities Regulation 32 (5)(b)(i) 
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expressed in more explicit terms, and expressly permits Member States to retrict 
the remedy to damages where the contract has been concluded. 
A second area where the EU rules may provide for a stronger remedy than that 
which must be available under the GP A, is in relation to compensation for loss or 
damage suffered as a result of an infringement. A possible interpretation of the 
GPA's minimum requirement is that implementing legislation can limit to 
compensation for tender preparation or protest costs, even in response to serious 
breaches. In common with the GP A, the express requirements of the EU 
Directives also afford the Member States considerable discretion as to the amount 
of recoverable damages, and the conditions of recovery. Thus Article 2(1)( c) of 
the Remedies Directive, and Article 2(1)(d) of the Utilities Remedies Directive, 
merely provide that review bodies must have power to award damages to persons 
injured or harmed by an infringement. 
However, because of the broader legal context in which the procurement 
directives exist, there is little doubt that an EU Member State would be in breach 
of its Community obligations, if its national laws totally excluded damages for 
lost profits, or if this occurred in practice. 
Even though the directives do not set out the criteria on which damages must be 
calculated, their implementation into national law can still be measured against 
the principle of effectiveness.38 Unlike the general requirement in GPA Article 
38 On the principle of effectiveness, see most recently, T. Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law 
(1999; Oxford Univeristy Press) Chapter 8 and references cited therein. 
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XX:2 that national challenge procedures be effective, effectiveness has 
established connotations in EU law. From the relevant case law of the European 
Court of Justice on the national conditions governing actions for the protection of 
Community rights,39 it can be discerned that effectiveness firstly requires that the 
overall purpose of the Directive in question be ascertained. It is clear from the 
European Commission's Green Paper40 on procurement reform, and its follow-up 
Communication of March 1998,41 that it sees the purpose of the remedies 
directives as providing both a strong incentive for suppliers to challenge breaches 
of the rules, and a strong deterrent against non-compliance. Therefore, Member 
States choosing to limit available remedies to compensation where the contract 
has been concluded, must ensure that the remedy has a real deterrent effect,42 that 
the compensation paid must be adequate in relation to the damage suffered,43 and 
that the criteria do not render it virtually impossible, or excessively difficult to 
b . d 44 o tam amages. 
Taking these considerations into account, it is at least arguable that where the 
remedy is limited to damages, recovery for lost profits should be available upon 
the demonstration of an infringement of the directives, and of a realistic chance of 
39 See for example, Case 14/83 Von Colson and Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westaflen [1984] ECR 
1891; Case C-271191 Marshall v Southampton and South-West Area Health Authority [1993] ECR 1-
1476. 
40 Public Procurement in the European Union: Exploring the Way Forward COM (96) 583 fmal, 
paragraphs 3.37 and 3.38. 
41 Public Procurement in the European Union COM (98) 143. The Communication can be viewed on 
the SIMAP homepage at http://simap.eu.int. On the implications of the Communication, see S. 
Arrowsmith, "The Community's Legal Framework on Public Procurement: "The Way Forward" at 
last?" (1999) 36 Common Market Law Review 13. 
4 ~ ~ See for example, Case 14/83 Von Colson and Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westaflen [1984] ECR 
1891; Case C-271191 Marshall v Southampton and South-West Area Health Authority [1993] ECR 1-
1476. 
43 Ibid. 
44 See, for example, Joined Cases C-46 and C-48 Brasserie du recheur v Germany and the Queen v 
Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte F actortame Ltd. [1996] ECR 1-1029, para. 83. 
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winning the contract. The required deterrent effect, and incentive to challenge 
would seem to require this (or a similar) conclusion. IfEU suppliers can recover 
this measure of damages under this burden of proof, then GP A suppliers should 
also be able to claim compensation under the same conditions, by virtue of GP A 
Article m.45 The conclusion applies notwithstanding what the precise 
requirements of the GP A itself are. 
Given that the DSU cannot be expected to provide private entities with effective 
remedies, the domestic challenge procedures will be pivotal to the enforcement of 
GP A obligations, and overall confidence in the regime of regulated purchasing. 
The preferred analysis of Article XX presented above, would be capable of 
providing an effective framework of remedies. However on a different possible 
interpretation of the requirements of Article XX, it is also arguable that too much 
implementing discretion has been left to the Parties, and that a minimum 
implementation would leave a highly unsatisfactory system of national remedies. 
It is therefore regrettable that one can find this level of ambiguity in what is one 
of the GPA's most important provisions. Apart from differences in the actual 
remedies available, suppliers are also likely to encounter considerable differences 
in the speed and cost of national procedures. There is therefore rrom for concern 
over whether national procedures will be perceived by aggrieved providers as 
holding out a genuine chance of timely and effective remedies. 
45 It is notable that Article 2(7) of the Utilities Remedies Directive already pennits recovery of damages 
for bid preparation or participation costs, upon the fulfilment of this burden of proof. It may only be a 
matter of time before both remedies directives are changed to expressly pennit for the recovery of lost 
profits on the same burden of proof. This would remove any uncertainty caused by having to apply the 
principle of effectiveness. 
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The author would not wish to end this analysis of Article XX on a negative note 
however. The fact that the GP A makes any provision for national challenge 
procedures is a considerable achievement. Also the contribution which challenge 
procedures will make to the GPA's overall success, will depend far more on the 
commitment of the Parties to provide for effective procedures and remedies, and 
the willingness of suppliers to complain, than the precise requirements of Article 
xx itself. 
3. International and domestic dispute settlement procedures and the 
exhaustion of Local Remedies Rule46 
Under the GP A, both the challenge procedures before national courts and panel 
proceedings are mandated to examine a "breach of the Agreement". This raises 
the question of what the relationship between pronouncements of the panel and 
those of domestic review bodies should be for a disputed procurement which 
yields both types of action, and of whether the international law rule of 
exhaustion of local remedies is applicable. 
This rule holds that, until a foreign national has, within the limits of 
reasonableness and good faith, done everything within his power to obtain redress 
through the ordinary channels, his home state lacks the requisite legal interest in 
taking up the claim on the international level. Its rationale is to encourage states 
to provide effective national remedies and to avoid unnecessary international 
46 See R.SJ. Martha, "World Trade Disputes Settlement and the Exhaustion of Local Remedies Rule" 
(1996) 4 Journal of World Trade 107. 
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litigation. The rule does not apply where the local remedies are ineffective, or 
illusory or where the national action is futile. 
The rule of exhaustion of local remedies has found no application in the history of 
GATT dispute settlement practice. However, it has been suggested that its non 
application does not constitute proof that the rule has been dispensed with. 
Rather, its absence can be explained by the "interest structure" of traditional 
GATT obligations which have concerned the protection and enforcement of the 
rights and obligations of governments. Thus the obligations involved in dispute 
settlement under the GATT 1947, have not come within the sphere of application 
of the rule, which is understood by the International Law Commission to operate 
as a condition for the existence of a breach of an international obligation 
concerning the treatment of private parties.47 
Given that the Uruguay Round has introduced judicial remedies at the national 
level in relation to procurement, it is arguable that the nature of these obligations 
requires the local remedies rule to be applied. Yet the WTO Agreement contains 
no provision on whether or how the rule should operate. Credence is, however, 
given to the view that the rule ought not to be excluded for this reason by the 
ELSI case.48 Here the US argued before the International Court that if the parties 
had meant for disputes considered under the Treaty concerned of to require 
exhaustion of . local remedies, they would have explicitly so provided in the 
Treaty. This argument was rejected; the Court noting that is was, "unable to 
47 See the Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Twenty - Ninth Session, 9 
May- 29 July 1977, in ILC Yearbook, 1977, Vol. II, Part Two, Doc. Al32.10, p.40. 
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accept that an important principle of customary international law should have 
been tacitly dispensed with".49 
If the exhaustion rule does apply in principle, in what circumstances should it 
operate? Under the GPA, the same conduct that injures a State's national (failure 
to follow the award procedures or failure to implement GPA obligations) will 
usually also injure the state itself. Where the GP A Party seeks merely declaratory 
relief based on the Agreement's application and interpretation under the DSU, in 
relation to a dispute which is pending before a national court, then the rule 
probably does not apply. 50 However, if the State adopts the cause of its national 
and seeks a remedy for that national before the DSU, then the rule will apply.51 
Following ELSL the rule will also apply where the State pursues both objectives 
concurrently. 52 If the claim would not have been brought without the 
accompanying claim for the national's benefit, the DSU would probably make the 
State await the national's exhaustion of local remedies. 
It is therefore submitted that where there are alleged . breaches of the Agreement 
relating to specific procurements, an aggrieved supplier would have to exhaust 
the remedies available to him under the challenge procedure of the defendant 
State, before his home state would have the requisite legal interest to challenge 
the contract award under the DSU. 
48 United States v. Italy (Elettronica Sicula SpA) [1989] I.C.J. Rep. 15. 
4? Ibid at p.42. See M.H. Adler, "The Exhaustion of the Local Remedies Rule After the International 
Court of Justice's Decision in ELSI" (1990) 39 International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 641. 
50 See Swiss Confederation v. German Federal Republic [1958] 125 I.L.R. 38. 
51 See United States v. Switzerland (Interhandel) [1959] I.C.J. Rep. 6. 
52 In the case, the US sought both monetary redress for its injured national, and a claim for declaratory 
relieffor injuries allegedly suffered through breach of the Treaty. 
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The rule will not apply where national remedies are inadequate. For example, on 
a possible interpretation of the GP A the Parties may provide for compensation 
limited to tender costs as the ultimate remedy for aggrieved providers. 53 
However, it is unlikely that this would exclude the operation of the local remedies 
rule when the limitations on the internationally available remedies are considered. 
It will be recalled that any award of compensation under the DSD must be agreed 
consensually, so that it is difficult to regard a mandatory award of damages as 
inadequate even if limited to tender costs. In fact, findings that national remedies 
are futile have been of the rarest occurrence. In InterhandeZ54 , it was found that 
pursuit of a claim in a foreign court for 11 years was not a "futile" endevour. 
4. Alternative enforcement mechanisms 
The simplification and improvement of the Agreement currently underway as part 
of the built in review process under Article XXIV:755, has led the ED to suggest 
that attention should be directed towards providing an alternative to the existing 
enforcement mechanisms.56 The proposal has its origin in the early stages of the 
ED's initiative towards strengthening its own enforcement framework through the 
setting up of 'independent enforcement authorities' in each of the Member States. 
A new approach has been seen as necessary in the ED context because of the 
inadequacy of national review actions observed by the report on the economic 
S3 GPA Article XX:7(c). 
S4 See United States v Switzerland, supra note 51. 
ss On the simplification and improvement process, see Chapter p.22. 
S6 See the Working document on GP A Review of the Advisory Committee on the opening-up of public 
procurement, CCO/98/21-EN, pp.2-3. 
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impact of the EU procurement rules compiled by the EuroStrategy Consultants.57 
It was found that many Member States had failed to implement an effective 
system of remedies providing rapid relief for aggrieved firms. Given that Article 
xx relies on national challenge procedures as the principal means by which 
suppliers can obtain redress, the non-implementations of an adequate system of 
remedies is of equal concern in the GP A context. This is especially the case as 15 
of the existing 23 members are composed of the EU's Members States who will 
apply their own inadequate remedies systems to GP A covered disputes. 
There is of course much that can be done to strengthen existing national challenge 
procedures, quite apart from any need to introduce alternative mechanisms. The 
author has, for example, suggested that the Agreement presently affords the 
Parties too much discretion in the area of providing damages to aggrieved 
suppliers. Not only can damages (and indeed the only available remedy) arguably 
be limited to the costs for tender preparation or protest, but no guidance is given 
on the conditions under which damages may be available; in particular on how 
much of a chance of winning the contract the firm must demonstrate. Also no 
maximum time limits for the completion of challenge procedures are provided 
for. The problem here is that the longer the review process takes, the less likely 
the review body is to suspend the procurement process pending resolution of the 
dispute. Where it is not fair or practicable to grant interim relief due to the 
57 European Commission, "Study on the Impact and Effectiveness of the Internal Market", Chapter on 
public procurement. The results of the project are summarised in a Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, The Impact and Effectiveness of the Single 
Market COM (96)520 fmal (see pp.l6-17 on public procurement). See also H. Gordon, S. Rimmer and 
S. Arrowsmith, "The Economic impact of the European Union Regime on Public Procurement and 
Lessons in for the WTO" in S. Arrowsmith and A. Davies eds. Public Procurement: Global Revolution, 
27 (Kluwer Law International; 1998). 
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prolonged nature of the proceedings, entities will usually conclude contracts so 
that the setting aside of decisions later found to be unlawful, and recommencing 
the procurement process, become increasingly remote possibilities. 
a) The possible inadequacy of national challen2e procedures 
The EU's proposal is correctly motivated however by the feeling that actions 
before national courts to assess the legality of procedures, and provide remedies 
for breach, are unlikely to provide a complete answer to enforcement problems, 
even if challenge procedures were strengthened and properly implemented. There 
are several reasons for this observation. Firstly, challenge procedures involve a 
..... ---- ~ ~
significant amount of commitment on the part of the complaining entity seeking 
redress. Any redress which is obtained will be before a court or other 
independent body, possibly in a foreign state whose procedures are likely to be 
unfamiliar. Those suppliers that are aware of the obligations under Article XX, 
would be justified in asking themselves whether challenging a decision is really 
worth their effort, especially if the eventual remedy is unlikely to go beyond 
compensating them for the cost of their protest. This is especially the case as the 
knowledge of the national procedures accumulated through challenging 
aprocurement decision may not necessarily ever be used a second time. It can 
also be argued that the formality of national challenge procedures, and the 
adversarial process which may be encountered in some states, tends to militate 
against firms complaining about procurement decisions in the manner envisaged 
by Article XX. Many suppliers may also be reluctant to challenge entities for fear 
of being black listed in future contract awards, especially when government 
procurement is a significant source of their business. 
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There is a clear need therefore for at least discussions on possible alternative 
mechanisms to strengthen the enforcement process, and this need is arguably 
stronger under the GP A than it is in the EU context. In the EU the Commission 
can bring enforcement proceedings under Article 226 (formerly Article 169) of 
the Treaty against both Member States for their failure to properly implement 
GP A obligations, and against individual procuring entities for their failure to 
follow correct contract award procedures. In practice, the Commission can only 
use its powers sparingly, to attack major infringements involving the faulty 
implementation of the Directives, or serious infringements during the award of 
major contracts. One off infringements, relating to smaller contracts, such as use 
of discriminatory technical specifications, or refusal to accept correctly presented 
offers from foreign firms, cannot be routinely attacked under Article 226. This is 
because of limited manpower and the ineffectiveness of Article 226 proceedings 
in correcting minor breaches of procurement rules; the whole procedure takes on 
average 20 months to resolve.58 Notwithstanding these limitations however, the 
central role of the Commission does provide an extra layer of enforcement which 
the WTO cannot provide for. There follows an explanation of the possible roles 
of independent enforcement authorities, as derived from the pilot project currently 
underway within the EU. 59 
58 In the Green Paper on "Public Procurement in the European Union: Exploring the Way Forward 
(COM(96) 583 fmal) the Commission itself noted that it had, "neither the resources, nor the 
information, to identify and resolve every breach of Community rules throughout the E.U." and that, 
"(f)rom a practical point of view, the vast majority of individual problems encountered by economic 
operators should be tackled at national level" (point 3.42 at p.l6). On the effectiveness of the Article 
226 procedure for redressing breaches of the EU procurement rules, see J.M. Fernandez Martin, The 
EC Public Procurement Rules: A Critical Analysis (1996; Clarendon Press, Oxford) pp.146-169. 
59 For details on the pilot project, see the SIMAP home page at http://simap.eu.int. See also A. 
Haagsma, "The European Pilot Project on Remedies in Public Procurement" (1999) 2 Public 
Procurement law Review CS25. 
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b) The possible role of independent enforcement authorities 
The pilot project currently underway involves six of the EU Member States being 
Denmark, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Spain and the UK. Its intention as 
originally expressed was that the states should, "designate independent authorities 
with the task of identifying problems of interpretation and discussing the 
treatment of individual cases.,,60 The authorities would then "serve as contact 
points for the rapid, informal solution of problems encountered in gaining access 
to contracts, and could co-operate with each other and with the Commission.,,61 
As to the original conception of the role of the authorities, it is also notable that 
the Green Paper emphasised that the authorities should be "genuinely 
independent and have the power to require contracting entities to correct 
procedural errors.,,62 Since the launching of the pilot project on December 10, 
1998 some of the above objectives have been prioritised while others have not 
received the attention which one might have expected. In particular, it has been 
noted that the elements of co-operation and co-ordination have assumed primary 
importance, while the need for independence among the authorities has been 
largely ignored.63 
The co-ordination and co-operation objectives which underpin the pilot will serve 
a number of different objectives. The most prominent will be to identify methods 
to obtain reliable and speedy informal solutions to procurement market access 
60 Communication adopted by the Commission on 11 March 1988, doc. COM (1998) 143 fmal, point 
2.2.3. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Green Paper, supra note 58. 
63 A. Haagsrna, supra note 59. 
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problems. The procedure envisaged is that interested parties can complain to 
their home authorities who will then take up the complaint with the authority in 
the state of the awarding entity. One of the clear advantages of this procedure 
over Article XX is that the pilot recognises that suppliers are far more likely to 
complain to their local authorities than they are to initiate challenge proceedings 
before a foreign body on their own initiative. The potential for bringing breaches 
of the rules to light is therefore greatly increased. A further difference between 
Article XX and the pilot project is that the rules relating to standing will normally 
be more relaxed in the latter. Thus while access to national challenge procedures 
under Article XX can be restricted to suppliers with a past or present interest in 
the procurement, anyone may notify a complaint to Denmark's independent 
authority (The Danish Competition Authority) even if they lack the requisite legal 
interest to bring an action before the Complaints Board, which is the body 
designated for the purposes of Article XX. The Competition Authority is obliged 
to examine all complaints which are well founded. 
Where interested parties bring their complaints or observations to their home 
authority (or indeed directly to the authority of the awarding authority if so 
desired) the pilot requires that adequate resources be devoted to making 
immediate enquiries into the problem and to establish whether there is in fact a 
problem of market access. The investigating authority is also obliged to make 
their best efforts to pursue all reasonable sources of information, to complete their 
examination as quickly as possible, and to achieve a solution as soon as possible 
from the date of the complaint. 
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As to the achievement of solutions, it is important to note that any solutions 
reached will be based on a consensus between the authority dealing with the 
complaint and the entity concerned. The authorities are highly unlikely to have 
any powers to require entities to correct their mistakes or make any remedies 
available to aggrieved suppliers. In this respect, the possible adoption of a new 
enforcement mechanism is seen very much as an alternative to the formal 
challenge procedures under Article XX, or, in the EU context, a petition to the 
Commission to bring Article 226 enforcement proceedings. The non-availability 
of remedies ought not, however, be regarded as a disincentive towards the 
notification of complaints to authorities. If suppliers are confident that minor 
infringement, such as discriminatory qualification criteria or technical 
specifications, can be rapidly and informally corrected through an immediate 
complaint to their home authority then, their participation would not be 
prejudiced, and the need for recourse to the formality of challenge procedures 
would hopefully be avoided. 
Given that authorities will not have the power to order that any particular solution 
be reached, their success in remedying problems will be influenced by the 
dominant tradition of dispute resolution in individual states. Authorities are more 
likely to be able to reach appropriate solutions with entities in states with a 
tradition of informal dispute resolution, than those with a preference for 
adversarial court based proceedings. Also, the manner in which the authorities 
address their complaints to entities will have a strong bearing on their success. 
For example, in handling complaints against Danish entities, the Danish 
Competition Authority has generally found that its lack of default powers has 
353 
done little to weaken its role in safeguarding observance of the rules.64 It is 
believed that a large part of the explanation for the Authority's success has been 
its practice of thoroughly briefmg entities of its role in order to commence a 
process of constructive dialogue. Further more, an increasing proportion of 
complaints made to the Competition Authority are involving tenders in progress 
where contracts have not therefore been concluded. In these cases, the Authority 
has sought to safeguard the observance of the rules and the participation of 
suppliers by approaching entities on the same day as complaints are received. In 
the rare cases where the Authority's recommendations have not been accepted, 
this has been due to entities failing to understand the binding quality of 
procurement rules. 
As noted above, the designated authorities of the six EU member States 
participating in the pilot project cannot be regarded as independent from 
executive influence. Rather than create new independent authorities with 
responsibility in the procurement field, the participants have merely nominated 
existing bodies, which represents a considerable departure from the standard of 
genuine and unquestionable independence originally envisaged by the 
Commission. The non-independence of the existing authorities create the same 
concerns as noted earlier in the context of the independence of national review 
bodies under Article XX. In other words, the confidence of complaining 
suppliers would be likely to suffer where authorities are part of the state's 
administrative structure, where the possibility exists that they could be informed 
that a lenient view of a discriminatory procurement policy is required. However, 
64 See the SIMAP home page, supra note 59. 
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it is suggested that the establishment of independent authorities should perhaps be 
seen as the next objective beyond the three year duration of the current pilot. It is 
to be hoped in this regard that the positive experiences of the Danish Competition 
authority in dealing with domestic complaints can be replicated among the 
present EU participants. Serious consideration should then be given to the 
adoption of such an alternative mechanism at the WTO level. This would then 
allow advantage to be taken of the possibility of rapid and effective dispute 
resolution, without the significant commitment required of suppliers under 
Article XX proceedings. 
Conclusions 
The framework for enforcing GP A obligations may involve both the participation 
of individual firms, as well as the Parties to the Agreement and it is in the context 
of significant changes introduced by the Uruguay Round that such enforcement 
will occur. The DSU, while much strengthened, cannot be expected to be a 
source of effective remedies. While suppliers will play an important role in 
notifying complaints to their governments, it has been shown that the DSU is 
more suited to the settlement of intergovernmental disputes regarding the proper 
implementation of GP A obligations and their correct interpretation, than to 
providing timely and effective remedies to individual suppliers. Further, it has 
been shown that the changes introduced to the DSU by the GPA, (the Trondheim 
provision) are unlikely to have any material impact on the remedies available. 
The most that the DSB can do is to authorise consultations, and both the entering 
into consultations and any possible agreement must take place on a voluntary 
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basis. Limitations resulting from the GP A itself also restrict the possible result of 
authorized consultations. 
Accordingly, providers should place their reliance on the new domestic challenge 
procedure, which represents an important step forward. However the 
effectiveness of available remedies may vary considerably between states due to 
the level of discretion given to the Parties in implementing the general obligations 
provided for, and because of the lack of clarity over some aspects of the 
Contracting Parties' obligations. In this regard, the absence of, at least, a 
timetable for the complaint procedure is regrettable. There is also room for 
concern over whether challenge procedures can provide a complete answer to 
enforcement needs due to the level of commitment required of individual 
suppliers in initiating formal proceedings before unfamiliar bodies, and possible 
fears of being black listed for future awards. It is therefore suggested that the 
level of success of the EU's current pilot project directed towards the informal 
and rapid resloution of market access problems should be closely monitored by 
theWTO. 
The overall tenor of this Chapter must, however, be a positive one. The fact that a 
strengthened and innovative remedies system is now in place, is indicative of the 
belief of the negotiating Parties that procurement rules must be accompanied by 
such remedies if they are to be successful. The framework now established also 
provides a foundation for further strengthening of the remedies in future 
negotiating Rounds as GP A practice develops. For the present, it remains to be 
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seen what practical impact the rules described will have on enforcement under the 
mechanisms identified. 
Conclusion 
The non-tariff barrier to trade created by closed procurement markets has 
presented the WTO with some of the most intractable problems which it has 
faced. The political sensitivity of SUbjecting procurement activities to 
international competitive tendering, has led the GP A to retain its status as one of 
the few remaining plurilateral Agreements, despite the economic importance of 
the procurement function in all states. There is also no clearer an indication of 
the difficulty of persuading states to open their procurement markets, than the 
launch of a major new initiative towards introducing transparency based 
obligations in the procurement field, as an alternative regulatory approach on a 
multilateral footing. One can only speculate, however, as to the likely content of 
any new Agreement which may emerge from the study which is presently 
underway. It can also be noted that it is not, at present, any part of the study's 
mandate to produce an Agreement which will replace the GP A. For the present 
and foreseeable future, therefore, the GP A will remain the most important 
initiative for the liberalisation of international procurement markets. This thesis 
has questioned the likely prospects for the GP A in achieving its market opening 
objectives. 
The most significant problem which procurement regulation at the WTO level 
faces is the GPA's limited membership. For the most part the WTO members 
have taken full advantage of the GPA's plurilateral status to the extent that only 
27 of the 134 WTO Members have acceded to the GP A. Many existing members 
have entered into regional or bilateral procurement agreements independently of 
their GP A membership. For these Members, it is arguable that the Agreement 
has had only a limited impact beyond further formalising the obligations already 
entered into, and requiring states to open some of their procurement to an 
extended list of states. Given the present membership situation, it can be 
observed that the GPA is not capable of making a significant contribution to 
opening up procurement markets among the WTO Members. Part I of this thesis 
has therefore investigated the principal reasons for the reluctance of states to 
accede to the GP A, and questioned whether realistic solutions to the problem of 
limited membership can be proposed. 
A key part of the explanation for the GPA's limited membership is that non-
members desire to retain their ability to use their procurement power for 
secondary purposes beyond the selection of suppliers, and -the purchase of goods 
and services on commercial criteria alone. Thus it has been shown that 
procurement can be used as an instrument of social, economic or environmental 
policy, as well as a possible means of strengthening competition and trade laws 
and policies. From the point of view of GP A membership, such secondary uses 
of procurement power are problematic in that they frequently involve the unequal 
treatment of suppliers, (or at least the possibility of their unequal treatment) 
thereby potentially breaching the obligations of non-discrimination which 
underpin the Agreement. 
In addition, it has been shown that many secondary uses of procurement will 
often be incompatible with the GP A even where those policies are capable of 
operating compatibly with the non-discrimination requirements. In particular the 
prohibition on offsets contained in Article XVI operates to preclude secondary 
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policies of an external nature, even if the non-discriminatory operation of those 
policies could be objectively demonstrated. It has therefore been argued that 
consideration should be given to relaxing the prohibition on offsets to the extent 
that the non-discriminatory treatment of suppliers could be demonstrated. This is 
one of the respects in which the introduction of a validation mechanism for 
secondary policies could play an important role in balancing the demands of non-
discriminatory treatment with the desire of states to retain their secondary uses of 
procurement. 
A further point of difficulty, however, is that where the discriminatory effect of 
secondary policies are reduced or removed, their utility for achieving their 
objectives at the national level may also be greatly reduced. It has been 
suggested that giving all suppliers the opportunity to meet the specified 
requirements on their own territories could reduce the discriminatory effect of 
certain secondary policies. Thus an obligation to engage the long-term 
unemployed on a construction project could be met by all suppliers without any 
discriminatory effects. However, it is clear that any benefits created by the policy 
at the national level, will be limited when procuring entities are not free to 
routinely place contracts with domestic firms. It is therefore the practice of 
favouring national suppliers which makes procurement a potentially useful (if 
inefficient) instrument for the achievement of secondary objectives. 
There is therefore a more difficult and fundamental question than whether the 
prohibition on offsets should be relaxed where the non-discriminatory operation 
of secondary policies can be demonstrated. This is whether the GPA's current 
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insistence on non-discriminatory treatment should itself be relaxed in the interests 
of increased membership. This is a most difficult issue not least because various 
of the other WTO Agreements are also underpinned by obligations of non-
discrimination. A section of Chapter 3 was therefore devoted to analysing what 
kind of treatment as between national and foreign suppliers Article III of the GP A 
requires, with reference to the Panel interpretations of the corresponding 
provisions contained in Article 111:4 of the GATT. Given the prevalence of these 
provisions in the WTO Agreements, and the emphasis which has been placed on 
their strict interpretation, there would have to be convincing reasons for departing 
from the standards currently required in the procurement context by Article III of 
the GP A. On balance, however, it is submitted that there are a number of reasons 
why the GPA's emphasis on non-discriminatory treatment should be relaxed. 
In the first place, GP A Members are permitted to pursue discriminatory policies 
where the procurement has been excluded from coverage by means of negotiated 
derogations. This is the approach which the GP A presently takes to balancing the 
demands of its obligations with the reality of limited membership. The negative 
consequence of this approach is that the coverage of the Agreement varies 
considerably as between any two Members depending on the outcome of the 
bilateral accession negotiations between them. 
It has been argued that an alternative approach of allowing states to transitionally 
pursue discriminatory policies subject to the safeguards provided by the adoption 
of a validation mechanism of the kind described in Chapter 3, would be a more 
appropriate way of building flexibility into the GP A. It would permit states to 
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pursue discriminatory policies even where the procurement is covered by the 
GP A. The need for bilateral negotiations on coverage would then be reduced, 
and moves could then be made towards the uniform coverage of the Agreement 
for all Members. The validation mechanism could also play the important role of 
requiring states to justify their secondary uses of procurement, which could be 
done according to a principle of proportionality as described in Chapter 3. A 
principal benefit of the validation process could then be to gradually educate 
states that procurement is generally not an efficient instrument for the pursuit of 
secondary policies. 
It is suggested that this possible alternative approach could have a significant 
positive effect on increasing membership by removing the perception that 
procurement covered by the GP A must immediately be subject to a regime of 
international competitive tendering on a non-discriminatory basis. The author is 
not convinced however that the compromise advocated in the preceding 
paragraphs would necessarily be enough to dramatically increase the GPA's 
membership. However, it is considered that any further a departure from the non-
discrimination principle would effectively amount to an abandonment of the 
existing Agreement and its replacement with a qualitatively different instrument. 
It is not suggested that this should be regarded as an appropriate step. Rather, it 
is concluded that the possible adoption of a new transparency based agreement 
should be regarded as the appropriate instrument for the multilaterlisation of 
procurement disciplines at the WTO level. Such an agreement would probably 
only provide for certain fundamental obligations relating to the clarity and 
predictability of national rules along with a requirement that the content of all 
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laws and practices In the procurement field (including the content of 
discriminatory policies) be published. 
A transparency based agreement could be viewed as a stepping stone to 
membership of the existing GP A. At the same time, the relaxation of the non-
discrimination requirement, through the adoption of a validation mechanism, 
could be seen as a means of easing the transition from the limited obligations of a 
transparency agreement, to the rigours of GP A membership. The author would 
also suggest, however, that states could be entirely satisfied with the level of 
market opening brought about by the multilateral, but limited disciplines of any 
agreement emerging from the WTO's present study. If a transparency agreement 
ever does come to fruition, the possibility must be contemplated that it would 
signal the death-knell of the GP A, and hence the abandonment of an approach to 
regulation based on detailed rules to promote non-discriminatory access to 
procurement markets. Developments in the forthcoming years will, therefore, 
indicate just how dramatic a transitional period in the area of regulated 
procurement the WTO is presently going through. 
While most of the thesis has been devoted to analysing the rights and obligations 
of governments, and procuring entities, Chapter 4 turned to consider how some 
aspects of supply side behaviour could affect the Agreement's operation. It is 
clear that collusion among suppliers can have a direct impact on the Agreement's 
success. Even if entities allow suppliers to participate on a non-discriminatory 
basis, any benefits of such broad participation to national and global economies, 
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would be likely to be defeated where pnce fixing removes any genume 
competition among firms. 
The GP A can be regarded as deficient in its treatment of collusive practices 
however. Aside from Article XV: 1 (a) which permits the use of limited tendering 
when collusive tenders are received, there is no reference to how firms suspected 
of collusion should be dealt with. The author has therefore suggested a range of 
possible responses which existing provisions provide for. While there would 
appear to be considerable scope for entities to take action against participating 
firms under the qualification and public interest provisions, concrete guidance on 
the appropriate responses to collusion would be most welcome however. 
Chapter 4 has also dealt with the possible responses to tenders which are low by 
reason of dumping and subsidisation practices. Thus it has been questioned 
whether the GP A's rules can be used to reinforce national trade laws which deal 
with these practices. This is an important question since any limitations on the 
pursuit of trade policies under the GP A can be regarded in the same light as the 
limitations on the secondary uses of procurement which were considered in 
Chapter 3. In other words, the strengthening of trade and competition policies 
(along with social, economic and environmental policies) are among the 
secondary uses which can be made of procurement power, and the present lack of 
acceptance of these limitations is a large part of the explanation for the GP A's 
limited membership. 
364 
The GP A should not be interpreted as pennitting a broad scope for the 
strengthening of trade policies against dumping and subsidisation. This is 
because any other interpretation would lead to considerable conflict between the 
GPA and the WTO Dumping and Subsidies Codes. This is not, however, 
considered to be a deficiency of the GP A in any way. This is principally because, 
the ability to use procurement power to strengthen trade policies is lost by reason 
of WTO membership, and binding nature of the Dumping and Subsidies Codes, 
rather than through GP A accession. The situation is therefore rather different 
than the limitations which the GP A itself imposes on the pursuit of the social and 
economic policies described in Chapter 3. 
Beyond the question of whether the GP A will have a significant impact on 
opening up procurement markets among the WTO Members generally, Part II of 
this thesis has questioned whether the Agreement is likely to be successful among 
its existing Members. In the absence of specific evidence on any impact the GP A 
may have had on increasing cross-border participation, and reducing 
discriminatory practices, the author has focused on two controversial and distinct 
subject areas, raising problems and challenges which are likely to emerge as 
barriers to the Agreement's success. The issues which are analysed can be seen 
as relevant not only to the prospects of the existing GP A, but also from the 
perspective of the content of any new procurement instrument emerging from the 
WTO's present study. Given that a Working Group is presently investigating the 
possibility of introducing limited, but multilateral disciplines in the procurement 
area, the nature of the challenges and problems identified, and the possible 
responses to them, are relevant to all existing and future WTO Members. 
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Chapter 5 began the examination of the GPA's prospects by analysing the 
potential uses of Infonnation and Communication Technologies (ICTs) for 
streamlining procurement processes, and contributing towards the GP A's market 
opening objectives. In many respects, there is no doubt that the use of ICTs, can 
enhance the benefits of GP A membership. The operation of existing procedures 
via electronic means has the potential to facilitate both the identification of 
procurement opportunities, and the retrieval of tender documentation. Supplier 
awareness of national and cross-border procurement opportunities could be 
enhanced, thereby contributing towards the price savings which membership of 
the GP A, is capab!e of achieving. 
The use of ICTs is unlikely, however, to markedly enhance the benefits of GP A 
membership at least in the short to medium tenn. This is primarily due to the 
emphasis which governments have naturally placed on streamlining procurement 
processes at national and regional levels. To date, these developments have done 
little to make procurement opportunities covered by the GP A easier to discover. 
Thus national and regional databases do not at present earmark contracts covered 
by the GP A in such a manner as to clearly indicate to foreign suppliers that their 
participation is pennitted, and their non-discriminatory treatment required. 
The frequently cited benefit of ICT implementation in increasing SME 
involvement is likely to prove illusory for the foreseeable future. It is the larger 
established finns, with access to the necessary ICT expertise, and the desire to 
serve international procurement markets, who will be in the strongest position to 
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exploit the newly increased availability of procurement information. There are 
therefore legitimate concerns that leTs will widen the gap between established 
government suppliers, and suppliers who face difficulties in the identification of 
procurement opportunities and the preparation of tenders to the required standard. 
While much procurement information will be available for free over the Internet, 
procurement information will also become a tradable commodity. The quality of 
information available to suppliers will depend on the level of services which are 
purchased from Value Added Networks or equivalent information providers. It is 
those suppliers which currently serve government markets that are likely to be in 
the best position to absorb the costs of the more sophisticated services on offer, 
and which will therefore be the most responsive to procurement needs. 
The role of the WTO as moves are made towards fully electronic procurement 
will be rather limited, due to the speed of national and regional developments and 
the impossibility of re-commencing this process according to agreed common 
principles. In order to safeguard the GP A's relevance, the WTO will need to 
emphasise the importance of ensuring that electronically available procurement 
information can be accessed by all suppliers having access to commercially 
available leT tools. 
While agreement on such a policy among the GP A Members would do much to 
promote the broad inclusion of suppliers, it would not prevent the rapid 
implementation of leTs in such a manner as to result in de facto discrimination 
against those suppliers not having access to the necessary technology. An 
internationally recognised timetable for the iinplementation of leTs and the 
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phasing out of paper based fonns of communication could, therefore, do much to 
minimise the effects of such discrimination. The need for such a timetable is 
becoming increasingly urgent; the EU already having phased out the hard copy 
publication of tender notices and Periodic Indicative Notices. 
While the GP A can be interpreted as pennitting the use of the new purchasing 
medium provided by electronic catalogues, it is arguable that the mechanisms 
described do not pennit sufficient flexibility to fully exploit the potential savings 
available. With greater flexibility however, comes legitimate concern over how 
to safeguard the non-discriminatory treatment of suppliers and the transparency 
of contract awards. The question of how these conflicting interests should be 
reconciled requires the WTO' s direct attention. 
The potential benefits of ICTs ought not at present be held out as a means of 
increasing the GPA's contribution to increasing international competition in 
procurement markets. It remains to be seen whether GP A covered opportunities 
will become any more accessible than they presently are, and how suppliers will 
respond to the increased infonnation potentially available to them. 
Chapter 6 began with the proposition that a strong system of remedies and 
enforcement capable of ensuring the proper implementation of the Agreement, 
and of being responsive to the needs of aggrieved suppliers, will be crucial to the 
GPA's success. The achievements of the Uruguay Round in strengthening the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), as well as the GPA's requirement to 
provide aggrieved suppliers with access to national challenge procedures, will go 
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a long way towards ensunng the Agreement's proper implementation and 
application. 
The DSU will provide a valuable tool for the settlement of inter-governmental 
disputes regarding the proper implementation of the GPA's obligations and their 
correct and consistent interpretation. However, supplier involvement in inter-
governmental dispute settlement will be limited to notifying complaints to their 
governments. The DSU should not be regarded as an appropriate instrument for 
the provision of timely and effective remedies for aggrieved suppliers. Suppliers 
will however have a role in safeguarding the proper implementation of the GP A. 
This will be through challenging individual decisions made under unlawful 
legislation. This process will, however, take place under the national challenge 
procedures rather than under the DSU. 
Article XX, which requires the Members to provide an independent forum before 
which individual aggrieved suppliers can bring their complaints, is strongly 
indicative of a belief that procurement rules must by backed up by timely and 
effective remedies if they are to achieve their market opening objectives. It is a 
difficult question, however, as to whether Article XX goes far enough to secure 
the confidence of suppliers in the remedies which are likely to be available to 
them at the national level. Chapter 6 has drawn attention to the apparent short 
comings of Article XX. The provision arguably affords the Parties too much 
discretion in the area of providing damages to aggrieved suppliers. On a possible 
interpretation of Article XX, Members can limit the only available remedy to the 
costs for tender preparation or protest. Also, no guidance is given on the 
369 
conditions under which damages may be available; in particular on how much of 
a chance of winning the contract the firm must demonstrate. 
The absence of maximum time limits for the completion of challenge procedures, 
and the difference of approach here between Article XX and DSU is also notable. 
The problem here is that the longer the review process takes, the less likely the 
review body is to suspend the procurement process pending resolution of the 
dispute. Where it is not fair or practicable to grant interim relief due to the 
prolonged nature of the proceedings, entities will usually conclude contracts so 
that the setting aside of decisions later found to be unlawful, and recommencing 
the procurement process, become increasingly remote possibilities. 
The level of discretion afforded by Article XX has the advantage that it is easy to 
'sell' such limited minimum obligations to non-members. Given the problem of 
limited membership this must be regarded as an important concern at the present 
time. However, among the present Members, Article XX cannot be regarded as 
going far enough to deter breaches of the Agreement, and encourage suppliers to 
attack those breaches which they detect. This problem is ameliorated to some 
extent by the effect of GP A Article III which requires that all the benefits of the 
remedies which are available to national suppliers, must be extended to all other 
GP A suppliers, where the complaint relates to a contract which is covered by the 
Agreement. However, while this is almost certainly a correct interpretation of 
Article Ill's requirements, tensions will inevitably result from suppliers 
demanding remedies from foreign review bodies, which are not available before 
their own courts. The effect of Article III, is therefore a far from satisfactory 
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solution to strengthening the limited remedies which must be made available by 
Article xx. 
The limited nature of the remedies which must be provided under Article XX, 
reflects the understandable desire of the WTO to spread the GPA's broader 
disciplines to a greatly extended list of signatories, before moving towards 
strengthened compulsory requirements in the field of remedies. Article XX will 
contribute towards the success of the Agreement among the present Members, 
although it would need to be strengthened, in the ways which have been 
suggested by this thesis, in order to have a pronounced impact in this regard. 
Chapter 6 has also drawn attention to mounting concerns that actions before 
national courts to assess the legality of procedures are unlikely to provide a 
complete answer to enforcement problems, even if challenge procedures were to 
be strengthened. The formality of challenge procedures, the unfamiliarity of 
suppliers with different procedures operated by each of the Members and a fear 
of 'biting the hand that feeds', may militate against frequent recourse to Article 
xx. The possibility of introducing independent enforcement authorities which 
would co-operate with suppliers, and with each other has therefore been raised by 
the ED, whose pilot project in this area is currently underway. Such authorities 
would be capable of removing much of the burden of seeking redress from 
suppliers themselves, and of taking immediate action (before the conclusion of 
contracts) in order to safeguard the participation of suppliers. The progress of the 
ED's pilot will undoubtedly be closely monitored by the WTO, and consideration 
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should be gIven to the potential advantages of independent enforcement 
authorities among the GP A Members. 
The question posed at the beginning of this thesis was whether the GP A will 
make a significant contribution to opening up procurement markets at the 
international level. The current GP A is a much strengthened instrument over its 
Tokyo Round predecessor, with its extension to services contracts, and the 
introduction of national challenge procedures. However, its continued limited 
membership means that the existing Agreement is not capable of significantly 
contributing to the liberalisation process. There are ways of relaxing the existing 
barriers to expanded membership. However, the author is not convinced that the 
suggestions made would have a marked impact on boosting membership. It can 
also be suggested that many WTO Members will now be inclined to delay their 
membership decisions until it is clear what kind of strategy and direction will be 
taken towards the multilateralisation of procurement disciplines. WTO Members 
will naturally want to understand what kind of residual role (if any) the existing 
GP A will play, should the current study towards transparency based disciplines 
lead to any new procurement initiatives. 
If the existing GP A cannot be expected to open up procurement markets among 
the WTO Members generally, what of its prospects of success among its existing 
Members? The conclusions here are largely positive. It can be expected that 
leTs will do much to streamline procurement processes even though 
developments are currently firmly focused at the national and regional levels. 
The system of enforcement and remedies currently provided for represents a 
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crucial first step in this area. The WTO will undoubtedly monitor the level of 
success achieved at national and inter-governmental levels with the view of 
strengthening existing mechanisms and the possible adoption of new alternative 
mechanisms. 
Ultimately however, it is against the objective of introducing a multilateral 
framework of transparent and non-discriminatory laws and procedures, that the 
GPA's prospects for success must be measured. Regardless of its precise form 
and content, it will not achieve these objective unless the general WTO 
membership can be persuaded that the national and global economic benefits 
brought about by non-discriminatory treatment, outweigh the benefits of retaining 
considerable discretion in the placement of contracts. 
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